

ETHICS FOR TODAY

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W. P. 1

MADE IN U. S. A.

PREFACE

Why another text in the field of ethics? New methods of thinking, and new and unique problems of conduct are facing men today. There is a growing familiarity with, and reliance upon, experimental methods of studying human behavior. Our rapidly changing conditions of living are also creating new problems, especially in our group relationships. Ethics is concerned with these problems of man's adjustment to the actual conditions in the midst of which he lives.

This text aims to present the field of ethics for those students who take only one course in ethics. The section given to historical material and to theories of morality covers only that part which appears to be essential for an understanding of present theories and problems. In addition to the more standard material, the book attempts to link ethics more definitely with the work on human behavior that has been carried on in the various sciences in recent years. It also opens up for students the important field of professional and business ethics. The author feels that a text which fails to acquaint students with the problems which they are to face almost immediately in the professional and business world is inadequate. The problems which seem pressing to students are very practical ones, rather than the more speculative questions of the philosophers. Questions and Exercises, which include a large variety of cases where such are applicable, are provided for discussion. For the most part these problems and cases have been taken from actual situations of modern life.

Since the book has been written for the beginning student, it does not attempt to elaborate every issue which might be of interest to the mature philosopher. The division of the work into six parts, however, will enable teachers more easily to add to, or to omit entirely, particular sections.

The various texts which the author has used and discussed with his classes have undoubtedly influenced him both in thought and in language a great deal more than he is aware. Numerous acknowledgments to these and other works have been made throughout the book.

My first obligation is to my wife, Pauline Parry Titus, who has read and criticized the entire manuscript, and who has made numerous im-

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INTRODUCTION

DECISIONS must be made continually by all normal persons. You had to decide whether or not you were going to college, and if so, to which college you were going. Probably this was simply a matter of choice and did not involve a question of right or wrong. However, many decisions which we have to make do involve such a question. Suppose you have an opportunity to secure a position during the summer vacation which will pay practically all of your expenses for the next year. You feel that the work which you will be required to do is wrong. You also think that it is the only means by which you will be able to secure sufficient money for your expenses the following year. Would you be justified in accepting the position? This is obviously a question in which you have to consider what is right. Some decisions are easily made because there is no question as to what is the right thing. For instance, deliberate lying and stealing are known to be wrong by practically everyone. On the other hand, nearly every person would agree that courtesy and friendliness are right. There are, however, many issues which seem involved and which cannot be decided quickly and easily. What shall be the basis for judgment in such cases? A part of our problem is to answer such questions as these. Consider, for example, the following problems of conduct, thinking each one over carefully, and deciding what would be the right thing to do and why:

1. A student who has been working hard and conscientiously at his studies has been getting only mediocre grades. He is eager to make good grades because he wants to repay his parents for the real sacrifice which they are making to keep him in college. He realizes that he is getting lower grades because many of the other members of his class are copying or receiving illegitimate help, thus forcing down the grades of those who are not cheating. Shall he accept the lower grades and say nothing? Shall he report to the professor that the others are cheating? Shall he himself indulge in copying?

2. A baseball player, who is a center fielder, stopped a fly ball just on the surface of the ground. He had really not caught the ball. However, no one except himself knew whether he had caught the ball in his hands or stopped it as it hit the ground. The umpire called the batter out and the batter's team lost the game, which was a critical game in the contest for the pennant. Shall the center fielder let it be known that the ball was not caught? Shall he accept the umpire's decision, whether it is favorable or unfavorable to his team, and remain silent?

3. A business man is confronted with a scheme whereby he will be able to make a large sum of money within a comparatively short time. The scheme, he frankly admits to himself, is morally wrong, but it is possible to carry it out without actually violating the law. He thinks of three or four splendid projects, including a library for his alma mater for which he would use a considerable portion of the money. This would bring credit to him and also serve other worthy causes. Shall he seize the opportunity which is before him to make the money?

4. A young woman who is a domestic servant in a family in the community calls to see the local physician. He finds that she is suffering from a communicable skin disease. If the family is informed she will undoubtedly lose her position. Since the young woman is unwilling to make the facts known, is it the doctor's duty to tell her mistress?

5. The members of the executive board of a corporation are anxious to show larger earnings for their company which is now making moderate profits. They control very largely the milk supply and hence the price of milk in the city in which they do business. They are contemplating raising the price of milk two cents a quart. While this will mean greater profits, it will also mean a reduced consumption of milk in the city. One of their members who does not favor the proposed action points out the fact that the higher price and the reduced consumption of milk will mean that some babies will die in that city who otherwise would live. Shall the decision be influenced by considerations of social welfare or only by those of business interests?

MORAL JUDGMENTS

These are the types of problems that are inescapable in present-day life. There is this ever-present necessity of moral judgment. As previously stated, some acts are practically universally disapproved. Other acts receive widespread approval. Still others are subjects for discussion and controversy. Wherever human groups are found, some practices are approved and others are disapproved. The practices which are approved are those which are considered desirable, and these are called right. The practices which are believed to be undesirable are called wrong. This problem of conduct, which has been so persistent in the history of the race, has taken on the name morality. Consciously or unconsciously men have been trying to discover the kind of life which is most worth living.

Obviously moral judgments do not apply to all behavior. Such judgments are not ordinarily passed upon the happenings or processes of inanimate nature, nor upon the behavior of animals. The exceptions to this will be found in figures of speech, or where nature is personified through poetic imagination. In a more positive sense, moral judgments are applied to the actions of human beings, and in particular to the voluntary acts of human beings.

Men are continually expressing judgments concerning their own conduct and that of their fellowmen. Some acts are praised and are called right or good; other acts are condemned and are called wrong or evil. We shall not stop at this point to consider the fundamental difference between right and wrong, but merely to point out the universality of such judgments.

An examination of popular usage will indicate that the adjective "moral" is used in at least two different senses. Sometimes it is used in a narrow sense as the contradictory of the term "immoral." In this sense good and right choices are moral, while bad and wrong choices are immoral. Sometimes the term is used in a wider sense as the contradictory of the term "nonmoral" (or unmoral or amoral). Here the term includes all cases where the moral issue is involved whether the act is approved or disapproved. There is a clear recognition that many of our actions are outside the realm of moral judg-

ment. These might have been performed, or omitted, or performed in a different way, without any moral issue being raised. For example, it is not a moral issue whether I take lemon or sugar in my tea, or whether I go out the front door or the side door in leaving my home.

In our study, we shall use the term "moral" as the contradictory of nonmoral, and not as necessarily implying our approval. Thus the term will include right moral conduct and wrong moral conduct. The word comes from the Latin word *mos* (plural *mores*) which means custom or way of life. The related term, "ethics," is derived from the Greek word *ethos* which also means custom or character. Both terms refer to that type of behavior which tends to become customary, because of the approval or the practices of the group. The terms morals and ethics are thus essentially synonymous. However, morals and morality ordinarily refer to the conduct itself, while ethics and ethical ordinarily suggest the study of moral conduct or the system or the code which is followed. For example, we usually speak of an ethical system or code, and a moral act or a moral man. Ethics attempts to determine what conduct is good and what is bad, or what ought to be approved and what disapproved. It undertakes to furnish a standard for distinguishing between a better character and a worse one. Ethics is a normative study of the principles underlying the desirable types of human conduct.

ETHICS AS A SCIENCE

Is ethics a science? The answer to this question depends very largely upon one's definition of a science. If the term "science" is used in a broad sense meaning "any body of facts in a particular sphere classified and systematized," then ethics could be called a science. If the term is used, as in the physical sciences, to mean knowledge which can be stated in quantitative or in mathematical terms, then ethics is not a science. Most sciences are concerned with studying and describing the uniformities of nature or of experience. Interest is directed toward origins and causes, and whatever activity is present is carefully described, and if possible explained. The fact that ethics

is concerned with the ends or ideals or values involved in certain forms of activity distinguishes it from the natural sciences. Ethics asks what is the value of an activity or a thing. It is the science of what is morally right. The interest is in discovering what *ought* to be, not merely in discovering what *is*. Consequently, ethics is a normative and not merely a descriptive science. Ethics asks what purpose the facts serve in human life. It is sometimes said that "to know what exists" is natural science; "to know what matters" is ethics.

Since ethics attempts to determine the goal or goals of true living and to point men to the means for attaining these goals, any facts concerning life and human conduct are valuable. While life is a unit, conduct may be studied from many different angles. A knowledge of the physical laws and processes of the universe enables man to predict more accurately the effect of various kinds of conduct. The moral life of man is also biologically conditioned. His organic needs and drives must be satisfied, directed, and integrated, if they are to be aids and not hindrances to the good life. A knowledge of the psychological and social sciences is essential for an intelligent understanding of the moral problems of the individual and of the race. The good life must be lived within definite personal and social relationships, and moral judgments are bound up with social processes as they actually exist.

REASONS FOR A STUDY OF ETHICS

We live in a world where we must not only make decisions, but where there are right ways and wrong ways of doing things. There are right ways and wrong ways of treating a sick man, of building a bridge, of making a will, and of driving an automobile. There are also right ways to attain the values of life. Ethics should make clear to us why one act is better than another. Ethics is the study which deals with human conduct insofar as this conduct may be considered right or wrong. This is the most important field of human knowledge. Professor Urban says, "It is possible for a man to be very keen in business, or his technical field, but be very stupid about the values of life. In other words there are also right and

wrong ways of doing things in the larger relations of life, in the business of living itself, and it is with these that ethics is concerned."¹

In the second place, in order to have any wholesome social life we must have agreements, understandings, principles, or rules of procedure. Ethics seeks the most intelligent principles of behavior, or the principles which will make life most wholesome. In every department of life we develop ways of procedure to which we refer individual cases. Any co-operative group activity is founded upon conventions, customs, and agreements. These may be conscious and very much in evidence, or they may be imbedded in the habits of the members and be more or less unconscious.

To some persons morality seems to be mere convention and a thing extraneous to their own desires. To such persons morality may seem to be a necessary evil or something from which they would like to escape if they could. Such an attitude may be due to a failure to realize that morality is simply the best way of living under existing conditions, or it may be due to the fact that the moral codes of the day need to be revised to meet the present needs of life. Morality must not be a mere matter of inheritance, of convention, of impulse or emotion. Men must come to see the naturalness and desirability of a moral code which is the result of applying their intelligence to the facts of life and human experience.

In the third place, moral conduct and ethical systems, both of the past and of the present, must be intelligently appraised and criticized. In the moral development of the race, guides and checks have been built up for conduct. These have expressed themselves outwardly in conventions, customs, legal and ecclesiastical laws, and rules and codes of various kinds. They have also expressed themselves inwardly in the sense of duty or the conscience of the individual, in shame and remorse, in praise and blame, and in contentment and dissatisfaction. These outward and inward guides and checks must be intelligently criticized. Some of them express the needs of man, some of them do not. Some of them are aids to wholesome living today. Others are quite definitely hindrances.

¹W. M. Urban, *Fundamentals of Ethics*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1930, p. 4.

Finally, ethics seeks to point out to men what are the true values of life. Ethics asks and attempts to answer such questions as: What values are most worth while? Why is one act better than another? No person can live a satisfactory life who has not set up for himself some scale of values. Ethics is a study of human values. It attempts to stimulate the moral sense, to discover the true values of life, and to inspire men to join in the quest for these values.

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Part One

EVOLUTIONARY AND THEORETICAL
BACKGROUNDS OF MORALITY

Chapter I

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY

A STUDY OF the earlier stages of moral development is important. A knowledge of the evolution of morality, in addition to satisfying our curiosity regarding the past, gives us a clearer understanding of the nature of morality. Morality will be seen, not as something artificial or apart from the problem of living, but as growing out of the conditions of life itself. The origin and development of morality is not more difficult to understand than the origin and development of social life, of intelligence, or of religion. Its development is closely connected with the general development of social life and social institutions. Conduct, like all other aspects of human life, will be found to have undergone a gradual process of development, both in the individual and in the race as a whole.

Moral standards vary from the traditional customs followed by the partly conscious primitive man to the carefully reasoned theory of life of the most mature modern man. This fact of the dynamic, progressive nature of morality can be most vividly grasped only as we trace the actual development of moral conduct and moral judgments. The moral standards of men depend upon the stage of social development, upon the level of intelligence, and upon the knowledge which is available at the time.

A knowledge of the evolution of morality also gives us a clearer understanding of human nature. There is a tendency for men to think that "what is, is a part of nature" and therefore it must continue to be as it is. A study of the past will indicate that "human nature" has changed and adapted itself to conditions. If man has made progress in the past, there is reason to feel confident that he will be able to do so in the future. A study of the practices and beliefs of the past will give a clearer insight into the possibilities and the limitations of individual and group behavior.

Again, a knowledge of the evolution of morality throws considerable light upon present-day problems of morality. Even today, we find men living at all the stages of moral evolution. We find primitive survivals existing side by side with more advanced ethical conceptions. Some men are attempting to apply to present problems solutions which were satisfactory for the solving of similar problems under earlier and different conditions, but which either do not apply now or do not satisfy the moral consciousness of living men. Many conflicts in practice and in judgment are more easily understood in the light of the history of morality.

Finally, it is easier to be impersonal and objective when studying earlier customs and moral standards. Once an objective, critical attitude has been developed, we may be able to carry it over into an analysis of our present ideas and practices. It is easy for our own desires and vested interests to warp our judgment, and to make us blind to the moral weaknesses and the misconduct of today.

ORIGIN OF MORALITY

The roots of morality go back until they are lost in the past. Morality was not at first the outcome of a conscious thought process, not perhaps even purely human in its origin. A study of the behavior of animals, and especially of sub-human social groups, is very illuminating for the light which it throws upon rudimentary forms of morality. Among the animals we find the beginnings of qualities or traits which in the human being we call personal virtues. From an early time men have been impressed by the industriousness of the bee and the ant, and have even held them up as examples,—“Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways, and be wise!” Courage is exhibited by many of the higher animals. Our attention has been called to the prudence exhibited by the camel in filling himself with water before the desert journey, and to the bird that builds her nest safely out of the reach of enemies. When the hungry but suspicious fox refuses to touch the tempting bait, is this an example of self-control?

Among the sub-human social groups we find the rudiments of such social virtues as self-sacrifice, sympathy, and co-operation. Com-

munal life did not begin with man; he merely expanded and enriched it. We are more or less familiar today with descriptions of group life among the apes, chimpanzees, pigeons, as well as the elaborate social life of the ants. Instances of self-sacrificing devotion of parents to offspring, of mutual helpfulness, and of loyalty to the group are common.

The animals to which we have been referring cannot ordinarily be thought of as seeking any conscious goal, since they are led by natural impulses and instincts to ends of which they are unaware. Nevertheless certain impulsive and habitual forms of behavior appear which are similar to the customary morality of early man.

Our morals, like our bodies and our social life, are the product of long periods of development and of adaptation to environmental conditions. Since this is true, it will be evident that we cannot give an exact and specific beginning, nor shall we be able to trace completely each step in the moral development of the race. We can, however, point out the main stages and the main characteristics of man's moral development.

EARLY GROUP LIFE AND CUSTOMARY MORALITY

When "man became man," there were well-established ways of doing things, and primitive man very naturally fell into the traditional ways. Students of early group life agree that the individual was more or less completely submerged in the life of the group. What was custom in the group became habit in the individual. The individual's ways of acting, feeling, and thinking were controlled by the group.

The early group was a kinship group, a family, clan, or tribe, whose members believed that they had sprung from a common ancestor or ancestors. The ancestor was usually believed to be a god, or some hero, or even an animal (as in a totem group). Birth into such a group usually determined for early man his standing in life. It determined where he was to live, how he was to make his living, the group or groups from which he must take his wife, what religious ceremonies he must observe, and the way in which he was to be ruled. The early kindred group was an economic, a political, a religious, and a moral unit.

Among early peoples an amazing variety of differences will be found, as well as numerous common features. These differences include the basic structure of the social groups. In the maternal type of family or kinship organization, the woman remains among her own kin and her children remain with her. In the paternal type, the wife leaves her blood relatives and goes to live among the kin of her husband. In the next chapter we shall consider marriage and the position of woman as an example of the evolution of morality.

While recognizing that morals are not something distinct from other phases of life, we shall make no attempt to describe primitive or early group life in detail. Such descriptions will be found in works dealing with primitive man. We shall, however, point out some of the characteristics which are most important for an understanding of the development of morality.

Students of early group life agree that a man's rights and responsibilities were fixed by the group of which he was a part. As an individual apart from a group he had no rights nor privileges which anyone was bound to respect. Within his own kinship group, if he broke the tribal code, he was treated more or less as an individual, but apart from this, he stood as one member of a group. In dealing with outsiders, the primitive group was a unit. If one member was killed or injured, his group would hold the group of the offender responsible. They might demand satisfaction or the life of the offender. In such cases, if the offender's group defended him or offered resistance, a blood feud might be started. Thus there was joint responsibility and mutual support.

The fact of joint responsibility and rigid social solidarity is well illustrated by numerous accounts that have come down to us from earlier times. The story of Achan as told in the Old Testament is probably the best known. When Achan sinned, not only Achan, but his kin, and his herds and all his possessions, were destroyed. Similar accounts are available from nearly all primitive groups of which we have records.

Each primitive group felt that it was superior to all other peoples. This helps to explain the lack of a sense of obligation toward out-

siders. If other people were inferior, perhaps not even real men, why should there be any obligation to respect them? Ethnocentrism seems to be a common human trait. Each group tends to think that it is the center of the world and that its own folkways are right.

The moral system under which moral standards are based on customs, which in turn are accepted without reflection, is called customary morality or group morality. This was especially prevalent among kinship groups. Among all peoples, ancient and modern, the power of custom is strong in the determination of conduct. Early man, however, showed very little tendency to guide conduct on the basis of a consciously chosen ideal of life.

In the stage of customary morality, there are certain acts which are almost universally forbidden, such as murder, especially of the members of one's group, cruelty and neglect of offspring, and disloyalty to the group. There are certain acts which are almost universally required, such as parental care, respect for the life of one's fellowmen, loyalty to one's group, and some curbing of the sexual impulse. Among all groups we find some regulation concerning the proper relations of the sexes and of marriage. These regulations vary widely, however, and they operate through habit and not through conscious choice.

Customs arise in various ways. In order to live, men have to adjust themselves to one another and to the environmental situations in which they find themselves. Out of these needs of life develop habits in the individual and customs in the group. Once these customs are formed, they pass on from parents to children by instruction, imitation, and tradition, and become a powerful societal force. They are not the creations of human reflection, and their change is not ordinarily due to intelligent processes. Changes in custom come when strain appears. These changes are ordinarily in the direction of better adaptations to the purposes of life.

EVALUATION OF CUSTOMARY MORALITY

The strength of customary morality is that it tends to the development of a stable character, which functions with little friction in a

stable environment. Social conditions, however, are never entirely static. There is always some change taking place. Consequently, the weaknesses of customary morality are more in evidence today.

Under customary morality, where custom and habit play such a large part, the margin of freedom is comparatively small. The average man may be held in line, but the exceptional man who might forge ahead into new and better ways is kept behind. Again, new situations are continually arising which are not adequately met by existing standards. Customary morality frequently condemns the traditional evils, but is blind to the newer forms of wrongdoing.

Customary morality tends to formalism, to literalness, and with changing conditions it may be so ill adapted to the needs of life that harm may result. A moral code that is satisfactory must provide for criticism and for some form of revision under changing conditions. Customs grow up under all sorts of irrational influences including chance, historical accidents, and superstitions, as well as under the pressure of human needs and through human reflection.

Our moral judgments are always influenced by our customary ways of procedure, and sometimes they are more or less completely the product of circumstances. Customary morality is never entirely superseded and undoubtedly should not be eliminated. Many customs are the outcome of past experience and reflection and there is no immediate need to question their wisdom. Our minds are left free to consider the pressing issues of our own day.

These customs which have come to us from the past should be accepted, however, not because they are old or venerable, but because we believe that they serve the needs of living generations and have inherent worth. An important difference between primitive and modern man is that, when necessary, modern man may critically examine the customs of his day and modify them in the light of experience and reflection. Only in the later and higher stages of morality do moral judgments come to take an important place in modifying customs and external conditions. Conceptions like morality, duty, right and wrong are late in appearance.

The position of modern man is well stated by Dewey and Tufts in the following passage:

The American or European belongs to groups of various kinds, but he "joins" most of them. He of course is born into a family, but he does not stay in it all his life unless he pleases. And he may choose his own occupation, residence, wife, political party, religion, social club, or even national allegiance. He may own or sell his own house, give or bequeath his property, and is responsible generally speaking for no one's acts but his own. This makes him an "individual" in a much fuller sense than he would be if all these relations were settled for him.¹

While modern man, in comparison with primitive man, is free to a large extent from stifling group restrictions and attitudes which retard moral progress, we are still too much bound by custom. Too large a part of our present morality depends upon where we were born or reared and not upon principles which will stand critical examination. Patriotic allegiance, the attitude toward property, toward marriage, and toward other races, as well as our standard of personal honor, are all largely set for us by our social circle and by the class barriers of our time.

FROM CUSTOM TO LAW

We have seen that the influence of custom continues to be strong from an early period to the present. With the growth of society, however, it is forced to share its influence with other factors. As population increases and as society becomes more complex, it is desirable that the simple customary observances be made more specific. Laws are then formulated. These laws may either crystallize previous customs, or they may change them to some extent.

The development from custom to law may take place in the following manner. Conflicts between kinship groups or tribes may continue until some leader succeeds in gaining control of an entire area. He may assume control and refuse to relinquish his power after the conflict has ceased. Thus he becomes the ruler. He may even succeed in establishing his family in power as the royal family. As he gathers military and civil aides about him, a nobility comes into existence as distinct from the common people. If captives or

¹John Dewey and J. H. Tufts, *Ethics*, rev. ed., Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1932, p. 18.

conquered peoples are present, they may be forced to occupy the position of slaves, serfs, or low-caste persons.

Gradually the decrees of the ruler and his court, or of some law-making body, take their place along with customs in the conduct of affairs. The distinction between what must be done and what must not be done is clearly and specifically stated, and definite penalties are attached to the violations of the law.

Under simple social conditions, with little or no division of labor, and with fairly rigid customs which are well-known and observed, there is not much conflict and scarcely any doubt as to duty. But under more complex social conditions embracing a larger number of people, one custom may be found to conflict with another, custom may conflict with the law, or one law may conflict with another law. Consequently, it is not always clear what is the right course of action. A man's duty as a father may conflict with his duty as a soldier; his duty as a judge may conflict with his religious obligations.

CONSCIENCE

Conflicts, such as these, have led men to search for some principle or standard of judgment. Men knew by experience the strong feeling that some things ought to be done. Consequently, one of the earliest attempts to meet this conflict was by the appeal to conscience. It was claimed that there was an inner voice or an inner law—a sense of obligation—which must be obeyed. This ability to feel a moral obligation was called conscience. It was interpreted in many different ways, however, so that its relation to moral conduct was not always clear.

In this appeal to the conscience of the individual, there are at least four elements of human experience. First, there is the memory of the past experiences of the individual. In the past some acts have resulted in pain or other unpleasantness. The memory of this lingers on in our emotions, if not in conscious memory. These experiences exert a vague but very real pressure against the anti-social impulses which occasionally arise. An additional element of unpleasantness may be the conscious or partly conscious fear of punishment for infractions of the law. Uneasiness may accompany viola-

tion, even if the act is not detected. Knowledge that the act is condemned, and that the individual may be brought to task at some time, adds its weight to the inhibitions which we have already discussed.

A second element in this inward development is the individual's consciousness of some group of which he is a part. Conscience is in part the voice of the community in us. Mackenzie in *A Manual of Ethics*, following Clifford, suggests in a somewhat dramatic and even personalized way what takes place. The tribe, or group of which man is a part, approves certain acts and strongly disapproves others. In general, the approved acts are thought to be for the welfare of the group, and the disapproved acts are felt to injure the group. The individual shares in these judgments of the group. They are a part of his tribal or group consciousness. When he does the approved things, the group consciousness will applaud him and say, "I like you." When he does the disapproved thing or follows some immediate desire of his personal self, the group consciousness within him may assert itself and condemn him, or say, "I do not like this thing which you have done." This self-judgment pronounced by an individual in the name of the group is an important element in conscience.²

In his book *Beyond Conscience*, Professor T. V. Smith protests against the tendency to conceive conscience too exclusively as the voice of the group sounding inside the person. Conscience, he says, may invent the group which supports its demands. The individual may thus set up an imaginary society and appeal to it to support his demands. Professor Smith says that conscience is in reality a part of the individual's drive for inner unity and for outer power. It is the form which consciousness takes when serious action impends. In this struggle for power the person may invent doctrines to quell doubts and to justify the claims of conscience. We shall thus list the egoistic drive for integration and for power as a third element in the conscience of the individual.

A fourth element, especially in more mature persons, is the feeling of moral obligation which accompanies moral judgment made

² J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, 4th ed., Noble and Noble, 1925, pp. 117-118.

in the light of some accepted moral standard. Thus rational and emotional factors may be fused. The fact that conscience functions immediately when faced with familiar problems and is frequently absent or confused in new and complex situations indicates that social experience and habit play the dominant parts.

The appeal merely to the conscience of the individual is not likely to be permanently satisfactory. The conflicts which occur in the life of action are likely to be found also in the inner life. The demands of conscience carry no valid claim upon anybody except upon the person whose thoughts and feelings they express. Like other human capacities conscience is the outcome of growth and education, in that emotions are trained to approve some actions and to disapprove others. Even the desire to do the right thing does not necessarily imply an insight into what is right. In a later chapter we shall consider further the values and the dangers of the appeal to conscience.

REFLECTIVE MORALITY

By reflective morality is meant that stage of moral development in which men formulate moral judgments on the basis of a reflective evaluation of principles and a careful examination of facts in their relation to human life. We have indicated that, with the growth of law as distinct from customs, conflicts inevitably arise. Such tensions stimulate the growth of reflective criticism. The precepts of the past are too rigid to apply to the guidance of conduct under new situations, and as exceptional circumstances and new difficulties arise men are stimulated to reflect upon the principles underlying law in general.

Whereas the legal enactments of a state or community are directly maintained against external acts which are detrimental to the welfare of society or to the individual's own welfare, mature moral judgments give greater consideration to the motives and character of man. "Complete morality is reached only when the individual recognizes the right or chooses the good freely, devotes himself heartily to its fulfillment, and seeks a progressive social development in which every member of society shall share."³ However, it must

³ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 66.

be remembered that the part played by reflection even among modern men is frequently exaggerated. The conduct of the most thoughtful men is guided to a large extent by convention and custom, and by legal enactment, as well as by ideas which are contributed by the intellectual atmosphere of the day. Yet the development of the highest morality depends upon the addition of reflective morality to those factors already mentioned in the process of the evolution of morality.

AGENCIES IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT

The development of morality is one phase of the growth of man and his culture. There is a continuous interaction between man's conduct and moral judgments on the one hand and his physical and social environment on the other hand.

Various books on ethics, including those by Dewey and Tufts and W. K. Wright, have emphasized the fact that there are individualizing, socializing, and rationalizing agencies and tendencies at work in the development of morality. Among the individualizing agencies and tendencies would be included all those things which helped to emancipate the individual from subjection to the group and enable him to stand as an individual with rights and privileges, and to develop his own interests and capacities. The growth of individual as opposed to group ownership, the right to choose a vocation for himself which came as a result of the growth of industry and the division and specialization of labor, the abolition of collective responsibility, greater freedom in the selection of a mate in marriage, were all contributions to the development of individuality.

Among the socializing agencies are included all those things which helped to develop a spirit of co-operation and mutual aid in seeking some common social good. The development of industry and the arts, the need of protection, and participation in the ceremonies and festivals of the group, all tended to develop a sense of social solidarity and to require a high degree of co-operation.

The growth of intelligence is an integral part of the development of morality. The moral life and the intelligent life are more or less synonymous. Dewey and Tufts mention forms of occupation, the

arts and crafts, exploration, and the overcoming of obstacles, as among the central agencies in the development of intelligence, especially among early men. Hunting and fishing require alertness and daring. Pastoral life and agriculture stimulate foresight and continuity of purpose. The arts and crafts develop a sense of order and logical arrangement, and have a refining effect upon character.

In summary: Among all groups of people we find problems of conduct and everywhere human life is in some sense organized and directed. Agreements and regulations of some sort are backed by the approval of the group. The actual beginnings of morality are lost in the past. Among primitive groups the individual was more or less completely submerged in the life and customs of the group. Man's rights and duties were fixed by the group and there was a strong sense of social solidarity. While the average man was held in line, the exceptional man was retarded. Customary morality was, and is, ill adapted to changing conditions.

With the growth of society, regulations expressed themselves outwardly in law and inwardly in conscience. As conflicts arose, men searched for standards of judgment, and reflective criticism was born. Morality appears to have taken the form of such a redirection of impulses as would make for the preservation and welfare of the group. Moral standards depend upon man's knowledge and intellectual and cultural development. As men become increasingly liberated from blind custom, there is a tendency for them to direct conduct more and more on the basis of a distinct philosophy of life.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Robert M., returning home unexpectedly one night, finds his wife and a paramour. He opens fire with a revolver and kills the man. In the state in which this happened, such actions do not ordinarily lead to any indictment, since such action is expected, or, at least, not severely condemned. Since public justice has replaced private revenge in nearly all anti-social acts, how do you explain the attitude depicted above? Is this merely a survival of a primitive practice?
2. What survivals of earlier moral standards are found in America today?
- ✓3. In China, a business man lives up to the moral standard if he starts to make payments on a debt at the time when it becomes due. In Amer-

ica, such a person would be considered in default, and a creditor could take action against him if he wished to do so. How are such differences to be explained?

4. Write a brief statement concerning your own moral development including answers to the following questions: Where did you get your ideas of right and wrong when you were very young? Did the source of your ideas change any as you went through high school? Have parents, the social groups, etc. always had the same influence in framing your standards? At the present time why do you think right is right?
5. Is the statement of some writers that custom can make anything right or make anything wrong strictly true? Does it have more truth at some periods of moral evolution than at others?
6. Make a list of the groups of which you are a member, indicating ways in which they influence your conduct. Are you conscious of any changes in attitude or in conduct as you go from one group to another?

SUGGESTED READINGS

(Where titles are not in alphabetical order, those listed first will probably prove most valuable to the beginning student.)

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Chapter II

ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY

IN THIS chapter we shall present some illustrations of the development of morality in specific fields. For our first example we shall consider the evolution of the administration of justice.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

We may go back in human history to the place where we find races with scarcely anything that can be compared with our modern administration of justice. Private wrongs were revenged by the individuals wronged, or perhaps by some close kinsman. Each man took vengeance as best he could. The individual, if wronged, might seek redress by retaliation. If the members of his family interfered to help him, and if, through the solidarity of the family, the offender was given aid, a blood feud might develop. While there was no attempt to render to each man a just punishment as judged by impartial authorities, there was a rough sense of justice in operation. This was especially true where custom laid down certain rules of retaliation which had the approval of the larger group. In the Old Testament we read passages reflecting this early practice. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed."

One of the first rules for the curbing of primitive vengeance is the famous *lex talionis*, or law of retaliation. "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." It is found in codes as early as the Code of Hammurabi, about 2100 B.C., but made most familiar through the Book of Exodus. This way of administering justice appeared not only among people living in early historical periods, but is found in modern times among people who live at a low stage of social and moral development.

The method of retaliation was expensive and destructive, and there was no assurance that the quarrel would cease. A continuation

of the method of retaliation back and forth would weaken or destroy the group. Slowly a stage of compensation for offenses came into existence. The payment of damages was less likely to lead to continual strife. This stage was likely to accompany the growth in power of a chieftain and the settling down of tribes into a more peaceable and civilized type of life. So much compensation must be given for an eye, so much for a hand, or so much for a life. Here, distinctions of rank, age, and sex were usually recognized and taken into the calculations. Both the injury inflicted and the person upon whom it was inflicted had to be considered. A free man was worth more than a slave, an adult more than a child, a person of rank more than an ordinary man, and usually, a man more than a woman. Some offenses might be considered too serious to be compensated for except by blood, and, in any case, if the compensation was not paid, a man might still resort to simple retaliation. In one form or another, compensation for offenses has been widespread right down to modern times.

Collective responsibility is almost the universal rule in the early stages of the development of law and justice. If a member of one tribe had injured a member of another tribe, the entire members of the first tribe might be held responsible to the entire members of the second. The whole family of the offender might be destroyed. Sometimes if the offender could not be found, vengeance might be satisfied with the life of his brother or son. Hobhouse says that "the blood feud is retribution exercised by a family upon a family." When compensation for injury done is the rule, it is compensation from the family of the offender to the family of the offended one. Among some tribes expulsion was used as a method of dealing with an offender within the group. This was exceedingly serious since the man was left entirely defenseless when beyond the protection of his kinsmen.

Failure to distinguish between accident and design is another surprising feature of primitive justice. Failure to recognize this distinction which seems so evident to modern men can be explained only by a knowledge of the theory of witchcraft and possession. If the ax slipped and killed a man, it might have been because he was

"possessed" by some spirit. As a "possessed" man he should be forgiven. In the early Hebrew codes the beginning of a recognition between accident and design is indicated by the appointment of cities of refuge for everyone that "killeth any person unwittingly." However, if the avenger overtook the offender before he reached a city of refuge he was free to deal with him.

A practice which seems especially strange to modern man is the punishment of animals and in some cases even inanimate objects. The slaying of offending animals was provided for in the codes found in the Book of Exodus, and such practices were found in Europe as late as the sixteenth century. Undoubtedly magical ideas entered into such practices. Perhaps the animal or the weapon possessed an evil spirit. In any event it was safer to get rid of it in case more or greater evil might follow. Where actual destruction was not demanded, the thing might be purified through certain rites.

With the development of society and the growth of a central authority, an independent and an impartial group tended to be formed to administer justice. The growth of the administration of justice by a group not directly concerned in the crime was by long and slow stages. One of the first steps was where the social group as a whole, or its chief or council of elders, stepped in to regulate actions which endangered the group and which were therefore resented by all the members. Acts, like breaches of the marriage law, violated the tribal taboo and might bring misfortune to the entire community. Witchcraft was also severely dealt with by the group as a whole. The object was to protect the group from a curse or other danger and only secondarily to punish the offender.

The tribe might interfere in what ordinarily were considered purely private matters to be left to private vengeance, if the sympathies or resentments of the members of the tribe were sufficiently aroused. Much depended upon the status and popularity of the persons concerned. This occasional intervention, however, easily crystallized into customary procedure. Intervention might take the form of fixing the penalty or of regulating the private vengeance. A duel or other test might be arranged and controlled.

Further progress was made when an injured person might call

upon his chief or elders for assistance. Serious offenses against the individual came to be thought of as injuries to the community. At this point, however, the council or "court" acted more as peacemakers than as judge. Private vengeance and feuds were less frequent, but might be used when other methods failed. From methods of self-redress we have witnessed progress to the point where the avenger was assisted or controlled by public force or by public opinion. We shall make no attempt to explain the various uses of the duel, the oath, or the ordeal (such as, walking through fire, or dipping one's hands into boiling water or boiling oil, etc.). These were magico-religious processes, and it was expected that the gods would intervene to protect the innocent and punish the guilty.

The growth of more impartial and public justice was stimulated by the rise and growth of the kingly power. Individuals and families could be summoned before an authority which could decide the case and require the parties concerned to obey and to keep the peace. A serious crime now tended to become an offense against the state. Private justice gave way to more rational public justice, even though vestiges of the older forms remained, as in the duel in some countries. "Thus by degrees there develops the conception that it is the duty of the court to try the case, to obtain proof of facts, to give its own verdict based on its own judgment, and execute its own sentence by its own officers, and which may take the initiative through its own officers."¹ The function of the court was now, not to supervise private redress or feuds, but to detect and to punish the criminal and to protect the rights of both innocent and guilty persons.

With the development of law and justice there has grown up a recognition of the difference between accident and design, or the degree of responsibility of a man for a particular offense. Today such knowledge is important for the proper disposition of a case. Another advance, also important, is the distinction between civil justice, where restitution or compensation is given to the complainant, and criminal justice where punishment is meted out by society through the pronouncement of a judge.

Until recent times punishment for crime was severe and often ex-

¹L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1923, p. 118.

ceedingly brutal. Death was the penalty for a large number of offenses, even as late as the nineteenth century in many countries. All persons held in prison, innocent and guilty, debtors and felons, were thrown together. The slow realization that extreme severity tends to harden people and make them indifferent to suffering, the unwillingness of juries to convict when the punishment seemed unreasonable, along with the rise of a more enlightened ethical consciousness, all contributed to the use of more humane methods of handling the criminal.

Today men are coming to recognize that the criminal as well as society has rights which must be respected. Punishment is ethically justified only when it helps to reform the wrongdoer and to lead him back to honest wholesome ways of living. Simply to make the offender suffer, without asking questions regarding the intent and the effect of such punishment, may further degrade the recipient. Pain, with no healing intent, is simply vengeance and is probably immoral.

More and more men are coming to realize that the criminal is the result of an unfortunate set of conditions. He is a "case" to be understood, and if possible, to be reformed. The criminal career, as well as the upright character, rests upon laws of growth which are coming to be more adequately understood. Reflective morality is able to justify only action which benefits those whom it affects.

MARRIAGE AND THE POSITION OF WOMAN

The great variety of practices concerning marriage and the position of woman in society makes a brief sketch of this subject especially difficult. The differentiation of the sexes affects human conduct in important ways. The legal and ethical rights and duties of the two sexes are never exactly alike. The questions to which we shall give attention are: (1) the number of parties in the marriage union, (2) the restrictions of marriage, (3) the stability of the marriage contract, (4) the methods of obtaining the partner, and (5) the relations between the members of the family.

(1) In considering the parties to the marriage relation, Hobhouse says we must ask: "Is it (a) a union of one man with one woman, or

(b) of one man with two or more women, or (c) of two or more men with one woman, or (d) of a group of men with a group of women, or (e) is it wholly irregular, the negation of union, promiscuity? All these are types of marriage which exist or have existed, or at least have been alleged to exist."² Polygamy, a state in which several women are the wives of one man, is very common throughout the uncivilized world and was fairly common during the early and middle periods of civilization. Polyandry, the relation in which several men are the husbands of one woman, is by comparison an exceptional practice. It is found among the ancient Spartans and the Tibetans. In the Tibetan marriage the husbands are usually all brothers, and the type of marriage has probably an economic basis in the poverty of the country which makes it difficult for one man to support one woman.

There is considerable difference of opinion among authorities regarding group marriage and promiscuity. What is sometimes taken as a group marriage may be merely a form of polyandry combined with polygamy.³ The looser types of marriage are confined almost exclusively to savage and barbarous tribes. If promiscuity or group marriages exist, then it is among these primitive peoples.

Westermarck strongly criticizes the view that certain tribes or races have lived in a state of promiscuity without any family ties. He says:

After examining in detail all the cases which are known to me of peoples said to live in a state of promiscuity, I have arrived at the conclusion that it would be difficult to find a more untrustworthy collection of statements. Some of them are simply misrepresentations of theorists in which sexual laxity, frequency of separation, polyandry, group-marriage or something like it, or absence of a marriage ceremony or of a word for "to marry" or of a marriage union similar to our own, is confounded with promiscuity. Others are based upon indefinite evidence which may be interpreted in one way or other, or on information proved to be inaccurate.⁴

²Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, p. 133.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 135-138.

⁴E. A. Westermarck, *A Short History of Marriage*, The Macmillan Company, 1926, pp. 7-8.

Monogamy, or the relation between one man and one woman, dominates the higher civilizations, although it is also found among earlier peoples. Monogamy may be the general practice among a people, while the chiefs or wealthier men have several wives or concubines. Monogamy is apparently the only form of marriage that is permitted among all peoples. Even where we find polygamy, polyandry, or group-marriage, we also find monogamy existing side by side with them. In numerous cases it is the only form of marriage which is tolerated. Monogamy may be merely habitual, an outgrowth of the difficulty of obtaining and supporting more than one wife. Monogamy, in the ethical sense, which is based on the belief that one ought to have only one wife or one husband is comparatively recent.

(2) Among all peoples there are some rules or restrictions concerning marriage. The most common are the laws of exogamy, forbidding marriage between members of certain specified groups, and laws of endogamy, forbidding marriage outside a certain group. Prohibition of marriage between parent and child or brother and sister is almost universal. We shall not attempt to consider the great variety and diversity of restrictions found among primitive peoples, but merely to point out that the more civilized peoples tend to discard rules which limit the free personal choice of mates by men and women. In some states of the United States, however, there are still legal and social restrictions to the marriage of whites with Negroes, with Indians, and with Mongolians.

(3) While there are groups as widely separated as primitive tribes and the present Roman Catholic Church that make the marriage relation indissoluble, the most common practice both in the uncivilized and in the civilized world is to grant divorce either at pleasure or under specified conditions. Among many primitive groups divorce is so easy and so frequent that some would question whether the relation is really marriage at all. The practices vary so widely that it is almost impossible to generalize concerning them. We can affirm, however, that in the uncivilized world, marriage is usually a loose tie and divorce is relatively easy. Especially under the patriarchal family, the husband ordinarily has more privileges and rights as to divorce than does the wife.

(4) Methods of obtaining a marriage mate show not only a diversity, but a definite trend, as we approach modern times. Marriage by capture, or the practice of taking women captives in tribal wars or in petty raids was found among savage peoples. A more common, and probably on the whole a later practice, was that of purchase. She might be considered the property of her family to be sold, or to be bought by some suitor. A loftier conception is one in which gifts were given to her family as compensation for her loss from their household, or in which there was an exchange of gifts between the respective families.

Three other early forms of the marriage contract may be noted. In one the man serves for his wife—probably because he has not the money to make an appropriate gift or payment. The case of Jacob, in the Old Testament, serving for Leah and Rachel is well-known. A second, and less dignified practice, is that in which one girl is exchanged for another. A third is elopement, which apparently takes place occasionally among primitive as well as modern peoples.

To what extent is the woman's wish recognized or ignored in these forms of marriage? Even where purchase is the practice, her wishes may be taken into account. No general statement is possible except to indicate that consent increases and the position of woman improves as we pass from the hunting to the agricultural stage of early civilization.

(5) Hobhouse points out three main types in the structure of the family. First we have forms like the clan system, where the man and the woman are fully united, legally and morally. Either mother-right or father-right may prevail. Under mother-right the woman remains in her own family; whereas under father-right she goes with her husband's people and succession passes through him. Even under mother-right, the woman may be inferior to her husband and brother. Second, the natural family consisting of father, mother, and children, where the father is the head of the family and the wife is more or less in subjection, or at least in a subordinate position. Third, where the natural family is bound together by the closest sentimental and moral ties, and where the full legal and moral status of the woman as a free personality is preserved.

In the great majority of uncivilized peoples, the position of the woman is inferior to that of the man. She does most of the hard work and has few personal rights. Even her person may be considered the property of her husband. While he may kill his wife for unfaithfulness, the same husband may not hesitate to lend her to an honored guest. Furthermore, the system of child betrothal and the double standard by which the husband claims privileges not granted to the wife may be mentioned as evidences that the personality of woman is often disregarded.

Most of the civilized races have the patriarchal type of family organization. Mother-right appears to be an earlier form. The strongly knit marriage group consisting of father, mother, and children, with the father as the dominant link in the organization, forms the basis of the more stable and more recent developments.

A study of marriage in ancient times, especially in Babylonia, Egypt, and India, impresses one with the emphasis upon woman as property, rather than as a personality. Infringement of chastity was often regarded as an offense against the woman's owner, and was to be dealt with as such. This is, in general, the oriental attitude even today. Among the early Hebrews and among the Chinese, polygamy was recognized, as was the case in Mohammedan countries. Mohammed limited the number of legitimate wives to four, not counting the slave concubines. Among the early Greeks, monogamy prevailed, but concubinage was legally recognized under certain conditions. The woman was a ward rather than property. Plato, while believing woman inferior to men in their powers, argued for the equality of the sexes.

The marriage practices of European or Western civilization are based upon Roman, Teutonic, and Christian practices and doctrines. In early Rome monogamy was the rule and the tie was seldom broken until the laws were relaxed in the days of the Republic. While consent of the parties was not prominent at first, there was a gradual emancipation of the woman until she gained considerable legal and personal independence. The early Christian Church regarded marriage more or less as a concession to the weakness of human nature—a concession which the Roman church came to refuse

to her officials. The church declared that the consent of the parties alone was essential for a valid marriage, that the bond was indissoluble, and that the moral consequences of violations affected the man as well as the woman. Monogamy became the rule wherever the influence of the church was strong. The subjection of the wife to the husband was more or less taken for granted. The personality of the married woman was absorbed in that of her husband.

The leaders of the Protestant Reformation rejected marriage as a sacrament and as a concession to the weakness of human nature. Marriage was considered by them as a natural and a desirable state for man. Changes came about slowly, however, and it was only during the nineteenth century that the position of woman was radically improved.

The tendency of modern marriage laws is to grant the wife equality of status before the law, and full legal protection for her person. She also may own property in her own right or freely dispose of it. "Legislation moves in the direction of allowing divorce for adultery, cruelty, persistent desertion, habitual drunkenness, serious crime—in short, for such behaviour of one party as makes the married life impossible or unbearable to the other."⁵ From being a sacrament in the magical sense, marriage is coming to be one in the ethical sense. In a later chapter we shall deal more at length with the moral problems relating to sex and the family.

MORAL PROGRESS AMONG THE HEBREWS

The third illustration of the evolution of morality will be taken from the history of the early Hebrews. Probably no other group of people made such rapid progress in ethical insight in so short a period of time. Today most students are familiar with the fact that the Old Testament does not present one moral level throughout its pages, although the stages of development are difficult to discern clearly, owing to the fact that the literature of the Bible has not been placed in exact chronological order. Just as the geologist is able to point out the periods to which certain strata of rocks in the earth belong, so it is possible for the biblical scholar to arrange the writings of the

⁵Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, p. 231.

Bible in time sequence. When this is done, the development of moral ideas becomes evident. This growing moral insight can be traced in three main developments: (1) the growth of the idea of God, (2) the development from group to personal morality, and (3) the treatment accorded to slaves and foreigners.

(1) The ethical ideals attributed to God by a people are a clear reflection of their own moral conceptions. The moral aspirations of the Hebrews are set forth in terms of the words of Jehovah: "What doth God require of thee?" and "Thus saith the Lord." In the early writings God is represented in various ways. Jehovah (or Yahweh) is disclosed in a thunderstorm on Mount Sinai. He is thought of as a local deity who is interested in the military exploits of his people. Elsewhere he is represented as walking in the garden in the cool of the day. A man might see God, but this was highly dangerous, consequently *Moses was permitted to see only his back* (*Exodus 33:20-23*). Later, during the wanderings of the Israelites God is represented as traveling in an Ark or holy chest. When the Ark is with them, the presence of God is there with them; when they lose the Ark, they lose the presence of God. At a still later period God is represented as residing at Jerusalem, or at most he was the God of Palestine. When they passed from his territory, they passed from the presence of their God.

During this pre-prophetic period the idea of God is anything but rich in ethical content when judged from a modern point of view. However, as time went on, the moral ideals of the Hebrews became more refined and more universal in application, and consequently their idea of God took on higher ethical attributes. In the earlier Hebrew writings God is pictured as one who gives directions for the slaughter of the Amalekites, men, women, and children, without mercy; who encourages blood revenge; who hardens men's hearts and then punishes them for their deeds; and who sends evil spirits to confound men and permits deceit to gain desired ends. We are told that when certain men in curiosity looked into the sacred Ark they were smitten down (*I Samuel 6:19*), and when Uzzah touched the Ark in an attempt to steady it when the oxen stumbled he was struck dead on the spot (*II Samuel 6:6-7*). God's favor seemed to de-

pend in considerable degree upon the care with which men observed certain rituals and ceremonies.

The prophets of the eighth century (Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah) led the people more definitely in the direction of ethical monotheism. Amos told the people that they had no special claim on the favor of Jehovah since he was the God of the nations and would punish them for their sins. In their denunciation of the social evils of their day, Amos and Isaiah helped to raise ethics to a central place along with ritual in the religion of the period. During the prophetic period, and especially as a result of the Babylonian exile when the people were asking, "How can we worship our God in a strange land?" the prophets assured the masses that God was the God of all the nations. Moreover, he loved righteousness and justice.

In some of the later passages of the Old Testament and especially in the New Testament, the idea of God becomes spiritual and ethical. God is a loving father and it is not his will that "one of these little ones should perish." He is interested in purity, truth, and sincerity of purpose. "No man hath seen God at any time." "God is a spirit" and "He that abideth in love abideth in God." This is a very different conception from the one presented in the early records of the Hebrews.

(2) When we first read of the Hebrew people, they are nomadic tribes little different from other tribes about them. What is surprising is the fact that they have left such an imprint upon civilization when so many other ancient peoples have been lost in oblivion. When they entered Canaan or Palestine, they came as clans and patriarchal tribes with their flocks and herds. The tribe or family or group was the important unit, since the individual had only partially emerged from the social unit. Conflicts with the earlier settlers tended to increase the tribal clannishness and the solidarity of the groups. If one member of another group committed an offense, the whole group was punished. It was not even essential that the offender himself be punished. The group morality or tribal customs made a place for blood revenge, the sacrifice of the first born, polygamy, and other practices which later came to be condemned.

The prophets of the eighth century and after were important influ-

ences in three lines of ethical development. (a) The emergence of the individual and the transition to full individual responsibility. Instead of meting out punishment to an entire group, Ezekiel says, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son." (b) The emphasis upon personal purity and sincerity in place of ritual and outward conformity. "Man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart." "I hate, I despise your feast days." "What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" (c) A growing social passion for justice and righteousness in the affairs of community and nation. Amos strongly condemns, in the name of God, those who "know not to do right" but "who store up violence and robbery in their palaces," those "which oppress the poor," and "swallow up the needy, even to make the poor of the land to fail," those who monopolize the corn and the wheat and make "the ephah small, and the shekel great." Men are to look forward to a society in which good will and peace will be controlling principles.

(3) The morality of a people is reflected in their attitude toward foreigners and toward the weak. In Hebrew history we see a development from harsh demands for blood vengeance and eagerness to repay brutality with brutality to the view that Israel is the servant of the nations. In the New Testament forgiveness of enemies is both taught and exemplified.

An examination of the earlier records of Hebrew history will make clear that the foreigner had few rights which the Israelites were bound to respect. Non-Hebrew peoples were ruthlessly slaughtered, reduced to a condition of servitude, or heavily taxed (I Samuel 15: 3; I Kings 9:20-21; Judges 1:28). Canaanites, Amalekites, and Moabites were killed, men, women, and children. A person, as such, had no claims that need be respected by the members of other groups. There were really two ethical standards, one which applied to relations with other Hebrews, and another which referred to outsiders. While the Hebrew might not eat the flesh of an animal that had died "of itself," he could give it to a stranger within his gates, or sell it to an alien (Deuteronomy 14:21). A noteworthy

exception which represents a more highly developed attitude toward the stranger is reflected in Leviticus 19:33-34. Here the stranger is not to be harmed, but he "shall be unto you as one born among you."

After the establishment of the kingdom, and especially under Solomon, leagues with foreign nations became more common. There was a growing recognition of the value to be gained through agreement and compromise rather than by fairly continuous warfare.

In parts of the book of Isaiah and in later writings, the idea is set forth that God's sway was universal and other nations might also be the servants of Jehovah (Isaiah, chaps. 19-25). These nations might even be used by God for the purpose of punishing Israel for her sins. According to Jeremiah, a little later, God had no favorites. He disliked unrighteousness and loved righteousness wherever these were found. The same sense of a growing international justice is found in the books of Jonah and Ruth. Jonah wanted to see Nineveh destroyed, but God is represented as desiring that the people repent. The book of Ruth is the story of a foreigner who became the ancestress of the kings of Judah.

The noblest ethical ideals of the Old Testament are carried over into the New Testament and expanded. Forgiveness of enemies, even those who are foreigners, is definitely taught. Jesus appears to go out of his way to place certain despised foreigners in an admirable light, as he did in the parable of the Good Samaritan. The doctrine of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man is not in harmony with race prejudice.

Slavery, when it arose, was, in many cases at least, a moral advance. It was an act of mercy to spare defeated peoples from the sword. Most slaves were obtained through warfare. If cities surrendered peaceably, the early Israelites were to take the inhabitants into their service; but if they resisted and fought, the males at least were to be put to the sword (Deuteronomy 20:10-14). The foreign slave was the property of his owner who could do with him as he wished. As time went on, however, a more humane attitude developed, and the rights of the owner were restricted. As a human being the slave was felt to have some rights. While the master could beat the slave, there was a penalty for beating him to death (Exodus 21:20-21). Rest on

the Sabbath day, and the privilege of participation in certain religious ceremonies were also stipulated (Exodus 20:10; 12:43-44).

The Hebrew slave was in a more favorable position. Usually he became a slave through inability to pay his debts. The male worked for a six-year period and then was supposed to be released (Exodus 21:2). The female slave could not claim such a privilege, since she often became one of the lesser wives of the owner.

In the New Testament, slavery is accepted as one of the institutions of the day. Christians, however, were to treat their slaves with consideration. While Paul sends Onesimus back to his owner Philemon, he exhorts the master to receive his slave as a Christian brother.

We have illustrated the development of morality from three different fields, from the history of the administration of justice, the history of marriage and the position of woman, and the history of the early Hebrews. It is evident that morals are not something distinct and separate from the actual personal and social lives of men and women. Moral standards grow out of life itself and are related to human feeling and intelligence. As intelligence and experience grow and expand, the requirements of personal and social welfare are more and more taken into account.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Certain tribes living in Borneo were reported to consider it an act of merit to slay and behead a member of an enemy tribe, yet they considered it a heinous offense to slay a fellow tribesman. Men of various primitive tribes have been willing to lend their wives to honored guests, and yet they were as extremely shocked as modern men if their wives did the lending themselves. How do you explain such apparent inconsistency?
- ✓ 2. Can you see any justification at all for the practice of killing off the aged and infirm in an early hunting age?
- ✓ 3. When slavery began, was it a moral advance or a step backwards?
4. Go over the main steps in the administration of justice, and indicate how many of these steps have appeared in American history.
5. Compare the conventional criminal-court procedure, in which two partisan groups are each trying to win a victory, with the scientific

- methods of investigation used in some juvenile courts. See E. H. Sutherland, *Criminology*, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1924, pp. 283 ff.
6. What restrictions, if any, are placed upon women in America? Should women have all the privileges, legal, political, and moral, which men have?
 7. Study and sketch briefly the moral development of one of the following: (1) the Greeks, (2) the Romans, or (3) the Christians.
 8. For an interesting account of the code of the feudal warrior class in Japan see I. O. Nitobe, *Bushido, the Soul of Japan*.

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Chapter III

DUTY AS THE STANDARD

REFLECTION upon problems of right and wrong conduct first took definite form among the early Greeks, when men sought an intelligent way of living as well as an intelligent interpretation of the universe. From the time when Socrates walked the streets of Athens saying "Know thyself" and "Knowledge is virtue," ethical speculation has tended to conform to certain types of explanation which have persisted down to the present day. These types of ethical theory are in part reflections of the differences in emphasis which thought has exhibited toward the basic problems of life.

There are four main types of ethical theory. The first is known as Formalism. In answer to the question, "Why is this act right?" the formalist replies that the rightness is an inherent quality of the act itself. Right is right and wrong is wrong and the distinctions are absolute and final. Thus he will recognize few, if any, exceptions to moral standards. This position is best represented by Immanuel Kant whose views we shall consider in this chapter.

The other three types of ethical theory, Utilitarianism, Naturalistic Ethics, and Self-Realization, correspond roughly to the three answers usually given in response to the question, "What is the greatest good in life?" They agree in holding that acts are right or wrong according to whether they promote or hinder the attainment of some end or goal considered to be good in itself. These are the teleological theories, the name coming from the Greek word *telos* meaning end or goal. Utilitarianism considers happiness the goal of life. Naturalistic Ethics has as its goal the complete adjustment of the individual to his environment. The theory of Self-Realization sets as its goal the complete development of personality. These approaches will be considered in the following three chapters.

FORMALISM AND INTUITIONISM

For centuries there have been men who have believed that some actions are right or wrong in themselves, apart from circumstances, and that some things are good or bad in themselves. Among primitive peoples the tribal ways, or the "customary morality," was absolute and unquestioned. Later, when codes of law were formed, the same conviction of inherent right or wrong attached itself to the law. Still later, when morality became more inward and reflective, it was natural for men to think that right and wrong were parts of the very constitution of certain types of acts, that there was a special moral faculty within man by means of which the moral quality of acts was clearly and immediately recognized. This theory of the nature of morality which views some acts as intrinsically right or wrong is called Formalism or Intuitionism, according to the way in which it is set forth.

Formalism. For the formalist the standard of conduct is found in moral rules which are inherently right or wrong quite apart from any particular results which flow from them. Moral values inhere in certain types of acts which follow fixed principles. There are formulae in mathematics like "If equals be added to equals, the results will be equal." There are formal truths in logic like "Of two contradictory propositions both cannot be true." The formalist asserts that there are similar formulae in the field of ethics. For example, "Veracity is right," "Suicide is wrong," "Humanity must never be considered a means, but always an end."

Formalists do not believe that the rightness or the wrongness of an action depends upon the results of the action, although they do believe that good results ordinarily follow from good actions and evil results from evil actions. Right and wrong are inherent in the nature of things and are not derivable from any other standard.

Intuitionism. The intuitionist believes that there is a kind of mental perception within man by which he discerns the difference between right and wrong. If there is an intrinsic moral quality in some acts, it would seem reasonable to assume that there is a moral faculty in man which apprehends this moral quality. Intuitionists

have not been able to agree among themselves as to how this faculty should be interpreted, or as to how much of the content of morality is perceived in this way. Some persons would identify this moral sense with conscience, others say that reason is able to discern abstract moral truth.

Stated differently, the theory of intuition is the view that truth may be obtained by a superrational and supersensible faculty of some kind. Human beings have special sense organs to apprehend the quality of objects in respect to color, taste, temperature, etc. Do they not, it is asked, also have a special moral sense to apprehend the qualities of objects or acts in respect to moral quality? Morality, intuitionists claim, has its source in the nature of things and is made known to us by intuition which apprehends certain kinds of truth directly, or without the need of any appeal to human observation.

IMMANUEL KANT, 1724-1804

The outstanding representative of the view that actions are right or wrong according to their intrinsic nature, apart from any ends outside themselves, is Immanuel Kant. In his *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), *The Metaphysic of Morals*, and other writings, Kant, who was a professor of philosophy at the University of Königsberg, Germany, set forth one of the great moral systems.

The development of philosophy just previous to Kant forced him to ask and to attempt to answer the question, "What can we know?" His answer in part was as follows: The world is divided into three parts, the inner world of subjective states of mind (images, sensations, etc.) which is not a realm of knowledge; the outer world of ultimate reality (noumena or thing-in-itself) which is unknown and unknowable by the ordinary process of sense perception; and the world of nature or the realm of experience (phenomena) which is the realm of human knowledge. According to Kant, the mind is active and forms into a system of knowledge all the material brought in by the various senses. The mind has an innate way of working and our conception of the outer world, including the notions of space, time, causation and the laws of nature, are due to forms of thought (categories) which exist previous to experience,

and which the mind projects upon nature. We interpret the world as we do because of these categories of the mind. The real world (noumena) cannot be known through sense experience but only through the intellect (pure reason). Among these forms of thought is one which is central in Kant's ethical system—the categorical imperative, or the sense of duty. This is the moral law which is prior to experience (*a priori*) and which springs from a man's innermost being.

THE MORAL LAW

What does Kant mean by the moral law? For Kant everything in nature acts in conformity with law. He says, "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe the oftener and the longer we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within." The laws of nature are the laws of reason, and these laws of reason are reflected in the moral law which springs from man's innermost being. Man's moral nature thus brings him into direct contact with the order of the universe. Only a rational being possesses the ability to act in conformity with the moral law. When the will is governed by reason, it is the moral law which legislates within the individual. It appears within man as a sense of *ought*, or what is popularly called conscience.

The moral law is this sense of duty which originates in reason. It does not grow out of experience since it arises prior to experience. According to Kant, it is clear that all moral conceptions have their basis and source in reason completely *a priori*, and that they are recognized by the ordinary reason of men as well as by reason in its more speculative activity. The true object of reason is to produce a will which is good in itself, and not simply good as a means to something else. The pure idea of duty, or the moral law, apart from any ingredient of sensuous desire, influences the heart of man much more strongly through his reason than do all the motives which have their origin in experience. Conscious of its own worth, the moral law treats all sensuous desires with contempt and gains mastery over them. Devotion to the dictates of the moral law within is man's highest duty. The conception of duty thus comes to take a prominent place in the ethics of Kant.

THE MOTIVE

For Kant a good motive, or a good will, is central. While there are many things which men call good, a good motive is the only thing that has intrinsic value. "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will." The true object of reason is to produce a will which is good in itself, since nothing else is always and necessarily good. Other things like intelligence, courage, and happiness are usually good, but they may be used so as to promote evil. Intelligence or courage when used to carry out an evil purpose may increase the evil. Happiness may be gained in ignoble ways, or a person may gain happiness from an act which would bring unhappiness to a person of higher ideals. While a good motive is not the only good, it is the highest good and the condition of all other good.

There is no direct connection between the morality of an act and its effects. If a man acts from a good motive, or out of loyalty to a sense of duty, then the act is good regardless of the consequences. If a man seeks to aid a sick friend, but from some unforeseen factor leaves him in a worse condition, the act is praiseworthy. On the other hand, if he seeks to injure the sick man, but inadvertently helps him, the act is still a vicious act. Kant does not say that results are not to be considered or that they are unimportant. He says that the moral quality of the act is not determined by them. A good will or motive is therefore the indispensable condition of the moral life.

In order for the motive to be good, a man must act from a sense of duty. If a man performs an act from inclination or desire, the act has no intrinsic value.

It is a duty to maintain one's life; and, in addition, everyone has also a direct inclination to do so. But on this account the often anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral import. They preserve their life *as duty requires*, no doubt, but not *because duty requires*. On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it—

not from inclination or fear, but from duty—then his maxim has a moral worth.¹

The Categorical Imperative. The moral law expresses itself, to use Kant's famous term, in the "categorical imperative." The categorical imperative is the voice of duty, the sense of "ought," the dictate of conscience, or the positive command which arises within the morally sensitive person. It is *a priori* or derived from the reason itself and it is applicable to experience everywhere. This voice of duty has reference not to what *is* but to what *ought* to be. The world of phenomena, which is the world of our ordinary knowledge, is conditioned by experience and is relative. The world of morality, which brings us into the world of supersensible reality, is absolute reality and therefore unconditional. The voice of conscience is the only thing that is fixed in a relative and changing world.

If the will is governed by reason, or from within, it is absolute and unconditional, admitting of no exceptions. It is the categorical imperative, the moral law. If the will is governed by inclination, by desire, or by sense impression, it does not have any positive moral quality. "If now the action is good only as a means to *something else*, then the imperative is *hypothetical*; if it is conceived as good *in itself* and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is *categorical*."²

Kant formulates his principles of morality in three ways. He tells us that they are simply different statements of the same law. They are the principle of universality; the principle of humanity as an end-in-itself; and, the principle of autonomy. We shall briefly consider them.

THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALITY

Actions should spring not from impulses but rather from principles that can be universalized. It is the very essence of reason to express itself in necessary and universal terms. "Act in conformity with that maxim, and that maxim only, which you can at the same time will to be a universal law." Expressed in another form it appears

¹Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysic of Morals*, Abbott trans., 6th ed., Longmans, Green and Company, 1909, 1927, pp. 13-14.

²*Ibid.*, p. 31.

in this way, "Act as if the maxim from which you act were to become through your will a universal law of nature."

In the second section of his *Metaphysic of Morals*, Kant gives four examples to make clear this principle of universality. A man after a succession of misfortunes feels tired of life and is contemplating suicide. Can such an act be justified? When he tries to universalize such behavior, it is evident that it cannot be approved. Such a practice could not exist as a system of nature. If everyone were to commit suicide, it would lead to the elimination of the race itself. Another man finds himself in a position where he needs to borrow money. In order to get the money he must promise to repay it within a definite time. He knows that he will not be able to repay it then. May he get out of his difficulty by making a promise that he knows he will be unable to keep? He asks, "Is it right?" When this suggestion which has arisen out of self-love and convenience is changed into a universal law, he realizes how contradictory it is. No one could borrow, and no one would be willing to lend money, if such promises were not held as sacred trusts. A third man has in himself a talent which if cultivated would make him a more useful member of the community. He is in comfortable circumstances and prefers a life of ease and pleasure. Yet he is concerned about his duty. As a rational being he cannot will that it become a common practice not to cultivate one's talents. He must will therefore that his own faculties be developed. Finally, a man who is prosperous sees other persons in extreme poverty. He could easily help these persons but he is not inclined to do so. While such a society might continue to exist, the attitude is wrong, since a society in which a rich man considers his own interests only and disregards the needs of others is not a desirable social order in which to live.

In referring to the type of situation which is presented in the second example given above, Kant says that the question is not whether it is expedient under the circumstances to make a false promise, but whether it is morally right. In order to answer the question conclusively, one needs to ask whether this principle of avoiding some embarrassment, by making a promise which one has no intention of keeping, should have the force of a universal law, which would

apply to others as well as to oneself. When it is stated in this way, we see at once that while we may be able to will some particular lie, we cannot will that lying should be a universal law. If lying were universal, then no promises would be accepted as valid and human confidence would be broken down. The principle thus proves itself to be self-destructive when it is taken as a universal law. To tell a lie, even to shield oneself or others from serious disaster, is wrong in spite of the consequences because it is contrary to the moral law.

THE PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITY AS AN END-IN-ITSELF

Kant's emphasis upon the inherent worth of personality has received more widespread approval than anything else in his writings. The passage which is probably most frequently quoted from his writings is "Act so as to use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always as an end, never as merely a means." Rational beings or persons, are ends-in-themselves and cannot rightly be made use of simply as means. We may use physical things as means to our human purposes, but when we use another person as a means to an end we degrade him to the level of the material and violate his very being as a person. The person who is false to another in like manner uses that person as a means to his own advantage.

While in theory, Kant's principle of universality, previously discussed, seems to disregard consequences entirely, it would appear from the above that they do play a part in his thinking.

In speaking of the above formulation of Kant's moral law, Professor W. K. Wright says:

In this modified form it is one of the most fruitful that has ever been advanced in ethics. It is capable of endless illustration. The college student, the business and professional man and woman, the husband, wife, parent,—each may properly ask himself or herself: "Am I respecting my own personality and making the most of it? Or am I allowing myself through idleness, selfish enjoyment, and irrelevant distractions to become less of a real person than I owe it to myself and those dearest to me to become? Am I respecting the personalities of those about me, contributing to their happiness when I can, and making it easier for them to

make the best of their lives? Or am I selfishly exploiting those about me for my own advantage and at their real cost? Am I treating them as mere means, or as ends in themselves?"

The principle has been applied since Kant's time to many social problems. Slavery was wrong, because the slave was exploited for the profit of others, and he was not treated as an end in himself. Prostitution is wrong; because in it a woman is treated as a mere means to man's pleasure at the cost of the degradation of her own personality. The fact that she consents to her own degradation only signifies that she also violates the moral law, since she does not respect her own personality. Free love is wrong; because the man and woman in such a relation do not truly respect themselves, and they refuse to develop their own characters in a manner best in the long run for themselves and for society. Drinking and gambling are wrong for similar reasons. Mere idleness in college, or absorption in extra-curricular activities to the extent that the student cannot get a real liberal or professional education, are cases of lack of self-respect.³

THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY

According to Kant, man governs himself: he is a law unto himself. The moral laws to which he is subject are laws which he imposes upon himself. Man is not governed from without, but from within. In obeying the sense of duty within himself, man is not obeying any outside legislator; he is obeying a law imposed by his own reason. While Kant was strongly impressed with the necessity of order and law, he also felt that the central fact of life was the voice of duty, the "I ought," which implied the freedom and the independence of the individual. The result was his principle of the autonomy of the will, or the principle of personal self-government. The universal laws to which man is subject are "laws which he *imposes upon himself*." Consequently, "he is only under obligation to act in conformity with his own will, a will which by the purpose of nature prescribes universal laws."

AN EVALUATION OF KANTIAN ETHICS

Kant's ethical theory is one of the ablest presentations of the formalist approach. During the latter half of the eighteenth century,

³W. K. Wright, *General Introduction to Ethics*, The Macmillan Company, 1929, p. 306.

when men were questioning the very foundation of things and especially all external authority, Kant impressed upon men the fact that order and consistency may be found within. Moral distinctions are not matters of mere expediency, nor expressions of personal inclinations, nor are they due to the blind pressure of social customs. Moral distinctions are real, and intelligence is central. The sense of obligation is central in our moral consciousness, and there is an obligation to live according to some norm. The notion of duty is implied in any system of morality. Since the time of Kant, men have realized more fully that there must be something of intrinsic value, that a good motive is essential to conduct which we wholeheartedly approve, and that human personality is an end-in-itself. There are, however, certain weaknesses which need to be considered, and questions which should be raised.

1. The moral judgments of men have varied from age to age and from place to place. Ways of thinking, feeling, and acting are handed down by our ancestors through the process of cultural conditioning. Men frequently forget the way by which they have come to feel that one act is right and another wrong; consequently, they may insist that the rightness or the wrongness of the act is due to some quality inherent in the act itself. Questions of right and wrong are likely to be presented to the child as commandments of some sort. When morality becomes more conscious and reflective, and when external authority is laid aside, it is an easy step to the view that moral principles are absolute enactments which express themselves within the individual as a sense of duty. Men may fail to realize that the moral principles which have become a part of themselves in this way are the principles which make a wholesome life possible under existing conditions.

2. Why should an act lack moral worth because it is in harmony with our desires and inclinations? As men develop in character and intelligence, they come to find increasing interest and happiness in following the path of duty. Kant's conception of duty for duty's sake is purely formal and divorces moral principles from particular content and situations. Our lives, however, are lived under particular circumstances. Why should the principle of an action be independ-

ent of every object of sensuous desire? Most men will rebel against the attempt to view the natural relations and inclinations of men as something inferior, and also against the attempt to elevate abstract principles above the needs of human personality.

3. Kant's principle of universality is open to serious objections. This principle is a fairly good negative guide in that men should be encouraged to consider the larger implications and the general reasonableness of the principles upon which they intend to act. When, however, we ask what we should do, especially in new and unique situations, this formal principle is not satisfactory.

What is a person to do when duties conflict? If there is a conflict, for example, between the principle of truthfulness and the principle of the worth of human life, the moral choice becomes a choice between competing ends or conflicting values. To universalize these principles only adds to the embarrassment. Under such circumstances, it seems that the path of duty depends upon the consequences which Kant would have us ignore, at least theoretically. When a situation arises which presents a choice between loyalty and disloyalty to family or to country, the issue may be decided on the basis of Kant's principles. When, however, a conflict arises between loyalty to family and loyalty to country, this principle appears inadequate.

The principle of universality may be interpreted in two very different ways. It may refer to particular acts under particular circumstances, so that a man could argue that if anyone else were in exactly this situation he would be willing to have anyone else do the same thing, such as, steal or lie, if some good would result. If we judge an action from the point of view of the particular situation, it may lead to extreme laxness. There is, however, another interpretation and this is the one which Kant means to establish. The principle of universality refers to general types or principles of conduct. If a man is tempted to steal or to lie, he should ask whether he is able to will that stealing and lying become universal. Since such action would not only make social life impossible, but would be contrary to reason, he cannot will that they should be universalized. Consequently, these types of conduct are wrong without exception.

Whereas the first interpretation might lead to considerable laxity, this second interpretation is too extreme in that it allows no exceptions under any conditions. There are apparently some good actions which cannot be universalized without running into inconsistencies. For example, Kant believes that the principle of relief may be universalized, but if everyone were engaged in the relief of distress, it would not be necessary for anyone to engage in the activity. On the other hand, celibacy, as Kant states, could not be universalized as a principle, yet we can see some cases in which celibacy is not only right but a duty to future generations.

4. Apparently, consequences do play some part in Kant's moral judgments. His position is that the moral quality of an act depends entirely upon the motive and not upon the consequences. Yet his own principle of universality tends to refute this. For example, in the illustrations used, consequences do play a part even though they are not recognized. He thinks that the principle of the relief of distress universalized would produce a desirable result, while the principle of celibacy universalized would produce an undesirable result. But why is one result called desirable and another undesirable? We are left with mere assertions unless we appeal to consequences. One is right because its consequences are right or desirable; the other is wrong because its consequences are wrong or undesirable. Thus we see that the applications of the principle of universality imply a recognition of consequences, even though Kant does not attach any moral value to them. We need to ask why it is that we are able to will that some acts become universal, and why it is repugnant to us to think of other acts as universal. Is it not because the acts which we gladly universalize are necessary conditions of human welfare, and the other acts are detrimental to human life? Kant merely assumes the goodness or the values of certain acts and institutions. When men challenge these assumptions and ask why they are good, we are forced, are we not, to give a teleological answer? Moral principles are made for man, not man for moral principles.

The weakness of formalism is not so much that it is wrong, but that it is incomplete when left alone. While we need a certain

amount of formalism in order to gain valid principles which are consistent, we need something more than formalism. Principles need content; they need to be applied more concretely to personal and social situations. The moral theories set forth in the following chapters judge conduct on the basis of whether that conduct does or does not forward some end or goal which is thought to be good.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. An impulsive and dangerous man is in a great rage because he thinks wrongly that your friend has injured him. He will seriously injure and perhaps kill your friend if he finds him before his anger has subsided. Do you think it would be right or wrong to tell a falsehood so that he will not find your friend? What would Kant's answer be?
2. What do you think of the statement, "To tell the truth is a duty, but only towards him who has a right to the truth?" Can it be defended? A French philosopher, B. Constant, argued that the idea of duty is inseparable from the idea of right. To tell the truth is a duty toward him who has a right to the truth, but a man does not have a right to a truth if it means injury to others. See Abbott's translation of Kant's *Theory of Ethics*, Appendix, 6th ed., pp. 361 ff.
- ✓ 3. Victor Hugo, in *Les Misérables*, tells how Jean Valjean, an ex-convict under the name of M. Madeleine, had built up a successful business, was the popular mayor of his town, and a public benefactor. While he is mayor, he learns that another man, a feeble-minded old beggar, has been arrested as Jean Valjean and is about to be sent to the galleys. Since the welfare of many persons depended upon him, what was it his duty to do? What would Kant say?
- ✓ 4. A reporter learns of "an affair" in the life of a girl from a prominent family. When the girl discovers that he knows the facts, she begs him not to print the story in his paper. If the story is published, it will undoubtedly harm the girl's reputation. For the reporter it would be a "scoop," and consequently he would like to send it in. What is the reporter's duty in this situation?
5. Some persons consider that a more adequate presentation of formalism is found in *The Philosophy of Loyalty* by Josiah Royce. Study Royce's view, especially as found in Chapter Three, and be ready to discuss his position.

SUGGESTED READINGS

- Chapters in the general works by W. M. Urban, J. Dewey and J. H. Tufts, W. K. Wright, W. N. Nevius, Clifford L. Barrett, F. Paulsen, J. S. Mackenzie, et al.
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Chapter IV

HAPPINESS AS THE STANDARD

IN SHARP contrast to the formalism of Kant are the teleological views which we are to consider next. These theories judge conduct as right or wrong in relationship to some end or goal which is considered good. After all, a knowledge of goals is important. A few years ago in an important football game a player ran eighty yards and made a touchdown at the wrong goal. In the greater game of life, if we are to play well, we must know the direction in which the greatest good is to be found. In this chapter we shall consider the views that emphasize pleasure or happiness as the thing to be gained. Where a distinction is drawn between pleasure and happiness, pleasure is usually associated with the sensory or perceptual level of experience, whereas happiness is associated with the thought or conceptual level of experience. In popular discussions, however, pleasure and happiness are used as almost synonymous terms.

This doctrine that pleasure or happiness is the chief good in life is known as Hedonism. Since the time of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century, Utilitarianism has been the chief hedonistic doctrine. Utilitarianism differs from earlier hedonistic theories since it emphasizes not the pleasure of the individual, but "the greatest happiness of the great number." Interest shifts from the individual to the social group.

Hedonism dates back at least to Democritus (c. 460-c. 362 B.C.), who said that happiness is the object of our conduct, and to Aristippus (c. 435-c. 356 B.C.), a pupil of Socrates whose home was in Cyrene on the Northern Coast of Africa. The views of Aristippus are sometimes called Cyrenaicism. Pleasure is said to be the one and only good. The most intense pleasure is the highest good and is the aim of life. Epicurus (c. 342-270 B.C.) another Greek exponent of the pleasure theory modified the views of Aristippus. His system of

ethics was known as Epicureanism. Not the most intense pleasure but the most lasting and the highest is the thing for which men should seek. The spiritual pleasures are elevated above the fleeting physical pleasures and self-control, friendship, and wisdom are encouraged and developed. The pleasure theory was revived during the Renaissance, and especially in England in the seventeenth century by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704). Later exponents of the pleasure theory were Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).

TYPES OF HEDONISM

The doctrine that the chief good in life is pleasure takes a number of forms. We shall distinguish between *psychological hedonism* and *ethical hedonism*, then between *egoistic hedonism* and *altruistic hedonism*. These types of hedonism are not all mutually exclusive. While a person could not accept egoistic and altruistic hedonism at the same time, he could accept either one of them along with psychological hedonism, or even with ethical hedonism.

- 1) *Psychological hedonism* is the view that every person does as a matter of fact seek his own pleasure in life. The only motive that is effective in conduct is the desire to get pleasure and to avoid pain. Just as it is natural for water to seek its own level, so it is natural for men to seek pleasure. This position was defended by Jeremy Bentham. The theory is defended as one which is psychologically true and as one which gives a scientific foundation by which to understand and to control human conduct.

- 2) In contrast to psychological hedonism, *ethical hedonism* does not claim that we always seek to gain pleasure and avoid pain, but that we ought to do so. Men should choose so that their actions will bring the most happiness and the least unhappiness. Pleasure or happiness is not the sign or accompaniment of some other value, but the value itself. When we consider the views of John Stuart Mill, this position will receive additional elaboration.

- 3) Those who accept pleasure as a standard may differ in emphasizing self-interest or the common good. The first is *egoistic hedonism*, and the second *altruistic hedonism*. Some thinkers like Aristippus,

Epicurus, and Thomas Hobbes have reduced morality to self-interest considered on a pleasure-pain basis. If there is an opposition between our own interests and the interests of others, our sole duty is to ourselves regardless of the cost to others. The type of hedonism which stresses happiness, not to the individual but for the greatest number of people, is altruistic hedonism. As mentioned above, since the time of Bentham and Mill this form of hedonism has been the prevalent type, and it has been called Utilitarianism. x)

THE UTILITARIANISM OF JEREMY BENTHAM

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was especially interested in social and political reforms. This undoubtedly influenced him to seek a basis for morality that was practical or useful and that was social in its scope. He used the phrase "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," and felt that in it men have a yardstick that may be applied both to individual and to social behavior.

Nature, said Bentham, has placed man under the guidance of two masters, pleasure and pain. It is for them to indicate what man ought to do or to leave undone. "Man is a pleasure-seeking, pain-avoiding animal." Psychological hedonism is set forth and defended as a true account of man as he is. These two sensations determine man's behavior. That which brings pleasure is good, and that which brings pain is evil.

Since pleasure is good and pain is evil, the consequences are the important parts of actions. Consequences determine whether an act is good or evil. The proper ethical attitude is to calculate carefully the amount of pleasure and the amount of pain any act will bring, then to subtract the pain from the pleasure and find the balance. If there is a balance in favor of pleasure, the act is a good act. Since men naturally tend to seek pleasure and to avoid pain, there is no need to use the word "ought" at all.

Bentham's Utilitarianism was established on a purely quantitative basis taking into account the strength or the amount of pleasure and the number of persons involved. These are the only relevant differences that need to be considered since the quality of the pleasure may be disregarded. Bentham lived in an age that had just passed

through great development in the mathematical sciences. Qualitative differences of such things as warmth and sound were being expressed in numerical relationships. What would be more natural than to apply such measurements to pleasure and pain and gain exactitude in these fields? Pleasures vary according to: intensity (strength or weakness), duration, certainty, nearness, fecundity or the tendency to be followed by like sensations, purity, and the number of people involved. If these elements are measured, it will be possible to give an exact and objective statement of the morality of any action.

THE UTILITARIANISM OF JOHN STUART MILL

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), the greatest of the Utilitarians, accepts the general position of Bentham, defends it against numerous attacks, and adds some new elements. In defining Utilitarianism, Mill speaks of it as "the creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure."¹ Pleasure and the absence of pain are the only things desirable as ends. All desirable things are so because of the pleasure they give or because they are a means to the attainment of pleasure and the prevention of pain.

Of the many criticisms which Mill answers, we shall consider only two. First is the charge that Utilitarianism promotes sensuousness or that it is "a doctrine worthy only of swine." Mill points out that it is not the Utilitarians but the critics themselves who would debase human nature since they assume that human beings are capable of enjoying only those pleasures of which swine are capable. Human beings with refined faculties are not satisfied with the pleasures of the beast, but seek the higher pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments. Those who are equally acquainted with and equally able to enjoy the higher and

¹John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, Everyman's Library, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1910, p. 6.

the lower pleasures, give a definite preference to those pleasures which employ the higher faculties of man. The charge that Utilitarianism encourages selfishness is also vigorously denied by Mill who points out that not the person's own happiness but the good of all men is the standard of what is right in conduct. So long as we live in an imperfect and unjust society, the sacrifice of one's own happiness for the happiness of others is the highest virtue. Such sacrifice, however, is never an end-in-itself; it is a means to some greater happiness for mankind.

The most important change which Mill makes in Utilitarianism is to add a qualitative standard to Bentham's quantitative standard. "It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some *kinds* of pleasure are desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone."² As we have seen above, Mill was more or less forced into this position in his defense of the happiness principle. A person whose faculties are more highly developed is capable of higher pleasures and also of more acute suffering. The mental pleasures are superior to bodily pleasures, and, once a man has lived on a higher level, he can never really wish to sink into a lower level of existence. This may be due to a human sense of dignity, to his realization of the desirability of the higher pleasures, or to some other reason. "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."

What evidence or proof is there that men actually do desire pleasure? Can they be sure that happiness is the greatest good in life? Mill warns us that questions of ultimate ends cannot be proved in any final sense. This is true of all first principles, those of knowledge as well as those of conduct. Consciousness is immediate or direct and knowledge grows out of such experience. The only evidence we have that an object is visible is that people do see it. In the realms of sight and sound our perceptions are our undeniable evidence. In like manner, the only evidence that anything is desirable

²*Ibid.*, p. 7.

is that men do actually desire such things. Men do desire pleasure or happiness, says Mill, and they do so because it is the thing most to be desired or the greatest good. Thus the standard for conduct is and should be pleasure.

The Utilitarians believe that the best evidence of a good character is good actions and thus they stress the consequences of conduct. An action is not to be called right or wrong because it is performed by a good or a bad man, or because the man is courageous or amiable. Such considerations are relevant to our estimation of persons but not of actions. On the other hand, a right action does not necessarily mean that the person has a virtuous character; it means that the act in question leads to desirable results. The morality of an act depends not on the motive that prompts it, but upon the effects of the act upon society as a whole. In some cases, however, where unforeseen circumstances prevent good consequences, we recognize the act as praiseworthy because of the intended effects. In other cases where a vicious intention miscarries and some good effect ensues, we condemn the man because of the intended consequences.

Whereas Bentham depended upon the person's enlightened self-interest to explain consideration for the welfare of other men, Mill felt that the social state was natural and more or less habitual to man. There is no clear line of separation between the interests of the individual and of society. The social feeling of mankind is a powerful force which tends to grow stronger as men advance in civilization. A society of equals can exist only when "the interests of all are to be regarded equally." When men co-operate as they must in society, their interests tend to be the same. They realize that the interests of others are in essential harmony with their own interests. To promote not individual happiness but the greatest total happiness is the essence of Mill's position.

AN EVALUATION OF THE HAPPINESS THEORY

The desire to be happy is a normal desire and it appears to be widespread if not universal. That pleasure is a good and pain an evil seems to be on the whole self-evident. Unhappiness and pain indicate that something in ourselves or in our environment is wrong

and needs to be changed. Within broad limits it is to be admitted that the happiness standard is a more or less accurate guide to conduct, especially if the higher or intellectual pleasures are kept to the fore.

The happiness standard has the advantage of setting up a goal that is easily recognized, even though we do not always know exactly how to attain happiness. No form of conduct would be called a virtue if it did not, at least in the long run, increase human happiness. The virtues, like courage, self-control, and honesty, are the types of conduct that tend to increase happiness. If they consistently led to unhappiness, men would probably call them vices instead of virtues.

The Utilitarian Movement, the revival of hedonism in the nineteenth century, has led to many practical, social, economic, and political reforms. The movement grew out of the wretched conditions that existed in England after the Napoleonic Wars and the disturbances of the early stages of the industrial revolution. Men were made conscious of unjust and cruel conditions which had been taken largely for granted, and they were moved to work for changes which would make possible greater human happiness. Pain and misery were regarded as warnings which it was dangerous to disregard. In England, where Utilitarianism arose, the anti-slavery movement, the new missionary program, and the Reform Bill of 1832 were all to a considerable extent expressions of the new urge to bring greater happiness to all mankind.

In pointing out certain weaknesses of the happiness theory, we shall need to distinguish between different types of hedonism. First, let us consider psychological hedonism. Some men might seek pleasure all the time and all men might be motivated by pleasure part of the time, yet that would not prove the theory true. To prove the theory it would be necessary to prove its universality, and this appears to be impossible. If a man rushes to save the life of another person, there is no conscious thought or weighing of the pleasure and pain involved. This is also true of many acts performed by the average person. To say that every act is motivated by feelings of pleasure and pain because these sensations accompany all of our acts is like arguing that the purpose of driving a car is to consume gasoline.

Ethical hedonism, the view that we ought to seek pleasure and avoid pain, like psychological hedonism, presents difficulties. According to Mill, a person on a higher cultural level will require different *kinds* of pleasure than a man on a lower cultural level. The pleasure and pain which will come to a man will be those which are in accord with his character and cultural development. The things that give a man pleasure change in a few years, or during his lifetime, as well as in the history of the race. Apparently it is the character of the man who is seeking satisfaction, and not the desire for pleasure, that determines conduct. Men are not alike; one man's pleasure is another man's pain. The dishonest or stingy man will seek pleasure according to his ideals, and the honorable man will seek pleasure on the basis of an entirely different set of ideals. Not all pleasures are of equal worth. Since some kinds of happiness are opposed to moral values, then happiness itself cannot be the standard of value. There are values that cannot be measured in terms of pleasure and pain.

To accept pleasure or happiness as the standard of right and wrong is to place emphasis almost exclusively upon feeling to the neglect of the intellectual, aesthetic, and religious side of man's nature. The fleeting nature of mere feeling is expressed by Bradley:

Pleasures, we saw, were a perishing series. This one comes, and the intense self-feeling proclaims satisfaction. It is gone, and *we* are not satisfied. It was not that one, then, but this one now; and this one now is gone. It was not that one, then, but another and another; but another and another do not give us what we want; we are still left eager and confident, till the flush of feeling dies down, and when that is gone there is nothing left. We are where we began, so far as the getting happiness goes; and we have not found ourselves; and we are not satisfied.³

Happiness is evidently a by-product and not an end-in-itself. The pursuit of pleasure by itself leads to its own defeat. The person who says, "I am going out to find happiness," will probably not find it. Happiness apparently comes to men as a by-product of achievement, of creativeness, or of the fulfillment of function. The terms "good"

³F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 1927, p. 96.

and "happiness" apparently are not synonymous. As John Dewey says, "The statement that all good has enjoyment as an ingredient is not equivalent to the statement that all pleasure is a good." We judge some pleasures to be good, others we condemn.

The emphasis upon "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" has much to commend it. Misery and pain are indications that something is wrong. We do need to increase human happiness. Yet it is well to remember that to emphasize happiness alone may be quite inadequate. Happiness while a good is not the chief good since it represents only one side of man's nature and one class of ends. Man is a rational as well as a feeling being and he needs to grow. The good consists in growth and in a maximum of life and not simply in a maximum of pleasurable sensations.

THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS

While it is not possible to accept happiness as a complete goal, nevertheless happiness is a good to be desired. Therefore it may be in order here to digress briefly to ask how we may attain it.

In our discussion thus far we have indicated that the desire for happiness is normal and widespread and that pain and unhappiness are indications that something is wrong. Why, then, are so many people unhappy today? Disregarding the evils of our social system, such as poverty, economic injustice, and war, as well as the misfortunes that occasionally visit some individuals and family groups, many persons are unhappy because they are looking in the wrong places for happiness. Among the "mistaken roads" over which persons hope to attain happiness is wealth. While a certain income is necessary, since persons must have food, clothing, shelter, and other things, this is not the way to the happy life. Persons who have lived in close contact with the very rich tell us that they are by no means the most happy group in society. Fame or notoriety, while frequently sought after, is another blind alley on the road to happiness. Others seek happiness through a round of amusements. These, however, soon lose their appeal and do not give the expected contentment. These paths often lead to disappointment because happiness is so largely a state within the person.

There is no formula for happiness which will be effective for all individuals. A study of happy and unhappy persons seems to indicate, however, that the following four factors are important for the attainment of happiness. First, some worth-while work into which a person can put his best. Enjoyment of work and success in it is one of the chief elements in happiness. What men dislike is over-work and drudgery rather than work itself. If men hate their work, it may be a curse rather than a blessing. A small boy is said to have remarked that life would be "just great" if it were not for two things, if we didn't have to get up before breakfast or work between meals! One study of happy persons made at Columbia University indicated that happiness is associated with responsible, hard-working living and not with impulsive, amusing dilettantism.⁴ Happiness is frequently the result of deliberate achievement, and grows out of work and self-sacrifice rather than from mere emotion. It frequently lies near the field, the factory, and the crowded desk.

A second ingredient of happiness is a great loyalty, or devotion to something greater than oneself. For some persons this great loyalty and purpose will be found in their work. An outstanding example is afforded by the life of Jane Addams who gave and found her life in a great social task in Chicago. Those who have a sense of mission in a noble task, and those who contribute much to the welfare of the race, gain a satisfaction seldom known by those who have not given so fully. For many persons this sense of loyalty to something greater than themselves comes outside their routine tasks. It may come through loyalty to a great personality, through loyalty to great ideals, or through contact with some movement or organization that one is endeavoring to promote.

A third element in happiness is an expanding and friendly interest in other persons and things. The self-centered person is seldom happy. Self-absorption may lead to the exaggeration of minor defects and pains, to self-pity, to vanity and a desire for admiration, or to more serious abnormal traits which destroy happiness. Today, an individual cannot live unto and for himself alone. He must be more than an individual in order to get along at all. A wide range of

⁴*The New York Times*, March 9, 1930.

interests and broad human sympathies are elements in a life that is rich and full. A harmonious adjustment in marriage or with intimate friends and companions is also needed. The desires for recognition and response demand some satisfaction.

Interest in other persons needs to be a friendly interest and not that of the faultfinder or scandalmonger. The faultfinder probably will not be finally successful in life, and is seldom if ever happy. The person who cultivates the attitude of looking for the best in others will be rewarded by finding a large number of admirable qualities, since his attitude will call forth the best in others as well as in himself. A similar attitude of looking for the good that is near at hand is a valuable trait. Distant fields tend to look green. Some persons are continually saying, "If I were just in some other place," or "If I were just some other person," how grand life would be. The writer once saw a picture in which the artist had drawn two dogs each with its head through a fence eating out of the bowl belonging to the other dog. No doubt each dog was convinced that it was getting a much better meal. While we should strive to make progress, we need to see and to enjoy the values that are near at hand.

The final element in happiness, that we shall mention here, is character and a well-integrated self. A psychologist tells us that the chief element in unhappiness is the conflict in our lives between incompatible tendencies.⁶ This does not mean that, for happiness, we must have a life without difficulties and problems. For a man whose life is at peace within, external obstacles and difficulties may add to the zest of living. Happiness is largely a state within. External circumstances are important, but they are not the final factors. The cultivation of a rich inner life and a strong character are among the most important elements. This, perhaps, is exceedingly fortunate. If happiness depended most largely upon things and came from without, then other persons could rob us of it. Perhaps this is part of the meaning of the statement by Jesus that "the kingdom of God is within you." The kingdom is to be gained by changing oneself as well as by changing the environment.

⁶William McDougall, *Character and the Conduct of Life*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1927, chap. IX.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. A farmer, after a few decades of successful farming, decided to retire. He purchased a new home in the town nearby. His new home was equipped with many modern conveniences which he did not have in the country. However, the long-looked-for leisure and comforts, which he thought would bring him happiness, did not give him the contentment and the peace which he had expected. Is this typical? How do you explain this case?
2. To what extent is happiness due to outside circumstances and to what extent an inner state or condition? Do adverse external conditions always detract from our happiness, or do they sometimes give zest to life? Do you agree with the statement that happiness springs from character and not from circumstances? Explain.
3. What is the meaning of suffering? Is there any value at all in pain?
4. What part does a sense of humor play in helping us to be happy? What part does laughter play?
5. See John Stuart Mill's answer to the charges that Utilitarianism is: (1) Too lofty an ideal for humanity. (2) A view that renders man cold and unsympathetic, and is a "godless" doctrine. (3) Mere expediency. See John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, Everyman's Library, pp. 17-20.

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Chapter V

NATURE OR EVOLUTION AS THE STANDARD

THE SYSTEM of ethics which emphasizes "nature," biological development, the maximum of life, or adaptation to environment, is called the Ethics of Naturalism or more recently the Ethics of Evolution. The terms "nature" and "naturalism" are used in a great variety of senses. Naturalism ordinarily means the explanation of the higher or later or more complex in terms of the lower or earlier or more simple. The laws which operate throughout nature are also believed to determine man's behavior. Naturalism is thus an explanation of things in terms of resident forces, quite apart from any outside purpose or agency. It is an appeal to the facts of the world of nature.

Today naturalistic ethics is evolutionary ethics, since the prevailing explanation of the world of nature is in terms of evolution. Theories of naturalism and of evolution did not begin with the nineteenth century. Naturalism goes back at least as far as Democritus, and ideas of evolution to Anaximander and Anaxagoras in ancient Greece. We shall confine our consideration to views which have been set forth during the last one hundred years. While there are divergences in presentation, some form of the Ethics of Evolution is set forth by such men as Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Leslie Stephen, and M. Deshumbert. The Ethics of Evolution assumes that what is natural is right, that the standard of goodness is to be found in the evolutionary process at work in nature, and that the good is that which is achieved through natural selection. We shall turn, next, to a brief elaboration of the views of Darwin, Spencer, and Deshumbert.

CHARLES DARWIN, 1809-1882

The publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859, and *The Descent of Man* a few years later, furnished scientific evidence for

the theory of biological evolution. The conception of evolution as the result of natural selection in the struggle for existence soon became a fairly popular view among informed persons. The new evidence seemed to account for the evolution of all life, including man, by natural agencies of cause and effect, existent in the past as in the present, and without the aid of mind or any outside agency.

As a result of long and careful investigations Darwin had collected a mass of evidence which convinced him of the change of species. The problem of how one species arose from another was more difficult to see. Suggestions from the work of animal breeders and the cultivation of plants, along with the theory of population set forth by Malthus, offered the clue. Animal breeders were careful to select the animals with the most desirable traits and in this way they were able to improve the stock. Here was one clue. Does nature also use this method? The theory of Malthus had pointed out that population tends to outrun the food supply since there is a biological tendency to increase in a geometric ratio or by doubling, while food for the population increases in an arithmetic ratio or by simple additions. While there are other positive and negative checks on the population, in the last resort it is the food supply which determines the population. Putting these suggestions together with others which he had gained from his observations and investigations, Darwin set forth his famous doctrine of natural selection.

The theory of natural selection rests upon four postulates: 1. Heredity. Parents produce offspring more or less like themselves. Like tends to beget like. 2. Variations. No two offspring are exactly alike. There are small differences. 3. The struggle for existence based chiefly upon competition for food. There is competition within each species, and struggle against enemies in other species. 4. The survival of the fittest or the tendency of those best adapted to the environment to survive the struggle. Thus progress takes place as a result of the elimination of those individuals less fitted and the propagation of the more capable.

Darwin gave most attention to the case for organic evolution. He collected a great mass of evidence from such fields as comparative anatomy, embryology, vestigial remains, and geographical distri-

bution. He also offered evidence for the development of mental and moral qualities and the close relationship between the subhuman and the human. Animals, the lowest savages, and the highest men are connected by the finest gradations. The same senses and many of the same instincts and emotions appear. Man's moral sense is based on sociability which grew out of sympathy, and sympathy is seen in both animals and man. In discussing such virtues as sympathy, fidelity, and courage, he says:

Such social qualities, the paramount importance of which to the lower animals is disputed by no one, were no doubt acquired by the progenitors of man in a similar manner, namely, through natural selection, aided by inherited habit. When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into competition, if (other circumstances being equal) the one tribe included a great number of courageous, sympathetic, and faithful members, who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other, this tribe would succeed better and conquer the other.¹

This application of the principle of natural selection to the field of morals led to some interesting conclusions. It was seized upon by many because it seemed to put ethics on a scientific and naturalistic basis. Standards for human conduct were now to be sought in the very nature of things. Artificial devices and purposeful explanations were needed no longer. Chance and mechanical processes were believed to be working in the direction of good. The good was, therefore, to be gained by natural selection.

HERBERT SPENCER, 1820-1903

Herbert Spencer gave one of the most elaborate presentations of nineteenth-century naturalism. He was a great generalizer who popularized the theory of evolution and attempted to apply it to all realms of modern thought. The idea of Evolution in his mind became a cosmic principle. There is a Cosmic Unity, a World Energy, or a Power behind the world of appearances, but we cannot discover the nature of this Ultimate Reality. It is unknown and

¹Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, chap. V.

unknowable. Human experience and logical thinking imply a cosmic unity of some sort.

Central to Spencer's ethical position is the emphasis upon the adaptation of the organism to the physical environment. Ethical impulses, ideas, ideals, and moral standards are all explained in the biological conceptions of adaptation and survival. This emphasis brought Spencer into close harmony with the views of Darwin. Life is "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." The greatest good is length of life and harmonious adaptation to the environment. Not only a long life but its richness or fullness or "breadth" must be considered, and not merely the individual life but all life.

Moral conduct is that action which leads to the preservation and adaptation of life, whether of the individual or of the group. Such good actions tend to produce happiness or pleasure. The surplus of pleasure over pain makes life desirable and is also a sign of healthy functioning. Spencer does not, however, go the whole way with the Utilitarians and say that it is pleasure that makes an action good and pain that is evil. Pleasure tends to accompany acts which lead in the direction of human welfare, and pain tends to accompany actions of the opposite kind. On the whole, the pursuit of happiness would be advantageous to survival.

Spencer exhibits an unshakable conviction that the natural laws of the evolutionary process itself lead in the direction of the good. As the individual improves physically, he is also passing from a crude gregariousness to conscious sympathy and intelligent co-operation. The laws of nature are gradually bringing a harmony so that acts which are good for the individual are also good for the group and for the race. Moreover, acts which bring pleasure, acts which bring personal adaptation, and acts which preserve the race tend to coincide in one grand harmony. There are occasions, however, when the sacrifice of an individual for the preservation of the species is necessary. This opposition between individual good and social good is becoming less and will disappear eventually.

The implication of the position set forth above is clear both for personal and social morality. The chief duty of man is to stand

aside and avoid interference with the processes of nature. Let man trust in evolution since it is gradually bringing about a more harmonious adjustment of his nature to the environment in which he lives. Biological changes in the constitution of man are tending to eliminate evils and to bring happiness and progress. A system of morality should be founded on the laws of the evolution of life.

The duties of society or of the state with respect to individuals are also clear. Apart from artificial devices or manipulation, the strongest members of society will achieve the greatest success and propagate their kind. The desirable qualities will be handed on to future generations and will increase. The individuals with defects or weaker strains will naturally fail to survive. In this way society will be purged of its weaklings and the race will be strengthened. Apart from protecting men from foreign aggression and preventing crime within the group, the state has few, if any, duties. Individuals must be as free as possible from all interference by the state so that the laws of nature will work without hindrance in their own lives and in social relationships. Spencer regarded even education, the postal service, and the making of roads as outside the proper jurisdiction of government. Individuals may assist others, since charity is at least good for the giver. Such benevolence, however, is outside the function of government.

M. DESHUMBERT'S THEORY

In *An Ethical System Based on the Laws of Nature*, M. Deshumbert sets forth an ethical system closely akin to those just considered. From among the more recent statements of the evolutionary approach, we shall select this for a brief exposition.

Nature includes everything that exists, and nothing can exist apart from nature. Man, then, is a part of nature, a component part of the universe and subject to the same laws as are found in the rest of nature. Since it is in nature that we live and have our being, it is the part of wisdom to find out what nature wants in order that we may obey her laws and live a full, harmonious life.

The first great facts about nature that impress us are the "overwhelming plenitude of life distributed throughout the universe,"

and the "persistent tendency to live." To live appears to be the fundamental law of all existence. Wherever life can exist, there it appears, and against all obstacles it strives to continue to live. Nature has endowed living creatures with a marvelous power of adaptation. Consider the superabundance of life in the air, on land, and on the surface and in the depths of the water. Adaptation of living creatures to every kind of environment and to most diverse conditions is in evidence. Consider also such things as the numerous protective devices like bitter juices and prickly hairs, the recuperative faculty or the healing power of nature, the adjustments made to serve life processes, the maternal foresight, and the co-operation of bodily organs. Deshumbert goes to considerable length to illustrate such things from nature and to point out that the tendency of life to persist is not a chance phenomenon but the central goal which nature sets out to achieve.

In the development from protozoa to men, it is not mere life that nature is content to produce, but it strives to endow life as richly as possible.

In considering the struggle for existence, especially amongst the lower animals, one is rather apt to assume that strength is the only thing that counts. Yet it is evident that there are many qualities, both intellectual and moral, which play an even more important part, such as attentiveness, perseverance, energy, patience, courage, adroitness, power of observation, and judgment. *And it is precisely the importance of these qualities in the struggle for existence that has led to their development, first of all in the lower animals and afterwards in man.*²

Among all living things, whether it be plants, animals, or men, there are elementary rules of behavior which must be observed or the species will cease to exist. Here we find the "elements of morality." In the care and provision of the plant for its seeds we find the "first example of maternal morality." In the social life of birds and mammals we have examples of "family morality," along truly altruistic lines. The virtue of parental devotion was in existence long before man appeared. The gregarious animals like the monkeys,

²M. Deshumbert, *An Ethical System Based on the Laws of Nature*, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1917, pp. 51-52.

beavers, ants, and bees exhibit reciprocal service and care. They are examples of "tribal morality." With the bees and ants which establish fixed abodes and are highly sociable and industrious, we reach "the morality of the citizen." In the evolution of life, co-operation and mutual aid are of far greater importance than physical combat. As in histories which describe every battle but pass over facts of greater importance, so in our consideration of the development of life we have failed to see that co-operation has been more important than competition.

When we consider human morality, we find the same principles and forces in operation as were found among the animals. Natural selection has led those groups to survive which have shown the most kindness and sympathy in their dealings with their fellows. After passing through the stages of family, tribal, and civic morality, men rose above the level of animals and attained national morality when larger units took shape. While most people are in this stage, with some the ethical sense is tending "to expand and become cosmopolitan." The goal of nature is life of the highest degree of activity, morality, and intelligence.

The desire for the enlargement of life is seen in such diverse activities as the growing plant, the egg which produces a bird, the growing child, a wound that heals, in intellectual development, in the urge to love, in aesthetic appreciation, in the sun that warms the earth. As a part of nature a moral man ought to act in harmony with the universe and extend and enlarge life. "Natural Ethics may be defined as the science which has for its object all means of conserving and augmenting life in all its aspects (physical, intellectual, moral, social, and aesthetic), and thus realizing the full development of the whole being."³ "The good is everything that contributes to the conservation and the enlargement of life" or, stated differently, "that contributes to the harmonious expansion of the individual and of the groups of which he is a member." In this emphasis upon life, however, Deshumbert points out that the effort to improve the quality of life takes precedence over mere improvement in quantity.

The advantage of such a system of ethics, according to Deshum-

³Deshumbert, *An Ethical System Based on the Laws of Nature*, p. 89.

bert, is that it is universal in its scope or application. It applies to all groups, both artificial and natural, as well as to individuals. These acts which enlarge life also tend to bring us pleasure or happiness. While happiness should not be the direct object of our strivings, the good man who endeavors to augment life finds happiness as well. By following such a system of ethics, we endeavor to enlarge the lives of others in order that we may expand our own lives more fully, and we enrich our own lives so as to serve others more adequately. Thus the egoistic and the altruistic impulses are harmonized. Instead of following some arbitrary commands imposed upon us by others, we follow the commands of the life within us.

EVALUATION OF EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS

The three presentations of Evolutionary Ethics which we have set forth are not equally open to the same criticisms. The ethics of Deshumbert in recognizing the need of "augmenting life in all its aspects" and developing the whole being comes much nearer to the theories of self-realization, as set forth in the next chapter, than do the other views. In the main, however, the following points need to be kept in mind in our consideration of all of these presentations.

1. The survival of the fittest is a biological concept and not an ethical standard. To say that a thing is "fit" in the biological sense is merely to say that it is able to survive, or that after it has survived you choose to call it the fittest. Since there are many different kinds of adaptation, survival in itself does not guarantee that it is the best in a moral sense. A parasite that preys on some other living form may survive merely because it has accidentally adopted its predatory ways. In some environments a lower form of life may be better fitted to survive than is man. From a purely physical point of view man is not as adequately adjusted to his environment as are some other organisms. If the evolutionary process is aiming to secure adaptation, it might have stopped with certain lower forms which were so well adapted that they have practically ceased to change.

2. To assume that there is continuity of behavior from the reactions of the protozoa to the conscious moral choices of man is to disregard the fact that there appear to be quite different levels of

behavior. Natural selection, while an important factor, is not the only element in the evolution of morals. As we approach the higher levels of morality, the relationship between survival value and moral value is not so close. Conscious or rational choice leads to the use of new and different standards of selection. Human conduct must be judged on the basis of human standards of evaluation and not on the basis of what we know about animal behavior. By means of rational selection man is able to choose to some extent what environment shall influence him, and he may be able to adapt that environment to his own needs and ideals. Evolution becomes somewhat different with man. Social evolution and social heredity are very different things from the process of organic evolution. To assume that moral ideals have been acquired by man as a result of the biological acquisition of useful experiences is to fail to appreciate the factors of social or cultural conditioning. Biologically, the race may make little change through thousands of years, yet great moral transformations may take place in a few years or within the lifetime of an individual.

3. Practically all persons are ready to admit that some natural results of the evolutionary process are not equally good when compared with others. If some products of the process of natural selection are better than others, then it is not the process itself but some other standard which must be sought. It is the good results, then, toward which we need to strive.

4. Finally, there is in man, as Kant made clear, a sense of duty. This feeling, "I ought," is an important part of man's moral consciousness. Now, if man is simply the outcome of the natural forces of selection, an injunction to conform to their ways has little meaning. The sense of obligation is meaningful only if there is that about man which is to some extent independent of those forces, and which may decide the relationship in which he shall stand to them. A person may hold up before himself some possible state or achievement as expressing his greatest good, and he may act for the sake of that good. The sense of duty is not always synonymous with man's judgment as to what is useful, nor is the demand always for adaptation to the environment. Throughout the centuries cou-

rageous pioneers have refused to adapt themselves to conditions as they existed or to gain survival in this way. Yet through their struggles, their martyrdom, and their visions, the race has moved forward to new moral insights and achievements.

THE APPEAL TO NATURE

For thousands of years men have appealed to nature in support of what they considered to be fundamental principles. To find a support in nature seemed to place such principles above criticism and change. Among the great thinkers of Greece there developed the conception of a law of nature embracing both the physical world and man's own life. For the Stoics the conception of a law of nature became central. "To live according to nature" was the Stoic formula for the good life. Nature was a great rational process, and justice was immanent in nature and therefore fixed and immutable. The idea was further developed among the Romans and received attention from a number of medieval thinkers. It was revived by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) in his work *The Rights of War and of Peace*, (1625). Grotius laid the foundation of international law by contending that there is a divinely constituted law of nature to which all men and nations are subject.

During the eighteenth century, nature and reason became the two dominant ideas. The Law of Nature became the basis of the revolutionary creeds of that century. In the Declaration of Rights of the Philadelphia Congress of 1774 appeal is made to "the immutable laws of nature" as well as to the principles of the English constitution. First among the rights claimed are those of life, liberty, and property. In the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, the thirteen states base their claim to independence on "certain unalienable rights" which come to man from his Creator. The French Declarations of 1791 and 1793 are drawn up "in the presence of the Supreme Being," but the "imprescriptible rights" come to man from nature or by birth.

The idea of a law of nature upon which was based certain natural rights was made to serve the interests of the growing business classes. These groups felt strong enough to stand by themselves, and they

were hampered in their dealings by numerous regulations. They, therefore, demanded freedom from governmental interference, together with protection of the rights of property and of contract so essential to business life. Men like Adam Smith and Ricardo in England and a group in France known as the Physiocrats emphasized the laws of nature as the source of wealth and property, and the undesirability of interfering with the natural laws affecting the processes of society and industry. Men ought to study nature so as not to disturb its action, since nature is operating in the interests of man. Government should keep the peace but let natural laws, including economic laws such as free competition, reign supreme. This position created a favorable atmosphere for the reception of the doctrine of natural selection in the nineteenth century. The social philosophy and the evolutionary science of the nineteenth century tended to reinforce each other.

What is the validity or justification of this appeal to nature? While any moral standards and social institutions must face facts and recognize the nature of the world in which we live, it appears ridiculous to attempt to prevent intelligent human control by an appeal to nature. Man's ethical and rational powers are also natural in the sense that they have appeared in the evolutionary process. The first direct challenge came from the Utilitarians who claimed that utility, and not some ancient or natural right, is the test of an institution or program. Today, leaders in the field of the social sciences are pretty well agreed that the test of any program or institution must be its social desirability, or evidence that it will forward some social end. When men want some action because of reasons based upon their emotions or upon vested interests, they tend to fall back upon "nature" for support. We must challenge their right to do so, and demand that present and future human welfare be the criterion of action.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Mr. A is sitting in a dentist's chair, and the dentist is working to save a tooth which is considerably decayed. The dentist, Mr. B, protests against government regulation in our economic life. He says that he thinks we should not interfere with natural laws. Our economic dis-

orders will right themselves if we keep our hands off. Mr. A replies that just as the dentist manipulates certain processes so that men will have healthy teeth, the government must manipulate and control so that economic disorders will be eliminated and conditions be more conducive to healthy living. Give examples showing where we refuse to accept nature and nature's ways.

2. Does the fact that a connection can be established between human and animal behavior necessarily mean that no new principle or factor is present in human behavior? What is the difference between nature, animal nature, and human nature?
3. If man is considered a part of nature, then intelligence is a part of nature. To what extent is intelligent control a natural thing?
4. Do you think that the test of an institution should be its survival value or its social desirability? Give reasons for your answer.
5. Report on the ethical conceptions of one of the following: (1) Leslie Stephen, or (2) M. Bergson. Indicate in what ways they differ from the views set forth in the chapter.

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Chapter VI

SELF-REALIZATION AS THE STANDARD

THE LAST TYPE of ethical theory which we are to consider takes for its goal the development of the self as a thinking, feeling, and acting being. Self-Realization means the harmonious development of the normal capacities of human nature. By different persons it has been called Idealistic Perfectionism, Eudæmonism, and Energism. Supporters of this view believe that any theory which is purely formal, as well as theories which stress feeling alone, or which stress organic adjustment to environment, are inadequate. This theory of life has had numerous able representatives since the days of ancient Greece. We shall consider the Greek and Christian contributions before discussing Self-Realization as a modern ethical ideal.

GREEK CONTRIBUTIONS

Plato and Aristotle are two of the greatest intellects which the world has produced. Their influence upon the course of Western Civilization has been tremendous, and they are still forces to be considered. Plato (427-347 B.C.) was a pupil of Socrates. After the death of Socrates and a period of travel, he founded the Academy at Athens. This school became famous as one of the chief intellectual centers of Greece. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), a pupil of Plato, founded the Lyceum at Athens in 335 B.C. He achieved great fame as a teacher, writer, investigator, and administrator.

Plato. There is no one treatise which elaborates completely the ethics of Plato. His great work *The Republic* most nearly does this. In it he attempts to set forth the ideal state, the society which embodies his ethical ideals. His ethical views are inseparably connected with his view of the universe, his view of man, and his view of society or the state. The good is bound up with and concerns every problem in life.

The universe, Plato believes, is a purposeful moral order in which the real, the true, and the good are closely related. Instead of the one world of previous philosophers, he says that there are two realms. There is (1) the world of perceptions or the realm of appearances. This is the world of nature, the phenomenal world of sights, sounds, individual things, change, and relativity. This is not the real world. Then, there is (2) the realm of thought, of ideas, of concepts, or of universals. This is the supersensible world of abiding realities. We recognize individual trees because of our general idea of tree. We say "this is a tree" because we have in mind the pattern or model or concept "tree" which enables us to identify the particular thing as a tree. The same is true for all other things. We recognize individual things because of our knowledge of ideas or universals. The soul of man, because of its previous existence in the realm of ideas, has these innate or inborn ideas which enable it to recognize things through "recollection." Perceptions are copies of the real things and remind the soul of what it formerly knew. Reality, then, consists of these patterns or concepts, or as Plato calls them, ideas. The goal of the world process is the expression of the idea of the good. The goal of life is to discover reality and the good.

Man's life is composed of three parts. There is (1) a rational part, located in the head or brain. This is the "soul" or the mind whose true function is to rule the body. This is the seat of wisdom. There is (2) a feeling part located in the breast. This is the seat of man's sensations and the basis of the heroic virtues, especially courage. Then, there is (3) a desiring part located in the abdomen. This is the seat of man's passions and appetites. There is no principle of order here, and this part of man needs to be brought under the control of reason. This is the basis of self-control or temperance. When these three parts operate in harmony, each carrying out its own function, there is peace and order.

The well-ordered state is also made up of three parts corresponding to the three parts of the life of man. There are (1) the rulers or philosophers whose function it is, by the use of their training and insight, to rule the state. These men are devoted to the common good, the ideal of perfection, and their chief virtue is wisdom. There

are (2) the officials or warriors who execute the laws and guard the state. Their chief virtue is courage. Then, there are (3) the workers or the artisans and peasants who furnish the material foundations of the state. Their virtue is temperance.

Justice or righteousness is the all-inclusive virtue implying harmony within a man's life and of the individual's life with the ordered life of the state. When each part of the individual and each part of the state fulfills its function, then there is justice. Man's life and the organization of society should be patterns of the harmony and the moral order of the universe. The greatest good is the maximum richness of life. The good of any particular thing is to fulfill its function or purpose and to add to the harmony of things.

Aristotle. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* we have the first systematic treatise upon ethics as a separate study and one of the most influential books in the field. Aristotle differs from Plato chiefly in method and emphasis rather than in the fundamental point of view. Whereas Plato attempted to explain particulars in terms of universals, Aristotle begins with an examination of the facts of human experience. For Aristotle, there is one world of reality and that is the visible world of nature. Ideas exist, but they exist in things. Reality is found in things. It is an unfolding process. Ideas and things, or form and matter, are united and there is a continuous development from potentiality to actuality. The "spiritual" and the "natural" are inseparably connected. The moral ideal is found in the structure of man's own nature.

What is the goal of human life? For what do men seek? Men apparently are seeking many different things. Men engaged in medical pursuits seek health, the military man seeks victory or proficiency in military tactics, the bridle maker aims to make good equipment for horses, the business man wants to acquire wealth. But these are not ends-in-themselves. These are means to still other ends, and there is apparently a hierarchy of ends. Is there any final end, or highest good (*summum bonum*) which is an end-in-itself and not a means to another end? The good is "that at which all things aim." The highest good, Aristotle thinks, is *eudaimonia*, which is often translated *well-being*. It includes the complete

development of the functions which make a man a human being and a member of a society. It is not a passive achievement but the active exercise of functions, and happiness is its natural outcome. Just as the excellence of the sculptor lies in the skill with which he practices the principles of his art, so the excellence of man lies in the proper fulfillment of his function. The function peculiar to man is his life of reason. Consequently, he should exercise this function and live in the light of reason.

Man's nature is divided into two parts. There is an irrational side to man's nature composed of a vegetative part, not directly controlled by reason, and an appetitive part which man shares with the lower animals. The impulses emanating from man's animal nature may be controlled. In contrast to the irrational part, man has a rational nature or self which is a distinctive characteristic of human beings. The well-being of man differs from that of the vegetable or the animal in that it is an expression of reason. The rational part of man may be engaged in reflective contemplation upon the nature of things, or it may direct its energy to the control of the impulses arising from his irrational nature. By redirecting irrational impulses into rational virtues, human personality is perfected and man's highest welfare attained. The habit of right thinking and right acting is a virtue.

The doctrine of the *golden mean* or of moderation is central in the ethics of Aristotle. That conduct is virtuous which avoids the extremes either of excess or of deficiency. The good life is not one that exercises extreme repression or that permits excessive indulgence, but one which encourages the harmonious development of all moral functions of the organism. For example, courage is the middle position between rashness and cowardice. In the case of any virtue the point between the extremes which is moral action will depend upon the circumstances. More courage is expected of the soldier than of the artist. Circumstances and reason together enter into the consideration and indicate virtuous conduct. A virtuous man is one who has formed the habit of performing virtuous acts. In a later chapter, Aristotle's position regarding the virtues will be discussed further.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS

A study of the history of the Christian Church will indicate that Christian ethics have varied from age to age and from group to group. Yet the golden thread running through these systems has been the teachings of Jesus as seen in the New Testament. In the attempt to study the ethics of Jesus, certain difficulties present themselves. Jesus, himself, left no writings. The Gospel records, which are our main source of his teachings, are quite obviously not shorthand reports of actual conversations. They are interpretations written down at a later time, and they do not always agree. Jesus did not set forth a complete system of ethics. His teaching was also adapted to the particular problem which he was facing, and frequently took the form of a parable or illustrative story. He accepted much of what had been worked out or discovered by the race up to his time, yet he felt free to revise and to adapt it to the new conditions. His message came to men with such a freshness, a directness, and a ring of reality that men said that he spoke with authority.

Central in Jesus's philosophy of life is his emphasis upon the value of the self or person. Man is of greater value than anything else. Other things derive their value according to their relation to or their effect upon man's life. The Ten Commandments of the Mosaic law had forbidden labor on the Sabbath day. At the time of Jesus numerous kinds of work were forbidden. Knots must not be tied on the Sabbath day, except such as those made by women in fastening their garments. One liberal rabbi said that it was permissible to tie a knot if it could be untied with one hand. Carrying a burden was labor. One rabbi said that a cripple could go out with his wooden leg, but another declared that it would be a burden and hence a sin to go out with a wooden limb on the Sabbath. Jesus swept aside such rules as irrelevant to life. When asked a question regarding the use of the Sabbath, he said, "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath." Persons are ends-in-themselves, other things are means. An application of this principle to modern personal and industrial relationships would lead to many changes.

Closely related to his emphasis upon man is his principle of the progressive growth of personality. Life is not a static achievement, it does not stand still. Men must grow or they deteriorate. Jesus appealed to the physical world to illustrate this truth. "First the blade, then the ear, then the full grain in the ear." The kingdom, he said, was like a farmer who sows seed in the ground. While he sleeps and toils, the seeds sprout and grow without his being conscious of what is happening. In the outcasts of society, in the woman of the street, in the hated tax-gatherer, he saw the possibility of progressive growth. Since man was a part of the creative process, there was something in man which would respond to the appeal of the higher life.

The principle of "the law of love" was also central in the teaching of Jesus. "All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them: for this is the law and the prophets." For Jesus, morality was positive. Men are to take the initiative in applying the principles of the good life to their relations with others. Each man is under obligation to promote the interests of those with whom he comes into contact. Men are to love even their enemies. Equality of treatment for all, including ourselves, is expected. On its inner side the law of love includes sincerity of motive or intention. The inner moral quality of a man's life is of supreme importance. "From within, from the heart, flow evil deeds." Man may be delivered from the power of bodily impulses, not by crushing them, but by directing them toward moral or spiritual ends. Love, however, must go beyond self and neighbor and include God. When asked regarding the great commandments he said, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength: this *is* the first commandment. And the second *is* like, *namely* this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. There is none other commandment greater than these."

Another distinctive feature of Christian ethics is the close relationship between ethics and religion. In this it differs from secular ethics. With Jesus ethics and religion are inseparably connected. The highest morality springs out of a new relationship with God. For

Christians the obligation to live the good life is expressed as obedience to God and discipleship of Jesus Christ. God is the ever-present Spirit to whom man owes allegiance, and fellowship with God depends upon right conduct.

The Christian Church has frequently based its morality upon fear, upon authority, or upon an appeal to save oneself. Punishment in this world or in a world to come has frequently been made prominent. In the teachings of Jesus, however, this is not the dominant element. The appeal to live the good life is based upon the motive of love for God and for man. "For whosoever would save his life shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall find it." Self-renunciation and self-sacrifice for worthy ends are elements in moral progress.

Today Christian ethics may express itself in one of two forms. First, there are those who claim that Christianity is a deposit of truth and a program which has been completely revealed. The duty of individual Christians is to ascertain the content of this revelation and to obey it. For many modern persons, Christianity is an authoritative system and the chief virtue is obedience. Second, for an increasingly large number of Christians, loyalty to Christ means loyalty to the best possible life in the situation in which men find themselves. The spirit of Jesus is best expressed as a supreme concern for human values. The Christian life is a quest for the good under the inspiration of devotion to the ideals of Jesus. In Christianity the moral appeal has been personalized through its identification with Jesus, and through him, with God. Men discover empirically the tasks which need to be done, then these tasks are viewed as a part of their duty to God.

SELF-REALIZATION AS A MODERN ETHICAL IDEAL

Many modern thinkers view ethics as a normative science more or less distinct from religion and theology. In the modern world the ethical ideal known as Self-Realization has found expression among the followers of quite diverse philosophical schools. Idealists, realists, and pragmatists are found supporting the position. The representatives of this approach include Hegel of Germany, T. H. Green,

B. Bosanquet, F. H. Bradley, and James Seth of England, and B. P. Bowne, W. M. Urban, and John Dewey of America. While there is some difference in presentation, the following points of emphasis would be accepted by practically all of the writers.

1. The realization of the self is the greatest good. This belief rests upon the conviction that there is a scale of values according to which living forms are higher than non-living forms and that persons are higher than organic life below the human level. As a personality, I belong to a realm that has needs and possibilities beyond the merely physical or the merely organic. I am a unity, an entity different from those parts of which I am composed. While I must conform to the laws of physics and of biology, I may redirect them to some extent. In any case, I have ethical, aesthetical, and rational aspirations and needs which place me in a different realm.

2. Self-Realization implies the development of all the functions of the person. The aim is the realization of the entire self. If man were merely or even predominantly a feeling being, then his highest good would consist in so living as to secure an abundance of pleasurable feelings. If man were merely a biological organism seeking a more satisfactory adjustment to its physical environment, then adaptation and survival would be the things to be sought. In opposition to such one-sided approaches the supporters of the Self-Realization theory maintain that it is all the normal functions of the person that are to be realized. Nothing short of the harmonious development of all sides of man's nature may be accepted as an adequate goal.

In the total functional development of man's rational nature, both individual and social, the realization of all his capacities as a person in connection with that scheme of things of which he is a part, such a final end is found. As distinguished from intuitionism, this is a teleological theory. As distinguished from hedonism, it is based, not on feeling, but on the totality of all those elements which go to make up man's rational consciousness.¹

3. In its modern presentation, the Self-Realization theory is social as well as individual in its emphasis and outlook. Man is a social being and personality is a social product. Man cannot live, let

¹W. N. Nevius, *The Meaning of the Moral Life*, Noble and Noble, 1930, p. 274.

alone live the good life, entirely apart from his fellows. The true self is a social self. Personal welfare is bound up with social welfare. There is no permanent success for oneself that does not involve enrichment for others. In the long run, a person succeeds only as he makes it possible for other persons to succeed also. Ignorance, and not a genuine understanding of life, leads many persons to think falsely that they make gains for themselves through the losses of others. Not only co-operation, but sometimes sacrifice is necessary in order that the greatest good may be attained.

THE STRENGTH OF THE THEORY

The theory of Self-Realization appeals to many thinkers since it recognizes those qualities which are distinctive of human beings and which common sense regards as higher or more worth while. It frankly recognizes a distinction between persons and living forms in general. There is no attempt to reduce the qualities of mind or spirit to mere bodily activity. This emphasis upon the functions which are distinctive of persons is the chief point in which this approach is distinguished from "naturalism" and biological ethics.

Man's rational, ethical, and aesthetical nature is what is unique. Evolution on the human level exhibits characteristics not found elsewhere. There is a purposeful and meaningful element. Man appears to be evolving in the direction of self-consciousness and of greater powers of moral insight and conceptual thinking. This means that ideas and ideals are coming to play an increasingly important part in human development. Evolution is taking place on the basis of a pull from in front and not merely as the result of a push from behind. Interpretations from the point of view of struggle for existence have become entirely inadequate. There is a creative power in the universe that is moving toward a larger wholeness of life. Goodness, truth, and beauty are important elements in that wholeness.

OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY

The criticisms which have been directed against Self-Realization as a standard usually take one or more of the following lines of approach. First, it is said that the self may find its satisfaction in

ways that are morally bad as well as in ways that are of ethical value. Some of man's capacities and potentialities may lead to vicious and cruel conduct. Some men inherit capacities which would be undesirable if developed in modern society. To tell men to develop themselves does not give them instruction or wisdom as to which aspect of the self should be realized if they are in doubt. In moral action men may have a choice between realizing one or another element of the self.

Selfishness is another charge directed toward the Self-Realization approach. To center attraction upon the self may promote a dangerous egoism, it is said. Many of the great spiritual seers have encouraged men to forget themselves, or to lose themselves in devotion to causes greater even than their own lives. To forget oneself through loyalty to some great task may be the way to attain fullness of life.

Finally, it is said that the term Self-Realization is vague and meaningless. To the advocates of this theory Self-Realization is more or less synonymous with goodness in the highest degree. Consequently, to define the good in terms of realization or perfection is really to define the good in terms of itself. Also, when men act they seldom think about their own self-realization or perfection. There is some concrete desire which they are attempting to satisfy.

In reply to these objections, supporters of the Self-Realization theory assert that a distinction must be made between the part-self and the whole-self. The charge that the development of some of man's capacities may lead to conduct which is vicious or cruel has little point, if the theory emphasizes, as it does, the harmonious development of the whole self. Such conduct would be quite at variance with the rational and ethical sides of man's nature. These, moreover, are the distinctive characteristics of man as compared with mere animal organisms. If the all-comprehensive demand is to grow, then growth presupposes life and survival, and recognizes pain as a warning and happiness as one sign of harmony.

The charges of selfishness and of vagueness do not go unchallenged. The Self-Realization theory is social as well as individual in its outlook. Man is a social being and there is no true realization which does not involve the development of others. Selfishness, in

the long run, is destructive to the realization of the self. Whatever vagueness is attached to the theory is due in part to the fact that we are considering final ends and not the concrete means for the attainment of these goals. Since men live in a growing world, even their goals tend to grow and to expand with new insight and new knowledge. The concrete ends which lead in the direction of Self-Realization will be discussed in later chapters.

THE COMPETING STANDARDS

In the four successive chapters we have considered various answers to the question, "What is the greatest good?" We have been told to follow the line of duty, to seek pleasure, to adjust ourselves to nature, and to realize our potentialities. All of these views have had able supporters. In spite of important differences they agree in certain respects. They agree that there is a higher and a lower in respect to human conduct. The problem before them is to identify the higher and to attain unto it. They also agree that there is an obligation to follow the good or to do the right if the way can be found. They agree, with the possible exception of some statements of naturalistic ethics, that men must think or that the intelligent life is more desirable than any life devoid of intelligence.

As intelligent persons who live in a social order, we must consider the consequences of our acts upon ourselves and upon others. Under some circumstances a man must consider his obligations and duties to others, under other circumstances he may seek pleasure and relaxation, under still other conditions he may make the effect of an act upon his personal growth or upon social welfare his first consideration. We need to think and to act, and in so doing to respect the personality of ourselves and of others.

Considered in a narrow sense, each one of these approaches is inadequate. This is true of the teleological views as well as the rigorism and absolutism of the formalist. If the happiness theory means to stress merely the feeling side of life or if it stresses one's personal pleasure or happiness, it appears inadequate. If by happiness is meant the continual presence of intrinsic goodness and the absence of intrinsic badness which comes from an all-round development, as set

forth by the late Durant Drake, then there can be little objection to the approach. Evolutionary Ethics is inadequate if its emphasis is purely biological; it is more satisfactory to the extent that it recognizes all the aspects of man's nature. If the Self-Realization theory is narrowly construed, it may lack something on the social side. If it is stated so that the social as well as the purely personal implications of personality are kept in mind, then, in the opinion of the author, it is the most satisfactory statement of the goal to be sought.

Each one of the teleological theories may be so explained that it includes the values stressed by the other views. In this case, there are probably few objections to be offered. For any of these three theories, and even for the approach of formalism, the great majority of cases will be decided in the same way. The difference is most likely to be noticed in the unique, exceptional, or borderline cases.

These general theories of morality lack something when left by themselves. While we need general principles which are consistent, such principles need content. Ends separated from means, and from particular conditions, may be little more than sentimental indulgences quite unrelated to conduct. We shall turn next to a consideration of the particular conditions in the midst of which we must live.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. There are many examples today, and a great deal of discussion about so called "mercy killings" and "the right to die." One doctor claims that he has taken life five times, and he attempts to justify his actions. Some persons suffering from incurable diseases have asked to be relieved from pain by death. The case of Charlotte Perkins Gilman has led to much discussion. Mrs. Gilman, suffering from cancer, ended her life. She left a note indicating her belief that, while there is no excuse for ending one's life while any possibility of service remains, when all usefulness is past and death is unavoidable and near, one is justified in choosing a quick and easy death in place of a slow and horrible one. Give your own reaction to the conduct of Mrs. Gilman and the doctor mentioned above. What relation do such cases have to the discussion in this chapter?
- ✓ 2. When Scott's expedition was returning from its ill-fated dash to the South Pole, one man who was exhausted and who knew that he was a

burden to the other members of the group, walked out into the storm and never returned. Was this self-sacrifice? Was it suicide? Can the act be justified?

3. Consider the cases in the chapter on "Duty as the Standard." From the point of view of this chapter, how would these problems be faced? Even though the outcome would be the same, would the reasoning be the same? Explain.
4. If the term Self-Realization seems vague, can you put more specific content into it? List some of the things you think it should include.
5. In present-day society what parts of ourselves tend to be overdeveloped and what underdeveloped?
6. What are some evidences of man's need to grow, and what forms may his growth take? See R. C. Cabot, *The Meaning of Right and Wrong*, chaps. V and VI.

SUGGESTED READINGS

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Part Two

DETERMINERS OF CONDUCT

Chapter VII

PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL FACTORS

SO FAR IN OUR study we have considered the general steps in the development of morality and then the theories of the good life which have emerged as intelligence has become more mature. From a logical point of view, it might be argued that we should pass at once to a consideration of the nature of morality, and thus continue with the more strictly philosophical part of our study before we introduce material of a more descriptive and scientific nature. While we shall not base our views of the nature of morality exclusively upon the determiners of conduct, there are certain reasons why it will be well to consider, at this time, the specific elements that enter into human behavior. One criticism of the general theories of morality just presented is that they are abstract and fail to consider the particular conditions in the midst of which the good life must be lived. A second reason is that it will be well for us to have this material in mind as we consider the nature of morality, as well as when we consider the problems of personal and social morality. Such a discussion will indicate more fully the need of a flexible, relative, and experimental approach.¹

During recent years a large amount of research has been done on the problem of human behavior. As a result of the increasing knowledge of the concrete factors involved in human conduct, new methods of dealing with misconduct are in evidence and new theories of the nature of human behavior are arising. Human behavior does not occur in a vacuum; it is the interaction between a particular organism and a particular environmental situation.

The factors which enter into the determination of human behavior are many and varied. For the purpose of study, we may

¹Material in this and the following chapter is taken in part from the author's unpublished Ph.D. thesis, "The Christian Treatment of Sin in the Light of Recent Studies of Behavior," The University of Chicago, 1926.

segregate them; yet in any conduct situation there is a combination of many of them. This does not mean that all of them are equally important or equally constant. One may predominate now, and another later on and in a different situation.

THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

The natural environment may influence man in ways which are direct or in ways which are indirect. Where the natural environment influences the biological, the psychological, or the social conditions of man, it indirectly affects his behavior. Chief consideration here will be given to the geographical environment and to the climate, as these are believed to be the most important physical factors influencing behavior. Taken together, they determine to a large extent the plants and the animals found in any locality, and these in turn influence man in numerous ways beyond the direct effect of climate and geographic conditions.

GEOGRAPHIC INFLUENCES

Man is in large part a product of the environment in which he lives. The land upon which he lives feeds him, gives him his tasks, and directs his thoughts. From birth until death the human being unavoidably comes into contact with the physical world. Man can no more be intelligently studied apart from the land he travels and tills, or the seas he sails, than can the animal be understood apart from its habitat. The geographic conditions include the location, land forms or relief, bodies of water, soil, and minerals.

The geographic environment to some extent determines the occupation of a people, whether it be hunting or fishing, cattle or sheep raising, agriculture, mineral extraction or lumbering, trading or manufacture. In turn these occupations affect habits, attitudes, and forms of social organization. A marked change is noticed as one passes from an agricultural to a lumbering community, or from a mining town to a manufacturing center. The lives of the people in these communities will differ in a great many ways. Habits, temperament, and attitude as well as ideas and ambitions will differ considerably.

Soil and minerals play an important part in the affairs of men. A poor, sandy soil may mean that a region will be poverty-stricken with all the dire results which poverty entails. A rich soil or valuable mines may mean that a community will be prosperous and contented. The food men eat and their water supply have much to do with health and strength.

While physiological and other factors must be considered, it is a fact that pigmentation and nigrescence increase from the temperate to the equatorial zone, and that the climate and the geographic environment are at least in part responsible. If this be true, then the sun and other elements in the natural surroundings of men are in part responsible for the sense of strangeness and difference between certain racial groups, and hence, a remote factor in some of the present-day prejudice and antagonism.

Some students of the geographical influences affecting man have pointed out that the topography or relief of a country has notable influences upon man and his conduct. For example, it is said that mountain people tend to be superstitious and conservative. Social and economic organization is usually retarded owing to isolation. Usually the people work hard, have little leisure, and are not far from poverty. Miss Semple says:

With this conservatism of the mountaineer is generally coupled suspicion toward strangers, extreme sensitiveness to criticism, superstition, strong religious feeling, and an intense love of home and family. The bitter struggle for existence makes him industrious, frugal, provident; and, when the marauding stage has been outgrown, he is peculiarly honest as a rule. Statistics of crime in mountain regions show few crimes against property though many against persons. When the mountain-bred man comes down into the plains, he brings with him therefore certain qualities which make him a formidable competitor in the struggle for existence,—the strong muscles, unjaded nerves, iron purpose, and indifference to luxury bred in him by the hard conditions of his native environment.²

Deserts, grasslands, and steppes from time immemorial have tended to produce tribes of wandering herdsmen who live as

²E. C. Semple, *Influences of Geographic Environment*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1911, p. 601.

nomads. These people are conservative and show little alteration in their manners, customs, or mode of living from age to age. The characteristics of these people are: pride of race, hardihood, courage, vigilance, keen powers of observation, hospitality, intolerance, and fanaticism. Robbery abroad is frequently encouraged, while robbery at home or within the tribe is severely punished.

Seacoasts and accessible islands tend to develop a more progressive, cosmopolitan type. The coast is the natural home of the middleman and the trading people who have initiative and endurance. Except for barren and inaccessible coasts with no rich hinterland, these regions are centers of culture and progress and often of racial intermixture.

Plains and well-watered lowlands enable easy expansion of peoples and of cultures. Because of their fitness for agriculture, trade, and intercourse, they are favored locations for the massing of a sedentary population. Unbroken plains make for homogeneity and for a greater uniformity of life conditions than is usually found in mountainous regions.

With the growth of cities and modern means of transportation these factors of the geographic environment are not so important as they have been in the past. Modern man has numerous ways, not available to primitive man, of overcoming the limitations and checking the influences of the natural environment upon him. However, these forces must be kept in mind and taken into account.

CLIMATE

Climate includes temperature, humidity, wind, barometric pressure, etc. The influence of climate upon conduct has been frequently overlooked. Men are like trees which tend to produce excellent or poor fruit according to the conditions or circumstances under which they live. The best tree will not produce if the atmospheric conditions are unfavorable. Mental and physical energy, as well as the moral character of men, apparently reach their highest development only under certain climatic conditions. The climate may set up a barrier to man's movements and development. It determines to some extent his food, clothing, and shelter. It has a direct and

important bearing upon health and energy, and hence influences man's temperament and his general conduct and character.

Some writers, on the basis of certain historical and archaeological evidence, have set forth what they term the "climatic hypothesis of history."³ While these men have almost certainly overworked their theory and have failed to take sufficient account of other influences, such as the cultural and the psychological, yet these climatic conditions undoubtedly have played some part and must be considered. No attempt will be made here to discuss the continuing changes of climate such as glacial periods, inter-glacial periods or fluvial changes, or of climate cycles of shorter periods. It can be shown, it is asserted, that the great nations of antiquity enjoyed a climate similar to that of leading countries today. Professor E. Huntington says:

According to the climatic hypothesis of history, as we may call it, mankind, since first the race gained the rudiments of civilization, has always made the most rapid progress under essentially the same climatic conditions. The conditions apparently are that the summers shall have a sufficient degree of warmth and rainfall to make agriculture easy and profitable, but not enough to be enervating; that the winters shall be cool enough to be bracing, but not deadening; and that the relation of summer and winter shall be such that with forethought every man can support himself and his family in comfort the year round, while without forethought he and his will suffer seriously. Comparatively clear, dry air and high barometric pressure appear to be subsidiary conditions favorable to human progress.⁴

Another source of evidence of the effect of climate upon human life and conduct comes to us from the vitality maps of insurance companies, from a comparison of cultural and educational maps with the climate energy maps, as well as from the efficiency tests in factories. Besides indicating a close relation between climate and human energy, it was found that a mean temperature of 60°-65° (noon 70° or over) is best for physical activity; that a mean temperature of 38°, with mild frosts at night, is best for mental activ-

³Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and Climate*, 4th ed., Yale University Press, 1924.

⁴Ellsworth Huntington, *The Pulse of Asia*, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1907, pp. 381; 384-385.

ity; and that the greatest general efficiency lies halfway between the physical and mental optima, or about 50°. Uniformity of temperature causes low energy and is not so good as a variable climate. Slight rises and falls, as well as seasonal changes are very beneficial. The physical and mental curve is highest in the fall (October–November) and in the spring (May–June). The important factors are: (1) mean temperature, month by month, (2) changes from day to day, (3) relative humidity. Climate appears to affect physical and mental characteristics, including health, habits, temperament, and character.

Evidence of the effect of climate upon human life and conduct is further shown by a study of the different climate zones. Intermediate degrees of temperature and seasonal diversity seem to be very favorable to high civilization. The seasonal changes of the temperate zone energize and stimulate man to activity. They encourage a higher civilization by developing him physically and mentally. The cold of the winter in the north temperate zone, unless too severe, acts as a healthful stimulant to man. The organs of the body act more equally and regularly than in the very warm or the very cold latitudes.

There appears to be a marked difference, not only between zones, but between northerners and southerners in the temperate zone. The northern people of Europe, living in a harsher climate with cold and sometimes dreary winters, tend to be more energetic, provident, serious, thoughtful, and cautious; while the Southern Europeans are more easygoing, improvident, cheerful, emotional, and imaginative. Likewise, if conditions north and south in the United States are contrasted, similar tendencies will be found.

In the tropics or the torrid zone there are no "seasons," in the temperate-zone sense of the word, classified according to temperature. This zone is characterized by a remarkable simplicity and uniformity of climatic features. The mean variation in temperature is so slight (seldom more than 10°) throughout the year that the seasons are classified entirely by the rainfall and the prevailing winds. The tropical monotony of heat is usually accompanied with high relative humidity, except in the deserts and in the dry seasons, and

thus the air is muggy and oppressive, and energetic physical and mental action is difficult.

The climatic conditions of the tropics have certain well-defined physiological effects.⁵ These render an individual less able to resist disease and more prone to excesses of various kinds. In the tropics the people tend to be slow in action and dull in thought, with a lack of industry and economic efficiency and a tendency to high temper, drunkenness, sex-indulgences, etc.

All arctic peoples have a civilization similar to that of each other. The length and the monotony of the cold put a drag on civilization and determine the occupation, habits, ideas, and temperaments of the people. The arctic dweller is characteristically very dirty because of the lack of water and the facilities for cleanliness. The return of the sun after the long months of darkness and winter has a stimulating effect on the passions and leads to many excesses. The polar night is exceedingly depressing; not only are there physiological results, such as, a weakening of the sense of taste and smell, etc., but also it is noted that apathy and sleepiness are often followed by extreme nervous excitement and sometimes insanity.

We are slowly realizing that character in the broad sense of all that pertains to industry, honesty, purity, intelligence, and strength of will is closely dependent upon the condition of the body. Each influences the other. Neither can be at its best while its companion is dragged down. The climate of many countries seems to be one of the great reasons why idleness, dishonesty, immorality, stupidity, and weakness of will prevail. If we can conquer climate, the whole world will become stronger and nobler.⁶

Investigations have been carried on dealing with the influence of climate upon health, insanity, suicide, drunkenness, clerical errors, and crime.⁷ Sickness and death are found to be generally more prevalent during the winter and early spring, although the death rate does increase greatly during the extremely hot spells of summer. Insanity increases from the colder to the warmer months and

⁵R. D. Ward, *Climate*, rev. ed., G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1918, p. 185.

⁶Huntington, *Civilization and Climate*, p. 411.

⁷E. G. Dexter, *Weather Influences*, The Macmillan Company, 1904.

also in dry weather. Suicide is also excessive on clear dry days, and is more prevalent in the late spring and summer months. This is possibly due to the irritating heat of summer. It is excessive at both extremes of temperature and increases as humidity and wind increase.

Arrests for drunkenness are more numerous during the colder months of the year than during the warmer. Drunkenness as a rule varies inversely with the temperature, being excessive for low readings and more moderate for high ones. On the other hand, clerical errors are found to be more numerous during the warmer months and in excessive heat. They increase as the wind increases and are most numerous on cloudy, wet days.

On very dry days, according to Dexter, crime increases enormously, as nerves become unstrung by reason of the high state of electricity induced in the air by the dryness of the wind. There is a corresponding lack of self-control. Arrests for assault increase with the temperature from the coldest to the warmer months, but fall off slightly for the hottest months. Deportment among school children in some localities was found to be best during cold, calm, and clear weather and worst during the hot and muggy days. "In an invigorating climate it is also easier to be honest and sober and self-controlled than in a more enervating one. It is much easier to speak the truth or to control one's temper when one feels strong than when one feels weak."⁸

The ethical effects of the physical environment are important. We have seen the numerous and varied ways in which, directly or indirectly, the moral ideas and the conduct of men have been affected. We have noted how the natural surroundings have influenced moral ideas and conduct, indirectly, through the determining of such things as occupation; and, also, how the climate and the geographical conditions have had a more direct influence upon the conduct of men. Changes in the moral codes of different groups can be explained to some extent on this basis. We shall briefly point out a few additional incidents.

⁸Huntington and Cushing, *Principles of Human Geography*, 4th ed., John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1934, p. 292.

It is reported by Blackstone that in the Isle of Man it was no felony to steal a horse or an ox as these animals could not be successfully hidden, but that it was a capital crime, punishable by death, to steal a pig or a fowl as these animals could be eaten quickly or easily hidden away. In Tibet, because of the poverty of the soil, one man is not able to support one woman, and consequently polyandry is the approved marital relation. Some writers believe that this is due directly to factors in the natural environment. Cases such as these indicate that the natural environment has a considerable part in determining right and wrong as well as in controlling human activity.

BIOLOGICAL FACTORS

Man is sometimes said to be the product of heredity and of environment, and controversies have raged over their relative importance in the determination of man's behavior. These two influences, however, are not mutually exclusive, but are in continual interaction, and are more or less inseparable. We tend to name a trait "hereditary" or "environmental" by the way in which it can be altered. Apparently some traits may be produced or altered by either heredity or environment.

The eggs of the marine fish, fundulus, when they develop in untreated sea water, produce the expected results, a fish with two eyes. If, however, certain magnesium salts and some other substances are added to the sea water, marked differences result, notably the development of a fish with only one eye. Apparently some abnormalities are normal developments under different conditions.⁹

The characters of the adult are no more present in the germ cells than is an automobile in the metallic ores out of which it is ultimately manufactured. To get the complete, normally acting organism, the proper materials are essential; but equally essential is it that they should interact properly with one another and with other things. *And the way they interact and what they produce depends on the conditions. . . .*

Clearly, it is not necessary to have a characteristic merely because one inherits it. Or more properly, characteristics are not inherited at all;

⁹W. D. Hoyt, "Some Aspects of the Relation of Species to their Environment," *Science N. S.*, Vol. LVIII (1923).

what one inherits is certain material that under certain conditions will produce a particular characteristic; if these conditions are not supplied, some other characteristic is produced.¹⁰

ORIGINAL NATURE OF MAN

There are some things which a man brings with him at birth which affect his conduct and character. While there is general agreement that we are born to do some things better than other things, there is no agreement as to just what we inherit or how it should be defined. The individual arises from the fertilization of the ovum or egg cell by the sperm or male cell. At this point his heredity is determined and his growth begins. The chromosomes within the nucleus of the fertilized ovum are the carriers of hereditary characters. The genes, subordinate units within the chromosomes, are the units of heredity and determine many traits of the individual.

Heredity appears to be the important element in (1) physical make-up, including size, over-development or under-development, texture and color of hair, eye color and the like; (2) constitutional inferiority and superiority, the first of which is related to epilepsy, the "insanities," etc.; (3) mental inferiority and superiority; (4) temperamental or emotional tone, including speed of reaction, attentiveness to stimuli, and other factors which probably have a glandular basis; (5) certain units of behavior, including impulses, reflexes, and possible "instincts." These units of behavior, which are either actually or potentially present at birth, may be analyzed in different ways and set forth under various terms. They will be considered more fully in the next chapter.

MAIN THEORIES OF HEREDITY

All living organisms arise from parents more or less like themselves. Like tends to create like. While practically all biologists agree that evolution depends upon variation and heredity, many theories of heredity have been set forth. The acceptance or rejection of some of these may have a direct bearing upon the treatment of

¹⁰H. S. Jennings, "Heredity and Environment," *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. XIX (Sept. 1924), pp. 230-233.

problems of human conduct. Lamarck and his followers believed that acquired characters might be transmitted to offspring, such as the strong arm of the blacksmith to his son, and that organic evolution proceeds on this basis. According to this view, modifications due to changed use or to environment are passed on through heredity.

A view more commonly held by modern biologists is the theory of "germinal continuity" first set forth by Weismann. He maintained that the germinal material which gives rise to offspring is continuous with the germinal material from which the parent or parents arose and that it is not changed by environmental factors. What is continuous is the germ plasm "of definite chemical and special molecular constitution." With certain exceptions, external factors do not permanently change the race. Students unfamiliar with them will do well to acquaint themselves with the mutation theory of DeVries; the laws of heredity, including dominant and recessive traits, as set forth by Mendel; and Galton's law of ancestral inheritance.

EUGENICS AND HEREDITY

According to the eugenisists, the human race can be improved only by better breeding or by a close regard for the laws of heredity. The experience of the plant and animal breeder, it is claimed, should lead men to see that a more reasonable selection of mates is the greatest means of permanently improving the human race, and saving it from immorality, degeneracy, imbecility, and disease. Care for the weak and diseased, unless accompanied by a check upon the reproduction of the unfit, is leading the race downward.¹¹

The problem of feeble-mindedness is one of the most serious which is faced by the eugenics movement, since heredity appears to be the largest single cause of this defect. The feeble-minded, because of a defect of the brain existing from birth or from an early age, do not develop mentally to the normal age. Since those who are feeble-minded are weak in will and in judgment, or in the power of discrimination between right and wrong, they are a fertile source of wrongdoing.

¹¹S. J. Holmes, *The Trend of the Race*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1921, pp. 362ff.

Insanity and epilepsy appear to be inherited in some way since they occur more often in certain families than in the general population. In one study it was found that in some families where insanity occurred that 21 per cent of the offspring of sane parents were insane, and that even a higher percentage of the children of insane parents were insane.¹² The intermarriage of members of families in which insanity occurs was found to increase the percentage. There is no need to elaborate upon the abnormal, and often antisocial, behavior of the mentally diseased. Epilepsy, which may be inherited as a recessive Mendelian character, frequently leads to anti-social behavior. Healy tells us that in a study of 1000 cases of delinquency, using repeated offenders, that 5 per cent were known to be epileptic. Epileptics tend to be incalculable in their moods and impulses, subject to emotionalism and to irritability, deficient in the sense of moral discrimination, lacking in self-control, and they sometimes exhibit anger and vicious conduct with apparently little cause. While all epileptics are not affected in the same way, there is a tendency toward a morbid self-love and egocentricism.¹³

ORGANIC CHANGES AND DEFECTS

Quite apart from the hereditary factors which we have been considering, there are organic changes and defects which have an important bearing upon behavior and character. The most simple changes which take place in the organism are the chemical and physical changes involved in the constructive and destructive processes known as anabolism and katabolism, or to state it as one continuous process, metabolism. But each organism passes through a series of changes from the fertilized egg to the embryo, and from the miniature form to the full-grown adult. During this process there are numerous changes, structural and functional, which are important for the conduct and character of the individual. Adjustments are needed, temporary and permanent, and different organisms have different degrees of plasticity. Modifications of bodily structure or

¹²Castle, Coulter, Davenport, East, and Tower, *Genetics and Engenics*, Harvard University Press, 1916, pp. 248-249.

¹³W. P. Spratling, *Epilepsy and Its Treatment*, W. B. Saunders Company, 1904; W. Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, Little, Brown and Company, 1917, pp. 414ff.

habits are sometimes acquired which persist even after the inducing conditions have been removed or cease to operate. Thus, besides variations which have a germinal origin, the individual may acquire various structural and functional modifications. Defects and peculiarities may be due to heredity, to ante-natal conditions, to the birth process, to conditions and experiences of childhood and later life.

The ante-natal conditions surrounding the child may produce marked effects in later life. Among the conditions recorded as factors are: congenital syphilis; alcoholic poison from the mother; strain or shock to the mother; extreme sickness, insanity, or feeble-mindedness of the mother; the crowding of twins; attempted abortion; severe or prolonged labor; premature birth; and instrumental delivery. During childhood, while the organism is developing and plastic, physiological as well as environmental factors are important. Imperfect nutrition, digestive disturbances, adenoids and mouth breathing, nervous instability as a result of fatigue, lack of sleep, over-stimulation, or defective sense organs may not only lead to abnormal behavior, but may leave permanent results to influence later conduct and character.¹⁴ Shocks at this period may produce sex revulsions or attractions that are difficult to overcome.

The adolescent period has a very close relation to the development of character. Beginning with puberty there is usually a rapid growth of the body and all the organs are put under new conditions which mean an upheaval of the whole being.¹⁵ Physiological changes which take place give rise to various peculiarities and character changes. New impulses arise which are difficult to control.

Both the menstrual period and pregnancy may cause mental disturbances sufficient to result in anti-social conduct. Especially in the case of women of a neuropathic tendency, there may be seen impulsiveness and irritability and lack of self-control at the time of the menstrual period. Much the same tendency has been noted during pregnancy which may have a marked influence upon mental powers and give rise to impulsiveness and lack of control.

¹⁴Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*. Most of these factors are set forth and illustrated by cases.

¹⁵G. S. Hall, *Adolescence*, 2 vols., D. Appleton-Century Company, 1905. This is a standard work.

Age and sex have a fairly direct relation to certain kinds of misbehavior. There is a gradual increase in delinquency and crime from the age of ten until the maximum is reached in the ages 21-24, then there is a gradual decline until the age of 44 when the decrease is rapid.¹⁶ Delinquency in old age is not uncommon even in individuals who have not previously been guilty of misconduct. The proportion of first offenders has been found to increase from the age of 50 on. This is due in all probability to "senile dementia" and the breakdown of the power of the will and of ethical discrimination. In regard to sex, about nine tenths as many males are arrested as females, although the fact that women generally live more sheltered lives must be considered. Men appear to be more aggressive and to indulge in many types of crime, while women in similar circumstances become prostitutes.

Over-development and under-development are exceedingly important as causative factors of misbehavior. Healy claims that of 823 cases of delinquency, 13½ per cent had defects of development as one of the probable causes of their misconduct. He asserts that 73 per cent of the girls were over-developed for their ages, while 52 per cent of the boys were under-developed.¹⁷ If a boy or girl reaches physical maturity at an early age before experience and mentality have developed to an equal extent, the situation is dangerous, since new desires are awakened with little or no change in the power of control. The situation is especially critical when sex maturity comes at an abnormally early age. The evidence cited by Healy, Sutherland, and others will show the importance of these factors in conduct situations. These imperfect correlations lead to irritation and defective social adjustments, hence to various forms of misbehavior.

We shall be able to deal with only a few of the many physical defects which have a bearing upon human conduct. Any defect or injury which results in local irritation in any part of the body, or which leads to social maladjustment, frequently leads to chronic bad temper and to anti-social behavior. Many mean dispositions can be

¹⁶E. H. Sutherland, *Criminology*, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1924, pp. 90ff. Gives age at which certain crimes are most frequent.

¹⁷Healy, *op. cit.*, pp. 145; 236.

explained in just this way. Among the defects which are notorious in their effect upon conduct and character are: speech defects, nose and throat obstructions, ear defects, eye defects, decayed teeth, etc.

Eye defects or ear defects or obstructions of the nose and throat may have the following sequence of effects: irritability and discomfort, retardation in school, lack of success in efforts, dissatisfaction with school or work, truancy, association with bad companions, and general view of one's self as an outcast. The child with enlarged tonsils who consistently holds his mouth open will be jeered at, called foolish, suffer a lowering of status. The child with crossed eyes, also, will be ridiculed, and only an extra effort will enable him to get along in the group in the regular way. . . . Stuttering and, especially in boys, lisping have the same effect.¹⁸

ORGANIC DISEASES AND INJURIES

Diseases may be due to abnormal or deranged processes arising from a germinal cause, or they may be induced by acquired modifications or by the presence of parasites. Strictly speaking, a disease is never inherited. That which is inherited is a weakness, a constitutional peculiarity, or a predisposition to a disease. Some diseases which are noticed in successive generations are apparently the result of congenital or prenatal infection.

For many years men have observed that certain diseases are associated with certain types of mental states. Among these may be noted the "hopefulness of pulmonary tuberculosis," the "hypochondriacal depression associated with disease below the diaphragm," the "anxiety that goes with aortic disease," the "dementia that" is associated with destructive cerebral processes," etc.¹⁹ Diabetes often gives rise to states of depression, impairment of mental capacity, indifference, and apathy. The deliriums associated with infectious disease and with severe exhaustion, loss of blood, or prolonged convalescence, are fairly frequent.²⁰ Syphilis is one of the most serious diseases in respect to the physical, mental, and moral deterioration

¹⁸ Sutherland, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

¹⁹ W. A. White, *Mechanism of Character Formation*, The Macmillan Company, 1916, p. 245.

²⁰ A. J. Rosanoff, *Manual of Psychiatry*, 6th ed., John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1927.

which so frequently attends it. Nervous diseases usually have some basis in an inherited nervous instability, and these diseases are found to be peculiarly persistent in family histories, yet environmental factors play a large part. The nervous organs, composed of highly complex and differentiated cells and structures, have a very limited power of regeneration after strain and injury. Among the injuries which affect conduct and character none are so important as injuries to the head. These frequently lead to instability, irascibility, forgetfulness, passionate outbreaks, a decrease in the power of self-control, hypersusceptibility to minor stresses, and the like. Healy found that 21 out of 1000 cases of delinquency had suffered from some severe head injury.²¹

THE GLANDS

While some have overemphasized the part played by the glands and have seen in their control the panacea for all human ills, the glands are important factors in life. The duct glands have little openings which lead to the exterior of the body or into the hollow or visceral organs. These include the salivary, the sweat, and the mucous glands, the pancreas, liver, kidneys, etc. They play a large part in the regulation of digestion and other vital functions of the body, and their over-action and under-action may throw the organism out of adjustment and lead to various harmful results.

Watson in *Behaviorism* says:

Will you take my word for it that our so-called higher forms of behavior are terribly at the mercy of just these lowly secretions we have been talking about, especially when something goes wrong with one or more of them? Let the mouth glands begin to over-secrete or under-secrete, as happens at times; or the small mucous glands begin to over-secrete as they do in the nose when we have a cold; let something go wrong with the digestive secretions; or let the throat become irritable and sensitive through lack of secretions; let the kidney over-secrete and keep the bladder overly full, or the secretions from the sex organs become excessive—then our whole conduct may become modified. Even our social behavior may become involved. We may insult or hurt the feelings of a friend, spoil a piece of fine work, even lose our jobs, and what is worse,

²¹Healy, *op. cit.*, pp. 620ff.

if the faulty glands are deep down in the visceral cavity we may be able to give no verbal account of what has gone wrong.²²

The ductless glands or the endocrine organs have no external openings, but they give out a secretion, called hormone, into the blood. The secretions of these glands are very important for the nutrition and growth of the body as well as for general behavior. These endocrine glands have an exceedingly close relation to mental and emotional processes. There is an interaction between the emotions and the glands, so that emotion may stimulate the glands to activity, or the activity of a gland or glands may cause emotion to arise.²³ The most important ductless glands are the thyroid, the gonads, the adrenals, the pituitary body, the pineal body, and the thymus. We shall take space here to consider the first three only.

The thyroid secretion appears to be the controller of the speed of living. If this gland is strong and active, one lives faster or has abundant life; if it is weak and inactive, one lives more slowly. A child born with a faulty or deficient thyroid becomes a cretin. Growth is arrested, and the individual remains infantile in body and mind. In hyperthyroidism the body works too quickly and all "the vital processes are speeded up." There is over-activity, over-excitability of the nerves, irritability, and often insomnia.²⁴ When this gland is underdeveloped, the life processes are slowed down and life is difficult. Removal of the gland may result in apathy and indifference.²⁵ It is claimed that many crimes of passion can be traced to disturbances of the thyroid.²⁶

The gonads or the reproductive glands bear a close relation to the emotional life of the individual. The removal of these glands in the male prevents the development of the secondary sex qualities and we get the effeminate type of man with muscular weakness and mental sluggishness. The removal of these glands from the female

²²John Watson, *Behaviorism*, Lectures-in-Print, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1925, p. 54.

²³Jien Rikimaru, "Emotion and Endocrine Activities," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. XXII, No. 4 (April, 1926), The Macmillan Company, p. 206.

²⁴L. Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*, The Macmillan Company, 1922, pp. 46ff.; 228ff.

²⁵Rikimaru, *op. cit.*, pp. 212ff.

²⁶Berman, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

prevents the secondary feminine qualities from developing and we get the masculine woman with a dulled mentality. In both cases there is a retention of infantile mental traits and a failure to develop adult attitudes and reactions. Overdevelopment of these glands may result in an individual who is sexually abnormally susceptible.

The adrenal glands are two small bodies placed above and in front of the upper end of each kidney. Under strong emotional excitement these glands pour adrenalin into the blood and more sugar (glycogen) is released into the blood from the liver. This results in a heightening of the tone of the nervous system, the heart beats more quickly, more red blood corpuscles enter the blood, breathing is more rapid, the eyes see more clearly, and the whole body is ready for an emergency. It is the contention of Cannon that it is these glands that give boldness and strength and prepare the organism for a combat or for difficult situations demanding strength and endurance.²⁷ The poisons of fatigue and waste products are neutralized by the action of the adrenals, so that adrenalin relieves fatigue. Failure of these glands gives rise to fatigue, a sensitiveness to colds, a loss of zest in life, mental instability, a tendency to worry, and sometimes depression or even melancholia.

It is claimed by Berman that the life of every individual is dominated largely by his endocrine glands, and that one or several of these glands may control the individual. These "glandular preponderances" are the basis of personality and give rise to different personality types.

CONCLUSION

This survey has shown that the behavior of man cannot be understood thoroughly without a knowledge of the natural conditions under which he lives. Some natural factors make the development of a high moral character difficult. They may help to explain some instances of failure and of misbehavior. If our aim is to help men to find and to attain the good life, these factors of the natural environ-

²⁷W. B. Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage*, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1920. Since the failure of G. M. Stewart to duplicate the experiments of Cannon, this whole question is somewhat in dispute.

ment must be taken into account. A part of our duty will be to give agricultural aid, to irrigate deserts, to clear swamps, to install sanitary devices, as well as to promote general advance in the natural sciences. Moral advance, at least for some people, will be aided as we eliminate natural conditions which make it difficult to have strong consistent characters.

We have also seen that hereditary and organic factors are important elements in human behavior, and that some misbehavior can be attributed to such causes. Much wrongdoing is the result of physiological conditions, such as defective sense organs, fatigue, nervous instability, overstimulation, and the like. Wrongdoing may be described, biologically, as the result of organic defects or of appetites and impulses which are as yet unsocialized or as organic defects, etc. We do not wish to leave the impression, however, that human impulses and appetites in themselves are evil since they are the materials out of which the good life, as well as anti-social acts, are formed. Wrongdoing as such cannot be inherited. No person has such a heredity that he must inevitably commit immoral acts. Immorality is a social phenomenon produced by a combination of bodily, mental, and social conditions. However, some natural characteristics which, under certain conditions, function in producing abnormal behavior may be inherited.

In the light of the importance of these biological factors for the development of character, we are coming to see more clearly their moral significance. Medical care gains a new meaning and a new urgency. There is a moral obligation to eliminate the disease and the organic defects which blight personality. These facts explain the growing sentiment that every child has a right to be wellborn and to be adequately cared for and nourished.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

- ✓1. Write a short essay upon "The Effect of the Weather Upon Me," indicating any changes in disposition or behavior of which you have been conscious.
2. Ask the teachers in your community, the officials in a hospital, or the warden of a prison, whether they notice any difference (especially

- irritability or signs of unrest) in the persons under them upon the approach of a storm.
3. Make a comparison of the local temperatures and the number of arrests in your community. Does the season have any effect upon the type of misbehavior? The local weather bureau and your local police office may have information.
 4. Does the fact that a character trait appears for a number of generations in one family strain necessarily prove it to be hereditary? Explain. See E. B. Reuter, *Population Problems*, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1923, pp. 212-220.
 - ✓5. A boy who lived on the outskirts of a large city was arrested for setting fire to haystacks. He was known as the bad boy, the scamp of the community, and the school authorities were unable to deal with him successfully. When he was brought to the juvenile court, the members of the staff noticed that he had a harelip which affected his appearance and his speech and which they suspected might be related to his misbehavior. They sent the boy to the hospital where the harelip was corrected. A short time later they returned the boy to his community and asked that he be given another chance. The boy thereafter acted as a normal boy and gave no more trouble. To what extent do you think that loss of status among the boys had anything to do with the abnormal behavior? What do you think would have been the outcome had the boy been whipped, or sent to a reformatory or jail, or reprimanded?
 6. A case is reported where a boy's misbehavior was stopped by the removal of an abscess from his head. How may this be explained?

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Chapter VIII

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

DURING RECENT years much light has been thrown upon human behavior and especially upon the causative factors in wrongdoing by numerous psychological and social studies. In this chapter we shall be able to touch upon only a part of the evidence which has been obtained through psychological tests, laboratory experiments, case studies, statistical research, and general observation.

PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF BEHAVIOR

At birth each individual inherits, with slight variations, certain types of structure which force him to respond to stimuli in certain ways. This is man's unlearned behavior. These unlearned units of behavior may be stated in terms of impulses, reflexes, and instincts, or in terms of reflexes and beginnings of emotional reactions.

The impulses and random movements, which are characteristic of early childhood, appear to rise out of the excess energy of the organism. Certain random movements or unorganized motions of the trunk, arms, and legs are especially noticeable. The reflexes may be very simple or more complex. They include the eye wink, sneezing, hiccupping, sucking, swallowing, circulation, respiration, crying, smiling, laughter, and numerous other activities or functions. These responses are determined by the hereditary nature of the protoplasm and give stability and adaptability in a standardized environment. Regarding the inherited neural basis of character one writer says, "Any neurone will, when stimulated, transmit the stimulus, other things being equal, to the neurone with which it is by inborn organization most closely connected. The basis of intellect and character is this fund of unlearned tendencies."¹

¹E. L. Thorndike, *The Original Nature of Man*, Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1920, p. 3.

Instincts are inherited tendencies to perform certain acts in specific ways when the appropriate stimulus is present. They aid in the adjustment and survival of the organism, especially under stable environmental conditions. When any one of them is over-developed or when expression is prevented, the individual may be led into abnormal behavior. Since the lists of instincts vary so widely and since some students of the problem believe that the behavior involved may be more satisfactorily explained in other ways, the instinct theory is under attack. If we continue to use the term, it should apply to the comparatively fixed physiological functions which we carry on in common with other members of the animal kingdom. Our more complex social activities may be more satisfactorily explained on the basis of habit or cultural conditioning.

While psychologists vary widely in the use of terms and in the classification of data, there is a considerable degree of agreement in the general approach. For example, there is no fundamental contradiction between the unlearned units of behavior just set forth and the six "prepotent reflexes" of F. H. Allport or the "three types of unlearned beginnings of emotional reactions" of J. B. Watson. Habit formation or conditioning proceeds in the same way in either case. The three types of unlearned emotional responses are as follows: 1. A fear reaction which may be called out by a "loss of support," or by a loud noise. These things will call out a jump, a start, or a respiratory pause, then rapid breathing, closing of the eyes, clutching of hands, puckering of lips, and depending upon the age of the child, crying, falling down, or running away. 2. A rage reaction, called out by sudden hampering of bodily movements, which may express itself by a stiffening of the body, slashing movements of the arms or legs, and the holding of the breath. 3. A love reaction, stimulated by stroking of the skin, tickling, rocking or patting, and expressing itself by smiles, cooing, and the like.

Whether these three types of response are all that are original is not certain. It is clear, however, that the emotional reactions are very simple in the infant, that the stimuli which call them out are few in number, and that they form the beginning out of which later emotional reactions arise. These emotional reactions may be conditioned

so that they may be attached to various persons, places, or to general situations. The number and variety of objects and situations which call out the rage, the love, or the fear response may become enormously increased. A child or adult may come to fear almost any object, person, or act. Correspondingly, attachments may grow up around almost any of these things. There may be a spread or transfer of conditioned emotional responses, as for example when a child through some terrifying experience with a dog may afterwards show a fear response at the sight of any hairy animals or even hairy objects.

While there is very little difference in the general set of responses between one racial group and another, or between the people of one geological age and those of another, yet these hereditary responses may be shaped in a thousand different ways according to the way in which the child is brought up and the environmental conditions with which it meets. Habit formation starts at birth, possibly in the embryonic life, and it forms so quickly that sharp distinctions between inherited and learned equipment break down. We shall attempt now to show how this process of habit formation, and especially these emotional drives, may lead to mental disorders.

MENTAL DISORDERS

Men live in a world of ideas, as well as in a world of external events. Man's motives, ideas, ideals, and delusions profoundly affect his behavior. When any group of ideas and sentiments become attached through experience to certain objects, persons, or situations, and respond to their presence, we have a complex. Complexes may be socially desirable, such as an attachment to one's alma mater, or they may become morbid or pathological and tend to dominate the personality. The latter is the sense in which the term is commonly used. Sometimes complexes are repressed and forgotten. In such cases they may have an unwholesome influence on life since they are charged with a strong emotional tone. They may at any time force themselves into consciousness, against the self as a whole, and demand expression. They may find an outlet in dreams, in nervous disorders, or in disorders of conduct.

At the basis of many mental disorders, and consequently of abnormal behavior, there is a conflict between two of the impulses or drives of the individual, or between the desires of the individual and the standards of the group. While conflicts centering around sex are most frequent, they do not always lead to sex transgressions. The mental conflict may find substituted expression in numerous forms of misconduct, such as stealing, truancy, great temper, and the setting of fires.

While recognizing that there are other impulsive tendencies or drives, the sex impulse is one of the most powerful channels of life energy. We shall here set forth one interpretation which has gained a fairly wide recognition. In the psychological development of the child the objects of love are successively: self, mother, the parent of the opposite sex, a member of its own sex (companion or gang), and a member of the opposite sex. It is believed that every normal person passes through these five stages and that a failure to pass from one stage to another is often the cause of abnormal conduct, or of a nervous and moral breakdown. Emotional disturbances, wrong environmental influences, or even hereditary defects may lead to a "fixation" at one of the earlier stages. Fixation at the baby stage results in autoeroticism so that an individual is not able to free the sex interest from his or her own person; fixation at the mother stage results in "mother fixation" where the childish dependence cannot be broken; fixation at the stage of devotion to the parent of the opposite sex results in the *Oedipus complex*, which underlies many family conflicts and which is an exaggerated attachment of a boy for his mother or a girl for her father; fixation at the stage of love for a member of one's own sex results in the homosexual type of individual who finds it more easy to love a person of his or her own sex than one of the opposite sex. The individuals who are unable to break away from these earlier attachments and face the world as normal persons easily become neurotics, delinquents, and chronic perverts. Other perversions will be found discussed in psychological treatises.

When the desires and emotions of persons are prevented from expressing themselves in one way, they may find expression in some

other form. Some psychologists speak of "mechanisms" or "channels of expression" which the unconscious may assume. When an individual is guided in his action, not by a rational choice in the light of facts, but by his unconscious desires which are in opposition to what he should do, we call the excuses or "reasons" which he gives "rationalizations." For example, a man may steal and then justify his action by saying that the person from whom he stole was cheating him anyway and that this was just a way of "getting even." If an individual has a "fainting spell" to protect his own feelings or as an excuse for some failure, it is called the "mechanism of defense." When persons are unable to face the realities about them or to derive any satisfaction from their own world, they may resort to fictions, fabrications, daydreams, or utopias, in which they may take refuge. This is known as the "mechanism of escape." When an impulse, blocked in one direction, seeks outlet in another, as for example, when a man insulted by his employer to whom he cannot talk back, gives vent to his emotion upon his wife or upon his dog, it is called "substitution." When people try to escape responsibility for their own deeds by attributing them to someone else, it is termed "projection." In "regression" the person finds outlet in an earlier or lower state of emotional development, whereas in "sublimation" his impulses are attached to some socially acceptable activity.²

Psychiatry is a branch of psychology (of neurology,³ or of medicine⁴) which deals with mental disease. It is chiefly concerned with the mental processes which have become exaggerated or diminished in their capacity for action or expression. Among the symptoms of these mental diseases are found disorders of perception, of the thought process, of emotion, of action, and other disorganizations of personality. The American Psychiatric Association lists the various disorders under twenty-two main divisions. These may be found in the manuals of psychiatry.⁵

²These "mechanisms" and others are explained and illustrated in the writings of Freud, Brill, Tansley, Hadfield, White, et al.

³A. J. Rosanoff, *Manual of Psychiatry*, Preface XIII, 5th ed., John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1927.

⁴A. C. Buckley, *The Basis of Psychiatry*, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1920, p. 1.

⁵See the works on psychiatry by P. E. Bowers, A. D. Buckley, A. J. Rosanoff, and W. A. White.

SOCIAL CUSTOMS

Human behavior is never the result of environmental factors alone, or of human traits alone, but always the result of the interaction of the individual and his environment. The first task of the individual and the group is to live and to satisfy the needs of the present. Before men begin to think or to reason about their problems, they are already acting. In the satisfaction of needs and the attempt to avoid pain and gain pleasure, groups of men have come to adopt the same ways of fulfilling their desires, hence the ways of acting become customs. In this manner "folkways" arise, and the child that enters the group inevitably learns them by imitation, tradition, or authority.⁶ These ways of acting or folkways produce "habits" in the individual, and customs in the group, and they become powerful forces in society. The lives of all human beings in all times and places, and of whatever degree of culture, are primarily controlled by innumerable folkways handed down from past generations.

The folkways are considered to be the "right" ways and the "true" ways, because they exist in fact and are customary or traditional. With the development of ethical generalizations and doctrines of welfare the folkways become "mores." Since the folkways control the life of the group, they seem right and true and develop into norms of conduct, and in turn give rise to ideas, doctrines, and philosophies. Each class or group in society tends to develop its own mores or standards. Institutions as well as laws grow out of them. Moreover, each group believes that its mores are good, and that the standard of right and wrong inheres in them. Our behavior ordinarily conforms to the standards approved by the group which we trust and admire, and our moral ideals tend to sanction these ways.

The folkways and mores, or the conventions and traditions of the social group, exercise a powerful force in society, as we have seen in our study of customary morality. There is hardly anything that has not at some time or place been regarded as wrong, or hardly anything that has not been approved by some group at some time. Custom may approve of nakedness without indecency as in bathing;

⁶W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, Ginn and Company, 1911.

sanction polygamy, causing a woman to think it a disgrace to belong to a man who could afford only one wife; approve of infanticide, and the killing of the aged⁷; or permit the burning of women at the death of their husbands, the strangling of new-born babies, slavery, and the burning of witches. The term "immoral" has usually meant that a practice or act is contrary to the mores of the time and place and group in which it is being considered. Custom can make almost anything appear right or appear wrong. Just as an individual acquires the language, the ways of thinking, feeling, and acting of his group, so he tends to acquire its moral standards.

Society has always endeavored to control the conduct of the individual. The simplest attempt, as seen in primitive as well as in civilized communities, is the "primary group" organization.⁸ Contacts are those of "intimate face-to-face associations" where one identifies himself with the common life and purpose of the group. This face-to-face group, which may be the family or even the community, has a powerful habit-forming influence on the individual. Rules of conduct are defined, social control is powerful, and the status of the individual is more or less fixed.

In the secondary contacts there is "social" distance, and rules of conduct are more formal and relative. In society an act is considered to be good or bad according to its meaning for the welfare of the group; and the limits within which one's wishes may find expression are determined by the "definition of the situation" by the social group. Begun by parents in the form of praise and blame, it is continued by the community, the church, and the law.

"Good" behavior, conformity to accepted standards, is secured in any population by what we may call a common definition of the situation. The "shalt nots" of the Ten Commandments are definitions of the situation. The "don'ts" of the Mother, the gossip of the community, epithets ("liar," "thief"), shrugs, sneers, and "bawlings out," the press, the pulpit, legal decisions, etc., are common methods of defining the situation.⁹

⁷ Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 77ff.; E. Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideal*, The Macmillan Company, Vol. I, chap. XVII.

⁸ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, University of Chicago Press, 1921, p. 284.

⁹ R. E. Park and H. A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted*, Harper and Brothers, 1921, p. 60.

When a social code has been broken, its violation calls forth an emotional protest from the group. This has a powerful effect on the person. The force of public opinion, which is a rationalization of the customary mode of conduct, may cause a person mental discomfort or conflict, or it may be expressed to the extent of causing bodily suffering to the offender.

The facial expression, gestures, and the bodily movements of others affect us in many and subtle ways. One of the major forms of social stimulation is language, oral and written. Public opinion, the edict of the government, the message of the preacher, rumors, the advice and warning of a friend, all come through this medium and direct our thoughts and our conduct in certain directions. Through conversations, letters, the works of the novelist, the lectures of the professor, and numerous other forms of oral and written language, men attempt to impress upon others their experiences, attitudes, and feelings, and these in turn tend to register themselves in human behavior.

Suggestion as a force in determining our conduct is frequently overlooked. This is doubtless due to the fact that we so frequently think we are making rational choices, when in reality we are being led by unconscious influences. In everyday life our attitudes and our conduct toward certain other persons and toward particular situations may be due largely to the suggestions of friends regarding those persons or situations. Though all persons are open to suggestion, there is an immense variation between individuals, and there is also a difference between the different periods in the life of one individual. Those who are abnormally suggestible are very easily led into any or every kind of misbehavior.

The presence of a large group or of a crowd has a tendency to create an attitude of submissive suggestibility in the individual. There is the tendency to do what the crowd does. The behavior of the individual in the crowd, while seldom different from his behavior when alone, may become greater in degree. Stimulation strengthens response, and doubt and worry as to the course of one's action disappear. The fact that others are doing the same thing gives a sense of moral sanction. This is one reason why the crowd,

the fraternal order, and other groups will do what the individual alone would not attempt or perhaps would disapprove.

Illustrations of mob psychology are probably familiar to everyone, especially in the form of the industrial dispute, the race riot, or lynching. The ordinary crowd or even an audience may become a mob in a crisis, such as when a fire breaks out. When the crowd reaches a high degree of common feeling, attention, and activity, it is called a mob. Owing to the emotional excitement and the narrowing of attention, the members of the mob frequently lose their power of intelligent control and indulge in anti-social behavior.

POPULATION RELATIONSHIPS AND MOVEMENTS

The attitudes, values, and the personality make-up of the individual depend to a large extent upon the general social situation in which he is reared and lives. The individual does not develop his human traits apart from the social group. A population which maintains a proper balance between people and the available resources is desirable. Either too small or too large a population will adversely affect social relationships and the standard of living. Human institutions, as well as human nature itself, become accommodated to certain spatial relationships of human beings. As these relationships change, social problems and personal maladjustments are likely to arise.

Evidence from various sources indicates that misconduct is relatively more prevalent in urban or thickly populated areas than in rural sections of the country. The causes of such conditions, while varied, include the limitations of city environment and the more numerous social restraints upon the wishes of the person, as well as the greater opportunity for conflicts to arise and for anti-social attitudes to be formed. In the open spaces of the country young people have ample opportunity for play and expression, whereas the same group in the crowded city may have little opportunity for expression apart from commercialized amusements.

Emigration, immigration, and the mixing of diverse racial and cultural groups often have a close relation to misbehavior. The forces leading the immigrant or the child of the immigrant into anti-

social conduct are not hard to find. There frequently results a confusion of standards through the weakening of the native standards, and a failure to grasp and to assimilate the standards of the new country. In his native land the immigrant was controlled largely by the community, and he had developed a certain store of values and a set of attitudes toward them. In the new land different attitudes and values are prized, and this necessitates a reorganization of his life according to new standards. The breakdown of the old habits, with a failure to reorganize one's life and adopt new habits and standards frequently means demoralization. The language, dress, and customs which were held in respect in the native land and which bound the individual to the group are now met with contempt and ridicule. The foreigner is isolated or segregated and perhaps mistreated or exploited, and he tends to lose status in the new land. When these things which are the basis of his self-respect are scorned or regarded with contempt, attitudes and anti-social grudges sometimes develop which make it easy to give way to natural impulses and to commit offenses. The problem of social adjustment is even more difficult for the children of the foreign-born, who must live more or less under a double standard. The child may come into contact with one standard in the home and another or different standard and set of ideals in the school and community. The child may develop a contempt for the standards of the parents, and friction and irritation may lead to misconduct. When one parent is native-born and one is foreign-born, this situation is accentuated and has been found to result in the highest percentage of misdemeanors.¹⁰

While difference of language, customs, and ideals tend to isolate the foreign group and to lead to the development of undesirable attitudes, a difference of color is even more effective in causing irritation and a consciousness of loss of status in relation to a dominant group. Throughout the United States the proportion of Negroes committing misdemeanors is higher than for whites. Social factors doubtless explain these figures. Cultural barriers and prejudice may result in attitudes which lead to anti-social conduct.

¹⁰H. H. Laughlin, *Analysis of America's Melting Pot*, p. 790, The Sixty-Seventh Congress, 3rd Session, Nov. 21, 1922, Serial 7C.

THE HOME

An analysis of case studies made by various investigators bears out the conclusion that the home environment has a very close relation to misconduct.¹¹ William Healy judged that in the first series of a thousand cases studied, 23 per cent of the offenders came from homes having extreme lack of parental control, and in the second series 46 per cent came from such homes.¹² An analysis of the life histories of 647 prostitutes committed to the New York State Reformatory for women indicates that very few prostitutes come from homes where the conditions are good, or where there is wholesome family life, education, and economic security.¹³ An examination of the work of Breckinridge and Abbott will show the close relation between "bad" home conditions and misbehavior.¹⁴

The fact that 60 per cent of all "repeaters" in juvenile delinquency come from "bad" homes does not mean that all children, or any particular child, reared in such homes will be delinquent, nor does it prove that the home in any particular case caused the delinquency, which is the product of a personal reaction to a given environment. When the home conditions cause unsocial attitudes or suppress wishes which break out in misdemeanors, we can attribute causation to the home condition. In general, if you have an "undesirable" home, where poverty is combined with degradation, you will get a delinquent individual. On the other hand, the well-organized prosperous family with status in the community is usually able to regulate and satisfy the wishes of its members, who feel more strongly the force of the social restraints.

Certain special circumstances of home life may lead to anti-social conduct. The mere huddling of people together has been found to be a factor in the causation of sexual vice. The number of prostitutes and "loose-living" people who come from such conditions is

¹¹ Most of the studies are of children and youths, yet in most cases the results apply also to adults.

¹² W. Healy and A. F. Bronner, "Youthful Offenders," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXII, p. 501.

¹³ W. I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, Little, Brown and Company, 1923, p. 116.

¹⁴ S. P. Breckinridge and E. Abbott, *The Delinquent Child and the Home*, Survey Associates, Inc., 1916, pp. 73ff.

proportionately high. If the home is crowded and the mother distracted with many children, little attention can be given to any of them. Other conditions which tend to develop attitudes and habits which are socially undesirable and which are closely related to misconduct include: quarreling, nagging, and teasing within the home circle, excessive strictness which prevents the normal satisfaction of desires, and lack of parental control which permits children to shift for themselves.

Another serious factor in the home environment is the "broken" home. The child who is not controlled by the united supervision of both parents is seriously handicapped. If the break is caused by a parent's misconduct, the seriousness of the situation is increased and may cause misconduct or compensation in some form of misbehavior on the part of the child. A comparison made between the girls and boys in the Cleveland public schools and a group of delinquent boys and girls, showed that 20 per cent of the delinquent boys and 63 per cent of the delinquent girls had lost their fathers, while the percentage of delinquency for school boys was only 6 per cent, and for the school girls 5 per cent.¹⁶ Similar results were found by Young in Chicago,¹⁶ and by Breckinridge and Abbott.¹⁷ A break through death is not so serious as a break through desertion and divorce. The broken home is usually less efficient in directing the desires of the child along socially desirable lines. An examination of the Judge Baker Foundation Case Studies will impress one with the important place played by the home in general, and by the above factors in particular, in problems of misconduct.¹⁸

THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Next to the home life the individual comes into contact with the neighborhood, which has a powerful influence upon family con-

¹⁶R. G. Bonser, *School Work and Spare Time*, Cleveland Recreation Survey, Vol. II, 1918, pp. 32ff.

¹⁷R. D. Young, "Delinquency Among Boys and Their Use of Uncontrolled Time," MS., Northwestern University (30 cases), quoted in E. H. Sutherland, *Criminology*, p. 143.

¹⁸S. P. Breckinridge and E. Abbott, *The Delinquent Child and the Home*, Survey Associates, Inc., 1916, p. 92.

¹⁹Judge Baker Foundation Case Studies, Series I, "Bad" home conditions figured in cases 1 and 6-18.

ditions as well as upon the individual. As numerous case studies indicate, there is a definite connection between neighborhood conditions and standards and the wrongdoing of boys and girls. Certain neighborhoods or communities produce far more than their proportion of offenders. Boys and girls, but especially girls, are the victims of neighborhood standards and conditions. In some districts with a reputation for immorality and misdemeanors, an individual gets standing or status in proportion to his offenses. Neighborhoods which have a rapidly changing population may have no permanent standards, and consequently exert little restraint upon the conduct of the individual.

The School. The relation of the child to the school is important. After a study of a group of delinquent boys in California, one writer says that with a few exceptions delinquent boys are misfits in the public schools.¹⁹ Other studies appear to support this statement. School irritation arising out of a loss of status in the school group, through physical or nervous trouble, or through lack of satisfactory adjustment may lead to various forms of misconduct.

Gangs. One of the most powerful forces in the formation of habits of behavior comes from the neighborhood associates, or from companions and gangs. The gang age is normally from about ten to sixteen, although such groups may exist much later. Under wholesome leadership the gang may become a strong influence for good. Such organizations as the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts are attempts to direct and to organize this impulse along wholesome lines. Undirected and vicious gangs create serious social and moral problems. On the basis of two series of one thousand cases, where repeated offenders in Chicago were studied, Healy and Bronner found that there were "bad" companions in 34 per cent of one and 55 per cent of the other series.²⁰ Miss Bingham reports that of the 500 delinquent girls in Waverly House, New York City, 62.4 per cent were influenced unfavorably by "friends."²¹ "Gangs" exert a powerful

¹⁹J. H. Williams, "Delinquency and Density of Population," *Journal of Delinquency*, Vol. II (1917), p. 89.

²⁰W. Healy and A. F. Bronner, "Youthful Offenders," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXII.

²¹Anne T. Bingham, "Determination of Sex Delinquency in Adolescent Girls based on an Intensive Study of 500 Cases," *Journal of Criminal Law*, Vol. XIII, p. 516.

influence upon their members, and are often direct factors in the causation of wrongdoing. A gang may exist in a neighborhood and set the conduct codes for the children of the community. A child must either get into the gang as he becomes old enough, or be scorned and his life thereby made unpleasant for him. Most serious offenses are committed by groups of offenders, and only a few by single individuals.²²

Places of Amusement. Places of amusement or recreation frequently contribute to the misconduct of the neighborhood. Especially is this true in regard to the concerns which are interested only in profit and not in the welfare of the individuals. Since it is common for people to lessen their inhibitions during recreation, a more lax standard prevails, consequently recreations which are socially undesirable or morally questionable are particularly dangerous. Because of this many dance halls, poolrooms, and picture shows are injurious to youths. Houses of commercialized vice, "hangouts," and such institutions are especially demoralizing. After a study of about 3,000 cases, W. I. Thomas believes that the beginning of serious misconduct among girls is usually an impulse to get amusement, adventure, pretty clothes, favorable notice, freedom, and companions, and that these things rather than sexual passion lead to the development of a "wild" life.²³

Certain types of shows stimulate individuals to misconduct. In nearly all persons visual memory and visual imagery are dynamic forces in mental life leading to overt behavior. Concerning motion pictures Mr. Healy says:

When it comes to motion pictures we have added elements of force for the production of either good or bad. Not only a single event, but chapters from life histories are depicted. Not alone is one action or posture depicted, but there is added all of the motor phenomena active through a period of time. The act is not suggested; every detail of it is made clear. The breaking open of a safe, the holding up of a train, the effort at suicide are all represented in such fashion that it is bound to register as a memory picture of detailed events, if there is any tendency or

²² F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang*, University of Chicago Press, 1927.

²³ Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

opportunity for its mental reproduction. Added force comes from the concrete issues which are presented.²⁴

LITERATURE

Pernicious stories and cheap literature, sometimes circulated in the gang or purchased at bookstands, arouse mental imagery which spurs to action and misconduct. The relationship between such literature and the moral breakdown of young men and young women is well known. Short stories and novels which deal with bandit life and wild-west scenes have admittedly been the chief influence in the formation of some immoral conduct. Such literature, by suggestion and glorification, makes these deeds appear to be easy and alluring and often leads plastic youths into otherwise undreamed-of conduct.

Newspapers. In considering the factors of the neighborhood which lead to misconduct, we cannot overlook the newspapers. One study of fifty-seven representative newspapers indicated that from 5.91 to 20.02 per cent of the news was of anti-social nature.²⁵ Newspapers, as agents of public opinion, sometimes create a sentiment which looks lightly upon misbehavior and crime. Whereas public opinion in more primitive or simple societies made it almost impossible to commit offenses without becoming an outcast, public opinion in modern society not only has lowered the barriers, but gives glorified examples or suggestions, and makes it appear as if misbehavior were a customary thing.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Economic factors have a more-or-less direct bearing upon human behavior. This fact is evident even though we do not go to the extreme of accepting the economic interpretation of history.²⁶ There appears to be some correlation between business depressions and crime, the total volume of crime being greater during economic depressions. Sudden changes which disturb the settled conditions of

²⁴Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, p. 307.

²⁵Frances Fenton, "The Influence of Newspaper Presentations upon the Growth of Crime and Other Antisocial Activity," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVI, pp. 538ff.

²⁶See the works of Karl Marx, W. A. Bonger, and E. R. A. Seligman.

life, the reduction of wages, unemployment, or conditions of want on the part of the workers while the upper economic classes live in apparent luxury, cause the fires of hate to flare up and destruction of property or violence may follow.²⁷

Unemployment appears to be a factor of importance in leading to misconduct. Employment furnishes for many the chief basis of self-respect. When this is destroyed by unemployment, many persons give way to anti-social behavior. In a later chapter, we shall consider certain moral problems which arise in connection with our industrial institutions.

CONCLUSION

From the survey it will be seen that mental and social conditions are among the most important factors in determining human behavior. Misconduct may be the result of conflicts, complexes, and various personal and social pressures. The original impulses may be shaped in specific ways by the social environment, so that "conscience" and "human nature" appear to be in large part social products.

Throughout this chapter it is seen that the actual causes of wrongdoing are frequently not of a conscious nature. Moreover, the causes are often different from the explanations or "excuses" which men give for their action. These unconscious forces in life cannot be lightly ignored. Harmful habits may be formed, and emotions attached to unsocial acts or objects, even before the person is aware of what is happening. The causes of behavior are exceedingly complex. Wrongdoing may be rooted in appetites and impulses, strengthened by habit, and propagated by social suggestion and by education. Social and anti-social habits, emotions, and principles are so inter-related that it is sometimes hard to distinguish between the two. A large amount of abnormal behavior, mental, moral, and physical, is functional in nature, or is caused by a neurotic condition of the mind, and perhaps is a result of worry, fear, repression, or conflicts. High moral endeavor is made difficult or perhaps impossible under such circumstances.

²⁷J. L. Gillin, *Criminology and Penology*, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1926, pp. 183ff.

The traditional morality did not recognize these mental and social forces; or, if it did, they were not taken seriously. Wrong acts were thought to spring mainly from an evil will or motive. Any adequate treatment of the problem of morality will take these causative forces into account. As a result of recent research along these lines, men are coming to realize that the individual does not grow in a social vacuum, and that character is a matter of growth and social relationships. The moral tasks of the future will include: an attempt to remove undesirable elements in man's development; a positive program of character development; and a program of education so that men will realize the conditions necessary for a good life.

If moral philosophers in general have not recognized these causative factors, it is largely because the research has been so recent, and the implications not fully understood. Today the moralist, the sociologist, and the psychological clinic must work in close co-operation. Exhortation and good advice alone will not be sufficient. Conditions leading to misconduct need to be removed so far as possible, and the natural impulses of man so directed that a well-integrated character will result. Positive instruction regarding the attainment of the good life is of much greater value than negative instruction or warnings to avoid evil. Moral leaders are taking the emphasis off the "Thou shalt not," and are seeking to lead men to a better life through persuasion, suggestion, and a knowledge of the conditions making for a wholesome life.

While, in this chapter, we have occasionally spoken of wrongdoing in terms of maladjustment, or as the failure of the individual to act in socially approved ways, it must be kept clearly in mind that morality is not merely a matter of adjustment to these socially approved ways. Persons who are morally mature will see the need of changing or of improving these ways, and so they may be led to challenge many elements of the existing order. The social order needs to be viewed as a dynamic and not as a fixed or static order.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

- ✓1. John Brown, a bank clerk, forged a check for \$100 and was caught. Investigation showed that he was not a criminal, but that he had

forged the check in a moment of weakness. He was a good father and husband, and wanted to provide for his family some things that they needed, but had not been able to afford. The criminal court sentenced John Brown to from five to ten years in prison. The family, faced with the loss of support, was forced to move to a poor residential district. The mother was compelled to accept work which kept her from home all day, while the children had to shift for themselves. Was this case adequately handled, or did society handle the situation so that all the members of the family faced a psychic and physical crippling? Considering the total situation, the man and his family, which would have been the best solution: a prison term, probation, or guidance by some social agency? For further details and discussion, see "The House of Human Welfare" by Judge Ben B. Lindsey, *The Forum*, Vol. LXXXVIII (Dec., 1927), pp. 801ff.

2. Which area in your community or city produces the most delinquents? Why?
3. Read the life story of a criminal, such as *In the Clutch of Circumstances* by a burglar, or *You Can't Win* by Jack Black. Outline the steps by which the anti-social career was developed. Give your own impressions of the case. Drucker and Hexter's *Children Astray*, provides excellent records of short cases of youthful offenders.
4. Is there a moral loss which accompanies prolonged and enforced unemployment? See the article "The Moral Cost of Unemployment," *The Christian Century*, Vol XLIX (Aug. 17, 1932), pp. 1004-1006.
5. Read carefully the cases and illustrations reprinted below. Do you know of others, similar to these, from your own experience or from your reading?

(a) A ten-year-old girl had been engaged for two years in an unusual amount of stealing. She would also lie about the stealing. When the case was analyzed, it was found that she was continually fighting certain thoughts and "bad words" which came to her mind. These thoughts and words were traced back to her contact with a boy whom she had met while on a vacation. He not only gave her her first knowledge of sex life, but talked to her about stealing, and taught her words of which she was secretly ashamed. She attempted to repress these thoughts and words, but they came back again and again with the force of an obsession. Her misconduct apparently arose out of this conflict. When the cause of the difficulty was discovered, her parents talked it over frankly with the girl and tried to develop new interests. Soon the misconduct ceased,

and a report six years later indicated normal progress in school with no more delinquencies. Summary of Case 9, *Mental Conflicts and Misconduct*, by William Healy.

(b) A boy whose conduct had always been normal, at the age of eleven and a half years suddenly began to run away, to steal, and to exhibit other undesirable attitudes. He came from a good environment, from fairly good stock, and had no serious mental or physical abnormalities. An investigation disclosed that a meddling neighbor had told him that the woman whom he thought was his mother was not his mother, but that his real mother had died soon after he was born, and that the other children in the family were not his real brothers and sisters. The statements themselves were true, for the father had re-married soon after the loss of the boy's mother and had kept the information from him thinking that it would make for a more harmonious family life. The discovery of the facts, however, was a distinct shock to the boy, although he kept the information to himself. He felt that he had been deceived, that his parents were liars, and that he did not want to stay at home any longer. The misconduct, previously noted, developed from this situation. He felt that he must in some way get even with society for the injustice which he thought had been done to him. Summary of Case 6, *Mental Conflicts and Misconduct*, by William Healy.

(c) A district in a Western city, where juvenile delinquency had been prevalent, showed a considerable decline in delinquency after a park with play facilities had been opened. During the same period, delinquency was increasing in other parts of the city.

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Chapter IX

THE RELATION OF FREEDOM TO CONDUCT

IN THE LIGHT of these numerous determiners of conduct, physical, biological, psychological, and social, which we have been considering in the last two chapters, it is evident that conduct cannot be explained merely in terms of an isolated will. Such an empirical inquiry into the conditions of human behavior makes it clear that human activity is influenced by numerous factors. We are, therefore, naturally led to ask whether or not man's life is completely determined. Are men caught in the grip of cause and effect? Are human actions, like objects in nature, under the reign of natural law? Can man influence or regulate, even to some extent, the course of his actions in the future? The answers to these questions are central and fundamental for the study of ethics.

In the Introduction we pointed out that moral judgments are not ordinarily passed upon the processes of physical nature, nor upon the behavior of animals. Moral judgments are applied to the actions of human beings, and in particular to the voluntary acts of human beings. The child who is under the "age of accountability" and the insane person are not regarded as moral agents. Just why do we make such distinctions?

The term "freedom" is used in a number of different senses. 1. Freedom may mean the liberty to exercise one's powers without external restraint, or the absence of compulsion. The prisoner, the slave, and the animal in the cage are not free in this sense, since they cannot follow the inclinations of their own beings. When set free, they are able to live their own lives to a greater extent. In modern society there is much freedom in this sense, although all persons live under some restraints imposed by the physical environment or by society. Ignorance, intense fatigue, or disease may also exercise restraint upon man's conduct. 2. Freedom may mean civil liberty,

including freedom of speech, of assembly, and of religion. In this sense, freedom may mean the liberty to express oneself in social and political activities. 3. In the more strictly ethical sense, the term freedom means the power on man's part to choose between different possibilities and values, or to act as a causal agent in the process of behavior.

In the past, moral freedom has usually been called "freedom of the will." Today the term is less used since men do not think of the will as a separate entity or faculty, but as a term denoting the activity or motor tendencies of the organism. In a more restricted and personal sense, the term "will" refers to a person's ability to perform voluntary acts. The will is the person expressing himself in action.

The question as to whether a man's acts are the outcome of his own independent choice, or whether they are wholly determined by past events has been keenly debated by moral philosophers, psychologists, and religious leaders. This is an issue upon which eminent men disagree. We shall consider briefly the opposing positions.

THE CASE FOR INDETERMINISM

The indeterminists, who take the most extreme position in their support of freedom, contend that there are events in the mental and moral life of man which cannot be explained in terms of cause and effect. Man has the power of alternative choice, and even beyond this, he has the power to act without any motive at all. Since the mind may work without any motivation, there may be unmotivated conduct. Man may choose those things to which he gives his attention, and he may make choices which are independent of his heredity and his environment. The will, according to this view, is capable of defying the power of the strongest motive. In support of this position the indeterminist advances certain arguments.

1. The Consciousness of freedom. There is the consciousness of freedom, which, among other ways, expresses itself so forcibly in the sense of "ought." When we make a choice, we feel ourselves to be free and that the will is uncaused. This is a fact of experience to be recognized. This sense of freedom and the sense of "ought" are quite meaningless apart from the power of alternative choice. For

Kant, this sense of freedom and of obligation is central in the moral life. For him, "I ought" implies that "I can."

2. *Moral responsibility assumes an uncaused will.* Growing out of the sense of "ought" is the sense of moral responsibility. We hold ourselves responsible for many of our acts, and we hold others responsible for their actions. All judgments upon conduct and character presuppose that men are free moral agents. We hold children responsible for their acts, in proportion to their age and experience. At a very early age we do not hold them responsible, but as they come to an age of understanding and are able to grasp clearly the significance of a given act and its rightfulness or wrongfulness, we do hold them accountable. In our courts we do not hold persons responsible unless we think they could have done otherwise than they did. Our whole system of rewards and punishment, praise and blame, approval and disapproval, assume freedom and responsibility.

3. *Indeterminism, the only intelligible view.* The indeterminist asserts that if determinism were complete, then values, thinking, and even truth would become meaningless. It would be absurd to appeal to ideas, ideals, and logical reasons. Everything would be an equally necessary outcome of what has gone before. Reason is meaningless, unless there is enough freedom to enable the person to discriminate and to choose between two or more alternatives. We say that men are prejudiced when their decisions or judgments are rendered on the basis of their own desires or emotions. Real knowledge depends upon our ability to rise above such impulsive reactions.

Explanations in terms of complete determinism arise, we are told, when the methods of the physical sciences are taken as the only methods. In the physical sciences, investigators definitely attempt to exclude all personal and non-quantitative factors. This approach is a legitimate one, but the investigator needs to realize that his conclusions or results must be confined to these fields of investigation and not to human experience as a whole.

THE CASE FOR DETERMINISM

In opposition to the preceding position, the determinist maintains that, at the moment of choice, the agent's will is always determined.

Determinists maintain that all human behavior is antecedently conditioned by preceding events, of which it is the outcome. The act of choice is determined either by external pressures or by the desires and tendencies that belong to the agent's character.

Determinism, or the view that events, including man's will, are to be explained by preceding events, must be clearly distinguished from both fatalism and predestination. Fatalism is the view that everything in nature and in life is fixed and that our wills have no part in determining behavior or the outcome of events. Man's life is so bound up with an inexorable law of nature that all his actions are predetermined. Predestination is the view that God has decreed every event that is to occur, including man's will. Thus predestination has a theological and a supernatural element in its outlook.

Determinism has expressed itself in a number of forms. In its application to human behavior, we need to recognize at least two forms, Physical Determinism and Psychical Determinism. Physical Determinism (complete or mechanical determinism) accepts a thoroughgoing mechanistic interpretation of the universe, including man. The human personality, comprising consciousness, volition, and thinking, is explained in terms of changes which take place within the physical organism. There is a fixed causal series to which the facts of biology and of psychology offer no exception. What happens at any particular time is determined by a previous set of conditions or chain of events. A man must necessarily act as he does, since his actions are the outcome of what has happened in the past. Evolution is repetitive, but not emergent, since nothing entirely new emerges anywhere in the cosmic process. There are only new combinations and relationships of previously existing elements. No element of freedom is present at any point in the process. Man is no exception in the chain of cause and effect.

Psychical Determinism (Inner or Character Determinism) rejects the thoroughgoing mechanical interpretation given above, and makes room for life and mind as something quite different from matter. We act as we do because of desires or motives which grow out of the past and present conditions of life. Moral choices are determined by man's character, which, in turn, is determined by the total factors

of heredity and environment. These produce a condition within the organism in which certain desires are bound to arise. These desires tend to express themselves in overt behavior.

The determinist believes that there is strong evidence for some form of determinism. We shall consider below some of the arguments that are presented by the determinist in outlining his position.

1. *Determinism is a necessary scientific assumption.* The determinist is impressed by the orderliness of the universe and by the fact that steady progress is being made in the discovery of causal relations. The idea of an intelligible order of nature is the guiding principle of scientific thinking. While it cannot be conclusively proved, the progress which science has made on the basis of this assumption offers strong evidence in its behalf. The complete denial of determinism would seem to make each new phenomenon, or each new event, an ever-renewed miracle.

2. *Determinism is also the presupposition of all intelligent behavior.* All social legislation is based upon the assumption that human behavior can be controlled if the right technique is used. The actions of men, on the whole, are characterized by dependability. We can rely upon the behavior of most of the persons with whom we are well acquainted. An analysis of acts of choice will reveal the fact that they always arise out of a given set of conditions and have little meaning apart from those conditions. The numerous case studies of behavior problems make clear that, in proportion to the data available, the conduct may be explained in terms of specific causes. There does not appear to be any unmotivated conduct. Unless some knowable factors influence the self, it is difficult to see how a science of psychology is possible.

3. *Moral responsibility implies determinism, not indeterminism.* The determinist directly challenges the contention of the indeterminist that moral responsibility implies an uncaused and undetermined will. If one could make any choice at any time, apart from one's past experience and present tendencies or "character," it is hard to see how responsibility is possible at all, as the next paragraph will make clear.

EVALUATION OF THE OPPOSING VIEWS

Neither indeterminism, nor determinism in its more extreme forms, gives a wholly satisfactory answer to the problem of moral freedom and responsibility. Indeterminism seems to make human conduct altogether too capricious, and to fail to take account of human experience. As Professor W. G. Everett says:

If the moral life be not continuous development, if there be any breaks in the relation of its past and present, then indeed the good tree may bring forth evil fruit; in the moral world we may gather grapes from thorns and figs from thistles. Our sowing of the good seed today may count for naught tomorrow. Evil may be done with the hope that it will not matter. Expectation of the conduct of men is disturbed and confidence destroyed. Punishment and reward, the training of the young, education, government, social effort, responsibility—all rest upon an implicit determinism.¹

The basis of our confidence in our fellowmen is the belief that their conduct is not arbitrary, but is dependable and that it will be in harmony with their character.

Men like praise and rewards; they do not like blame and punishment, and ordinarily they endeavor to gain the former and to avoid the latter. Wise parents and leaders of men know that interests and hence conduct are influenced by one's associates and by the expectations of the group of which one is a sympathetic member. We hold persons responsible, not because their wills are necessarily uncaused, but because holding them responsible has a determining effect upon their conduct.

The argument of the indeterminist based on the consciousness of freedom is inconclusive. In the first place, it may mean nothing more than our ignorance of the causes that have influenced us, as Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) so effectively pointed out. In the second place, it may simply mean that individuality is a causal factor in the interaction of the person with other people and things.

To claim that values and thinking become meaningless on the basis of determinism is true only if the most extreme form of deter-

¹W. G. Everett, *Moral Values*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1918, p. 353.

minism, that is, physical determinism or a thoroughgoing mechanism, is accepted. There are, however, various forms of determinism.

The determinist's appeal to the scientific postulate of causation, and to the fact that men are empirically discovering the actual causes of human behavior, are strong points for this view. To say, however, that human behavior is determined does not in itself tell us how it is determined. There are many different kinds of determinism. Failure to grasp this important point explains in part the attempt of some men to reduce all behavior and all activity to some one type of determinism. The uncritical attempt to explain everything by one principle of interpretation is one of the more frequent fallacies of overspecialization. It occurs whenever the totality of things is thought to be exhausted by some one category. Men who center their attention exclusively upon one field of activity are often led to take it as the independent variable, in terms of which other things are measured. Physical determinism may explain behavior in terms of the units employed in the physical sciences. Geographic determinism may emphasize topography, climate, or food as the significant factors of social development. Biological determinism may stress racial or hereditary traits, while psychological determinism may stress one of a variety of personality traits. Social or cultural determinism, in turn, may seek to explain the same phenomena in terms of institutions and cultural contacts.

Since the main argument of determinism is the appeal to the postulate of scientific determinism, we need to keep in mind that this principle does not necessitate the acceptance of any complete mechanism nor physical determinism. The work of Schrödinger, Bohr, and others seems to indicate that there is an uncertainty in nature. There is a tendency today to regard the laws dealing with molecules, atoms, and electrons, as statistical averages only. Since strict causality and determinism are open to question even in the basic or "exact" sciences of physics and mechanics, we shall need to be cautious about affirming any special type of determinism, or of stating the principle of causality too rigidly.² In this connection the statement of an out-

²Sir William Dampier, *A History of Science and Its Relation to Philosophy and Religion*, The Macmillan Company, 1935, pp. 471-477; and Hans Reichenbach, *Atom and Cosmos*, The Macmillan Company, 1933, pp. 279-280.

standing biologist to the effect that the determinism of science is not predeterminism or fatalism and that it does not destroy all freedom and responsibility when applied to man is worthy of note.³

An adequate determinism must include man's intelligence as an effective element in the causal series. We have already spoken of moral conduct as the voluntary action of human beings. A study of moral conduct implies the existence of a self-conscious personality. If there is any problem of human conduct, there must be a self, or a person, capable of conscious and deliberate discrimination between values. Man is not only an organism that belongs to a physical and an organic world, but he belongs to a rational and an ethical order. As a rational and an ethical being, he is free from some of the limitations of the laws of physics and of biology. Unlike the stone, the tree, or the animal, he is able to carry on experiments which are mental. As a result of this mental trial-error process, he may to some extent select his future behavior. Man is a personality, a unit, with qualities and characteristics quite different from the parts of which he is composed. The human self is a center of energy, which may mould the original materials given by heredity and environment into a pattern of moral character distinctly its own. Ethical and rational discrimination, however, do not eliminate the influence of biological inheritance or of environmental pressure.

There is no need to assume that if the will is determined it is not an effective agent. We do not think in this way even about the objects of nature. When we say that a man is free, we mean, not that his choice is undetermined, but that he is not coerced against his wishes. When a man stops to deliberate before making a choice, he brings before himself so far as he can the consequences which would follow from the different possible courses of action. Deliberation would seem to be of little value if his final choice is not to be determined by this process of thinking. It is the foreseen advantages of one course of action and the disadvantages of another that determine his choice.

While every choice may be motivated by some desire, the desire

³E. G. Conklin, *Has Science Discovered God?* ed. by E. H. Cotton, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1931, p. 86.

may be the expression of a self-formed character. The chief significance of indeterminism is in emphasizing that man is not the mere plaything of external forces. With the growth of the power to control the forces of nature, and to escape many of the older fears which haunted primitive man, man believes that in some sense he is master of his destiny. The chief significance of determinism is in its emphasis upon the specific determiners of conduct, including past tendencies and present character. Human conduct is not the result of chance, since all behavior has predetermining causes. There are, however, certain kinds of determinism which coincide with what others consider freedom. Freedom demands only that the volitions of men shall be the result of their own desires and not the rigid necessity of some compulsory outside force.

HOW FREE IS MAN?

Primitive man was so pressed by his immediate need of food, clothing, shelter, rest, and protection that he had little opportunity for reflection upon the aims of life, or for choice as to means to attain these ends. In the case of modern man, these needs are only slightly less pressing. Consequently, the times when conscious choice and reflection are present are also likely to be few and fleeting. Men gain freedom, however, with the development of self-consciousness, with the growth of intelligence and knowledge, and with the aid of leisure hours and the released energy which civilization usually makes possible, at least for some. Whereas consciousness is the awareness of one's environment, self-consciousness is the awareness of the contents and activity of one's own mind or self. It is the kind of consciousness that distinguishes the self from its environment, and which makes possible language, reasoning, and the sense of right and wrong. In the development of the child and of the race, consciousness precedes self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a prerequisite of freedom.

With the growth of intelligence and knowledge, there is an increase in freedom. If, in a crisis, a person knows or can think of only one thing to do, he is not free. With an increase in reasoning power and in knowledge, come additional potential choices. New ways of performing necessary tasks suggest themselves, and choices

and moral problems arise where they have not arisen before. Not only physical and mental health, but a fertile imagination, a broad range of interests, and a capacity for intelligent valuation are necessary conditions of freedom. When a person is confronted with a perplexing situation, there is uncertainty, and a conflict arises in the organism between the principle of organization and the forces making for disorganization. At such times emotions arise as disorganized responses. As organization and control become less and less, the person's behavior tends to revert to the deep-rooted primitive responses of the race. Under these conditions a man has little or no freedom. With the development of self-consciousness and intelligence, there is opened up for a person the possibility of self-control or self-determination which was not possible before. The important question is not "Is man free?" but "How free is man?" Some men have little freedom; others apparently have considerable freedom. In this sense, we could avoid the word "freedom," if we wished, and talk about intelligent behavior.

With the growth of intelligence, and hence freedom, there is increased responsibility. Responsibility has a future, as well as a retrospective, bearing. We hold persons liable, in order that their future conduct may be different.

It would be absurd to hold a stone responsible when it falls from a cliff and injures a person, or to blame the falling tree which crushes a passerby. The reason for the absurdity is that such treatment would have and could have no conceivable influence on the future behavior of stone or tree. They do not interact with conditions about them so as to learn, so as to modify their attitudes and dispositions.⁴

We dare not treat human beings as we would treat stones or even trees. Apparently, persons represent a different order of existence.

Society holds persons responsible in order that they may learn, or in order that their growth may be directed. The fact that human beings are able to refashion or redirect old tendencies, as well as to acquire new and additional information, is another argument against a too rigid statement of the principle of causality.

⁴Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 337.

Sometimes when men are confronted with a choice of alternatives, they stop and deliberate upon the nature of the alternatives presented, and weigh carefully the reasons for and against each possible choice. A football, when kicked, does not stop to deliberate whether or not it shall go, nor does a baseball reflect when hit by a bat. Action is immediate and in the direction determined by the force of the blow. In human deliberation something different takes place. After sensory or ideational stimulation, there may be a prolonged delay, while further thought is given to the situation and many relevant factors called in and evaluated. Reflective consideration may change the relative strength of motives or desires, so that a motive that was strong before deliberation may lose its force and another motive come to take its place.

If I act in a certain manner because of a particular set of conditions of which I am unaware, my action takes one form. If, however, I become aware of these conditions which have influenced me, I may react to them in an entirely different way from then on. When I know what reaction a certain stimulus is supposed to produce in me, I have a new motive for deciding which way I shall act. As Professor W. E. Hocking has pointed out, men can be managed through stimuli only so long as they do not know that they are being managed. When men become conscious of the fact that they are being influenced by persons or things, they may modify their reactions or even react negatively. Freedom thus means, in part, the ability to stop and think before committing oneself to a particular line of activity. It means the ability to place before oneself other satisfactions or courses of action besides the one suggested by the immediate environmental situation.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Primitive man crouched in fear when his community was visited by a great electrical storm. He knew nothing of the nature of the great forces acting in nature. Modern man, however, may enjoy the storm. He understands its vast forces and even controls similar forces to light his home, to cook his meals, to communicate with his friends, and to drive his interurban electric cars. Give other illustrations of the freedom which comes through intelligence.

- ✓2. List the conditions which you think are necessary for the largest degree of freedom. Do health, fatigue, intense pain, disease, mental habits, range of interests, and ability to reflect, influence the degree of freedom which we have at any time?
3. Is it true that when we discover the part that heredity and environment play in our lives, their character and influence is thereby altered?
- ✓4. When the soldier in the army is commanded to perform an act which he feels is immoral, is he a free moral being? To what extent should he be held responsible?
5. Mr. A accepts the position of complete determinism. He tries to convince his friend, Mr. B, who accepts a degree of freedom of choice, that B's position is wrong. Mr. A says that B's conduct really is determined, although he does not know it and will not admit it. Mr. B replies that A cannot be a consistent determinist and say that he is wrong, since if he does, A assumes that he is a really rational agent who is able to change the course of events from what they would be otherwise. Mr. B contends that A assumes that a man may go counter to his past and accept a new position. Comment upon this argument and the issues raised. Read E. G. Spaulding, *What Am I?* chap. II.

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Part Three

THE NATURE OF MORALITY

Chapter X

WHY RIGHT IS RIGHT

THERE ARE before us today baffling problems of human conduct, and our traditional moral standards seem unable to arbitrate the issues, and to lead men on to clear convictions as to what is right and what is wrong. The knowledge of the concrete factors involved in human conduct may aid us, not only in attaining the good life, but in setting forth a more satisfactory interpretation of the nature of morality. Conduct may be determined by a variety of conditions, most of which are amenable to control. Any adequate discussion of the problems of morality will take these concrete causative factors into account. Our next task is to consider the nature of morality, asking, first, why right is right, and why wrong is wrong.

On a number of occasions during the last few years, I have asked groups of persons, mostly seniors and juniors in college, to write down what they considered to be the basis or bases of judging between right and wrong. In every case the answers have varied so widely that it was necessary to classify them under a number of different headings. There are four answers which are nearly always included in the list.

SOME UNSATISFACTORY REASONS

According to one group of answers, morality is a matter of individual preference or of private opinion. There are no standards, or at least none which have any real claim upon an individual. A second group use as a criterion, "Let conscience be your guide." Conscience, however, means a different thing to different people. To some, it is of divine origin and sanction, while others think of it merely as a reflection of the standards of the social group. A third group would base morality upon some external authority having a religious basis, such as the Bible, the teachings of Jesus, some church

or ecclesiastical institution, or certain moral codes or principles delivered at some time in the past. A fourth group seem to believe that what is right is determined by customs or public opinion. They argue that ideas of right and wrong vary from place to place and from age to age, and therefore they are dependent entirely upon the element of group approval and disapproval.

While people do act to some extent on the basis of the explanations given above, and while there is some truth in each of them, no one of them appears to be a satisfactory basis for judging between right and wrong. Let us briefly consider each of the four answers.

To the question, "Why can't I do as I please?" we may reply, "Within certain limits you can." A man may disregard social obligations and pay no attention to the laws of health. He cannot, however, avoid the penalty of such action. If a man wishes to travel, to advance in social life or in business, or to engage in any co-operative enterprise, he must adjust his action to the lives of others and to the demands of the situation. Society is an organization of persons who are co-operating in innumerable ways whether at work or at play. A complete realization of individual preference is out of the question in the kind of world in which we live, unless the person is highly intelligent and socially minded in his preferences.

In every department of life we have developed ways of procedure which are taken more or less for granted. This is true whether it is business, science, law, or amusement which we are considering. Even in the less serious activities of life we need standards of procedure. Every game has its rules which must be followed if one is to participate. Imagine eleven football players rushing to the field, with one or more of them exclaiming, "Never mind the rules; I am going to express my individuality in this game!" Persons who take the attitude that everyone should be allowed to make his own rules usually do so because they resent some particular restriction or restrictions which are irksome to them.

The appeal to conscience is more reasonable and widespread. Doubtless all persons can recall situations when some proposed course of action was obstructed by a sense of uneasiness. Conscience is the product of both individual experience and social contacts and

is the name for the restraining impulses upon conduct which come from within. These inhibitions in their simpler form may express our vague reluctance due to unfamiliarity or to the presence of the new and the untried. They may be the result of early training, or of opposing habit, or of the restraining influence of custom, tradition, or public opinion, as we saw in Chapter Eight. At other times they may be more definitely of a conscious nature, the result of the conviction that the opposed action is harmful in its personal or social effects.

When we compare various possible lines of action and select the one which seems to lead to the most beneficial results, we do not ordinarily call it conscience. Conscience acts chiefly as a restraining force. Professor A. K. Rogers says, "Conscience implies a dislike of something which at the same moment involves the machinery of desire, and it is only because it thus comes in conflict with desire that there arises the feeling of compulsion which is necessary to its being in the distinctive sense a case of duty."¹

While it is right to follow one's conscience, yet one's conscience is not always right! The consciences even of good men differ widely. Some of the great blunders of history have been performed by conscientious men. Their consciences needed training and redirecting. John Ruskin expressed a truth when he said, "Follow your conscience, but first be certain that it is not the conscience of an ass."

These restraining impulses and inhibitions and the more positive prompting to duty, which we call conscience, are especially valuable. They usually bring pressure upon us at such times as we need it, and they tend to represent the experience and the wisdom of the race. The chief defect of conscience is that it tends to represent the conventional morality and to be ineffective, or perhaps misleading, when we attempt to solve entirely new problems. While it is right to follow one's conscience, conscientiousness is not enough. Conscience cannot be taken as the standard for right and wrong.

To take custom or the social group as the standard is to submerge the individual in society. In an earlier chapter we saw that this standard was prevalent in primitive times, and even today many per-

¹A. K. Rogers, "Art and Conscience," *International Journal of Ethics*, Jan. 1931, p. 146.

sons accept the dictates of the group without reflection or criticism. Moral evolution has moved in the direction of emancipating the individual from the complete control of the group. The fact that a majority, or even all, of the members of a group declare an action to be right or wrong does not necessarily make it so. While custom and moral demands will ordinarily coincide, to accept all social customs as if they were moral obligations, and to recognize no duties except those laid down by the group is to surrender the main task of morality. Progress has come mainly through the individual challenging the customary actions of the group. If moral laws were derived from social conventions, then it would not be possible to subject social prescriptions to intelligent criticism. If there are good customs and bad customs, then custom cannot be the standard of right and wrong.

To accept divine law, in one or more of its forms, as the basis of right and wrong does not give as certain a standard as may at first appear to some. If expressed as the "will of God," there would be no argument against the claim that it is right to do the will of God. When, however, in any particular case we ask, "What is the will of God?" we face another problem. We still have to decide what is the will of God. What God's will is depends upon the interpretation of the individual in a particular case. There is no hard and fast body of rules which can be labelled "God's will." Just as soon as we ask, "Why do we believe this to be the will of God?" we are forced to still another principle or basis of judgment.

Almost all peoples have attributed their moral code to their gods or to God. Yet these codes have been most diverse. Even these conceptions of God's commands have changed with the development of the group and with changed conditions. In biblical literature, as we saw in Chapter Two, God is represented at an early period as commanding acts which at a later time were thought to be wrong.

There are two types of religious interpretation of ethical problems. The first type attempts to keep ethics strictly theological. Ethical duties stand out by themselves with no reason or justification except that they are God's will. Perhaps the most extreme expression of this attitude is the idea that God does not require certain things of us

because they are right, but they are right because God does require them. Thus the content of ethics becomes simply a matter of ascertaining what God expects us to do and then obeying those commands. The second type of religious interpretation is somewhat different. According to it, men are inspired by their religion and love of God to discover the right and to walk according to it. Religion thus is seen as a powerful motivation, directing men's lives in the way they should go, rather than indicating the particular acts they should perform. However, this still throws upon man himself the decision as to what is right in any particular situation. What then can be the criterion?

SOME TENABLE REASONS

Another group of answers to the question, "Why is right right?" judges conduct as right or wrong with reference to whether such conduct was thought to promote some end considered good in itself. That is, the answers corresponded roughly to the positions of the three teleological approaches considered in Part One of the text. There were those who said that happiness is the greatest good, and that conduct which promotes happiness is right and conduct which tends to subtract from happiness is wrong. Occasionally a person would answer that survival or adaptation is the good and that men must live according to natural laws. They therefore judged conduct on this basis. Others argued that the development of man's capacities is the greatest good; that the good for man lies in the perfection of his functions which include the rational and spiritual as well as the organic. Persons who gave these latter answers were usually those who had done considerable reading and thinking in the field. These answers need to be made more specific.

THE MORAL STANDARD

Is there any standard of moral judgment to which human conduct must conform if it is to be called right? Perhaps we should pause here to define the terms "right" and "good." While the terms are sometimes used synonymously, it is well to distinguish between them. The term "right" comes from the Latin *rectus* meaning

straight, or direct, or in line. Right implies conformity to some standard. Thus an act is right if it conforms to the norm or standard by which it is to be judged. Right conduct is conduct which brings about the greatest possible good in the situation. The term "good" applies to that which possesses desirable qualities or which satisfies some need. The term means a thing or an experience which is valuable or worth having. When we say that a thing is good, we mean that it is good for something or for somebody. A thing is good if it has value for persons, or if it makes for social welfare. Thus the right is based upon the good, and the good is that which has value for persons. On this basis the standard of right conduct may be stated in one of two different ways.

1. Action is right if it leads to physical, intellectual, and spiritual development, or to a more harmonious personal and social life. Action is wrong if it is detrimental to the individual or to society. If the foregoing statement is true, and I believe it is, then the standard of moral judgment is based on the effect of an act upon one's personality, using personality in the sense of the total of one's physical, mental, and spiritual nature, and realizing that personality is also a social product. If this way of stating it seems too individual to the reader, he may use the term social welfare instead of the term personality. If we had a term that expressed personality development in the direction of goodness, truth, and beauty, and which included social integration and social welfare, or even the greatest happiness of the greatest number, I would use such a term.

Morality is an observance of the laws of wholesome living. To be moral is to be intelligent and to be socially minded in the process of living. An act which is right is an act which enriches and strengthens the life of the group. An act which is wrong is an act which has proved in experience to be socially harmful. This standard was in operation before men became conscious of it. Men learned long ago through bitter experience that there were certain types of action and ways of living which have resulted in disaster both for the individual concerned and for the larger community. These socially harmful actions were called wrong. Men also discovered that there were other ways of acting and of living which tended to pro-

vide satisfaction for the individuals directly concerned, and which were, on the whole, socially beneficial. These actions tended to receive group approval and were called right.

2. The same standard of judging between right and wrong may be stated a little differently. When a person is confronted with a situation presenting a choice or alternatives, the right choice is the selection of the greater or greatest value, the wrong choice is the selection of some lesser good or value. While some choices in life are those between what is definitely good and what is definitely evil, in a great many cases we must choose between a good and a better. In such cases, right conduct is action in the direction of the better.

To the degree that a group of people agree upon a certain value as a norm, then it becomes a matter of evidence as to whether a particular act does or does not lead in the direction of that norm. To the person who is morally mature an act that is beneficial is a good act, an act that is harmful is a bad act regardless of whether the community approves or disapproves. The growing knowledge of the specific elements that enter into human behavior, and the way in which these factors affect our welfare will enable us to direct our lives more intelligently. The purpose of a study of moral problems and of standards of judgment is to lead men more consciously to consider what is most worth while in life, to approve conduct which has beneficial results, and to disapprove conduct which is harmful. Without some such scrutiny, their views of the worth-while things in life may be superficial, and their knowledge of the personal and social effects of conduct may be warped or fallacious.

MORAL SKEPTICISM

The fact that moral codes and man's views of what is right and what is wrong have varied from time to time and from place to place has led some persons to believe that morality is merely a matter of opinion and that "there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so." These persons find it hard to reconcile the historical relativity of morals and the claim to objective validity. The skeptics seem to assume that moral codes must be universal and necessary in order to have genuine worth.

The position of the skeptic rests upon a misunderstanding of the nature and function of morality. If the conditions of life change, and if there is progress both in man's knowledge and in his insight into the meaning of his life and his social relationships, then there must also be change and progress in his standards of living. A growing knowledge of the effect of certain forms of behavior on life is especially likely to cause changes in moral ideas. Consequently, actions which we once approved we may come to condemn because we have discovered some harmful effects. Things which we once condemned we may later come to approve because we have discovered that they are not harmful.

Today, we find people living at all stages of moral development from a primitive type of group morality to intelligent, conscious morality. Just as we find persons at all levels of intelligence, so we find persons at different stages of moral development. Between the primitive man acting half consciously in terms of the welfare of his tribe and the modern man thinking in terms of the welfare of humanity, there is much in common though there are at the same time wide differences in practice.

While it is to be admitted that we cannot give the skeptic absolute or conclusive proof in the realm of morals any more than we can in the realm of truth, nevertheless men must act, and some ways of acting are better than other ways. Consequently, the intelligent person attempts to find some basis of selection or discrimination. In the last analysis both the moral philosopher and the skeptic must appeal to intelligence. Both demand a reasonable explanation. To deny the criterion of the welfare of persons would seem to lead eventually to the elimination of both life and reason. The conviction that this approach is an intelligent approach may give men all the certainty that they need. In this case, doubt will prevail mainly in the unique or unusual cases, or at the growing points in the experiences of men. The historical relativity of morality, however, does not necessarily imply relativity for the individual who may be living under a code which is functioning effectively and which he recognizes as binding.

In seeking the most reasonable line of action, we need to make as

careful an analysis as we can of all the relevant factors involved in any situation before us. This will include an appeal to human experience and to such principles and facts as may throw light upon our problem. It is, however, only the person who is at the level of conscious or reflective morality to whom such an approach as we have suggested can adequately apply.

This approach to the problem of what is right may be further amplified and better understood if we consider some of the practical questions which commonly arise when people are trying to decide what is right. For instance, shall we judge conduct by the motive a person had in its performance, or must we consider the consequences of the act? Is the end itself important enough to justify the means?

MOTIVE VERSUS CONSEQUENCES

A man driving in his car comes upon the scene of an accident. He takes one man who needs medical care and speeds up to find a doctor. His extra speed is the cause of another accident. How are we to judge his conduct? Was his act right because his motive was good, or was his act wrong because the consequences were bad?

For almost any act we may list a number of possible motives. Three persons go to college. For one the motive is adequate preparation for some particular career. For another, the desire is for wider social contacts and a good time. Still another will go because it is the "thing to do" in one's social set, without which there may be a loss of prestige. We may cultivate a friendship for business contacts, for social advancement, or because of personal admiration for someone.

The motive for an act is basic for morality. An act which we wholeheartedly approve must satisfy certain conditions in regard to motive. If a good motive is absent, the act, even though externally beneficial, is not approved without qualification. We know that the doer meant otherwise and that the good consequences were due to his error of judgment or to conditions which he could not foresee. We cannot feel kindly toward such a person. On the other hand, if a good motive is present, but the act turns out to be harmful, we tend to condemn less severely and to excuse the person by saying,

"He meant well anyway." However, it must be noted that our condemnation or lack of condemnation will depend upon whether we think he could have foreseen the consequences of his act, or whether he could have done otherwise than he did.

While a good motive is a prerequisite to an act which we approve without qualification, yet motive does not give us the clue to what is right. When a man asks, "What is right?" we assume that he wants to do the right thing, but that he is unable to decide. A writer in the *Hibbert Journal* states this issue clearly.

But when we ask whether an act was right we do not usually mean: Was the agent morally to blame or not? We are more likely to mean: Did he choose rightly in deciding what to do? And this is much the more important question in practice despite the fact that motives are more important for morality than outward acts. For in order to act rightly we must find out what is right, and in order to do that it is in general futile to ask about our motives, since the very question what is right, if and in so far as it is to be relevant to our action at all, assumes that our motive is to do what is right. But we have still to find out what the right act is before we can express our motive in action, and we cannot therefore find this out by asking again what our motive is or even what it ought to be.²

There are thus two important questions which must be clearly distinguished. First, in performing a deed, is a man morally responsible? Here we are considering what he intends to do, or his purpose. What is his motive? Does he genuinely endeavor to carry it out in action? Second, is the act right? Does the man choose rightly in deciding what to do? The latter question has nothing to do with his motive. In order to act rightly a man must find out what is right. Here we ask, "Granted that this man wishes to act for the best, what ought he to do in this situation?" An answer to this second question demands evidence and reflection.

MEANS VERSUS THE END

Just as there may be a number of possible motives for an act, there are often various ways by which we may arrive at some end or goal.

²A. C. Ewing, "Rightness and Consequences," *Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1931, p. 329.

We must employ some means or we cannot carry out our intention. To keep an appointment, I may drive my own car, go by bus, or by train. To give myself relaxation from mental labor or from some trying experience, I may use any one of a large number of means, including perhaps, sleep, a theater performance, baseball, tennis, a walk, or getting drunk. Thus the same end may be gained by one of several possible means. Once chosen, however, the means becomes part of the intention.

The means used may be the reason why we approve or condemn some action. A business man wishes to give a large amount of money for a hospital in his city. His motive may be good, and we may approve the results. In order to get the additional money, however, he uses unscrupulous methods in his business. In such cases our judgment upon the man's action depends, not upon the intention alone, which may be good, but upon the means employed which may be evil.

The means employed in action may be morally neutral; it may be good; or it may be evil. Providing I can keep my appointment, it may be morally neutral whether I go by bus or by train. In the illustration above, a walk or tennis may be considered a good means of gaining relaxation, while getting drunk would be considered an evil means because there are better ways of accomplishing the same results. If it were the only means of saving her life, the cashier would be justified in giving up her keys to the cash box, even though the means under ordinary conditions would be wrong.

The question, "Does the end justify the means?" is often asked and discussed. This question implies that the means is wrong by itself. It continues to be debated because it is one of those questions which cannot be answered categorically "yes" or "no." "Does the end justify the means?" has to be answered differently depending upon the circumstances. In the case of the surgeon who risks the death of his patient in the hope of saving or of prolonging life, we would answer in the affirmative because there seems to be no other alternative. In the case of the man who sells opium illicitly as a means of supporting his family, we would answer in the negative because there are better means to be found.

Cases in which the end does justify the means are situations in which the goodness of the whole overbalances certain evil means which seem unavoidable. The morally mature person, however, will use the best means that are available. We must not permit a means which of itself has previously appeared evil to prevent us from seeing the greater good of the act in its entirety. However, this cannot be interpreted to mean that any and every means may be used provided it can be shown that the end is in some sense good. This would be a vicious principle. Cases in which the end does not justify the means are cases where the evil of the means is such that the evil outweighs any value which is gained from the act as a whole, or cases where the good results might have been obtained by better means than the one used.

Another popular saying is, "Do right, whatever the consequences." This is opposite in meaning, but similar in substance to the previous question which we have just considered. If it is interpreted to mean that men ought to consider only the motive, or the motive and the means for an act, and to ignore the consequences, then it cannot be accepted. If it means that men should act in the way which they consider right, regardless of what inconvenience or unpleasantness may result, then it is an acceptable principle. Here again the problem is one demanding reflection upon the facts in the total situation. As A. C. Ewing has pointed out:

On the one hand, we cannot make the rightness of an act depend entirely on the character of the act itself in abstraction from its consequences, for if we take away the consequences nothing is left that we can call an act or, at least, a reasonable act, and, on the other, that we cannot make its rightness or obligatoriness depend entirely on its consequences, for it is unreasonable to suppose that what value there is always belongs to these and never to the act itself, which is after all only the initial part of one and the same process.³

JUDGING THE ENTIRE ACT

The essence of reflective morality is the ability and the willingness to weigh all relevant facts in moral conduct, and to base choices

³Ewing, *Hibbert Journal*, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

upon the results of such reflection. Thus in moral judgments, it is conduct that we judge and therefore we cannot disregard the motive, the means, or the consequences. Any ethical theories which stress motives alone or which stress consequences alone are extreme and fallacious. There is no part of the entire process, motive, means, and consequences, the good or evil of which we can ignore except at great risk. Conduct is right if it proceeds from a high motive through the use of good means to effects which are beneficial. Let any one of these conditions be violated and men will approve the conduct with reservations or they will condemn the conduct as immoral.

Reflective morality consists not only in forming judgments but in the setting forth of reasons for one's moral judgments. When a moral problem confronts him, the morally mature man will examine and carefully consider the motives, means, and consequences involved in the selection of each of the possible lines of action. In the light of his comparison of the values involved, he will make his decision. Reflection will bring to a man's attention, values and considerations which would have been overlooked had he merely followed impulse or blind custom. The cases presented in the "Questions and Exercises" furnish material for practice. The reader should also form the habit of handling his own personal problems in this way.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. In the light of the discussion of this chapter, consider cases 1, 2 and 3 as presented in the Introduction, and indicate how you think the problems presented should be handled.
- ✓ 2. A student at an Ohio college has the opportunity to draw cartoons for the editorial page of a large daily newspaper. The paper is "wet," while he is "dry"; the paper is militaristic, while he wants to promote peace; the paper stresses property rights, while he wishes to promote human rights. In order to work on the paper, which pays well, he must express the sentiments of the paper, not his own convictions. Should he accept the position?
3. During June, 1934, the newspapers printed a report that Oliva Dionne, father of quintuplets, had been offered \$50,000 to exhibit the babies at the Chicago World's Fair. The physician said that it might mean death to at least one of the babies. The father, thinking

that it was a choice between poverty for all or a fortune and comforts for those who could survive the trip, was apparently perplexed. What would you have done? Why?

4. Two college students, Ruth M. and Fred B., were leading their class and were in line for an important scholarship which would pay expenses during the following year. Ruth came from a large family in only moderate circumstances, and the scholarship would be a real help. Fred did not need the financial aid but desired the scholarship for the sake of the honor. Ruth's standing was slightly better than Fred's. However, about a month before the final examinations, an epidemic of chicken pox broke out in the college. While the disease was not serious, the doctor ordered a period of quarantine for each person in the college hospital in order to check the spread of the disease. One morning Ruth discovered that her body was spotted with a fine rash. Since it was not conspicuous on her face, and since she felt fairly well, she put on a dress with a high neck, used extra powder, and went to class. She felt that absence from class for a period would mean that she would lose the scholarship. Since she avoided contacts and the light, no one discovered her condition. Give your reasons why you think she was, or was not, justified in her action.
5. One of the states wishing to increase the consumption of milk carried on an advertising campaign under the direction of the state department of health. The campaign was a model of dignity and accuracy of statement, but milk consumption did not rise materially. A year later the task was turned over to another department which hired a professional advertising agency, which made many extreme appeals. A picture showing an amorous couple declared that you should drink milk in order to have a glamorous complexion. Testimonials from famous athletes stressed its athletic potency; and movie stars emphasized its value for reducing. This campaign boosted milk consumption as the state officials desired. Did the end justify the means in this case?

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Chapter XI

AUTHORITY AND EXPERIMENTATION IN MORALS

HABIT AND inertia make it easy for men to continue to hold to a belief or to a line of conduct. Familiar ways are often pleasant ways. Men may avoid doubts of conventional beliefs and practices by closing their minds to all contradictory evidence, and thus insulating themselves from all those beliefs which are contrary to those held in the past. However, the need for support, especially in the face of opposing beliefs, often leads to an appeal to some authority to substantiate one's views. Infallibility and finality may be claimed for the authority which is used to oppose innovation.

In the field of morals, the authoritarian has been almost entirely in control in the past and still is, so far as the majority of people are concerned. During recent centuries, however, especially in Western civilization the reign of authority has been growing weaker and weaker. This has been due to a number of influences. The Renaissance and the Reformation gave rise to ideas and attitudes that helped to break up the universalism of the medieval period. The rapid development of science gave men not only an entirely new conception of man and of the Universe, but a new method upon which men have come to rely. The growth of the modern democratic spirit has emphasized the importance of the individual and his right to judge for himself. The development of our industrial life has led to changes in our mode of living, to a host of new problems which we do not know how to solve and for which we have no precedents, as well as to the feeling that we live in a man-made, man-controlled world. The use of historical criticism, including the study of the origin and growth of the Bible and of religions, has affected men's views of authority. An understanding of the composite character of many ancient books, the conditions which called them forth, and the nature of oral tradition have altered men's views of inspiration.

These are not the only influences, but they are among the most important.

Anyone who is acquainted with the more thoughtful and the more inquiring minds, especially among the younger men and women of today, knows that they are questioning many of the basic assumptions which an older generation took for granted. A decade or two ago young people were asking questions as to whether this line of conduct or that was right. Now young people frequently question the very basis of morality and ask if there is any real and fundamental distinction between right and wrong.

A second discovery that one makes is that the traditional way of meeting the questions and the doubts of young people is quite inadequate. A few decades ago inquirers were given an authority—some moral code, the Bible or a passage from it, or a statement regarding the teachings of the church. For many young persons, however, the old authorities are largely gone. To attempt to force young people to accept ready-made solutions is to turn them from an interest in morals and to make the situation worse. The prevailing attitude is to "prove all things" and to "hold fast that which is good." At least they are critical of the older authorities.

Different types of mind can be distinguished by their relation to moral standards. There is the authoritarian, the person who prefers to cling to some authority. Such a person often craves certainty or finality. For him, right conduct means obedience to the commands of some established authority; and morality becomes only a set of static rules to be rigidly followed. On the other hand, there is the person who distinguishes between right and wrong on the basis of present facts. Such a person believes that right conduct is that which leads to the development of personality or to social welfare, and that this is a question of fact to be discovered through knowledge and investigation. Between the two are various persons who have rejected the older authorities and who have discovered no new ones. Since the old questions keep arising, these persons are confused. They may become indifferent to moral standards and may even ridicule the need of them. This middle group is probably in a more unhappy situation than either of the others.

THE APPEAL TO AUTHORITY

The reliance upon authority is widespread among all groups of persons. We may distinguish between two types of the appeal to authority. One type is justified and reasonable. It is followed to some extent by all persons, and is more or less inevitable. The other type, while widely followed, is under attack today and has less to be said in its favor.

The method of authority is justified when the person whose testimony we follow has had more opportunity than we have to know the facts and the problems in question, when we feel that he has used the best method in facing them, and when he is a person of integrity. Even in scientific research, present investigators accept the findings of investigators of the past if there is no evidence calling for a revision of their findings. However, they do not assume that these findings are so final that they must never be questioned or modified. We must leave the answers or the solutions of many problems to experts in whose knowledge and skill we have confidence. This is true even though we realize that their conclusions are only relatively final, and that we may have to modify them at some later time.

More of our knowledge comes from testimony than from any other source. Professor Montague is probably right when he asserts in *The Ways of Knowing* that we accept on trust, or from the testimony of our fellows, nine tenths of what we believe. In nearly all fields we accept the opinions of those men whom we regard as wiser than we are. Our knowledge of the solar system and of the earth is accepted on the word of the astronomers and the geologists. Our knowledge of health and disease comes largely from the medical profession.

In the field of morals the same thing is true. Our views of right and wrong are first implanted in us by our parents and companions and teachers before we develop our own critical faculties. As children our experiences are limited, and we tend to believe what we are told. As adults we are only slightly less suggestible and credulous, and we tend to believe what we hear or read unless we have reasons for doubting. This is as it should be, since there is a presumption in

favor of principles and practices that are widespread in time and in space and that have been approved by men of insight. Such principles and practices are no more to be discarded without sound reasons than are the scientific principles discovered in the past.

The second type of the appeal to authority invests some pronouncement with infallibility and finality. The true authoritarian is one who feels secure only when his convictions are certified as true by some accredited authority. The authority may be that of the group, as in customary or group morality, where the approved ways of acting are handed down from generation to generation and are enforced by special guardians like the old men, the chiefs, or the priests. The authority may be the will of a divine being, like the "Thus saith the Lord" among the Hebrews. Here the law is regarded as the command of a personal deity. Authority may rest in divinely ordained rulers as in the medieval period, where the rulers, as God's representatives, are entitled to the obedience of all men. Men have also taken as their absolute authorities the church, the commands of the state, what they term "natural law," and their own private consciences. A common element in all these is that there is a pronouncement so authoritative that it precludes the need of inquiry.

DANGERS OF AUTHORITARIANISM

What are the main dangers of authoritarianism in the field of morals? Professor Montague¹ has stated so effectively three implications for ethics that we shall follow his general line of thought. First, a system of morals based upon authority will be essentially negative in character. Since positive commands are not so definite nor so easily enforced, authoritarian morals tend to be prohibitive and to tell us what we must not do rather than what we ought to do. "Thou shalt not" is much in evidence, and codes abound in prohibitions and taboos.

The negative and austere nature of authoritarian ethics is responsible for the attitude of the small boy who is reported to have defined morals as a set of rules telling you to do what you do not like to do,

¹W. P. Montague, *The Ways of Knowing*, The Macmillan Company, 1928, pp. 50ff.

and telling you not to do what you naturally wish to do! To many persons morality has seemed colorless if not repulsive, because of the way in which it has been presented. Any authority has to deal with a person possessing some critical and moral capacities. Even at the age of six the child will raise questions of fairness and justice. When the child or the adult is appealed to in ways which he understands and accepts, his own moral nature is strengthened. When a command fails to arouse in him a response, or fails to be in harmony with his conscience and sense of justice, it will arouse a feeling of resentment. Unless a person can see the intrinsic value of some virtue or act, it will have little moral significance.

A second weakness of authoritarianism in the field of morals is its tendency to delay social progress. We live in a rapidly changing social order. Consequently, a moral code that is adapted to the needs and conditions of one age may become quite inadequate for the people of a later period. We no longer believe in slavery, nor polygamy, nor witchcraft, nor dueling. While slavery may, at one time, have been a distinct moral advance over the practice of killing captives in warfare, moral codes dealing with the proper treatment of slaves are now quite obsolete, even though men thought that these codes were divinely inspired. True morality seeks for the positively good, for that which brings happiness, and wholesome, abundant life under present conditions. Some codes of conduct, adequate perhaps at one time, are today repressive of life. If so, they are immoral and are to be condemned or at least revised or replaced. Morality is not an inhibition, unless men forget why codes and agreements are set up and then take them as ends in themselves. The same thing happens in the case of moral codes that is said to have happened after the discovery of fire. Men found fire to be good and useful for the purpose of cooking and combating the cold. In the course of time this instrumental use of fire so directed men's attention upon fire that they set up fire as an end-in-itself. They even put it upon an altar, worshipped it, and sacrificed human beings to express reverence for it. While this was a wrong use of fire, it does not justify a condemnation of fire as such. Today, as in the past, moral standards are sometimes perverted and made ends-in-themselves,

regardless of their effect upon present life. Moral standards derive what valid authority they have from life itself. When conditions so change that the older principles do not enrich life, they need to be changed. Moral standards were made for man and not man for moral standards. If an authoritarian ethics tends to take moral principles and codes of conduct and place them above criticism and revision, then it is a dangerous approach.

A third danger of authoritarianism in morals is that it is destructive of moral perspective, because it considers acts wrong if they violate the moral code regardless of whether or not they are fundamental to living. If the unimportant and the questionable are put upon the same level with the universally recognized acts of wrongdoing and are condemned under the name of some authority, then whatever tends to discredit the authority tends to discredit all its teachings equally. If stealing and theatergoing are condemned on the same basis, then the person who comes to feel that the theater may be good rather than evil may not only lose respect for the authority, but may throw over most of the principles which he has previously held. To urge obedience to a code of conduct on the ground of authority, rather than upon the effect of the conduct upon personality, is to endanger the whole moral life.

WHY THE AUTHORITARIAN ATTITUDE PERSISTS

The persistence of the authoritarian attitude is due to a number of reasons. In the first place, many persons want the assurance of certainty before acting in a moral situation. Reliance upon some authority seems to them to give certainty. This demand gains considerable support from tradition and from man's emotions. For generations people have been brought up to expect certainty in the realm of moral judgments. Morality has to do with intimate and often with fundamental issues of personal welfare, where traditions have been reinforced by powerful emotional factors. Some degree of assurance appears to be necessary for the inner peace and the elimination of fear which are conditions for the most effective living. This desire for security and for certainty makes many persons easy prey to confident dogmatists and to authoritarian systems or institutions.

In the second place, many men are intellectually lazy and welcome the opportunity to let others do their thinking for them. It shifts responsibility for decisions to other persons or institutions. This freedom from responsibility is not only comforting, but some persons actually make a virtue out of this attitude of dependence or of faith.

Finally, many persons are deceived by the notion that the early origin of an opinion or a code is in itself an evidence of its truth. While there are more sentimental attachments clustered around ancient institutions, age in itself is not an evidence of truth. We remarked earlier that there is a presumption in favor of a principle or a practice that has been widespread, yet the early origin of an opinion may be only an indication of the immaturity of the group that formulated it. While older men are likely to be wiser than young men, the same is not true of older generations.

The refusal to accept an authoritarian basis for an opinion is not synonymous with a refusal to accept the opinion. A man may accept a certain conclusion, even though he may argue against accepting certain evidence which has been presented on behalf of it. While rejecting authoritarianism as a method of approach to life's problems, he may be willing to accept a great many things on the testimony of others or on authority.

Testimony that is to be accepted, in the manner of the authoritarian, on blind faith, regardless of the extent to which it may conflict with reason and experience, is one thing, and a bad thing, but testimony that is open to free and honest study remains as legitimate a source of knowledge as any other.²

THE APPEAL TO FACTS

There is an increasing number of persons who are not satisfied with the older authorities. Where the authorities are supported by valid evidence, they prefer to go directly to the evidence. Where the authorities make pronouncements unsupported by evidence, such persons feel that the claims are open to question and to examination. They are convinced, however, that it is possible to discover what is right and what is wrong. If we live in a changing social order and find that older solutions are inadequate for meeting the new prob-

²Montague, *The Ways of Knowing*, pp. 49-50, .

lems, then what we need to do is to bring them into harmony with present needs and present conditions. This can be done if we apply our intelligence to the facts of life and to human experience.

In the past when men decided to break away from the traditions of an earlier past, and to face the facts of nature with open minds, a new day had dawned. The great scientific advances of recent centuries have come, not from authority, nor from any infallible organization, nor from any divinely inspired book. They have come from human intelligence applied through a technique known as scientific method. The essentials of this method include careful observation, analysis and classification, setting forth hypotheses, and then testing those hypotheses. Today, if some ancient authority sets forth the theory that disease is the work of demons, and if modern investigators give us a different reason, for example, the germ theory, we accept the experimental evidence.

When a hypothesis is set forth with a greater or lesser degree of probability, depending upon the quality and the quantity of the supporting evidence, it would be wrong to represent it as proved, if the facts support only a claim to probability. It would be equally wrong to refuse to consider the evidence, or to brand it as a mere opinion, if it is supported by such strong evidence that it is much more probable than a competing explanation.

Is this attitude and method, which is open-minded and which stresses evidence, applicable to the field of morals? As we look back over the record of how codes of conduct arose, and observe the moral development of the race, we are impressed by the slow adaptation of moral ideas and practice to the needs of life. Apparently there has been much experimentation, even though it has been only partly conscious and ill directed. Is it possible for us to do consciously and more intelligently what has been going on in a more or less haphazard and confused way? Some leaders of our moral and spiritual life feel that it is not only possible but absolutely essential.

Wherever in our world today men are dealing with problems of human relationship simply on the basis of slogans, shibboleths, and the uncritical acceptance of tradition, there you find the attitudes of bewilderment, pessimism, and often of despair. And wherever men are manipu-

lating experimentally the factors in the situation with which they deal, there you have hope and confidence.³

In morals, even more than in science, experiment must be made on the basis of a provisional acceptance, combined with free criticism, of an existing hypothesis.⁴

An hypothesis in science is a well-knit principle or explanation which is put forth as a tentative suggestion. It differs from an assumption, which is an opinion that is taken for granted. An hypothesis is based upon some evidence and its maker intends to subject it to rigid tests before accepting, rejecting, or remolding it. The hypothesis must be reasonable and not contradict known laws. It is formulated usually by one who has both a thorough knowledge of the field and imaginative insight. The purpose of the scientific hypothesis is an improvement in the existing organization of knowledge or some new knowledge. It aims either to explain the familiar facts in a more adequate way or to include new facts previously omitted.

Whereas a scientific hypothesis is a new principle of organization or a tentative solution designed for the purpose of gaining knowledge, a social custom or a moral code is a principle of organization designed for the purpose of guiding conduct. A recent president of the United States referred to a certain much debated law as a "noble experiment." Mr. Roosevelt has frequently spoken about the experimental nature of many of his attempts to meet urgent social problems.

PRINCIPLES OF EXPERIMENTATION

There are three important considerations, as Canon Streeter has so well pointed out, that need to be kept clearly in mind if we are to profit by experimentation. First, the experiments must be devised by persons who are experts in the field in which the experiment is to be made. Before we attempt to experiment we should have a mastery of the available knowledge, including a history of the field and a familiarity with past experiments. The same thing is true in the field of conduct as in chemistry or physics. An uninformed and inexperienced

³J. W. Nixon, *The Moral Crisis in Christianity*, Harper and Brothers, 1931, p. 47.

⁴B. H. Streeter, *Moral Adventure*, The Macmillan Company, 1929, p. 56.

enced person would be as likely to blow up the laboratory as he would be to further research or make valuable contributions to the field. In the field of morals an uninformed person may create havoc for himself and for society by carrying on experiments which have been proved futile. Much waste and disaster can be avoided by a careful examination of the mistakes of the past.

Second, no intelligent investigator will proceed with an experiment, or attempt to test any new proposals or hypotheses, unless, on the basis of all available knowledge, the probability of success is such as to make worth while the cost and the risks involved. In the field of conduct, affecting persons, we need to proceed more cautiously than when dealing with less important materials. This is no argument against experimentation, however, since we must realize that to permit destructive practices to continue when they might be replaced, is itself dangerous and costly. "When the number of broken lives which an existing system produces is large, provided there is reasonable probability for expecting success, an experiment ought to be made, even if the risk involved is great."⁵

Third, in the special sciences an experiment is performed when there is a reasonable belief that it will add to human knowledge. In the field of morals an experiment ought to be performed only when there is a reasonable belief that it will advance human welfare. We must clearly distinguish, however, between an experiment which has moral significance and one which is immoral. Men are justified in departing from accepted ways when they are convinced that the custom or law is productive of evil and that the new path which they are taking will lead in the direction of human welfare and social progress. Men are not justified in breaking a code of conduct merely because of personal gratification or convenience. Such departures tend to break down confidence in the code and otherwise may be socially wasteful or dangerous.

The experimental approach, which we are presenting, places a premium upon intelligence in the field of morality. Morality is not a mere matter of opinion, nor of latitude, but of facts. An act is right if it makes for the development of personality and social wel-

⁵Streeter, *Moral Adventure*, p. 58.

fare; an act is wrong if it leads to the destruction of human personality. Whether the act leads to the development or to the destruction of personality is a question of fact to be discovered by applying our intelligence to the actualities of life.

Some persons may object that this approach does not give absolute certainty. It is very doubtful if we can hope to have any final certainty in an evolving or changing world. Many of the supposed "certainties" of the past have turned out to be uncertainties, and some of them we have discovered to be false. The authoritarian has led himself to believe that he has certainty by fixing his attention upon one authority and ignoring conflicting authorities. We need only a small amount of certainty in order to live well. If we cannot be absolutely certain about every question of right and wrong, we can be reasonably certain. We are not worse off in the field of morals than we are in the discovery of truth or of beauty. Those who have come to rely upon a factual and experimental basis insist that men can discover truth even though they have no absolute authority. They get a new sense of security, a sense of progress, and a thrill of creativity. They desire not only to play the game fairly but to assist in its improvement.

WHY WE NEED TO EXPERIMENT

The experimental approach seems to be essential for a number of reasons. First, we live in a social order which is rapidly changing and which is a mixture of good and of evil. We face new situations upon which the ancient authorities have not declared themselves. From the past we have customs, traditions, laws, and other standards of conduct. Some have arisen in response to particular needs, some have arisen by accident or chance, others as a result of peculiar geographical, or political, or economic conditions, others are the conscious work of teachers and religious seers. Customs which arose in an agricultural or a feudal civilization are intermingled with conventions and laws applicable only to a complex machine civilization. Under such conditions, it is not surprising to find many tensions and conflicts. Parts of our lives and segments of society fit into the twentieth century, other parts into the nineteenth, and still other parts are cultural children of earlier ages. Society has not developed according

to plan, although discussions on social planning are in vogue at present. Under such conditions, it seems clear that codes must be adapted and amended to the needs of life under present conditions. This is not a task that can be accomplished once; it is a continuous task. This fact necessitates a conscious reflective morality.

Second, we need the experimental approach because we desire adaptation and gradual, intelligent change rather than occasional disruptions or upheavals. Revolutions occur in political states when groups get in control which endeavor to keep society static. Authority and suppression seem to work for a time until the social life becomes stagnant in acquiescence, or else the expanding forces break forth in a more or less violent upheaval. The absolute political authorities in France and in Russia were in the main responsible for the French and the Russian Revolutions. There seems to be little hope of orderly progress in the future unless society adopts a form of control which permits progress by evolution—that is by experimentation—rather than by revolution. We need reconstruction rather than destruction.

Today we face a rebellion in the realm of morals. Where the rebellion is simply against the superficial and the trivial, it may be a gain for genuine morality. The danger, however, is that the rebellious groups attack the positive gains and achievements of the race as well as the false accretions.

There is a grave danger that the forces of reaction will make study, research, and experimentation difficult, if not almost impossible in some phases of our human relationships. Investigators have been under criticism for even attempting to gain information in some fields, such as sex relationships, or for releasing information about experiments that have been taking place in other parts of the world. It seems strange that the public accepts new discoveries in the field of our material techniques, or in the natural sciences with hearty enthusiasm, while any suggestions of change in the field of our social relationships are forced to meet the attacks of tradition and prejudice.

A third reason for the need of an experimental approach is our growing realization of the part which the geographical, climatic, biological, psychological, and social forces play in human behavior. Man's

moral conduct, and other personal traits, are influenced by the physical conditions under which he lives, by his organic make-up including his supply of physical energy, by the level of his intelligence, and his emotional balance, as well as by the intellectual and social climate in which he is reared. What is right for men living in the north temperate zone may not be right for men living in the tropics. This is not because the standard of right is different, but because the total situation is so different.

Finally, we need to develop an intelligent experimental morality because as persons we need to grow. Professor R. C. Cabot, in *The Meaning of Right and Wrong*, tells us that growth is man's "all-inclusive need," and that he has an "exceptional capacity to learn" and a tendency to swift decay if he fails to grow. Even the attempt to stand still, which is difficult if not impossible, is likely to produce the psychic poisons of self-deceit and isolation.

The person who is always obliged to think as someone else thinks or dictates, or who is forced to act as someone else commands, is not developing inner controls and to this extent he is not growing. Other forms of liberty will be more or less empty if a person does not have the liberty or the right to use his own ideas in governing his undertakings.

The world in which we live is intellectually and socially divided and chaotic. We cannot state with any degree of assurance how the conflicts of society will affect the inner lives of its members, nor to what extent changes in individual personalities will reproduce themselves in the social order. If men are to gain unity in their lives, it will come through knowing what to approve and what to condemn.

Will the authoritarian approach or the experimental approach lead to the greater growth? After pointing out that any evidence which tends to discredit an authority tends to cast suspicion upon all its pronouncements, Professor Montague says:

How different would have been the result if, instead of deadening the child's powers of appreciating and discerning moral values by resting all precepts upon authority, his teachers had justified those same precepts by demonstrating the ways in which they made for the protection and

development of society. To the child thus rationalistically taught, morality will be a matter, not of rules and commands, but of principles and ideals. And if, as is almost inevitable, the pupil discovers later that some of our teachings have been mistaken, instead of "chucking the whole thing" and feeling at liberty to gratify every impulse, no matter how base or how selfish, he will feel an increased responsibility to solve for himself the problem in whose solution his teachers have failed. In short, a rationalistic method of teaching ethics secures the pupil's essential morality against the consequences of the teacher's possible errors, and it also quickens and develops the child's moral sensibility by making him feel responsible, not only for doing right, but for finding out what is right. While, on the other hand, the authoritarian method of teaching ethics not only endangers the essentials of morality by making them dependent on an external authority, the validity of which may be later brought in question, but it also debauches and deadens the child's moral sense, and especially his sense for moral perspective, by refusing to submit its teachings to inquiry and verification and by lumping together in a code of arbitrary rules principles that are important and permanent with precepts that are trivial and temporary.⁶

DEALING WITH UNJUST CUSTOMS OR LAWS

In modern society, as frequently in the past, men are confronted with customs and with laws which they believe to be unwise and immoral. When practices are made obligatory because they are embodied in some venerable institution or when they rest on legal sanction, how is the individual to proceed? Should he obey or should he refuse to obey? At least two courses are open.

One is for a man to obey the law while he works to have the law altered. This would be desirable where the injustice or the injury is not great, and where the impairment of respect for law would work more evil than obedience for a time to an unjust law. A second course of action would be to protest and at the same time to disobey the law openly. He should make it perfectly clear why he has broken the law, and he should be ready courageously to face the results of such action. Which of the two courses should be taken will depend upon the total situation. Canon Streeter uses the illustration of a citizen who is convinced that a certain tax is unfair. Refusal to pay

⁶ Montague, *The Ways of Knowing*, p. 53.

the tax would not be the wisest or the moral way. On the other hand, for the early Christians, ordered to offer sacrifice contrary to their religious and moral convictions, compromise would have been "the declining of moral adventure."

Where man is confronted with a social custom which has no legal support, but which he considers immoral, the problem is slightly changed. A custom continues so long as people follow it. Secret defiance and evasion along with outward conformity only hinders reform, since one's personal influence is registered on the side of conformity. We shall not elaborate here upon the attitude of secrecy and evasion which may develop. Two things are necessary. One is to persuade the persons concerned that the custom is wrong, and the other is for persons who are respected to decline to follow the custom.

The custom, for example, of avenging an insult by a duel was first of all undermined by the gradual spread of the views of people who thought it was wrong; but it could never have come to an end in this country unless certain individuals on certain definite occasions had taken the definite step of declining to give or to accept a challenge.⁷

Today men are seeking for moral standards which rest upon principles and values which will make life radiant and wholesome. The test of such principles will be their adaptation to human needs. Many of these principles have been forged in the moral experiences of the race. Ours is a problem of sifting as well as of creating and adapting. "The test of every moral principle is its adaptation to the actual needs of life as seen over a period sufficiently long to sift the transient from the permanent."⁸

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Occasionally the mayors of cities or towns attempt to prevent certain plays, which they consider obscene or immoral, from being presented to the public. A number of court actions has resulted. How is society to handle the problem of obscene plays and literature? Should some authority tell the people what they may or may not see or read, or should people, at least adults, be permitted to decide for themselves? To what extent can morals be improved by law?

⁷Streeter, *Moral Adventure*, pp. 62-63.

⁸R. W. Sockman, *The Morals of Tomorrow*, Harper and Brothers, 1931, p. 228.

2. Infants tend to put their hands out to touch fire. One mother holds back the hand of her child before the heat begins to stimulate the child's tendency to withdraw. After repeated attempts the child keeps away from fire or flame, partly because of its properties and partly because of the authority of the mother. Later the mother will say, "Mary, don't go near the stove, and if you touch those matches, I will slap you." A second mother lets the child put its hand near the flame so that its own mechanism of withdrawal will be stimulated. She takes care only to see that the child is not burned.

Which child is living closer to reality? Which child is less likely to have disasters with fire later on? What are the values of inner as opposed to external controls? For a discussion of such cases see E. B. Holt, *The Freudian Wish*, pp. 100ff.

3. A high-school boy is confronted with the issue of drinking alcoholic beverages. In this case the disastrous consequences, including stunted growth and personal demoralization, are so great that it is not advisable for the boy to experiment for himself. The father explains to the boy the harmful nature of alcohol and that consequently it will be wrong for him to drink such beverages. If the father has the confidence of the boy, the conversation may impress the boy with the "Alcohol is harmful" reaction.

In what way would this situation differ if the father had merely said, "I will punish you severely if you ever touch alcoholic beverages"? See Holt, *The Freudian Wish*, pp. 109-113.

4. Study the Puritans as an example of a group with formal and fixed rules. Discuss the personal and social effects of these rules.
5. Did duelling cease as a custom because of authority or because of experimentation? What steps or changes led to its decline?

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Chapter XII

HUMAN NATURE AND CHARACTER

WHEN MEN express their hope of changing persons or social conditions for the better, someone is almost certain to remark, "You cannot change human nature." Human nature has been the scapegoat upon which the shortcomings, the failures, and the sins of the world have been placed. Once it was the factor which was held responsible for slavery and duelling; today it is considered the cause for selfishness, prejudice, jealousy, crime, war, and poverty. This is a serious charge to direct against the nature of man. Is it a correct charge? Upon the answer to this question will depend the approach which we must take to numerous moral problems. If we cannot change human nature, it is largely futile to spend our time in trying to make moral progress in the world today, at least by the means of education and social reform.

THREE VIEWS OF HUMAN NATURE

1. Human nature is essentially evil. This view has received support from at least three sources. First, from Christian theology, especially as reflected in the doctrine of sin set forth by Augustine (354-430). Augustine, who was strongly influenced by Manichaeism, a religious philosophy based on Persian dualism combined with Christian, Buddhistic, and other elements, emphasized the inability of sinful man to do any good through his own efforts. Adam's sin and fall has so corrupted human nature that every individual is born in a state of sin and is bad. Man's nature is corrupt and evil, since it is tainted at the source. During the Protestant Reformation, Luther and Calvin reaffirmed many of the views set forth by Augustine, including his doctrine of sin. This view received its most thoroughgoing statement in the doctrine of total human depravity set forth by the followers of Calvin. The church has always claimed, however,

that man is capable of redemption and that there are available certain means of salvation.

In the second place, the classical economists have popularized the idea that, under economic incentives, man acts only in accord with his individual interests. The "economic man" is essentially selfish. Social and economic conditions are the result of the working of certain unchangeable laws of economic life. These include supply and demand, the "iron law of wages," the relation between food and population, etc. Economics was called the "dismal science" and natural laws, operating upon human nature, became responsible for many human woes.

A third element in the disparagement of human nature came from nineteenth-century biological science. There was a tendency to emphasize the significance of man's biological heritage. Man is an animal, and like the animals, he inherits a great array of fixed instincts acquired in the struggle for existence, and must be expected to exhibit all the animal tendencies. Civilization is largely a veneer covering a bestial nature.

2. Human nature is good. Nature is good, and since man is a part of nature, he too is good. Rousseau (1712-1778) is the classical exponent of this view. Man was good until advancing civilization brought corruption and vice. Let man return to nature and all will be well. Children should be permitted to grow up in a state of simplicity and without direction so that their native tendencies for good may not be corrupted.

This view that human nature is good was supported by an interpretation of evolution as inevitable progress. For Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), a great popularizer of the theory of evolution, the course of evolution is a change for the better. The chief duty of man, therefore, is to stand aside and keep his hands off the cosmic process, and to trust to evolution to bring changes in the human organism. The natural laws, without man's aid, will gradually bring about a harmonious adjustment of man's nature to the environment in which he lives.

3. Human nature is neutral. A third view takes the position that man is born neither good nor evil but with great possibilities both

for good and for evil. As we discovered in Chapters Seven and Eight, man's original nature included as unlearned behavior: impulses, random movements, a considerable group of reflexes, and certain general drives or instincts. However, these original responses may be shaped in numerous ways. Recent studies in psychology and biology have made it clear that man differs from the lower animals in the flexible nature of his inherited tendencies. Learning capacity rather than a rigid nature is characteristic of man. Starting at birth, habit formation is so rapid that soon it is impossible to tell what is learned and what is unlearned, or in the language of traditional psychology, what is "instinctive" and what is "habitual." Certainly we can understand human nature only as we understand the total situation in which a particular individual grows up. What he becomes in later life is the result of the total influences to which he has been exposed.

EVALUATION OF THE THREE VIEWS

The notion that human nature is radically evil or is essentially selfish appears to be untenable. The theological support of this position has fallen into disrepute. The theory of original sin and of human depravity implies that there was a time when man was perfect, then his nature became corrupt as the result of a fall which affected all mankind. This position is refuted by historical and scientific evidence and has no foundation. The doctrine also attributes to God practices which would be disapproved or considered immoral if done by human beings. Men do not consider it moral to punish one person for the sins of another. There is no sin apart from a sinner or from persons who are guilty of committing acts of misconduct. A study of the rise of the doctrine of original sin and its relation to the views and experiences of Augustine will throw much light upon the formation of the doctrine. A large majority of the educated religious leaders no longer accept this view.

The support given by the classical economists to the view that nature is evil is also being undermined. Economists are pointing out that just as we control physical and physiological processes and direct them so that they will work in the direction of human welfare,

so man may direct his economic affairs. In fact, many special-interest groups have always manipulated things for their own advantage. Intelligent control in the interest of public welfare is urgently needed. Man is unwilling to admit that any social evil is inevitable.

In like manner, the disparagement of human nature from the point of view of man's biological inheritance has been weakened. In the past, if conduct of a certain type was observed to be widespread, the older psychologists and biologists assumed that it was due to some force called an "instinct" which was inherent in human beings. Since men fight, there must be an instinct of pugnacity. Therefore, they said, it is futile to talk about the abolition of war, since "you cannot change human nature." This approach to human behavior appears to be untrue to the facts. One psychologist says:

The "instinct psychology" which has recently dominated social and educational psychology, was a dangerous system. Having constructed a specific list of "human instincts," and having assumed that these "instincts" represented forces inherent in all normal human beings, the classifier thereupon proceeds to deduce the types of activity which must be expected of these human beings. . . . It is necessary for us to iterate and reiterate the important gospel that human nature cannot be explained in terms of "instincts" or equivalent "original tendencies."¹

A biologist explains the difference between animals and man in respect to instincts as follows:

In man, mind has evolved to a greater fluidity than that seen in any other creature. In lower forms, we find rigid instincts in which situation, impulse, and action are automatically linked. In man, the instincts are, we may say, cut down at both ends, until nothing but the central parts remain—the impulses to action with their accompanying emotions.²

The view that human nature is good is as true and as false as its opposite. Many human traits, such as generosity, sympathy, sociability, and the like, are desirable, while others such as selfishness, combativeness, and jealousy are undesirable. Apparently, all of these qualities are found in man, now one, now the other. Human nature

¹ Knight Dunlap, "The Principles of Human Nature," *Religious Education*, Vol. XVIII (1923), pp. 18-19.

² Julian Huxley, "The Biology of Human Nature," *Yale Review*, Vol. XXII, p. 337.

is many-sided and plastic. The idea that it is rigid and of only one quality is a false conception.

Man may become good or evil according to the way in which his "original nature" is directed or conditioned by the social groups in which he lives. Human nature is as plastic as the social medium in which it is formed. When every conditioning factor exerts a pressure in the direction of a crude individualism, it will be selfish and grasping. When conditioning factors place a pressure upon social motives, human nature reveals its possible nobility. Thus the view that human nature is neutral is the one which we shall assume as a basis for further discussion. It is the one accepted today by most sociologists, psychologists, educators, and an increasing number of biologists. Our consideration of the "Determiners of Conduct" in Part II made it clear that man's nature adapts itself to the most diverse conditions.

HUMAN NATURE CAN BE CHANGED

In the evaluation of the three views of human nature it has already become evident that human nature can be changed. Let us consider some additional evidence for this position. Even if we refer back to man's original nature, there is considerable justification for referring to that as plastic. While conditioning will not abolish hunger nor the tendency of life to defend and to propagate itself, conditioning does determine the ways in which these are organized and express themselves. These basic biological urges are not human nature; they are the original materials on the basis of which human nature develops. The chief task of moral education is to train these impulses and desires so that they will express themselves in wholesome social activity.

The view that human nature is plastic and can be changed receives support from a number of directions. First, the studies of feral men and other cases of isolation have thrown much light upon the changeable nature of man. Children born with a normal organism, who have been reared by animals or in some way deprived of the usual advantage of human contacts, do not develop a language nor other elements of a normal personality and of culture and civilization.

Again, education is built on the assumption that human nature can

be changed. While the nature of man's hereditary equipment sets the boundaries of educational achievement, under normal conditions the possibilities are great. To be educated means to be changed.

A study of human history indicates that the ways in which human beings have been meeting their needs have been continually changing. Society itself has passed through various forms of social organization, embodying different forms of motivation. Medieval society was theologically-minded and other-worldly in outlook. Religious motivation was dominant. Modern society is commercially-minded, and the incentive of private profit is prominent. Throughout history the sex impulse has expressed itself in numerous ways, from the crude ways of the cave man to the refined love-making of ethically sensitive persons. At one time no gentleman would refuse a challenge to a duel since his honor was at stake. Today we settle our differences in other ways. In reply to a boy who said, "I can lick you," one boy was heard to say, "I suppose you can." Nothing happened! What has taken place in boy nature? Or was this boy trained differently?

Professor Hocking explains very well the possibility of changing human nature when he says:

As to structure, human nature is undoubtedly the most plastic part of the living world, the most adaptable, the most educable. Of all animals, it is man in whom heredity counts for least, and conscious building forces for most. Consider that his infancy is longest, his instincts least fixed, his brain most unfinished at birth, his powers of habit-making and habit-changing most marked, his susceptibility to social impressions keenest, —and it becomes clear that in every way nature, as a prescriptive power, has provided in him for her own displacement. Having provided the raw material, nature now charts man to complete the work and make of himself what he will. . . . Other creatures nature could largely finish: the human creature must finish himself.³

SELFISHNESS AND ALTRUISM

There is a duality in man's life which may be expressed in terms of a conflict between man's animal nature and his human nature,

³W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, rev. ed., Yale University Press, 1923, pp. 15-16.

between his physical cravings and his rational and social behavior. This conflict may be stated in terms of selfish impulses and altruistic impulses. Human nature is being formed in the evolutionary process. Man is developing in the direction of self-conscious, reflective personality. In this upward process, however, he is not free from his animal tendencies. These express themselves in the form of powerful appetites and desires. Man's present problem is to modify these desires so that they will harmonize with the welfare of the group.

Two popular misconceptions have helped to confuse this issue between selfishness and altruism. The first is that selfishness is original in man's nature, while altruism is something artificial or added. This fails to take account of the fact that some of man's impulses are concerned with the safety and welfare of offspring or other members of his group. Some unselfishness appears to be as natural as selfishness. While feeling is personal, it is not true that feeling is always self-regarding.

Kropotkin has pointed out in two works⁴ that mutual aid, self-sacrifice, and justice are as truly innate in human nature as are other impulses and feelings. Warfare in nature is largely confined to struggle between different species. Within each species and within smaller groups which we find living together, the practice of mutual aid is the rule. Mutual aid and sympathy play a more predominant part than do warfare and antagonism in the order of nature. After pointing to the social life and co-operation of various animals, including birds, ants, bees, and apes, Kropotkin says that in proportion as we advance toward the higher representatives of a class of animals, we find that the identification of the individual with the interests of its group increases. This may continue even to the point of self-sacrifice. Darwin also pointed out that the social instinct is stronger and more permanent than the individual instinct.

At least we are justified in saying that much unselfishness is as natural as selfishness. If this is true of our original nature, then what we are in later life, unselfish or selfish, depends upon the way in

⁴Petr Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid a Factor in Evolution*, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1919; and *Ethics, Origin and Development*, The Dial Press, 1934.

which we have been trained. According to our personal and social contacts and our reactions to them, we may develop our self-seeking or our social tendencies. If society were so organized as to emphasize co-operation between men, human nature might display quite different characteristics.

A second misconception is that self-interest is always evil, and self-sacrifice or altruism always good. Self-love may be morally good or morally evil and the same is true of altruism. There are situations in which it is our duty to look after ourselves. Under ordinary circumstances our first duty may be to guard our health and our reputations. There are other cases where self-sacrifice may be morally wrong. Here is a mother who is so over-solicitous in her care of a child that she spoils the child and ruins her own health. To make a rigid separation between selfishness and altruism raises a false issue. Rather, we must inquire into the consequences of both. An act is not right merely because it aids someone else, nor wrong because it advances one's personal well-being. It is right or wrong according to whether it is fair or unfair, beneficial or harmful.

The important issue is whether as persons we are growing into narrow, small selves, or selves that are broad in their interests and outlook. The really selfish person needs an expansion of interests and the intelligence to see that his life is bound up with the welfare of other persons. He needs to cultivate the kind of self that gains happiness from common social values. Personality is a social product and man's true self is a social self. The good in life is not exclusively that of the self or that of others. It is a common good which includes the self and others. In Chapter Twenty-Six we shall consider the selfishness of groups.

When the above position is set forth, someone is likely to reply that when men sacrifice themselves for others, they do so because this brings them joy or at least enables them to avoid dissatisfaction, and therefore it is selfishness just the same. Two things need to be pointed out. The first is that if all seemingly different motives are only partial manifestations of self-interest—if love, friendship, and self-sacrifice are only disguised examples of selfishness and man can act in no other way—then ethics becomes meaningless. The "I

ought" vanishes into a mere "It is." This attempt to meet the problem by denying its existence runs counter to our human moral consciousness. In the second place, if every act does satisfy the doer, there is a big difference between finding satisfaction in an act which pleases only oneself and in finding satisfaction in an act which considers the welfare of others. The latter kind of satisfaction is what may be called altruism.

LEVELS OF BEHAVIOR

Human nature expresses itself at different stages or levels. There is human nature on the level of the physical organism. Behavior here is determined very largely by adjustment to physical and biological needs. Attention to these needs is fundamental at all levels, but at higher levels they are relatively less dominant. There is human nature on the level of social functioning, where the individual adjusts himself to the demands of social relationships. At the stage of customary morality these relationships appear to be the primary determining factors in behavior. Finally there is human nature on the level of personality, where the person thinks and judges for himself. Behavior becomes conduct since action is consciously directed. Human nature at this stage becomes human character. While man is not removed from the control of animal tendencies, nor from powerful societal pressures, he is gaining new capacities and new powers of adaptation.

While man is a being who conforms to the laws of mechanics, physics, chemistry, and biology, he is a unity, a self, which transcends these parts. From meager beginnings, and from the status of servant, mind is learning how to become the master. While this development is slow and sporadic in the race as a whole, it is nevertheless taking place. Man is "nature's rebel" who refuses to be imprisoned in any mechanism. He is developing purposes and pursuits of his own. At each level of activity there is some new quality, and each level is to some extent free from the limitations of the preceding levels. As a self-conscious personality, man belongs to a realm where intelligence and moral ideals play increasingly significant roles. Mind learns to use and to direct the body, and man's relation

to society becomes one not of blind subservience but of voluntary co-operation and mutual adjustment. The aim of moral education is so to develop the thinking and activity of the child that his conduct will be brought increasingly under his own conscious control.

HABITS AND IDEALS

Even for the intelligent man, to stop and deliberate before each separate act would be burdensome indeed. Nature has provided the mechanism of habit to enable us to act quickly and accurately in familiar situations. Numerous actions, attitudes, and ways of thinking become habitual in the lives of all men. This being the case, the formation of good habits is important for the moral life. William James, some decades ago, pointed out that our personal habits tend to be established before the age of twenty, and our intellectual and professional habits between twenty and thirty. This being the case, he felt that we should make automatic and habitual as many useful actions as possible so that our nervous system might help instead of hinder us.⁵

Various bodily and mental habits are developed as a result of our actions and interactions in the total environment in which we live. Some of these habits grow up in ways of which we are not conscious or are only partly conscious. Before we have arrived at an age of discretion, we have developed regular ways of caring for our bodily needs. Many of the customs of the group in which we were born have registered themselves in our lives as habits. Other habits, however, have originated in conscious decisions. A decision made once is easier to make the next time, and soon our actions become habitual. Originally matters of choice, these attitudes and acts have entered into the very structure of the self. They signify the crystallizing of desires in specific directions.

Responsibility for our habits cannot be avoided. The morally earnest man must continuously scrutinize old habits and watch the formation of new ones. They are expressions of the self and of character. Our actions are never completely isolated. Not only do

⁵William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1899, Vol. I, pp. 120f.

our decisions and our acts tend to influence future decisions and future acts and thus to commit us to certain lines of conduct, but each act leaves its impress on the one who performs it. Thus we fool ourselves when we say, "It won't make any difference if I do it this once!" Each new habit in a sense reaches down into the nature of the self and makes us different persons than we were before.

In discussing the significance of right choices and the effect of choice upon personality and character, Canon Streeter says:

Men do need continually reminding that the Reign of Law—that inevitable nexus of cause and consequence which holds throughout physical nature—holds also in the sphere of conduct. Every word and every action of mine sets in motion a chain of consequences—for good or evil—which extends far beyond my individual ken. Every deed—every thought, even, that is harboured for more than an instant in my mind—effects a subtle change within my personality. The kind of things I do and think make me the kind of man I am. And the kind of man I am determines the friends and enemies I make, the opportunities I see or miss, the things which I succeed or fail in. For better and for worse, "character is destiny." No one who has watched the actual working out of the Reign of Law in individual character or in the external consequences of actions in social life—regenerating or devastating as the case may be—can miss the glory or the tragedy which follows the right or wrong in moral choice.⁸

The person who forms the habit of reflecting upon his past behavior in order to gain insight and guidance for his future conduct is the conscientious person. We often call such a person "responsible," in contrast to the irresponsible person whose conduct is not consistent and dependable and who usually seeks to lay the blame for wrongdoing upon other persons or things. The conscientious and responsible person is sincere in his motives and intentions and gives diligent attention to the consequences which his conduct has for the general welfare.

Ideals also play an important part in the control of thinking and conduct. Like habits, they give direction to desires and emotions, and are important elements in character. They include moral princi-

⁸Streeter, *Moral Adventure*, pp. 26-27.

ples, social conventions, and our ideas of what constitute "good manners." Our ideal is that toward which we aspire.

Ideals in the form of moral and religious principles have exerted a powerful force in personal lives and in historical changes. Even powerful desires like hunger and sex may be denied in the interest of an ideal. The martyrs and the ascetics are only the more outstanding examples. Different civilizations have been the embodiment of different ideals. While it is not possible to say exactly what is cause and what effect, ideals, when once established, project themselves in individual behavior and social institutions. As Abbé Dimnet has reminded us "there is no more direct way of elevating our life than by elevating our ideas."

Out of the experience of the race there have emerged and crystallized certain principles. These are passed on through training. Whereas a rule is practical, ready-made, and rigid, the principle is a generalized statement which the individual must apply for himself to specific situations. Rules quickly get out of date and if applied rigidly tend to formalism and legalism. Such insistence upon hard and fast rules which apply equally at all times and places is likely to lead to one of two things. It may make men satisfied with things as they are and lead to a smug complacency, or it may lead to a revolt against all conventional morality. Even moral principles need to be evaluated in the light of changing conditions and needs. Character is not obedience to a set of rules or a code; it is a way of living well, upon principle.

STABILITY OF CHARACTER

Character is the sum total of a person's attitudes and responses, both inherited and acquired. These distinguish a man from his fellows. Character is always in process of being made and is never complete. As a way of living and of organization of habits, dispositions and values, character is the organization of the whole self. Nothing in life is more important.

The man of character needs stability and not fixity. According to Hugh Hartshorne, he

is one who is sensitive to ideals and values, and takes time to reflect upon them as they emerge in the midst of his preoccupation with affairs, seek-

ing always on the one hand better means for their progressive realization by the use of scientific techniques and, on the other, the continuing interpretation of what he discovers and of what he produces, in some sort of philosophy of life.⁷

For the greatest social welfare, it is essential that a nation be made up of men with well-integrated and honorable characters. Nations have risen to prominence and have fallen from positions of power and prestige as a result of a degeneration in the character of the people. Rome fell not only because of economic weakness and attacks from without, but because of a weakening of moral fiber. Character is especially needed in a democracy. Without character in the rank and file of its citizenry a democracy is likely to fail.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Mr. A has plenty of money and is one of the respected members of the community. Mrs. B is a widow in very humble circumstances and lives on her small farm near the town. Mrs. B had a horse which she wished to sell. Mr. A knew this and also a man, Mr. C, who wished to purchase a horse. Mr. A went to Mrs. B and asked her how much she was asking for the horse. Mrs. B said \$200, a fair price as horses were selling. "That's too much," said Mr. A. "I will give you \$150." Since Mrs. B needed the money she sold the horse, after a little hesitation, to Mr. A for \$150. Mr. A went right to Mr. C and sold the horse for \$200. Afterwards Mr. A boasted that he had made \$50 in an hour. Discuss this in terms of "human nature" and of character.
2. There are on record accounts of children, born with a normal organism, who were deprived of the advantages of human intercourse. These feral or wild children throw considerable light upon the nature of human nature. What is the effect of isolation from society? See Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 239 ff., 271 ff. For general illustrations of isolation see Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, chap. VIII.
3. Do the Dionne quintuplets throw light upon what can be accomplished by environment as opposed to heredity? The other Dionne children are asserted to be commonplace youngsters such as one would find in the average French-Canadian peasant's home. On the other hand, the

⁷Hugh Hartshorne, *Character in Human Relations*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933, pp. 276-277.

quintuplets who have been given superior care by means of funds supplied by the Canadian Government and from other sources, are reported to be superior children. Discuss this question in its social implications.

4. Jane is very much afraid of the dark, and in a thunder and lightning storm, runs and hides her head. Mr. L. says that such conduct is natural for a girl of six. While it is instinctive, she may be helped in outgrowing it. Mr. A. says that such an explanation is absurd. Her fears are due to the fact that she has been told frightening stories, and also because she has been with other persons who have shown fear under such circumstances. Give your reactions to the views set forth.
5. Read "Are All Men Human?" by Albert Jay Nock, *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. CLXVI (Jan. 1933), pp. 240-246. The questions are raised as to whether the truly human being may not be an occasional product, and whether there may not be a greater interval between the highest man and the lowest man than between the lowest man and the brute. Is it possible that the divergent views of human nature arise from the fact that there is no single human nature, and that different men are living upon widely separated levels of development?
6. If "self-preservation is the first law of life," as we frequently hear it said, then why does not this tendency express itself more completely in firemen, in policemen, in soldiers in time of war, and in the nurse and mother who stay by the child with the contagious disease?
7. In his *Fundamentals of Ethics*, p. 344, Professor W. M. Urban points out that, in the rating of individuals and business institutions, the amount of "credit" to which they are entitled is dependent in part upon character in the ethical sense. One man with considerable property may be rated "A," the highest class, while another man with an equal amount of property may be rated "E" or unreliable. What a man is, rather than merely what he has, is most important. Can you give further examples in business and social life where this is true?

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Chapter XIII

THE VIRTUES

IN THE CHAPTER "Human Nature and Character," we saw that character is the name given to the sum total of a person's dispositions. The organization of habits, attitudes, and values, known as character, is not fixed and complete; it is always in the process of formation. In this chapter, we shall give a more explicit formulation of those qualities that go to make up the well-developed moral personality.

WHAT ARE THE VIRTUES?

The good traits of character are called the virtues, the bad traits are called vices. Virtues are those qualities or habits of human character which men admire and value. They make for the survival and welfare of the group and are, therefore, often deliberately cultivated. A virtue is an habitual organization of impulses and desires around some idea or object. It is an attitude or a type of action that merits moral approval.

A vice, on the other hand, is some habit of human character that runs counter to the welfare of the group. Vices, like other habits, may develop more or less unconsciously and so establish themselves that the individual later finds them difficult to control. A drug taken to relieve pain, under the advice of a physician, may gain such a hold upon the person that it is continued after its original purpose has ceased.

A classification of virtues is evidently arbitrary and artificial since the virtues overlap and since the social order in which men live is continuously undergoing change. Changing social conditions make it difficult, if not impossible, to set forth any complete list of virtues and vices. All that we can do is to pick out those aspects of character or conduct which the consciousness of an age recognizes and approves.

THE TRADITIONAL VIRTUES

The Greeks sought excellence of character as well as order and symmetry in external form. Practically all the Greeks accepted justice, wisdom, courage, and self-control or temperance as the fundamental virtues. For Plato (427-347 B.C.) these are the four cardinal virtues. Their relation to the life of man and to society is seen in the threefold division of the "soul" and of society. In Chapter Six these divisions with their characteristic virtues were pointed out. Briefly, they were wisdom for the ruler, courage for the warrior, and self-control for the worker. Justice, the highest virtue, combines the other virtues into a harmonious whole.

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) added to the list of virtues and indicated that the virtuous person is one in whom a right relation exists between reason, feeling, and desire. The rational life is one which steers its course between two dangerous extremes. Follow the *golden mean* and do "nothing overmuch." Courage is the mean between foolhardiness and cowardice; temperance between licentiousness and repression; liberality between extravagance and avarice, and so on.

We shall discuss briefly the four primary virtues mentioned above: self-control, courage, wisdom, and justice. The Greeks stressed other virtues such as truthfulness, liberality, friendliness, etc. Space does not permit a separate discussion of each. Because of its importance, however, we shall consider truthfulness by itself in a later chapter.

SELF-CONTROL

The moral life is a struggle between impulse and passion on the one hand, and the demands of reason, conscience, and society on the other hand. "When I would do good, evil is present with me" (Romans 7:21) is a widespread human experience. Self-control means the rational and harmonious control of all the impulses and desires in the interests of the whole self and of society. A considerable degree of self-control is the very basis of morality.

As we saw in Chapters Eight and Twelve, the child begins life with numerous impulses and random movements, reflexes, and other drives. Habit formation and the organization of these urges in rela-

tion to the total life situation begins at once. Later as reason and voluntary action develop, these tendencies are more and more brought under intelligent control. An impulsive urge may become an element in the good life, or it may become an immoral passion distorting the life of the individual and leading to a conflict with socially approved modes of behavior.

Wise self-control avoids the evils of extreme indulgence, as well as the dangers of excessive repression. Self-indulgence, such as licentiousness, intemperance, or sensuality in one of many forms, may lead to the loss of a refined capacity for enjoyment, to social ostracism, and even to physical sickness and death. Repression, on the other hand, is not conducive to the highest satisfaction of life. Our energies need to be harnessed to great ideals and loyalties and to worth-while tasks. At its best, repression is negative and may lead men to center their attention upon the thing suppressed; at its worst it leads to disastrous lapses from the standard. Happiness and health appear to spring from a well-balanced, disciplined life.

Hunger is a normal demand which must be met, but gluttony and greedy manners cause disgust and lead to social isolation. The sex impulse is natural, but society has always established regulations for the good of the individual and of society. Unregulated sex impulse may lead to sorrow and suffering, regulated sex impulse may lead to great joy and lasting happiness. While men are easily provoked, they are expected to restrain their anger within the limits set by good manners and respect for personality.

In gaining control of some impulse or habit, we should avail ourselves of the help which social convention, psychology, and religion can give us. After reviewing in our minds the dangers of the old ways, we should center our attention upon the new habit to be established. We must remove, where possible, any stimuli which lead to the old temptation, then make a beginning in the line of conduct we wish to cultivate. It will aid materially if we are able to associate with a group where the new conduct is lived and approved. We tend to cultivate those habits which are approved by the group of which we are a part. For many, prayer, faith, comradeship, and the loyalty to a great cause which religion is able to instill will be effective.

COURAGE

Courage was one of the first of the virtues to gain the approval of the race. In tribal warfare and on the chase, the welfare of the group depended upon the ability and willingness of its members to risk dangers as well as to co-operate. Courage is the ability to sacrifice safety and comfort and to endure hardship for the sake of some higher cause. It is the middle course between foolhardiness, where an individual places himself in danger without good cause or for the purpose of notoriety, and cowardice or ignoble timidity.

Courage is of two kinds, physical and moral. Physical courage is the willingness to endure physical pain or risk in the service of some worthy end. It is illustrated by the daring of the soldier, the fireman, and the explorer. Moral courage is the readiness to endure ridicule, abuse, and unpopularity for the sake of one's moral convictions. The man with moral courage stands for what he believes to be right even though it means personal loss. Men who set forth new ideas or who support unpopular causes do not ordinarily gain the applause and admiration of their fellows. Their actions, however, may demand greater strength of character than enlistment for battle. Such loyalty to worthy but unpopular causes demands real daring and moral earnestness. Jesus of Nazareth, Socrates, Bruno, and a host of others have exemplified such moral leadership.

If courage is really good and a virtue, it is employed in *loyalty* to, and with *respect* for, causes and persons that are *just* and *benevolent*; the means employed are *wise*, *temperate*, and *economically* practical; and no other persons, causes, ends, values, or interests that ought to be taken into account have been overlooked. The courageous action, in other words, is an expression of all the virtues, in the interests of the whole self of the individual and the common good of society. Or, if this is not literally true, the action is at least the closest approximation to this ideal that is humanly possible in the given circumstances.¹

WISDOM

Since we will discuss later the moral obligation to be intelligent, we shall deal very briefly with wisdom as a virtue. Wisdom is not

¹W. K. Wright, *General Introduction to Ethics*, The Macmillan Company, 1929.

synonymous with knowledge. A man may have knowledge, erudition, and technical skill and yet lack wisdom. He may be unable to perceive the true end and meaning of life. He may be a "walking encyclopedia" and yet be a moral fool.

Wisdom implies conscientiousness, discrimination, the refinement of moral capacity, and an insight into the values related to personality. The wise man is receptive and open-minded toward new approaches and insights. He looks facts squarely in the face, but does not permit them to obscure his appreciation of ideal possibilities or to dull his sense of wonder at the richness of life.

Wisdom is not something that can be easily acquired. It is not gained simply by taking a course or reading a book. The cultivation of wisdom may be aided by meditation. The wise men of different ages, from the Psalmist and Socrates to the present, have testified to the value of spending some time each day in taking account of moral failures and personal attainments. With the poise gained through meditation, we must act on the basis of these higher moral insights, so that moral discrimination becomes second nature.

JUSTICE

For Plato, as we have seen, justice is the harmony of all the virtues. For Aristotle it is the practice of virtue toward other persons. Justice has been defined as "giving every man his due"; the satisfaction of all rightful expectations and claims; and an attitude of respect for the rights of human personality as an end-in-itself. Because men live in complex social relationships, they have both rights and duties. A society in which all men performed their duties and respected the rights of others would be a just society. If the discussion of justice at this point is brief, it is to be remembered that a large part of this book is directly or indirectly dealing with the problem of justice.

In society we are most familiar with legal or political justice. In an earlier chapter we traced the development of the administration of justice. The courts and law tend to follow the growing moral consciousness, but they usually lag behind to some extent. The state, in defending the rights of its members, can enforce an outward conformity to certain rights and it can remove hindrances to social wel-

fare. It cannot deal effectively with the motives and attitudes of persons, nor is it able to enforce the finer expressions of courtesy, loyalty, and mutual helpfulness. On the whole, the law tends to give a narrow interpretation to the conception of human rights. Legal justice implies the impartial enforcement of all laws in the interest of human welfare.

Ethical justice is based on the needs of man as a moral personality and a member of society. It must go farther than legal justice in its requirements. Ethical justice tends to stress the right of every man to the conditions necessary for a good life. On its negative side it condemns any violation of rights in the interest of individuals or privileged groups. Conceptions like liberty and equality have been closely related to the idea of justice, especially in modern times. Equal rights and equal duties have been stressed as the basis of social life. Justice is giving to each person the conditions necessary for his growth as a person.

The problem of social justice is one of the most disturbing yet pressing problems which modern men have to face. There is a growing protest against conditions which leave large sections of humanity in dire poverty, while other and smaller sections live in extreme luxury. Neither condition is conducive to wholesome living. Justice requires that the products of society be so distributed that all men may have an opportunity for self-development. Such problems will be considered in later chapters.

In the practice of justice, a man may justly defend his own rights as well as the rights of other persons. To fail to do so may encourage injustice in others. He must take care, however, not to demand for himself, or for groups whose interests he is guarding, that which he is unwilling to grant to others.

EARLY CHRISTIAN AND MEDIEVAL ADDITIONS

In different ages men have stressed different virtues. With the rise of Christianity there emerged a new group of moral values. The early Christians emphasized faith, hope, and love and added them to the previous list. Love became the supreme virtue; love, not in the sense of romantic love nor the mere love of a friend, but brotherly

love of one's neighbor interpreted as any needy person or one who is in want. The Hebrew-Christian conception of sin and salvation and a Kingdom of God into which men could enter only by means of divine grace was in marked contrast to the intellectual and naturalistic conception of the Greeks.

The Greek virtues had to do mainly with one's own person and interests. Virtues such as self-control, courage, and wisdom are largely personal. Even justice was concerned merely with the claims and rights of other persons and with the relationships between men. Love, on the other hand, surpasses justice and is more positive. It is "the transference of interest from the I to the Thou." Love has consideration for the other man as a person and for whatever affects him. Love does not stop at mere rights; it is concerned with the person for his own sake. Love is the fulfillment of the law; it is the whole law. Love strives for the well-being of others. This emphasis upon the supreme worth of each personality is central in Christianity.

Besides faith, hope, and love, the early Christians emphasized loyalty and obedience to the church, martyrdom or willingness to suffer, patient endurance, alms giving, conquest over the flesh, avoidance of avarice, stewardship, and work. For Augustine the life on earth is but a pilgrimage to God, and it is the love of God that makes the "pagan" virtues genuine virtues.

During the medieval period, as a result of the growth of the ascetic ideal, humility, self-abnegation, and self-mortification came to be prominent virtues. Lists of vices emphasized such things as pride, avarice, anger, gluttony, unchastity, envy, vainglory, gloominess, and indifference. There was no universal system of ethics applicable alike to all men. A different standard of conduct was expected from the clergy and the ecclesiastical orders than that expected from the ordinary layman or the masses in general. The ideals of poverty, chastity, and obedience were stressed in some of the religious orders. The layman was permitted to engage in worldly activities and to compromise to some extent with the desire of the flesh. All activities were expected to be carried on, however, for the glory of God.

THE VIRTUES OF PURITANISM AND CAPITALISM

With the growth of Protestantism there was a tendency to elevate the virtues related to the natural relations and associations of men, and to reject the dual standard. The rise of Puritanism and the rise of a middle class interested in commerce and industry led to the elevation of certain virtues, sometimes known as the Puritan virtues. The Puritans stood for a purification of the forms of worship, the authority of the Scriptures as opposed to an established church system, and an austere and a rather ascetic code of morality. The Puritan frowned upon the spontaneous enjoyment of life in this world. Life was a serious affair, and every man had a calling whether he were a laborer or an employer of labor. Unwillingness to work or lack of success in business was an indication of lack of grace. To make money, to save it, to contribute to worthy causes would help men to grow in grace and to lay up treasure in heaven. Industry, initiative, thrift, and benevolence came to be the virtues stressed by Protestantism and the rising capitalist society. They are the virtues of a *laissez-faire* economy.

EVALUATION OF THE VIRTUES

A number of writers including G. A. Coe, G. B. Watson, and Hugh Hartshorne have directed our attention to the inadequacy of the older, more absolute approach to the virtues. The reports of the Character Education Inquiry² furnish much concrete evidence as to the nature of character in general and virtues in particular. Three of the more important criticisms of the conventional approach to the virtues will be stated.

First, the term "virtue" is indefinite and vague. It may refer to the results of an action. Virtues like neatness and accuracy obviously refer to some object, such as a neat letter or an accurate account. A virtue like sincerity, on the other hand, has reference not to some

² *Studies in the Nature of Character*, by the Character Education Inquiry, Teachers College, Columbia University, in co-operation with the Institute of Social and Religious Research, Vol. I, *Studies in Deceit*; Vol. II, *Studies in Service and Self-Control*; Vol. III, *Studies in the Organization of Character*, The Macmillan Company, 1928-1930.

object or to a result of one's act, but to one's inner purpose or intention. When we speak of courtesy, we think of a process, such as a manner of speaking or acting. As distinct from these, reliability refers to the person himself quite apart from any particular situation. To call all of these responses by one name is somewhat confusing.

Even more confusing is the fact that these virtues show so little consistency. A boy who is courteous at a party for girls and boys may be a rough bully on the recreation grounds. A person who is neat in his written work may leave his desk very untidy. The person who is loyal in one situation may be disloyal in another. Also, when we talk about certain virtues, there is a tendency to imply that some quality or trait is either wholly present or absent. As a matter of fact, there are all degrees between these two possible extremes. Virtues have the property of "continuous variation." The ignorant and the wise are not sharply separated. It might be possible to make a continuous row of persons progressively less wise or less courageous, etc. While there are real differences between persons in respect to the virtues, there are no sharp dividing lines.

Secondly, on occasions at least, the virtues conflict with one another and with themselves. If they are taken as absolutes, an embarrassing situation arises. In times of war, loyalty to one's country may conflict with loyalty to one's religious convictions. Loyalty to a man's family may conflict with loyalty to his employer. At other times the demands of loyalty may conflict with the demands of honesty. If a man has not had a good time at a party, shall he be kind or truthful, if forced to express himself to his host? It is one thing to evaluate conduct in terms of some abstract ideal, it is quite a different thing to evaluate it in terms of its effect upon human personality, or the consequences which follow an action.

In the third place, a man's "fundamental outlook on life, his central ethical purpose," is the important thing rather than certain abstract qualities. To say that a man has self-control does not tell us much about his central purpose in life. A man may have courage in executing any plan, praiseworthy or not. A man's view of justice depends upon his general philosophy of life. Slavery and infanticide were once thought to be just. Whether industry and initiative are

good or evil depends upon what a man is aiming to do. Patience is frequently good, but men may well be impatient about some things.

Courage, loyalty, and intelligence by themselves do not make a good man. These must be considered in the light of the motives and the consequences to which they are related. The successful criminal may possess a set of qualities similar to those which go to make the successful carpenter. The burglar may have courage, patience, persistence, and perhaps other desirable traits. What he lacks is an ethical goal.

Two men may exhibit courage. From the point of view of the physical organism they may be the same. Yet ethically they may be far apart when related to the total conduct situations of which they are a part. The courage displayed may be the means to the attainment of a worthy goal or an unworthy goal. Ethics cannot ignore that goal without danger. To teach a child that some trait is desirable may be good, but the child also needs to be taught that an act which is moral under one set of circumstances may be immoral under another set of conditions.

Criticism of the Puritan or industrial virtues has been especially vocal in recent years. At a time when all men had to work hard in order to gain a living, the virtue of industry was readily accepted. If one man failed to carry his burden, life was harder for all the rest. Today, however, with millions seeking work in vain, with the government rewarding farmers for working less, and with demands for a thirty-hour week, we are thinking more than ever before about "intelligent loafing." As we pass from an economy of scarcity to one of abundance, the virtues which we stress are seen to change. The moral principles for today must meet the needs of personality under present conditions.

Private initiative is another one of the older virtues that is having difficulty in defending itself. Most of us no longer believe that if each man vigorously seeks his own interest then general social well-being will necessarily result.

Thrift as a virtue is also losing prestige. For years the leaders of our business civilization have been encouraging men to save. Today

there are two reasons why men are not so enthusiastic about the virtue of thrift as they were formerly. In the first place, many people who have lost the savings of a lifetime are telling us that in the future they are going to spend their savings while they have them to spend. In the second place, many of our leaders have been appealing to us to spend as a duty and not to save. They feel that too large a proportion of the national income has gone to increase producer's goods and too small a proportion of it has been available for the purchase of consumer's goods. They tell us that the money saved, when placed in banks, is used to finance industrial enterprises. As a result of these savings industry has been over-expanded, not in relation to human needs in most cases, but in relation to the goods which people are able to buy.

Since the time of the Greeks, benevolence has been praised as a virtue. Benevolence is the disposition to promote the well-being of our fellow men. In modern society benevolence has taken the form of charity and philanthropy. Generosity is praiseworthy, except when it leads to the injury of the recipient. Then it may be a vice. Even at best, however, it is necessary largely because of gross injustices in society. Charity may be, on the one hand, a salve for the conscience of the philanthropist, and, on the other hand, a substitute for thoroughgoing reforms.

The foregoing indication of changes is not intended as a statement that these virtues are now entirely outgrown, but simply that a change in industrial and social conditions is bringing about a shift in emphasis. Virtues which once seemed beyond criticism are now being questioned.

NEW VIRTUES NEEDED

Under changing social conditions the virtues which are emphasized are likely to vary from age to age. The Middle Ages with their other-worldly ideal stressed humility; the feudal leaders stressed courage and honor; an industrial society stresses initiative and thrift. The growing complexity and increasing contacts of the modern world are giving us a new sense of social solidarity. If we are moving into an era of greater collectivism, as the Commission on the Social Studies of the American Historical Association

reports,³ then we shall need certain qualities of character none too evident in the past. While re-emphasizing many of the older virtues like justice and courage, we shall need to emphasize co-operation, open-mindedness, and tolerance.

Co-operativeness is the willingness to share and to work with others. It may include a willingness to follow suggestions and directions, to help others with their problems, and to abide by the decisions of the group after they have been co-operatively formed.

Open-mindedness is a willingness to look at all sides of an issue and a readiness to take suggestions without offense. The open-minded person does not attempt to force his convictions upon others, and he readily acknowledges himself in error if the facts so indicate.

Tolerance is a disposition to recognize and permit beliefs and practices differing from one's own. It includes freedom from bigotry and a hesitation to judge until all the facts are known and appraised. Without a degree of tolerance, mental and moral progress is impossible. Intolerance is poor sportsmanship intellectually, since it refuses other persons the freedom of thought and of speech which we wish for ourselves. Intolerance is largely the result of fear and is especially evident in the fields of international and interracial relationships, and in attempts to prevent new social, economic, and political ideas from being expressed.

KNOWLEDGE AND CONDUCT

In the studies made by the Character Education Inquiry, it was found that there was no very close relationship between knowledge and conduct. A group of honest persons and a group of cheaters gave about the same kind of answers to questions concerning honesty and cheating.

Three things determine whether, in any situation, a child cheats, or exhibits self-control, or is charitable, or is persistent: (1) the nature of the situation, (2) what the child has already learned in similar situations, and (3) his awareness of the implications of his behavior.⁴

³See *Conclusions and Recommendations*, Report of the Commission on the Social Studies, American Historical Association, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934.

⁴Hugh Hartshorne, *Character in Human Relations*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933, pp. 210-211.

There is a close relationship between group standards and the conduct of a member of the group. As a boy changes from one group to another, his attitudes and conduct tend to change accordingly. A boy may have three or more vocabularies and types of conduct, one for church or Sunday school, one for the home, and one for his life with a gang. Some trait may be present in one group and entirely lacking when he is with another group.

While knowledge does not guarantee right conduct, it does furnish certain things which are essential for right conduct. Knowledge brings to a person's attention the way in which acts affect other persons and enables a man to discern between social and anti-social ends. Knowledge acquaints him with the types of conduct that are desirable and therefore approved. Thus knowledge brings a man face to face with issues upon which he must declare himself.

The criticism directed toward the traditional view of the virtues must not blind us to the value of the types of conduct which they represent. Self-control, courage, wisdom, justice, brotherly love, and other virtues are as valuable as ever. In any wholesome society the dispositions and behavior represented by them will be present in no small degree. We have tried to make clear, however, that virtues, like other moral principles, are justified to the extent that they promote the good life. The virtues are instrumental and relative to the function of society and to the need of human personality to grow.

A list of virtues may point out to us the general direction in which conduct should move. They do not furnish us with the knowledge as to what to do next in any specific situation. Such knowledge can be gained only from a study of the deficiencies and possibilities of the situation before us.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. If a friend had threatened to commit suicide, and you felt that you could save him by stealing his revolver, would you feel justified in doing so? If so, why?
2. Comment upon the following: "In a discussion on the subject of military morale, an officer of much experience and of large responsibility maintained that if he knew an accused man to be innocent, and if he

also knew that he was so generally believed guilty in his regiment that an acquittal would lower the morale at a critical time, he would order sentence to be carried out. 'Justice to individuals,' he said, 'is never more than approximate, at best: the interest of the cause is supreme. . . .'" W. E. Hocking, *Philosophy of Law and of Rights*, pp. 47-48.

3. Is it all right, for the sake of your team, to cut the bag in baseball, if the umpire isn't looking? If you can get away with holding in football, without being caught, is it all right to hold? Give the reason for your answers.
4. A senior member of a firm requested strongly that a junior member dismiss a man in his department. The junior member did so, only to discover later that the senior member had told the dismissed man that he did not desire his dismissal, but that the junior member had felt it necessary. The junior executive felt that his reputation for honesty was being injured. What should he do about it? See W. W. Charters, *The Teaching of Ideals*, p. 268.
5. Do you agree with the person who said that patriotism is an old-time virtue that we must "extinguish in ourselves before it extinguishes us"? What are the values and what are the dangers of patriotism?
6. When is charity a real virtue and when is it merely a covering for the brutalities and inhumanities of the social order?
7. Gambling is prevalent in modern society and varies in form from the stock speculations of the big business man to the child's nickel in the slot machine in the corner store. Gambling is usually considered a vice. To what extent is it a vice, and why?
8. When is conscientiousness a virtue, and when may it be a vice?

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Part Four

PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL MORALITY

Chapter XIV

BODILY CARE

AT VARIOUS times and places during the history of society, men have regarded the human body as something to be distrusted, and perhaps destroyed. Even among the Greeks, with their love of this life, we find Plato regarding the body as the prison house from which the soul longed to escape. The body was a distinctly subordinate part of the life of man. At a later time, especially during the age of asceticism and monasticism, all matter including the human body was thought to be distinctly evil. Since the spiritual element alone was good, it was believed that bodily desires should be destroyed. Under the more extreme forms of asceticism, practices such as fasting, flogging, celibacy, and other austerities of various sorts were used as disciplinary measures.

The disparagement of the body and bodily activities was suggested to the consciousness of men by the intense inner struggles which men occasionally experience. These moral conflicts were interpreted as evidence of the sinfulness of man's natural passions, rather than as a part of man's upward development. Repressive methods, however, were not always successful. The suppression rather than the control and direction of the natural impulses tended to intensify the struggle and to give rise to lurid imagery and to other abnormal psychical conditions. Such phenomena tended to convince men still further of the wickedness of their natures.

THE IMPORTANCE OF HEALTH

In the modern world there are few people who regard the body as evil, yet multitudes neglect the care of their bodies and fail to realize the important place which physical well-being plays in wholesome living. From various independent studies as well as from the United States Health Service, the investigations of insurance com-

panies, and the army medical tests during the World War, there is available a body of facts that is somewhat alarming. If malnutrition, defective sight and hearing, and defective teeth are included with the more serious ailments, probably 75 per cent of the school children have physical defects of some kind which are either potentially or actually injurious to health. All but a small percentage of these abnormal conditions can be corrected and yet a large portion of them are receiving no attention.

One study of "well" people has disclosed that less than a third of them are free from physical defects. More than 40 per cent had defects serious enough "to affect their health, happiness, or efficiency."¹ Apparently many persons are ignorant of small ailments which in some way may affect their lives. Such studies would seem to indicate the advisability of periodic health inspection. Perhaps such periodic physical examination is a real duty of all persons.

Other studies indicate that, on the average, individuals are ill between eight and nine days annually. At any one time between 2 and 3 per cent of the population is incapacitated because of sickness. At times this percentage may run much higher. Another group, as large or larger, feel ill but remain at work with impaired efficiency. During the World War, of several million men between the ages of eighteen and thirty who were given medical examinations, twenty-one out of every hundred were rejected. Nearly one third were unable to perform full military duty, and only 53 per cent fully met the military standard.

In the light of the above facts, it is encouraging to know that there has been and is a growing interest and emphasis upon health and physical development. In part, this emphasis has come from a realization of the military and economic importance of health. In the wars of history down until recent times more men have been lost through disease than from wounds. In the Crimean War, the British lost twenty-five times as many from sickness as from battle. In the war with Spain, deaths from disease claimed seven times as many men as did injury or wounds. During the World War the losses

¹ H. W. Green, "An Analysis of the Physical Examination of 200 'Well' Men and Women," mimeographed pamphlet by The Cleveland Health Council, 1929.

from sickness were slight compared with previous wars and with those lost from wounds.

The economic loss from disease is also tremendous. The direct costs include doctors, hospitals, medicine, and loss of wages. The indirect costs include decreased efficiency due to minor ailments and the cost to society of preventable or premature deaths. These direct and indirect losses have been estimated to amount to more than five billion dollars a year. Economic considerations are stimulating both individuals and groups to eliminate unhealthy conditions.

Probably the most important factors in the growing emphasis upon health have been the new knowledge about health, a growing realization of the fact that much of the pain and misery is unnecessary and may be eliminated, and a sense of the paramount value of health as an element of the good life. Because of the vital importance of good health, the existence of so much ill health should give us great concern. Let us now consider more fully why bodily care is essential from the point of view of morality.

As seen in earlier chapters, the human being is not a series of independent parts but a unified structure in which the malfunctioning of any one part may affect the whole. Character is a way of living in which every element that affects the human personality plays a part. A headache, a toothache, a case of indigestion, or any major disturbance may seriously affect emotions and thoughts. In turn, memory, imagination, or reason may influence digestion or cause other bodily changes. Man is a delicate mechanism, and the happy life is one in which the physical and mental capacities all function in one harmonious whole. Fatigue, backaches, and nervousness mean a depressed vitality and a lowered resistance to impulses and passions. Much irritability, nagging, and anger result from such conditions. At least one case is on record where a child's delinquency appeared to be closely related to his mother's irritation which was caused by a dental condition. The delinquency ceased after his mother had been provided with a comfortable set of false teeth. Man's higher powers, as well as his comfort, depend to a large extent upon a sound physical basis.

Good health is a value in itself, and it is the basis for the realization

of many other values. The man of abundant energy has a sense of the mere joy of living. He has open to him experiences and opportunities for growth that are not open to others. Those who experience good health often fail to realize its central place until some misfortune or lack of health calls their attention to its value. Then they realize that health is more important than wealth or fame.

Good health is essential for community welfare, as well as for personal happiness and growth. It enables a man to bear his share of the world's burdens and to gain joy in the task. Through work man grows into a resourceful, responsible being. Multitudes are so incapacitated that they are unable to perform daily activities and are a burden to the community, or they work at low efficiency. They do not know what it is to abound in life and energy. Ill health is a direct or indirect cause of many social problems.

Good health is an essential of the best life. There is a moral obligation to be as healthy as we can, and to live so that others may be as healthy as possible. We can all think, of course, of people who have been able to achieve wonderful things in spite of poor health and physical disability. All persons honor them. Nevertheless, it is probably fair to say that it is the unusual person who does accomplish things in spite of such handicaps. A genius may compose a beautiful poem or song, but he does so because he has genius rather than because he has poor health. Many men of genius have gone to an early grave when good health might have enabled them to continue their contributions to art and to literature for many years. For the average person, poor health is one of the worst hindrances, not only to success, but also to harmonious living. Therefore, it becomes a moral duty to guard our health and strength. Such a thing is not wholly within our control, but we can do a good deal about it. Deliberately to lower one's usefulness by unhealthy practices is a vice.

[The demands of morality are the demands of physical and mental hygiene. We should endeavor to know all that we can about our bodies, their individual needs and demands, and the conditions under which they function most adequately. If our bodies are to operate harmoniously and efficiently, there are certain conditions which must be met.

THE NEEDS OF THE BODY

In order to function well and not be a source of disturbance and pain, our bodies need fresh air, sunshine, sleep, food, and exercise. For most of us fresh air and sunshine come as a matter of course. We are more likely to violate the principles of wholesome living in connection with the last three.

Sleep is one of our greatest needs. We may go longer without food than without sleep and yet continue to live. Infants need to sleep nearly all the time, children of four or five years of age need to sleep about half the time, and most adults need eight hours or more. The proper amount of sleep is necessary for sound nerves and for growth. Insufficient sleep is responsible for the dull, irritable lives of millions, for numerous family quarrels, for accidents, and for the crowding out of our finer emotions and thoughts. While persons vary considerably as to the amount of sleep needed, it is our duty to gain the sleep which is essential for personal efficiency.

Fatigue is a condition of the organism that results from intense and sustained activity in which the available energy is reduced and poisonous waste products are left in the system. The symptoms of fatigue include drooping bodily attitudes, sluggish movements, and a general sense of inefficiency. The condition indicates the need for rest or for a change of activity. Sleep gives an opportunity for the repair of cells and the elimination of waste products in the body. On occasions, however, the urgency of important tasks may require that we forego the usual and necessary amounts of sleep. Here, as elsewhere, our duty is to follow our judgment of what is the greatest good in the particular situation.

Food is another demand of the body that must be satisfied. Lack of sufficient nourishment and overeating are each responsible for numerous warped lives. While from a fifth to a third of all pre-school children have been suffering from a greater or less degree of malnutrition, others in our population go to premature graves because of overeating. A vast amount of peevishness and anger may be laid to indigestion from overeating or from an unbalanced diet. No attempt will be made here to set forth the details of a balanced diet.

The desire for food is especially strong. The quest for food occupied a large part of the time of primitive man. In the modern world, under new methods of production and distribution, food is more plentiful and near at hand for large numbers. With less need for a large quantity of hearty food, but with an abundance of food artificially prepared to appeal to his taste, modern man has more temptation to excessive indulgence. The perversion of the organs of nutrition into organs of pleasure have caused unhappiness for many. Gluttony, resulting in loss of health and efficiency or in an irritable nature, is a vice against which modern men need to guard themselves. The quality and the quantity of food which any individual needs depend upon a number of things including physical make-up, environment, and work. Men engaged in hard muscular work need more food than those engaged in sedentary occupations. Nurture may assist or hinder our life activity. This being the case, we need to exercise care in the formation of intelligent food habits.

Exercise and recreation are also fundamental needs of the human body. We shall consider them here in the forms of play, amusements, and competitive athletics. The play impulse grows normally and spontaneously out of life. Play means the doing of things for the sheer joy and satisfaction which the activity itself brings. For a child, play is preparation for life. For an adult, it is the renewing of life. It is one method of re-creating body and mind and avoiding nervous exhaustion. A proper balance between work and play or recreation is an essential condition of health and efficiency. As the old adage puts it, "All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy." A full and rich development of the play impulse is necessary for wholesome living. Recreation through play in one form or another may save many persons for high moral purposes.

Amusements have great potentialities both for good and for evil. Among the values may be included the fact that they frequently add to the joy of living and give zest to life. There is probably a definite place in life for pleasures or amusements which have no immediate relation to the duties of life but which contribute to one's capacity to enjoy. The modern moral consciousness rejects the Puritan view that amusements, because they add to mere bodily enjoyment and

"waste" time, are therefore evil and to be rejected. The Puritan attitude was too severe and one-sided and failed to do justice to the needs of both children and adults for play and recreation. Happiness is normal and desirable. Unhappiness is an indication that something is wrong. The desire for enjoyment needs to be satisfied wisely.

Amusements of a wholesome type also relax body and mind and help to recuperate tired nerves and jaded muscles. In this way they enable men to return to their tasks better prepared to carry out their duties. A person cannot act or think energetically if his nerves and muscles have not regained their elasticity and tone.

Finally, there is a social value in many forms of recreation and amusement. There is nothing like the play attitude to break down reserve and artificial barriers and to aid in the formation of friendships. With both children and adults, amusements, especially in the form of group games, help to stimulate sociability, and to foster a spirit of co-operation and team work. Laughter and mirth tend to draw people together. They also act as a means of release for emotional pressures which under other circumstances may express themselves in irritation or anger.

Some of the most serious evils in connection with amusements have come with the growth of commercialism and professionalism in this field. With the development of an industrial order it was inevitable that the recreation habits of men should undergo some changes. Men and women who work for long hours at hard and monotonous tasks and come out with tired muscles prefer emotional excitement rather than vigorous physical exercise. Industrialization and urbanization created conditions conducive to the growth of commercialism and professionalism in amusements.

Where the money element is the dominant motive, the promoter of amusements is likely to be guided by the box-office receipts. Since people tend to spend more freely when their emotions are stirred, such commercialized pleasure resorts tend to work upon the passions and weaknesses of men. Commercial groups have been as quick to exploit the human desire to play as they have to exploit other natural resources of the race. Professionalism, one form of commercialism, substitutes for the desire to play, "the love of being played upon."

From active participation in games it encourages people to sit as idle spectators and pay to be amused.

While the charge cannot be made universally by any means, various reports of vice investigations in the larger cities indicate that many commercial recreation centers, such as public dance halls, moving-picture theaters, beer gardens, and amusement parks, are the rendezvous of criminals and near-criminals and are surrounded by dangers and temptations. Such places are frequently the breeding places of vice and other forms of immorality. The fact that persons tend to lower their inhibitions during amusement periods adds to the dangers.

Any amusement, however innocent in itself, may become a means of self-indulgence. If through excessive participation we impair our health or efficiency, or if an untimely pursuit of it leads us to neglect the performance of duty, it may become harmful and morally reprehensible. Amusements cease to be ethically valuable and become forms of dissipation when they sap our strength, lead us to neglect social obligations, or cause us to lose interest in the serious tasks of life. Each individual will have to decide the line of demarcation between amusements that are ethically defensible and those that are unethical.

A considerable part of the above discussion will apply to athletic competitions such as are found on most college campuses. In favor of such sports as football, baseball, basketball, hockey, and track may be mentioned the training and discipline which such games require. The good athlete must be alert of mind and sound in body. He must exhibit co-ordination of sense and muscle, persistence, and self-control. Such socially desirable qualities as co-operation or team work, loyalty and willingness to sacrifice for the group, and a spirit of fair play may be cultivated. Athletic competitions have even been suggested as the moral equivalents for war.

On the other hand, competitive athletics may require so much time and energy that health is impaired or studies neglected. On some college campuses some students over-exercise, while others do not exercise enough. The over-emphasis upon athletics on some campuses was the basis for the jocular remark that colleges are athletic clubs in

which opportunity for study is provided for the physically unfit! Here, as elsewhere, a virtue may become a vice. A program of intramural sports in which practically all students participate is to be desired as over against the tendency to permit a few good athletes to carry on the athletic program of the school. Another danger is that the spirit of rivalry and the temptation to win at any cost may undermine good sportsmanship and character.

Since intercollegiate and intramural sports are among the most powerful influences affecting student life, it is important that they contribute to the development of sound bodies and strong characters. The responsibility rests both with members of the student body and with the administration to see that the recreational life of the college leads to the growth of worthy standards of conduct.

NARCOTICS AND STIMULANTS

A discussion of bodily care would be incomplete without a consideration of the use of narcotics and stimulants. In this field we need clear thinking, since so frequently in the past such issues have been clouded by high emotion or confused by propaganda. When we ask, "Does the use of certain narcotics and stimulants affect life beneficially or adversely?" we need scientific evidence in order to answer the question adequately. If the results of the use of certain narcotics or stimulants in the long run are destructive of health and happiness, their use is unquestionably wrong. If there is no detrimental effect, then they can be justified. Because of its importance and widespread use we shall give proportionally more space to a consideration of alcohol when used as a drink.

Alcohol is used for a number of purposes. Besides certain commercial uses, it has definite uses as a medicine. In concentrations of about 70 per cent, it is an effective antiseptic. Its external application helps to harden the skin and to prevent bedsores or pressure ulcerations. It is used as a solvent and as an astringent. Where alcohol is recommended by members of the medical profession, or where its use serves some purpose or need of the organism, it should be taken. There are situations in which to refuse to take alcohol would cause more injury than to take it.

The use of alcohol as a drink is the use which creates a special problem. The common effect is known as intoxication. According to the amount imbibed, three stages of intoxication have been noted. In the first stage, the higher functions of the brain including reasoning power and self-control are weakened or inhibited. Impulses are freed from their habitual control and critical self-awareness is dulled. This leaves the lower centers comparatively free to act, and if there is added stimulus under social conditions, hilarious behavior, contentiousness, or combativeness may result. The effect is gained by the narcotic affecting first the higher or intellectual centers, thus leaving the lower centers free to act without control. In the second stage, movements and sense-perceptions are disturbed and confused. Clumsiness of action, ill-adjusted movements, and a narrowing of observation or attention are in evidence. The person may see double. He may also give way to violent outbursts of emotion. In the third stage, all his functions are depressed and he sinks into a deep sleep or into unconsciousness. He will probably remain in this condition until oxidation has disposed of the alcohol in his system.

In the light of recent evidence it appears that alcohol in one way or another may affect the action of every organ of the body. When taken as a drink, it is readily absorbed by the body and enters the bloodstream. Since its absorption is much more rapid than its elimination, the largest amount of alcohol in the bloodstream is found between one-half hour to two hours after ingestion. The severity of the symptoms of intoxication varies according to the person and the amount consumed. An habitual drinker tends to be less affected than the neophyte, and for both the effects are greater if alcohol is taken on an empty stomach.

The chief effect of alcohol is upon the central nervous system, consisting of the brain and spinal cord. A sense of freedom and relief is experienced through the deadening of the faculties of reason, memory, self-control, and discretion. The person is less keenly aware. Even moderate amounts of alcohol affect very definitely the response of sight, hearing, and touch sensation. There is delay in reaction to appropriate stimulation and often inaccurate interpretation of the sensation. The importance and danger of such delays

in an age which depends so largely upon the use of speed and power is evident. It explains the insistence of industrial and transportation firms that their employees refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. Haven Emerson, M. D., tells us that a moderate amount of alcohol is sufficient to cause a difference of a quarter of a mile in the location of a swiftly moving aeroplane between a signal of danger and the pilot's effective response, and of fifteen to thirty feet in the position of a motor car traveling at thirty-five to fifty miles an hour.² The decision to have just a little drink has often caused a lot of grief. "Alcohol is all right in the radiator, but not in the operator."

A discussion of the effect of alcohol upon other organs and functions of the body will be found in the recent literature on the topic. Here we shall mention just a few of the general effects whose reality appears well supported by scientific evidence. Prolonged and excessive use of alcohol is a principal cause of certain types of mental diseases, and a contributory cause to some other types; it reduces fecundity and increases the probability of defective offspring; it lowers resistance to some diseases, is a cause of considerable illness, and leads to some premature deaths.

The personal and social effects of the use of alcohol cannot be completely separated. The social effects are serious since the disturbance of the higher functions of the brain leads to a marked lack of self-control. As a result, the intoxicated person is likely to offend the public sense of decency and to exhibit conduct unbecoming to a gentleman or a lady. In extreme cases the person may give way to crimes of violence. Excessive alcoholism is a direct or indirect cause of many criminal acts. Poverty, dependency, invalidism, neglect or abandonment of family obligations are to be listed among the possible social effects of alcoholism.

While there are many persons who do not fully realize the harm that comes from drinking, there are others who do know the effects of alcohol and yet continue to drink. How is this to be explained? Alcohol is used for a number of reasons. For many it is a means of temporary escape from the worries and burdens of life, as well as

² Haven Emerson, *Alcohol, Its Effect on Man*, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1934, p. 48.

from social conventions and self-criticism. The drinker is less keenly aware of his surroundings, and he may experience a sense of well-being and power. After the monotony and fatigue of the day's work a moderate drink of alcohol may give a glow of excitement and a feeling of comfort and relaxation. Another reason why individuals indulge in alcohol is due to the fact that a habit may have been formed from the enjoyment of an occasional drink. The habit, once established, is, for many persons, very difficult to break. A considerable degree of self-control is required to keep from passing from the stage of light drinking to moderate drinking and then on to heavy drinking. A third reason for the prevalence of drinking is group pressure. If others are imbibing, there is a strong urge to join the group and be a "good sport." To be sociable and to give in to group suggestion is often easier than to resist, or to seek another group with different conventions.

From the point of view of morality there appears to be no justification for the continued use of alcohol except in the cases where it is recommended by physicians because of some abnormal physical condition. [Morality demands that we live at our best and bring our lower natures under the control of reason or our higher natures.] Inasmuch as alcohol acts as a narcotic, it tends to deaden the higher centers first. The higher faculties are stupefied, and the impulses and emotions are less restrained. Man has no justification for inflicting self-poison, nor for impairing his health and efficiency. Duty demands that we preserve our health and strength of body, and exercise diligence in respecting the rights of others. Whether drinking is a virtue or a vice depends upon the evidence as to its effect upon human welfare. The evidence as to the harmful effects of the excessive use of alcohol appears conclusive.

Narcotics, such as *opium*, *morphine* and *cocaine* are even more disastrous in their effects upon man than is alcohol. Since few intelligent persons use such drugs, except under the advice of physicians, and since nearly everyone is familiar with the devastating effects of their continued use, we shall not consider them in detail. These narcotics are more completely under control today, and their use is not openly promoted.

Nicotine, which is present in tobacco, is a habit-forming drug. The harm to mature persons, however, is less marked than in the case of persons who are immature. For adults the evidence is conflicting. Some persons are undoubtedly harmed by excessive smoking and should leave tobacco alone. For others it brings relaxation, and they claim that they do their best work while smoking and that it aids rather than hinders their efficiency. The use of tobacco by growing boys and girls is unquestionably injurious. The physiological effects include an impairment of growth, heart disturbances, stomach disorders, disturbances of the hearing and vision, and increased nervous irritability. Athletic coaches throughout the country forbid the use of tobacco during training seasons. The person who wishes to make the most of his or her life may well ask whether the expenditure of money involved, and the formation of such a habit, will be conducive to the greatest health and happiness.

The chief natural stimulants include pure, cool air, sunshine, physical exercise, interest, joy, and other healthy emotions. These stimulants increase the vital activity of the body without leaving any harmful effects. A wider use of the natural stimulants and a decreased use of artificial stimulants would make for greater human welfare.

In contrast to the early centuries when men sometimes considered it a virtue to abuse the body or the "flesh," it is today increasingly coming to be considered wrong not to care for one's body or not to give oneself the best opportunity for physical development.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. A writer in the official press service of the Nazi Women's Organization declared that no German woman and no German girl of today has the right to consider herself a private person who can do what she pleases with herself and her health, since without able women who are willing to make sacrifices in the interest of family life and of the race all efforts to reconstruct the nation are in vain. How far can the idea of social responsibility for maintaining health be pushed?
- ✓2. A young lady, in speaking about a certain habit, remarked, "I think it is slightly injurious, but I don't think it is a moral issue." Is this attitude prevalent? What is your criticism of it?

Chapter XV

THE MORAL OBLIGATION TO BE INTELLIGENT

AN INMATE of a state hospital for the insane is said to have remarked to a visitor, "They say that I have lost my mind, but do you know I don't miss it at all!" Unfortunately there are too many people at large in society today for whom mind is no more important. Jane Taylor, probably recalling Aristotle's description of man as a thinking being, has given us the following lines:

Though man a thinking being is defined,
Few use the grand prerogative of mind;
How few think justly of the thinking few!
How many never think, who think they do!

WHY WE MUST BE INTELLIGENT

Why should we be intelligent? John Erskine has pointed out that there has been an Anglo-Saxon tradition that intelligence is often a peril, that goodness is the essential thing. "Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever." As he says,

Here is the casual assumption that a choice must be made between goodness and intelligence; that stupidity is first cousin to moral conduct, and cleverness the first step into mischief; that reason and God are not on good terms with each other; that the mind and the heart are rival buckets in the well of truth, inexorably balanced—full mind, starved heart—stout heart, weak head.¹

It might seem that a book on ethics would be concerned only with the problem of "goodness," even though recognizing the fact that goodness and intelligence are not necessarily antagonistic. However, especially in society today, it appears that we cannot even be "good" unless we are first intelligent. Goodness alone is not enough. To

¹John Erskine, *American Character and Other Essays*, The Chautauqua Press, 1927, Bk. II, pp. 5-6.

choose the right in any sense in which such a choice has moral significance, we must first know the right. Canon Streeter in his *Moral Adventure* says that

Right choice depends quite as much on knowing what one ought to do as on the will to do it. . . . The individual conscience is an unsafe guide unless it has been educated, not only by right living but also by reflection on moral issues. Conscience is not a "labour-saving" device to exempt us from the trouble of thinking.²

If men are to do to others as they would have others do to them, they must be able to comprehend what it is that they would want done to them if they were in the other person's place. Otherwise an emphasis on the Golden Rule is nothing but pious sentiment.

Even the old proverb tells us that "the road to hell is paved with good intentions." A man may have a good purpose and yet cause untold harm if he has not also used intelligence. Any number of simple illustrations of this will occur to the reader.

I didn't think.

I didn't think you'd mind.

I didn't know the gun was loaded.

I didn't know you were there.

I didn't know it was against the law.

I didn't think we needed to be quarantined for so light a case.

Your letter was mislaid.

These are all expressions not of bad intent but of a lack of thinking.

There is a moral obligation not only for a person to be intelligent, but for an intelligent person to be informed as to the effect of his conduct. As we have seen in an earlier chapter, motives are significant and important. A good motive is a prerequisite to conduct which we wholeheartedly approve. Good will, however, does not express itself in a social vacuum. In order to do our duty, we must know what is our duty. To do the will of God, we must discover what his will is in the situation before us. An intelligent man needs to scrutinize not only the motives which prompt him to act, but also the situation in which his action will take place.

²Streeter, *Moral Adventure*, p. 27, footnote.

The boy who "thought the revolver was not loaded," and did not stop to make sure, may as surely kill a friend as if he had deliberately planned to murder him. A doctor may not keep up on the latest developments in medicine and may therefore be the cause of a patient's death as certainly as if he had neglected him. In these cases we may not hold the person legally responsible, but there is a big question of moral responsibility. In the case of an engineer who fails to check details and use available information in the construction of a bridge, and so is the cause of its collapse, we are likely to charge legal responsibility as well as moral. We hold a bus driver or railroad engineer responsible for exercising "due care" and for being intelligent as well as "good" in the sense of well-meaning. While we cannot blame a person for unavoidable ignorance, and while we have to realize that we are all human and make mistakes, it nevertheless is the clear duty of every morally earnest man to make himself as wise and as well-informed as possible.

In primitive times, direct aggression was the chief, if not the only form of anti-social behavior that was recognized. In modern society, however, when men wield great power and when their actions affect the lives of numerous other persons, public welfare is imperiled quite as much by ignorance and carelessness as by wilful aggression. That "ignorance of the law is no excuse" has long been recognized. An intelligent, morally sensitive person is expected to find out and to know the law of the community in which he lives. In like manner, a person who drives a car on the highway, or manages an enterprise which is closely related to the welfare of other persons, has responsibilities which need to be faced. Where the danger of ignorance to public welfare is great, as in the case of captains of ships and locomotive engineers, society may set up standards which must be met.

When a man professes some special knowledge or skill, and upon the basis of such claims offers a service to society, those who accept the service assume ordinary care and diligence. If such a person shows gross neglect leading to injury, the courts are expected to support a claim against him. Those who maintain services or employ agencies that may get out of order, or do damage, or escape as in the case of animals, are expected to exercise care in keeping them within

proper bounds. Only on this basis can men go about their affairs in society without constant fear and worry, and without danger to the general security. In the field of transportation an interesting illustration of the above principle is afforded by what is termed "common-carrier liability." A common carrier undertakes "to carry goods or persons and deliver them for hire." Persons who offer such services to the public have definite obligations, including a willingness to serve all persons equally and the responsibility for safe delivery. With certain exceptions, where injury or loss occurs, there is a presumption that the carrier is at fault. Liability irrespective of negligence is usually enforced by the courts. The student will do well to consider the legal and ethical principles involved in such cases.³

Stated positively, and in legal parlance, this is the principle of "due care." Society expects each person to meet his obligations to other persons with diligence. Due care is the care which the moral sense of society demands with respect to the effects of actions that may reasonably be anticipated. If a person did not plan nor foresee some ill effect of his action, should he have foreseen the consequences? Did he act with the care that the ordinary understanding exacts? In the case of the death of a patient, did the physician do all that he could, or was he negligent in his care? In the collapse of the bridge, was the bridge inspector careless, or did he know of any condition that might make the bridge unsafe? Did he exercise diligence in discovering the condition of the structure and in keeping it in repair?

On the morning of September 8, 1934, the *Morro Castle*, a ship running between New York and Havana, burned at sea with a loss of considerably over one hundred persons. Did the officers, the company which owned and operated the ship, and those responsible for the inspection and policy of the merchant marine, exercise due care or were some or all of these groups morally to blame? The inquiry conducted by the United States Department of Commerce concluded with charges of negligence against the master of the ship and four of his staff. A few of the facts brought out by the inquiry were: that the officers delayed the sending of S O S signals for thirty

³Stuart Daggert, *Principles of Inland Transportation*, Harper and Brothers, 1928, chaps. XVI, XVII.

minutes or more, hoping to save salvage fees for the company; that the officers failed to stop the ship soon enough and neglected the usual routine of fire fighting; that of the first ninety-eight persons to leave in lifeboats, ninety-two were members of the crew, thus breaking a rigid law of the sea requiring that passengers be taken off first. Responsibility rested upon a number of groups: upon the officers and crew who did not conduct themselves in the way in which the public has a right to expect; upon the company which had a defective labor policy paying low wages and exacting long hours; and, upon a merchant marine and a society that permits low standards and a spirit of "every man for himself" to dominate its operations.

In listing the limits of due care, Professor Richard C. Cabot says, "One is responsible morally as well as legally for blunders: (1) up to the limits of average intelligence, or of the intelligence to be expected in the individual concerned; and (2) except in situations which one could not reasonably have been expected to foresee and prepare for."⁴

{ Due care includes sincerity, attentiveness, a willingness to learn from experience and to profit by previous mistakes. In short, due care implies the union of moral earnestness and intelligence.

PROBLEMS DEMANDING INTELLIGENCE

To suggest that any special areas of human experience need the exercise of intelligence more than others may seem inappropriate. The fact remains, however, that conditions of living have changed so rapidly in the last generation or two that certain areas of our thinking have not kept pace. When we realize that in the space of a few generations we have changed from an ox cart to an aeroplane civilization, this is not to be wondered at. We find ourselves in a situation where we eagerly accept and adjust ourselves to new mechanical devices. Yet we frantically appeal to the principles worked out in earlier centuries, when leaders in the social sciences of today suggest social, economic, or political changes which they believe will lead to more harmonious and happy living. Any attempt to apply to human affairs the same critical analysis that we apply in

⁴R. C. Cabot, *The Meaning of Right and Wrong*, The Macmillan Company, 1933, p. 222.

improving the efficiency of our machines or our theory of matter is met with prejudice and fear. Any suggestion of innovation in social institutions or ideas is met with angry opposition. In these fields our forefathers have spoken and we are expected to remain silent and revere the *status quo*.

After pointing out that society does not oppose departures from the theories of Newton or Faraday, Raymond B. Fosdick says:

But let economics and political science develop the principle that the world we live in is an economic unit and that the process of integration and interrelationships has developed to a point where some international machinery like a league of nations is necessary to handle the common interests of mankind that overflow national boundaries—what happens? We begin to ask what George Washington would have thought of it one hundred and twenty-five years ago. We quote the casual remarks of statesmen long in their graves. We summon the ghosts of tradition and ancient custom to bear witness to the fact that the thing has never been done before. We criticize the mistakes and impugn the character of the chief inventor and his associates. We fight over the matter in political campaigns in which prejudice and passion take the place of intelligent analysis. For the detachment of the laboratory we substitute the emotion of the torchlight procession.⁵

As a nation we may expect confusion and even disorder if we permit changes in parts of our culture, but refuse to consider changes in other parts. There is little likelihood that we can successfully operate a machine civilization with the ways of thinking worked out in a simple pioneer age. That we are scientific, highly expert, and intelligently alert in the realm of *things* is admirable; it is unfortunate that we are not equally intelligent in our *social relationships*. To trust traditions, habits, and emotions is to court disaster.

Politics. Among the parts of our social life in which we find the application of intelligence strangely lacking, we may mention first the realm of politics. In the United States probably 75 per cent of the voters are regular. That is, they will vote for a certain party regardless of the principles involved. In a study of the campaign of

⁵ Raymond B. Fosdick, *The Old Savage in the New Civilization*, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1928.

1920 it was found that 372 out of 531 electoral votes were decided before the campaign began and before it was known what the party platforms would be. After studying thirty-four political campaigns in the United States, Professor C. E. Merriam says that clear-cut party issues divided the voters in only sixteen of the elections. The typical party platform consists of:

- "(1) Elaboration of the record of the party.
- (2) Denunciation of the opposition party.
- (3) General declarations regarding democracy and the nation.
- (4) General reference to certain non-party issues.
- (5) Expressions of sympathy.
- (6) Non-committal reference to certain disputed issues.
- (7) Definite issues."⁶

In referring to a popular definition of political parties as groups of people who think alike, Professor W. B. Munro says, "It is not that these men and women 'think alike,' many of them do not think at all."⁷ Responsibility for the low state of public affairs and for much recent dissatisfaction with democratic means can be laid upon the failure of voters to face facts and to *think* in the realm of politics. Certainly in this field, there is a moral obligation to be intelligent.

Economic Life. Equally evident is our failure to apply intelligence to the solution of our economic maladjustment. While the moral problems of our industrial order will be discussed in a later chapter, we shall point out here our attitude toward these problems. There has been a widespread tendency on the part of those in power to keep these issues from being faced in the open with all the facts in clear view. When issues have forced themselves to the front, various devices of crooked thinking have frequently been used. One device has been diversion, or the shifting of the discussion to some other issue. If the issues of working conditions or wages is raised, a cry goes up about "communist agitators." This method of "dragging a red herring across the trail" is an old and much-abused method of keeping people from facing an issue.

⁶C. E. Merriam and H. F. Gosnell, *The American Party System*, rev. ed., The Macmillan Company, 1930, p. 204.

⁷*Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. CXXXVIII, p. 457.

Where questions of fact are at stake, they are to be settled by scientific thinking. Most of our practical problems are of this nature. Where questions of value and rights are involved, they may be handled by discussion, by compromise, or by the arbitration of disinterested persons or groups. In any case, the principal thing is that we really use our intelligence in the settling of such problems, and not simply emotion and prejudice.

Freedom of Thought and Speech. In connection with this idea of thinking problems through and applying a rational solution, especially in the realm of the social sciences, there is another problem whose solution is a prerequisite of the former and yet is itself a problem of intelligence. That is the question of freedom. Even if we intelligently decide problems, are we free to express the results of our thinking? Or do we need to use our intelligence first in the development of a free atmosphere in which ideas can operate?

Freedom of thought, of conscience, and of speech are conditions necessary for the richest development of personality and the creation and enjoyment of human values. If men cannot freely think and express themselves, how can they discover what is true? If they cannot discover what is true, how can they live wholesome moral lives?

During recent years the restrictions placed upon freedom of speech have been alarming. They include numerous legislative "gag laws"; laws against the teaching of evolution, in a few states; the dismissal of teachers for expressing unpopular or unorthodox ideas; the dismissal of employees for expressing ideas displeasing to employers; ordinances requiring permits to speak in public halls or at outdoor mass meetings; the suppression of radical papers by denying the use of the mail to them; and the raids and threats from vigilantes and other such groups. From a large number of clippings of such incidents taken from newspapers and journals during recent years, the following editorial is especially interesting.

A woman went to Homestead, Pa., to tell the steel workers about their rights under the National Recovery Law. That was communism to the Mayor. He refused to let her speak on the town square. Her name was Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor. Must some steel or coal town official

jail the President as a Red before America awakens to the fact that free speech is dead in many parts of this country?⁸

The above incident is somewhat typical in three respects—First, some special-interest group is usually attempting to guard its privileges by keeping certain facts or ideas from the public or from their employees. Second, suppression takes place regardless of the truth or falsity of the ideas. Usually there is no attempt to discover the truth or the effect of the ideas upon public welfare. Third, there is an attempt to divert attention to some other issue by drawing in the boggy of communism.

Many persons when asked, "Do you believe in freedom of speech?" will answer something like this: "Yes, I believe in free speech, but, of course, I would limit it to what is right and true." That, however, is not free speech. The worst tyrant would permit others to express the ideas which he favors, or which he thinks right and true. Freedom of speech means the right of a person honestly to think and to say anything on any public issue without fear of interference. It means your right to criticize the other fellow, but it also means his right to criticize you.

There is a difference between the right to voice opinions upon all sides of any public question, and the right of a person to defame the reputation of another person. While citizens should be free to criticize public officials and to expose immoral acts, laws against slander and libel are necessary for the protection of innocent persons. There is also a difference between advocating a change in laws or in institutions and actually inciting persons to break those laws while they are in force. Slander, libel, inciting persons to break actual laws, and indecent speech in public places are probably the only restrictions which we need to make in the field of freedom of expression.

Ask yourself these three questions: Would I permit other persons to express views that are apparently true, but which are unpleasant or opposed to my interests? Would I permit others to say what I consider false, but more or less harmless? Would I permit others to express views which I believe to be both false and harmful? If

⁸ Editorial in the *Columbus Citizen*, Aug. 1, 1933.

you cannot say "yes" to the above questions, you do not really believe in freedom of speech.

Punishment of mere opinion expressed upon questions of public concern makes for violence and disorder instead of orderly progress. A great American defender of freedom, Thomas Jefferson, said: "It is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order."

We need freedom because we need new ideas. These are essential if we are to progress. Almost every idea which we prize today, including those of public education and democracy, was at one time considered false and dangerous. Most of the founders of this republic were denounced as radicals and heretics. As we look back through history, we find that most of the great benefactors of the race were misunderstood and that they were frequently persecuted.

Who today is sufficiently intelligent and sufficiently good to set himself up as a judge of what ideas are true? If an idea is false, the way to destroy it is to expose it. To prevent our opponents from expressing themselves is to admit the weakness of our own position. Let reason, discussion, and experimentation combat error. An attempt to suppress an idea or a doctrine is frequently the way to cause it to grow.

We need freedom of speech because only on this basis can we have a genuine democracy. In a democracy the minority must be free to express itself and to become the majority if it is able to do so by the peaceful methods of persuasion. The democratic ideal involves talking things out rather than fighting them out; it stands for ballots rather than bullets. Moreover, we need the free play of criticism upon all our institutions and practices. Only in this way will they remain efficient and responsive to popular demands. Repression is dangerous in individual lives; it is equally dangerous in society. When we drive opinion underground and permit no peaceful expression, it is likely to sow the seeds of violence and revolution.

The police power established for the purpose of protecting us against physical evils and maintaining law and order has in the course of time come to take as its duty the task of maintaining the

established order. Too frequently, preserving the peace has come to mean preserving the peace of mind of those in favored positions. Therefore there must be no criticism and no tampering with things as they are.

Orderly progress can be achieved only in an atmosphere of tolerance and freedom. If this is true, our duty is to stand for freedom of thought and of speech and to protest denials of these rights.

Leisure. Leisure is a comparatively new thing in America and the creative use of leisure constitutes still another problem in which the exercise of intelligence is urgently needed. Even a generation ago, no such problem existed, since practically no one had more leisure time than could be used easily. Today machines are making possible leisure for the many. Whereas a century ago factory laborers worked twelve to sixteen hours a day, there has been a progressive reduction of working hours until now the eight-hour day is widespread, and there is talk about the desirability of a thirty-hour week.

In this discussion of leisure we are not thinking about the great army of the unemployed. It is a serious indictment of our civilization, with its lack of intelligent planning, that so many men who are willing and able to work are forced to remain unemployed. This is a moral and social menace quite apart from the economic loss. However, the leisure about which we are talking here is the surplus time which a man has at his disposal after the completion of the regular work of the day.

While a certain degree of leisure time appears to be essential for civilization and intellectual development, an increase in the amount of leisure time does not necessarily mean an advance in civilization. Are we to be victims or masters of the labor-saving devices which are being produced? Are we gaining leisure for the enrichment of life, or just so that we will be able to manipulate more machines? Motion is not necessarily progress. If machinery merely increases the speed of living and adds nothing to our sense of beauty and our insight into the meaning of life, it may simply sap our nervous energy and lead to physical and moral deterioration.

There is a common impression, says L. P. Jacks, that in the hours of work we perform our duty, while in the hours of leisure we may

abandon ourselves to the expression of our impulses and inclinations. This separation between work and leisure has no moral justification whatever. The statement, often heard, that the character of a man can be determined by the manner in which he spends his leisure, is nearer to the truth, as is also the adage that "Satan finds some mischief for idle hands to do."

If as a race, we are intelligent and discriminating, we may look forward to additional leisure with the conviction that it will add to personal happiness and social progress. The fine arts, including music, offer excellent recreation for the mind. Sports and games renew both mind and body and cultivate good sportsmanship and co-operation. Through reading, one may commune with the world's great minds and find both pleasure and enrichment. Then there are the numerous skills and hobbies that persons may cultivate.

While many persons who are resourceful will find their delight in the more informal and spontaneous types of recreation, for large numbers community-organized activities will need to play a dominant part. Community centers, recreation grounds, neighborhood clubs, and such organizations may add to human happiness and strengthen character. Juvenile delinquency is reduced in the areas where playgrounds and community centers are established. Youths are interested in wholesome activities.

Unfortunately, in America, we have permitted selfish commercial groups, seeking profits, to monopolize a large part of the leisure-time activities of both youths and adults. This is especially true of the moving picture theater where the attendance averages about once a week per person for the entire population. Recent studies⁹ have indicated the great influence of motion pictures, especially upon the thinking and the conduct of youth. These pictures serve to set the pattern for mannerisms, ways of courtship and love-making, and personal adornment. They tend to stimulate emotions which express themselves in fantasy and day-dreaming as well as in overt behavior. They help to create ideas of right and wrong and to mould desires and ambitions.

⁹ *Motion Pictures and Youth*, The Payne Fund Studies, The Macmillan Company, 1933.

The fact that moving pictures are so largely occupied with crime and crude sex scenes is a menace to the mental and moral life of the coming generation. In some of the larger cities the censorship boards have found it necessary each year to eliminate, from films brought before them, several thousand scenes which they considered detrimental. Censorship boards are also maintained by some states. Protests stimulated by the League of Decency have brought some improvement and a larger number of high-class films. Some of these films have been among the most popular and have tended to refute the claim that such films do not draw crowds. Today there are a number of excellent Estimate Services, carried by several magazines which give reviews and estimates of films and enable one to pick what he wishes to see.¹⁰ There is a moral obligation upon persons to see that the films to which they and their dependents are exposed are elevating and not degrading.

OBSTACLES TO THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE

Why is it that so few persons really live an intelligent life? Part of the answer is the fact that we are so largely creatures of impulse and of habit. While habits are valuable in taking care of the routine details of life, they do not help in new or unfamiliar situations. Habits are emotional and intellectual as well as physical, and they form a mass of notions accepted uncritically through which the individual interprets the world.

Another obstacle to thinking is prejudice. A prejudice is a pre-judgment; a judgment in advance without examination of the evidence; a judgment formed because of emotional considerations. It is a mental bias which leads an individual to ignore some evidence and to overemphasize other evidence. Thus the conclusions which are reached are likely to be invalid. When persons are confronted with their prejudices, they tend to rationalize them; that is, they seek arguments for continuing to believe what they wish to believe. Prejudice is closely related to "wishful thinking."

¹⁰For example, The National Film Estimate Service, which is used by a number of magazines including the *Christian Century*, and the *Parents' Magazine*. The latter gives estimates from six or seven sources.

The third obstacle to thinking is propaganda. The word "propaganda" was once a perfectly good term referring to the spread of a particular doctrine where the methods were open and honest. Since the World War the term is increasingly coming to be used to refer to attempts to create public opinion by the spread of misinformation, where the methods are indirect and selfish in motive. Whereas education at its best extends knowledge by encouraging an examination of the facts and teaching men to think, propaganda stifles thinking in the attempt to spread one doctrine or point of view. The propagandist wants action, and therefore he does two things. First, he arouses some strong desire or emotion, and second, he suggests a program which appears to be a satisfactory way of expressing the desire.¹¹ There need be no logical connection whatever between the desire aroused and the line of action suggested as a way of satisfying it. The clever advertiser knows that the emotion of love may be aroused and then connected with the idea of flowers or an insurance policy. Propaganda is a subtle means of making up the other man's mind for him, whereas he believes he is thinking independently.

The pressure of public opinion is the fourth obstacle to thinking. A public is any group of persons who are "joined by some common interest." Thus at one time a person may belong to many publics, with one standing for regulation of the currency, another advocating lower tariffs, and so on. Public opinion is the aggregate of the views held by persons in a given community regarding issues that interest them or the community. Public opinion tends to align itself for or against proposals as to how to meet public problems. It is changeable and emotional and tends to thrive upon stereotypes or slogans and the opinions of persons who have prestige.

While public opinion exerts a strong pressure on the individual, its dictates are not necessarily intelligent or moral. Public opinion is often unenlightened owing to the fact that it tends to represent the average or mediocre mind. At its worst it may be the result of manipulation by special-interest groups.

If we want to learn to face life in an intelligent manner, we have to recognize these obstacles to thinking, and try to eliminate them so

¹¹E. K. Strong, *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. XIV (1922), pp. 234-252.

far as possible from our own thinking. This is not always easy to do, but it is a part of our obligation to be intelligent.

THE GROWING FAITH IN INTELLIGENCE

Belief in intelligence as a means of bettering man's condition through the control of himself and of nature is comparatively recent. While the ancient Greeks prized intelligence, it was largely as a means of knowing reality and not as an instrument for controlling the fortunes of this life. Even for Plato, the rational element in man was destined to escape from its confinement in a material body and to soar beyond the realm of nature. From the close of the Greek era until modern times faith in intelligence was eclipsed by a faith in revelation. Thinking was the handmaiden of dogma, but it must keep within narrow limits.

From the time of Francis Bacon until the present, faith in intelligence has been growing. There is a growing feeling that many of the evils of man's personal and social life can be eliminated through creative intelligence. This conviction has been expressing itself in the rise of public education and in the growth of democracy. Education has an important ethical function to fulfill. It must teach youth and adults to think and then apply intelligence to social purposes. Persons today need a sufficiently comprehensive view of the world in which they live so that they will be able to meet its changing problems with resourcefulness and vision. Education is an expression of the faith that every person has the right to develop and to express the best that he has in him. Each of us has a moral obligation to be intelligent, an obligation which is inescapable.

omit QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Danger signals, such as red lights and red flags, are ordinarily taken as a warning. No intelligent person would merely break the signal and rush blindly on. Yet in the case of social and industrial danger signals, such as strikes, riots, unrest, unemployment, and depressions, we frequently do not heed the signal, but attempt to cover it up or to break it. Is this an intelligent way of handling such a situation? What would you consider the most intelligent method?

2. The customs inspectors hold a person responsible for what is in his baggage regardless of his claim that he did not know that a certain article was there. If he fails even unintentionally to declare a dutiable article, he is liable for the penalty. Do you think that this is fair? Give your reasons.
3. In the days when Lincoln Steffens was conducting his muck-raking tour of American cities, Cincinnati was reputed to be one of the worst-governed cities in the United States. Today, it is admittedly one of the best. How is the difference to be explained? Did the use of intelligence play a significant part? Would the same change be possible in any other city in America?
4. Read the article, "Why Don't Your Young Men Care?" by Harold Laski, *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. CLXIII (July, 1931), pp. 129-136. Laski deplores the fact that students in America do not concern themselves with public issues as do the students in European countries. Do college students think about vital issues? If not, why not?
5. The following present good brief statements of propaganda and its effect upon the thinking of people:
 E. L. Clarke, *The Art of Straight Thinking*, chap. XIII.
 Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, chap. XXVII.
 Read one of them, and in the light of what you read, try honestly to state to what extent your own thinking has been biased by propaganda. As an intelligent person, what are you doing to try to overcome this state of affairs?
6. List the cases of negligence or carelessness which have come to your attention, indicating what moral issue or issues are involved.
7. List the blunders of history which have been due to the activity and the zeal of men who were "good," but who lacked intelligence.

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Chapter XVI

TRUTHFULNESS

A PERSON WHO is truthful is free from duplicity and from fraud; he is characterized by sincerity, genuineness, and straightforwardness in conduct, thought, and speech. Truth and truthfulness are not exactly the same. Truth may mean conformity to fact or reality, or the agreement between one's thought and objective conditions. Truthfulness is the agreement of one's word with one's thought and involves the intention and the responsibility of the person. The truthful man may say what is untrue or false, while the liar may speak the truth because he is mistaken. The essence of the lie or deceit is not to present what is untrue, but to present what one knows to be untrue.

Truthfulness means keeping one's agreements, stated or implied, until they cease to be valid agreements. The term "veracity" is usually used in the sense of verbal truthfulness. A lie is an intentional statement of an untruth designed to mislead another without consent. It is usually uttered, or acted, with the intention of affecting wrongfully the opinions, emotions, or acts of another. An unintentional misstatement or a slip of the tongue is not a lie, nor are the deceptions in games and performances when these are a part of the rules which are assumed and when we expect to be deceived.

THE VALUE OF TRUTHFULNESS

What is the value of truthfulness? In the first place, to be true to ourselves is "psychical self-preservation." To be dishonest is to destroy a portion of our own personality, and our self-respect is lowered. Trustworthiness is the main element in a man's integrity. The man of integrity is undivided and free from corrupting practices. Professor Hartmann says, "In truthfulness and uprightness there is an element of purity. A lie is a kind of stain . . . it is a deg-

radation of one's own personality, something to be ashamed of. In it there is always a certain breach of trust. And there is also in it an element of cowardice."¹ Deceit is usually an indication of weakness or of selfishness or of some other undesirable attitude. The secrecy and evasion that tend to accompany deceit are detrimental to the development of the finest human qualities.

In the second place, dishonesty is the betrayal of another person. It is the misuse of faith and confidence. The deceived person is injured and led astray. We assume the truthfulness of statements which are made to us unless we have reason for doubting them. The lie or other deception takes advantage of this trust and thus tends to create suspicion.

In the third place, deception tends to undermine social life itself. The present organization of society is based upon mutual confidence. Professor Paulsen illustrates the influence of falsehood by an example of counterfeiting. The counterfeiter injures the person who receives the spurious money and who is unable to pass it; he also brings sound money under suspicion and injures society. Lying does the same thing; it tends to invalidate the truth and to cast doubt and suspicion upon the "intellectual medium of exchange." The man who deceives suspects others of deceit. This distrust tends to break down human fellowship. Hence it is evident that falsehood casts suspicion upon our statements, undermines confidence, and makes any co-operative social life extremely difficult.

Finally, there is a practical value in truthfulness. Since a lie is apt to be discovered, we must be on our guard constantly. If a person tells the truth, there is no problem of remembering what one said. A truthful person recalls again the events as they were, a dishonest person must remember the lies which he previously told, or run the risk of detection. The liar is thus in an embarrassing and difficult position. Since dishonesty as a means of avoiding some present embarrassment so easily becomes a habit or a permanent character trait, and since the habitual liar is almost universally despised and loses status among men, lying tends to shut us off from many of life's richest values.

¹Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethics*, The Macmillan Company, 1932, Vol. II, p. 282.

TRUTHFULNESS AS ABSOLUTE AND AS RELATIVE

Are there exceptions, or is the duty of truthfulness absolute? There are real problems which arise in answer to this question, and we shall want to present views on both sides of the issue.

On one side we find certain rigorists who claim that truthfulness is an absolute obligation, and that no lie is ever justifiable under any circumstances. Dr. R. C. Cabot, who argues for absolute honesty, calls our attention to the fact that "no one wants to be called a liar." But if we permit exceptions to our rule, it is difficult to localize the area which tends to grow.

A single lie spreads. It is difficult to draw the line around it. It spreads in the habits of him who tells it and it spreads in the community as soon as it is openly defended. Self-permitted lying tends to spread beyond the limits allowed. Pious frauds are easier the second time; found convenient here, they are temptingly handy elsewhere. If one lies to the insane, shall one lie to the neurasthenic, to the irritated, to the prejudiced, to the unbalanced? But who is unprejudiced? Who is perfectly balanced? ²

While it may appear easy to defend a certain lie on a special occasion, we are told that it is hard to get a principle which is satisfactory, and that we assume that the persons to whom we lie are either enemies of society or are weaklings. If one falsehood is admitted, justification can be found without difficulty for others.

The best argument for absolute honesty, according to Dr. Cabot, is the one first stated by Augustine, namely that we are put on our guard against a man's attempts to lie, and confidence is impaired. As soon as a man avows his belief that lies may be told even occasionally, we are put on our guard against his attempts to lie under such circumstances. Moreover, if a man admits that a lie may be permitted under some special circumstances, then how many anyone be sure that he is not conscientiously lying when he defines the conditions under which a lie may be justified? That is, we can never be sure just where such a person is going to draw the line.

²R. C. Cabot, *The Meaning of Right and Wrong*, The Macmillan Company, 1933, p. 165.

Mr. Robert E. Speer, in arguing that no lie is ever justifiable, says that those who allow exceptions in their principle of honesty do so from an erroneous standard of value. They consider life the greatest value, when in reality it is not. "Life is not to be held as the one thing for which all else must be sacrificed. Men die for their honor, for their country, why should men not die for the truth? The truth is more than any man's honor."³

On the other hand, probably a considerable majority of present-day moral philosophers agree that in the concrete situations of life men occasionally face the alternative of sacrificing one value or another, and in some cases the selection of the greater value may mean the temporary denial of the obligation of truthfulness. Professor Hartmann states this position most effectively. After pointing out the injury which follows untruthfulness, and making clear that truthfulness never ceases to be a value and deception a moral wrong, he says:

Still we are confronted here with a very serious moral problem, which is by no means solved by the simple rejection of each and every lie. There are situations which place before a man the unescapable alternative either of sinning against truthfulness or against some other equally high, or even some higher, value. A physician violates his professional duty if he tells a patient who is dangerously ill the critical state of his health; the imprisoned soldier who, when questioned by the enemy, allows the truth about his country's tactics to be extorted from him, is guilty of high treason; a friend who does not try to conceal information given to him in strictest personal confidence is guilty of breach of confidence. In all such cases the mere virtue of silence is not adequate. Where suspicions are aroused, mere silence may be extremely eloquent. If the physician, the prisoner, the possessor of confidential information will do their duty of warding off a calamity that threatens, they must resort to a lie. But if they do so, they make themselves guilty on the side of truthfulness.

It is a portentous error to believe that such questions may be solved theoretically. Every attempt of the kind leads to a one-sided and inflexible rigorism concerning one value at the expense of the rest, or to a fruitless casuistry devoid of all significance—not to mention the danger of opportunism. . . . It is the morally mature and seriously minded person who

³R. E. Speer, *The Marks of Man*, Methodist Book Concern, 1907, p. 34.

is here inclined to decide in favour of the other value and to take upon himself the responsibility for the lie. But such situations do not permit of being universalized. . . . For it is inherent in the essence of such moral conflicts that in them value stands against value and that it is not possible to escape from them without being guilty.⁴

Professor Hartmann makes it clear that the problem arises from a conflict due to the structure of the particular situation. To refuse to decide might mean the violation of two values, moral cowardice, or the unwillingness to assume one's responsibility. A man in this situation is not denying the value of truthfulness if he feels that he should select the other value. He is merely choosing the lesser of two evils, or the greater of two values, according to the way we view it.

The morally mature man, when confronted with such situations, will weigh all relevant factors in the situation and will decide according to his best judgment of the relative values involved. In making his decision, he will take upon himself the consequences (and guilt if any) for the violation of what he considers to be, in this case, the lesser value. Out of such a conflict a man may emerge stronger. "Real moral life is not such that one can stand guiltless in it," but "it is only unavoidable guilt which can preserve a man from moral decay."

The position of the liberal, as opposed to that of the absolutist, is that while the virtues and our everyday standards of conduct are good, there are situations where exceptions must be made. In such cases there is a vast difference between recognizing a particular exception to a standard and raising the exception into a new standard. "It is one thing, in morals as well as law, to find 'extenuating circumstances' for variation from a norm. It is quite another thing to deny the norm itself."⁵

Again, virtues, like rights and duties, are instrumental and functional. Certain types of conduct are considered virtues because they are the kinds of action favorable to the welfare of the group. Absolute rules fail to recognize the unique character of some life situa-

⁴Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. II, pp. 283-284.

⁵W. M. Urban, *Fundamentals of Ethics*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1930, p. 49.

tions, and they do not permit the creative adjustment of a person in a changing social order. A type of conduct which is moral in one situation may not be moral in another and different situation.

The teleologist, or liberal, who may allow some exceptions to the duty of truthfulness, challenges the arguments of the absolutist that it is not possible to draw the line, and that it is not possible to state a principle which is satisfactory. He thinks that he has the only satisfactory principle in that it requires him to analyze the conduct situation and to act in the direction which he believes will lead to the greater good. Instead of breaking down human confidence, he believes that men can have greater trust in one another when each is dedicated to serve the greatest good. In his opinion the absolutist makes the mistake of giving an abstract principle a value greater than anything else in life or perhaps than life itself.

THE PROBLEM OF EXCEPTIONS TO TRUTHFULNESS

If exceptions are to be allowed, it is generally agreed that it is when some greater value is at stake, or when some great harm is avoided by means of the exception to one's standard. Among the examples found in the literature on the subject are the following: A theater manager discovering a fire in his theater while a play is in progress, and realizing that a knowledge of the fire would lead to a panic and serious injuries, perhaps even a loss of life, goes before the audience and gives a false reason for stopping the play. As a result the audience leaves calmly and no injury results. Did he do right? Again, a mother has lost a son whom she believes to be pure and noble. His companions know that he was otherwise. Will they add to the sting of her grief by telling her the truth? A mob intent upon lynching a man, whom you know to be innocent but whose hiding place you know, stops you and asks if you know where he is. Will you feel obligated to tell the truth? In cases such as these, few persons will feel remorse if they deviate from the path of truth. Probably many more persons would feel remorse if their insistence upon the truth caused a tragedy which could have been prevented.

Again, there are the deviations from literal truthfulness known as

the "conventional," "white" or polite lies, where no one is seriously misled and where embarrassment and perhaps even the loss of a friend is avoided. Durant Drake quotes two remarks which are worth repeating. "I know only one person whom I could count on not to indulge herself in these conventional falsehoods, and she has never been able, so far as I know, to keep a friend." "To thank a stupid hostess for the pleasure she has not given, is loving one's neighbor as one's self."⁶ If a guest, though still hungry, sees that the food is running short, is it wrong for him to say "No, thank you" when his hostess asks him if he cares for more? When a man returns home sad and bitter after some trying experience, but puts on a cheerful front before his wife and children, is his deceit justifiable? Should you tell the truth to an easily disheartened beginner, if your frank comment upon his work would in all likelihood lead to his discouragement and failure? These are questions which every morally sensitive and mature person must decide for himself. Solutions to such problems cannot be laid down in a set of fixed rules covering all occasions.

THE NATURE OF DECEPTION

As a result of the investigations of the Character Education Inquiry, considerable light has been thrown upon the nature of honesty and dishonesty. Hartshorne and May in *Studies in Deceit* set forth the "doctrine of specificity," which maintains that traits like honesty and dishonesty are achievements like ability in arithmetic and consist in skills and attitudes which have been found to be more or less successful. They are not qualities or unified traits which are either definitely present or entirely lacking. After pointing out that there is no inherent capacity for figures which will enable children to subtract when they have been taught only to add, the authors mentioned above say:

Honest and dishonest acts are specialized in the same way. Even after the principle of honesty is understood, the deceptive aspect of certain acts may not be noticed until one's attention is drawn to them. One may be meticulously honorable in his relations with his neighbors but steal a ride

⁶Drake, *Problems of Conduct*, p. 249.

on the street car without thinking himself a thief. Acts are not accurately labeled because they are not completely analyzed. Consequently, an otherwise entirely honest man may be shocked and insulted when his sharp business practices are called stealing or his purchase of votes, political corruption.

Our conclusion, then, is that an individual's honesty or dishonesty consists of a series of acts and attitudes to which these descriptive terms apply. The consistency with which he is honest or dishonest is a function of the situations in which he is placed in so far as (1) these situations have common elements, (2) he has learned to be honest or dishonest in them, and (3) he has become aware of their honest or dishonest implications or consequences.⁷

Deception is associated with such things as dullness, emotional instability, personal limitations, social and economic handicaps, cultural limitations, frequency of attendance at movies, and parental discord in the home. Thus the amount and the character of deception appear to be largely functions of particular situations. Deception is especially likely to arise where a conflict exists between a person and some element in his environment. Subterfuge is then used to gain the desired end. In such circumstances, a discussion of virtues or merely urging the person to be honest is not likely to be effective.

When deception is found to be the way in which an individual usually adapts himself to a situation, we can be fairly certain, then,

1. that what he wants to get or to do is disapproved and must be concealed; or
2. that when the thing he wants is legitimate, straightforward ways of getting it are either more onerous or less adequate or have never been learned; and
3. that even if deception is disapproved by the group within which the behavior occurs, it is approved by some other group to which the individual belongs in fact or fancy; or
4. that the individual is mentally disordered and must resort to self-deception of some kind to maintain his self-respect—such as the adoption of ingenious excuses, or telling himself that it won't count this time, or finding justification in other ways.⁸

⁷Hartshorne and May, *Studies in Deceit*, Bk. I, p. 380.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 22.

The removal of personal and social handicaps should accompany attempts to reconstruct attitudes and habits.

SELF-DECEIT

Besides the various ways by which men attempt to deceive others, there are ways in which they deceive themselves or blind themselves to the full implications of their acts. Self-deceit differs from simple ignorance in that we know what is right but refuse to face the facts. When we were discussing mental disorders in Chapter Eight, we named a few of these forms of mental processes which are self-deception.

Rationalization is one way in which we may deceive ourselves. It is not rationality or being reasonable. Rationalization is the finding of arguments or excuses for doing what we want to do because of impulse or emotion or self-interest. It is a way to make unreasonable conduct appear reasonable and proper. By means of this device we invent explanations which seem to render plausible a program which we wish to pursue.

Here is a man who faces a piece of work which should be done at once, but he would like to leave early to play golf. He tells himself that he really needs the extra exercise, and that he will be able to do the work better at another time. Here is another man who wants a motor boat. He will not acknowledge that he wishes the fun or that the money is needed to pay the family bills. He argues that his wife and children need the air and sunshine which they will be able to get on the water.

Rationalization also plays its part in group behavior. The members of a lynching mob are unwilling to recognize sadistic tendencies in themselves or to acknowledge that the regular course of the law is more likely to result in justice and social security. They contend that they are protecting all virtuous women and maintaining the moral standards of the race. When nations make war, they are usually able to persuade themselves that they are doing it from noble and pure motives. The people of each nation contend that they desire peace and are innocent, but that some national bully forced them to protect their homes and their ideals.

2. *Projection* is a second means of self-deceit closely related to rationalization. When we cannot get what we want or fail in some task, we blame others. We contend that other persons are the weak or immoral persons that we know we are. Projection is the prevalent habit of shifting responsibility for our deeds to some other person or thing.

Most of us have been familiar with some person who got excited and insulted another person and then went off maintaining that the other person deliberately insulted him and that he was quite innocent. If we gossip and relate scandal, it is because others press us to tell what we know. If we lose the tennis match, it is because the racket needed restringing or our partner was not up to par. The boy who fails in his college courses may blame the college or the teaching, "The professors are no good, and the college is going on the rocks." No mention is made of failure to read assignments, and lack of sleep, and other minor details! Some women who never marry fall back on the statement "All men are unreliable," and some bachelors on the statement, "All women are gold diggers." A willingness to face our own weaknesses and failures, and to accept responsibility for them is one mark of moral maturity.

The readiness to blame others instead of ourselves receives support from the psychological fact that we recognize faults in others more easily than we do in ourselves. David Seabury tells us that he asked a group of husbands to list their wives' queernesses and a group of wives to list their husbands' peculiarities. In this he received splendid co-operation. The same groups, when asked to write down their own queernesses, knew little about them.

3. *Compensation* is a third form of self-deceit. A man who is immoral in some form of personal conduct or unscrupulous in business, instead of eliminating the lapses from acceptable standards, attempts to gain prestige and self-respect by unusual devotion elsewhere. The man who is guilty of sharp dealing may show exceptional devotion to his club or to his family. Criminals are often very sentimental about their mothers.

A few years ago, a professor in another college who was showing me his campus pointed to a new building. "That is a fine build-

ing," he said, "but we wish that the donor would pay the girls who work in his factory sufficient so that they might live decently." A recent study had shown that they were paid such low wages that a number of them were supplementing their wages by immoral living.

There is an old story of a man who went home one evening with a large bunch of roses and was met by his wife at the door with the exclamation, "John, what have you been up to today!" This is a case of attempted compensation that did not work.

4. *Exception making* is a fourth form of self-deception. This may operate in at least two ways. When we attempt to maintain an indefensible or extreme position, and our opponent points out a valid exception we may reply, "This is the exception that proves the rule."

The attempt to ignore a sound refutation of an extreme position by the use of this formula . . . is a fairly common trick and is obviously a dishonest one.⁹

In our conduct we are also likely to minimize the importance of this tendency to the making of exceptions. There is "no harm in it once." "This won't count," we say. William James illustrates this tendency very well:

Where, however, the right conception is an anti-impulsive one, the whole intellectual ingenuity of the man usually goes to work to crowd it out of sight, and to find names for the emergency, by the help of which the dispositions of the moment may sound sanctified, and sloth or passion may reign unchecked. How many excuses does the drunkard find when each new temptation comes! It is a new brand of liquor which the interests of intellectual culture in such matters oblige him to test; moreover it is poured out and it is sin to waste it; or others are drinking and it would be churlishness to refuse; or it is but to enable him to sleep, or just to get through this job of work; or it isn't drinking, it is because he feels so cold; or it is Christmas day; or it is a means of stimulating him to make a more powerful resolution in favor of abstinence than any he has hitherto made; or it is just this once, and once doesn't count, etc., etc., *ad libitum*—it is, in fact, anything you like except *being a drunkard*.¹⁰

⁹R. H. Thouless, *Straight and Crooked Thinking*, Simon and Schuster, 1930, p. 57.

¹⁰William James, *Principles of Psychology*, Henry Holt and Company, Vol. II, p. 565.

Self-deceit is especially dangerous because it grows upon us so rapidly that we are not fully aware of its presence. In fact, we may become quite unconscious of it. It stunts our moral and intellectual growth and leads us toward unreality instead of toward reality. When we cannot satisfy our desires and our life energy is blocked, the only sane thing for us to do is to face the facts and make a rational decision. The boy who fails in college may sit down and analyze the situation. After arriving at some conclusions, he would be wise to submit them to some person whose judgment he trusts. Then he may outline a campaign of attack upon the causes of failure. This may involve changes in his daily schedule or even the choice of a new boarding house. If he finds that the causes of failure cannot be removed, he should face the facts and turn to some activity in which he may be successful. Frankness and honesty in dealing with oneself as well as with others is important for growth and for happiness.

In summary: Truthfulness is a virtue which should be cultivated. It is essential for both personal and social well-being. A few moral philosophers believe that the duty of truthfulness is absolute, admitting no exceptions. Others believe that in the concrete situations of life the virtues occasionally conflict and that in exceptional cases other values must take precedence over truthfulness. In these cases the value of truthfulness is not denied. Right action is action leading to the greatest good in the situation presented. Honesty and dishonesty are not unified traits but are functions of particular situations and often appear together in the same person. Self-deceit is a form of dishonesty harder to recognize but just as important to rectify.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What difficulties confront persons who lie? See "Traps for Liars," R. C. Cabot, *The Meaning of Right and Wrong*, pp. 158ff.
- ✓ 2. A fraternity is sending a delegate, one of its members, to a convention and paying all his expenses, including his carfare. When ready to leave for the convention, the delegate discovers that his uncle happens to be driving to the same city and is glad to take him along free of charge. The delegate keeps the carfare and says nothing. Should he keep the money or return it to the fraternity? Why?

3. A bank president, at Bucyrus, Ohio, alone in his bank when confronted by a pair of bandits, tells them that he has sounded an alarm and that they are in immediate danger of capture. This is contrary to fact. The bandits, however, leave without waiting to rob the bank. Did the bank president do right or wrong, and why? Reported in *The Columbus Citizen*, Oct. 3, 1933.
4. "A candy manufacturer selling candy in small packages uses an 'extension box'—a box with a piece of cardboard under the outer surface extending over the edges nearly half an inch, thus increasing its apparent size and capacity, although the contents is gauged by weight. Can any criticism be directed against this practice?" E. W. Lord, *The Fundamentals of Business Ethics*, p. 184.
5. A publisher, X, tells a friend, Y, that he would like to have a copy of a certain rare book, which he could sell for \$45. Y makes a call on an intimate friend, Z, and sees a copy of this book in the room. Y expresses a mild interest in it. Z intimates at once that he does not care for this book. He never did like it, and says, "Take it along. I am delighted to make you a present of it." Y takes it to X, who sells it for \$45 and gives Y \$20. What would you have done if you had been Y?
6. "We are engaged in the wholesale linoleum business. A short time ago, a customer owing us approximately one thousand dollars suffered a severe fire loss. Although covered amply by insurance, and despite his being a man of considerable means, he took advantage of his accident to request a settlement from all his creditors, on a 75 per cent basis. In order to keep the future patronage of this man, with whom we had been dealing for a long time, we decided to accept the offer. When, however, we received his check, instead of the 75 per cent, he sent us by mistake the full amount owing to us." *Golden Book*, Vol. VIII (Oct. 1928), p. 509.
Should they return the check and call attention to the mistake?

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Chapter XVII

VALUES, RIGHTS, AND DUTIES

IN THIS CHAPTER we shall make the transition from a consideration of problems of personal morality to problems of social morality. The distinction between these fields is to a considerable extent arbitrary and artificial. Most problems, as for example health and marriage, are both personal and social problems. The self is largely a social product, and society is composed of individuals. Life forces us, both as individuals and as groups, to make decisions. Consequently, we are forced to consider the basis of such decisions, or to form some scale of values.

WHAT IS VALUE?

When I ask, which substance is heavier lead or iron, I am dealing with a realm of ascertainable facts in which universally accepted standards are available. A pronouncement here might be called a factual judgment. If, however, I ask which of two pictures is the more beautiful, or where in the United States is the best place to live, I face a question not of fact but of value. Thinking here involves a process of evaluation which is closely related to my desires and interests.

Any definition of value will of necessity be rather unsatisfactory and incomplete at least to many persons. The term "value" is difficult to define since the experience which it describes is essentially personal and immediate. Just as hot or cold, green or red, sweet or sour, need to be experienced if one is really to know them, so a value must also be experienced. A second difficulty in obtaining a satisfactory definition of value is the lack of agreement as to the nature of value itself. Are values objective, that is, do they exist out in the world of nature apart from minds? Or, are values subjective in the sense that they belong wholly to the realm of mind? Or, are values both objective and subjective?

Those who claim that values are objective point out that values exist for all persons and that training tends more and more to bring such judgments toward a common standard. That is, among cultured people the world over, there is a consensus of opinion as to what experiences or things are valuable. This, they believe, is most easily explained on the theory that value belongs to the world of nature. There is something in the object which makes it appealing to us, and our value judgment is in some sense a description of what we find. From this point of view a value may be defined as a quality in objects or situations that calls forth appreciation or preference.

On the other hand, those who claim that values are subjective, or in the mind, point out that value judgments vary from person to person and from age to age. The value which a thing seems to have arises from the satisfaction of some desire and interest. When it ceases to serve desire and interest, it loses its value. This seems to indicate that values exist entirely in the subjective realm. While things may be valuable, they are not values. A value is always an experience of some person. From this point of view value may be defined as the satisfaction of some interest or desire.

Standing between the two views given above is one with which the author is in more complete agreement. Values are objective *and* subjective. They are products of the interaction between two variables, a person and an environmental situation. Value is objective to the extent that there are qualities in objects that call forth our desires. Value is subjective to the extent that it is a personal judgment with a pronounced emotional tone. A judgment is a mental reaction to some situation. We may judge things to be good, or beautiful, or true. A value is a relationship between a person and an environmental situation which evokes an appreciative response.

Moral values are inseparably related to values in general. Frequently, values are divided into types, such as bodily values, economic values, social values, aesthetic values, religious values. While there are values which are primarily economic or aesthetic, etc., any human value may be also a moral value. To the extent that any activity increases or diminishes the worth of human life it takes on moral significance. Values are thus both individual and social.

PRINCIPLES OF SELECTION

While no attempt will be made to set forth any rigid scale of values in the sense of classifying values as higher or lower, or as individual and social, there are certain principles which it is well to keep clearly in mind. First, of two values the greater ought to be selected. Where we are forced to choose between two evils, the lesser evil ought to be chosen. This appears to be self-evident and will need no lengthy discussion.

In the second place, intrinsic values are to be sought in preference to those which are merely extrinsic. An intrinsic value is one which has worth in its own right. It is an end-in-itself. An extrinsic value is one which is a means to some other value. It is of instrumental worth only. Goodness, beauty, and truth would be considered intrinsic values by most persons, whereas money, automobiles, and golf courses, would have extrinsic value mainly.

Again, the productive values are to be sought rather than the unproductive. Some values, such as friendship, increase as they are used. To share these values with others is not to lessen the value for oneself. The more common they are the more productive they are. In this respect, they are in marked contrast to material values which diminish in quantity as they are shared and used.

Finally, the permanent values ought to be chosen rather than the passing values. These permanent values will tend to correspond to the intrinsic and the productive values. Human experience has shown that social, intellectual, aesthetic, and religious values tend to give more lasting satisfaction than do the bodily and economic values. Professor Urban says:

The senses soon weary and cease to respond with pleasure to repeated stimuli, whereas the ideational activities are capable of comparatively long and unwearied exercise. Unless our life becomes filled with ideal content, unless it turns more and more to the values of association and character, and ultimately to the more permanent values of the mind and spirit, it is likely to be made up of long periods of boredom and weariness between the more intense sensuous gratifications.¹

¹Urban, *Fundamentals of Ethics*, p. 172.

VALUES AND RIGHTS

The recognition of a scale of values leads to a recognition of certain human rights. What is a right? A right is a claim to a condition which the individual needs in order to live at his best. If there is something which is indispensable to a good life, that is man's right. We have a right to demand some things, if the absence of these things will impoverish us and if their presence will enrich us, providing it is within the reach and means of society to supply these things. Rights have meaning only within a sphere of social relations. The rights of an individual are not constant; they are relative to time and to place and depend upon current social conditions. The right is not created by law, the law merely recognizes and protects the right. Rights are thus based definitely upon values. From the recognition of a value should follow the recognition of the right to share in that value so far as the means are available. We have this principle clearly illustrated in the case of education. A century ago a free education was not claimed as a right. The recognition of the value of education, however, led people to see that if it was valuable, then every child had a right to it. In other words, the value itself created the right. Today we are interested in knowing if there are other values where the corresponding right has not yet been recognized or accepted by society. To say that life is a value, or that a person has a right to live, is to admit that he has a right to those things which he needs in order to live.

In recent political discussions, as well as in most of our industrial disputes, we have heard much about "rights." The employer has been talking about the rights of business. These have been the conditions which he felt were valuable from the point of view of his success in business. The laborer has been talking about the rights of labor. These rights were the conditions which he felt were necessary for a wholesome life. Other groups have voiced their claims with equal vigor. When the discussions have been more specific, we have heard about the right of private property, the right of contract, the right to work, the right to organize, etc. Are there any rights today which society should recognize, and if so, what are they?

INADEQUACY OF THE THEORY OF NATURAL RIGHTS

For thousands of years men have appealed to certain rights which they felt were theirs in a very real way. These rights, they felt, were based upon nature. The doctrine of "natural rights" goes back at least to the great thinkers of ancient Greece. To trace the origin and the development of this doctrine would carry us too far afield. During the great struggles of the eighteenth century, however, it played an important part. The thirteen original states, in the Declaration of Independence, based their claim to independence on "certain unalienable rights," among which were "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." While neither the Articles of Confederation, nor the Constitution of the United States as originally ratified, contained a list of rights, there were those who desired such a declaration. The first ten amendments to the constitution, added in 1789, were regarded by Jefferson and others as a substitute for such a declaration. Many of the states, however, which drew up constitutions after 1776 inserted a declaration or a bill of rights.

Today it is pretty generally recognized that rights cannot be based upon a natural order. Change, rather than permanence, is characteristic of our modern age of science. The natural order of the pioneers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is not the natural order of the modern urban community. Conditions of life are so different that modern men find it hard to understand the doctrine of "natural rights," especially when the approach is used today to defend a kind of property and social arrangements which are totally different from those which existed during the eighteenth century. In the eighteenth century individuals were thought to possess certain rights by the law of nature, and the theory was a part of the doctrine of individualism. The rights were considered to be inalienable, so that the individual could not surrender them, nor could society take them away. The doctrine was in part an attempt on the part of a growing and prosperous middle class to give metaphysical support to conditions which they found to be beneficial to themselves.

Leaders, at least in the field of the social sciences, are agreed that the test of any program or institution must be its social desirability.

Appeals directed to natural rights or principles, real or fancied, developed in the past are no longer adequate. Not some supposed natural right but present value for human life is the test which must be applied. There must be evidence that the claim will add to the total realization of life. Any theory of rights must be in harmony with this principle.

HUMAN RIGHTS

If one examines the claims advanced in the struggles of the past, certain values, and hence certain rights, are found to be considered fundamental. If one examines the political and economic discussions which have grown out of recent legislation and out of industrial disputes, as well as the pronouncements of conferences and groups, such as the White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, certain further rights are also found. If one talks to his neighbor or to the man in the street, he finds that man expressing the things to which he believes he has a right because of their value to him. Putting together all these facts and demands, one arrives at the conclusion that there are today certain fundamental rights to which men may lay claim. These rights are the claims made by the individual upon the state or the social group of which he is a part. They are not "natural rights" in the sense that they are fixed and metaphysically grounded in nature. They are "human rights" which are instrumental and functional. They are the conditions of life without which a person cannot live at his best.²

For those persons who accept the view of the state as totalitarian, rights tend to disappear entirely. From this "statist" point of view the formula, "society for individuals," must be revised to read "individuals for society." In this case, the state has rights and individuals have only duties, or at least only those rights which the state wishes to grant to its citizens. For those who reject the above approach, as does the author, the state is not an end-in-itself; it is a means for the promotion of justice and social welfare. Institutions are good or evil in proportion as they promote or fail to promote these conditions. Human rights grow out of the mutuality of individual and social

²A portion of this and of the two following sections are taken from the author's article, "Human Rights," *Social Science*, April, 1933.

relations, and express a position which is neither extreme individualism nor extreme statism.

THE RIGHTS OF MAN

The number of rights which have been chosen and the form in which they are expressed are somewhat arbitrary. Any list of human rights will need to be restated from time to time as conditions of life change. The following ten rights, however, are among the most basic for today, and they are coming to be so recognized by society. They appear to be necessary conditions for self-realization. The fact that they are relative and functional makes it difficult to state their exact nature and scope, apart from the specific conditions in which they are to function. If pressed to an extreme, some of these rights may seem to overlap, or to conflict with other rights, as for example, the right to freedom and the right to security. It will be part of the task of each age to determine the point at which one right must yield to another. The human rights may be tentatively stated thus:

1. *The right to health.* Health is so important that without it life may be hardly worth living. A recognition of the right to health would mean that society would see that every child that needed medical care received such care. Since the importance of health was discussed in an earlier chapter, we shall omit further discussion here.

2. *The right to education.* This right is now recognized by society. Every child has the right to an education regardless of the ability of its parents to pay for such services. Education and knowledge appear to be almost indispensable to the realization of other rights. Knowledge is essential for self-preservation as well as for creative achievement. Young people face a world of bewildering complexities. Such conditions call for a wide range of knowledge if they are to meet its changing problems with resourcefulness and vision.

3. *The right to freedom.* The advantages of education and of democracy mean little, if freedom of expression, such as freedom of opinion, of speech, and of the press, is denied. Since the problems of freedom were discussed in an earlier chapter, we shall omit a further elaboration of this right.

4. *The right to work and to receive a living wage.* Emphasis upon this right was not so necessary in an agricultural civilization, but with the development of a complex, industrial civilization, access to the means of livelihood is often beyond the control of the individual. Since the forces are social, society must assume a responsibility and recognize the human right to a means of livelihood. Since, under ordinary conditions, man can live only by means of work, to refuse him work is to deprive him of the opportunity to develop his personality. When work cannot be provided, it would appear that society is obligated to share with him the goods and services produced. In the numerous forms of "relief" and in the principle of unemployment insurance, society is coming to recognize the right to work.

The mere right to work does not meet the needs of civilized society; we must include the right to work at a wage sufficient for health and decency. Every man needs food, clothing, and shelter as a bare minimum for subsistence. Unless his personality is to be stunted, he needs a wide range of things which lift life above the level of the merely organic. Increasingly, men are beginning to question the right of a few to a superfluity before others have even a bare sufficiency.

5. *The right to security.* This includes not only protection for life and property, but also security against unemployment, old age, sickness, and accident. Insecurity today affects the officials of industrial corporations, professional groups, and small business men, as well as wage earners. During the years of the depression, unemployment in the United States has probably not fallen below 10,000,000. Persons have been losing their lifetime savings, including titles to their homes, at an alarming rate. Fear of the future has become one of the dominant fears. Since the age limit set by many private industries for hiring new employees is 45 or even 35, many older workers find it impossible to secure positions. A feeling of insecurity is exceedingly destructive of human happiness.

Perhaps the most tragic results of insecurity are found in the lives of the children of the unemployed. Of approximately 8,000,000 children on public relief, there are many "who have never known a time when their fathers had a steady job, and who, until federal relief

provided the family with a weak cohesive agent, have known nothing but the threat of being scattered" and their lives "are lost beyond full restoration to their physical and social fulfillment. Their childhood is already destroyed and their future dark and uncertain."³

6. *The right to love and a home.* Love is here interpreted as sufficiently broad to include friends and companions. Because of the importance of intimate social contacts and of a normal home life in the development of personality, each person has a right to the conditions which make the establishment of a family and a home at least possible. Care for the child during the long period of infancy is best provided by the family and home.

7. *The right to play and to leisure.* Under a machine system of production, the development of personality for large numbers must come in the hours of leisure. If the labor has any element of drudgery, probably a seven- or eight-hour day is the maximum which a man may work and still expect to understand and to enjoy the complex life about him. Technical advance is making possible a large degree of leisure for all.

8. *The right to a share in the control of the conditions of life.* This right includes the privilege of assisting in choosing the persons by whom one is to be governed, or of being chosen as a leader if he can persuade others so to designate him. This right to share in the control of the conditions of life has been accepted in principle so far as our political thinking is concerned. Today, however, men's lives are controlled more completely by the industrial conditions under which they live, and in this field industrial autocracy is the rule. Ownership of the means of gaining a living may become a dictatorship over the lives of the masses. The power to hire and fire, to evict, to give or withhold credit, to produce goods or not to produce, may mean the power to give or to take away life. The right to a share in the control of the economic order may be as valid a claim as the right to share in the control of the political order.

9. *The right to share in the cultural and spiritual heritage of the race, including art, literature, and religion.* If rights are based upon values, then this claim appears to be valid. Man has aspirations

³Report to the President, of the Committee on Economic Security, p. 35.

toward the good, the beautiful, and the true. Unless he can fulfill and express these functions, he falls short of self-realization and lasting happiness. The values expressed in goodness, beauty, and truth are creations of the race and belong to all individuals and classes. They belong to humanity and if they are shared all men will be the richer.

10. *The right to be well-born.* If a child is to be brought into the world, he has a right to a sound hereditary background and to conditions which will make the development of a wholesome personality at least possible. The child, it would appear, has a right to be wanted. If this is so, then parents have a right to such information as will enable them to have children when they want them and when they are able to care for them properly. The attempt on the part of society to keep parents ignorant regarding methods of birth control has probably no adequate justification.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

Taking the above list of rights as tentative objectives, let us consider certain phases of the present social order to see whether these human rights are being emphasized.

Are human values or rights placed first in the industrial order? Or are we subordinating life to the means of livelihood? Is it not a notorious fact that human values and human welfare are often forgotten? The theory of *laissez faire*, the philosophy of rugged individualism, underlying our modern social order, takes it for granted that the business man must be free to make all the money he can and that he is free to use it for his own ends or interests. Any interference with what he regards as his right to make money as he sees fit is usually resented. The service rendered is unfortunately often incidental to the money accumulated.

While it will not be possible to discuss each of the ten rights in relation to each of the realms of society, it may help us to decide whether human values and rights are given first consideration in the modern industrial order if we take into account certain facts. If a man turns out cows or mules on the highway, with no provision for their welfare, society does not remain silent. Yet thousands of

men may be turned out with no means of livelihood in sight and the industrial leader apparently has little or no social responsibility. The rights of health, work, security, etc., may be ignored in such cases. Again, consider the extreme indifference to the spectacle of great luxury and great poverty existing side by side. Is it not unfortunate that while millions are unable to find work, some who have jobs are working excessively long hours? Up until a few years ago some were working twelve hours a day.⁴ If we took seriously the right to work and the right to leisure, an adjustment would be made. In later chapters, we shall consider certain moral problems in business.

When our political institutions are brought before the bar of human values, where do they stand? Certain theories, like the legal doctrine of sovereignty, useful in earlier struggles or under different conditions, have interfered with the positive protection of human rights. The present need is for a recognition of the functional and instrumental character of both law and government. Neither of them is an end-in-itself. The idea of government as an instrument of social welfare will have to be substituted for the conception of government as an embodiment of power. Justice, rather than unlimited power, is coming to be the end of the state.

The government has made progress in respect to some specific rights, but has woefully neglected others. In the fields of education and health an admirable beginning has been made, in spite of much illiteracy and ill health. The right to work; to receive a living wage, to security, and to leisure have never been given sufficient attention. Since about 1933, however, these rights have been widely discussed and have received some support through legislative enactments. Persons who, through no fault of their own, cannot work or find work must be cared for. Recent discussion and legislation regarding social insurance of various types, minimum-wage legislation, a shorter working week with fewer hours of work a day, and general security measures, indicate the trend of our thinking in the direction of a growing recognition of certain human rights.

⁴In numerous textile factories, just before the National Industrial Recovery Act, the eleven-hour day, and the twelve-hour night were in effect. See E. E. Cummins, *The Labor Problem in the United States*, 2nd ed., D. Van Nostrand Company, 1935, p. 52.

The controversy, a few years ago, centering around the rejection by the United States Senate of a President's nominee for the United States Supreme Court, has brought to the fore the importance of the political and social philosophies of our legislators and judges. It was stated on the floor of the Senate, as well as emphasized by certain groups taking part in the controversy, that the country needed a man who would stand for human rights as over against property rights. We are sometimes told that we are governed by laws and not by men, but the numerous five-four decisions by the Supreme Court would seem to disprove that claim. Child-labor legislation and minimum-wage legislation have been declared null and void on the strength of a clause in the constitution guaranteeing freedom of contract. These laws might have been declared legal on the strength of the clause giving the federal government power to pass laws in the interest of the general welfare.

In later chapters we shall have additional opportunity to consider certain social problems in their relation to human rights. War, racial hatred, poverty, unemployment, and crime are among the major enemies of human values. All of them could probably be eliminated, or at least reduced, if society used the knowledge and the means which are available. We might even be able to face the problem of population if certain leaders did not want a reserve labor force and some idle men. Most of our problems are tied up together and must be faced jointly. However, an emphasis on human rights might enable us to face them more frankly.

As a nation we have been eager to progress. We have not always been greatly concerned about the direction in which we were going. We have sought more and more money and more and more power, but we have not seriously inquired concerning the objects for which money and power should be used. We may have thought at times that these were good in themselves. Today we are beginning to realize that they have only instrumental value. We cannot move ahead intelligently until we have some clear, even though tentative, objectives. Clarity as to the ends which are desirable may be conducive to efficiency in the selection of means. It is even more important to reach correct conclusions about what we want, than to

reach correct conclusions about what to do in order to attain what we want, though the latter is exceedingly important. If we gain a clear idea of human values and the rights which are based upon them, and set them before us as our goals, we may be more willing to take the definite steps which will make their achievement possible.

DUTIES

Any discussion of values and rights would be incomplete without a consideration of duties. The recognition of a value implies an obligation to seek it. Duty is coextensive with the realm of values, and rights and duties are correlative. When new rights come into being, they also bring with them corresponding duties. A list of duties would be merely a list of rights in another form. For example, if we have the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, then we have the corresponding duty to respect the lives of others, to refrain from restricting their liberty and from placing obstacles in the way of their attainment of happiness. If there is the right to work and to receive a living wage, men have the duty of working and of giving a fair day's work for that living wage. The right to security implies the duty of assisting in the defense of the group. The right to be well-born implies corresponding duties on the part of parents and of society toward future generations.

Duties, like human rights, are relative and functional. If I have a right, then other persons or groups have corresponding duties. Again, if I have a right, then I also have the duty to respect the claim to that right on the part of others. When conflicts between rights, or between duties, or even between rights and duties arise, such conflicts must be decided on the basis of the greater value involved. Both rights and duties are made for life and must serve life. They arise from the nature of the relations of persons to one another under a particular set of conditions. The values involved, the needs of the person, and the circumstances must all be taken into consideration.

In a well-balanced society the rights and duties which are recognized and respected will be fairly evenly distributed among the groups and classes of society. A society in which one class claims

most of the rights and another class is assigned most of the duties is in an unstable condition. The class deprived of fundamental human rights is likely to be restless and so become a source of strife.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Read the Constitution of the United States and its amendments, and list the rights which are guaranteed. How well are these constitutional rights recognized and followed?
2. How do you explain the fact that the fifteenth amendment, which sought political equality for the Negro, has never been applied, either by the executive branch of the government or by the courts?
3. A Chicago surgeon, contrary to accepted medical practice, refused to operate to save the life of a baby boy a few days old. He explained that the baby was extremely defective and that he believed it would remain so throughout life. Without an operation the infant would die, but its life would be prolonged or saved if an operation were performed. With the consent of the parents, nature was allowed to take her course and the infant died. Comment on this case and the issues involved. For a further discussion of this case see W. M. Urban, *Fundamentals of Ethics*, pp. 41-49.
4. To what extent should ties of kinship, affection, and friendship affect our moral judgments? For example, in the case of the man who discovers his child playing upon the railway tracks in front of an oncoming train, and sees that the switch has been left open, shall he save his child or prevent a wreck, if he has time to do only one thing? F. C. Sharp, *Ethics*, p. 44.
5. In our moral judgments, should our decisions depend upon the character or personal qualities of the person with whom we are dealing? That is, do we have obligations and responsibilities to an honorable or to an intelligent man that we would not have to a criminal or to an uncultured person? In this connection see Sharp's *Ethics*, pp. 45ff.
6. To what extent are "moral values" and "material values" dependent upon each other? During the serious depression of the early thirties, it was sometimes said that without moral values there could be no material values. The population, resources, and potential wealth had not decreased, yet material values were debased by a moral debauch of greed and a confusion of moral values. To what extent is character a basis of wealth?

7. Go over the ten rights listed in this chapter and indicate by specific instances whether you think these rights are or are not coming to be increasingly recognized and respected.
8. What is the relation between rights and laws? Should rights follow laws, or should laws follow rights?
9. Do those who are aided by society owe anything to society in return? See "Responsibility Under Relief" by James Truslow Adams, *Reader's Digest*, Vol. XXVII (Nov., 1935), pp. 77-78.
10. Dr. Charles M. Sheldon of Topeka, Kansas, in an article in the *Christian Century* a few years ago entitled "The Ethics of Some Publishers," called attention to the fact that because of a slight defect in the copyright, his book, *In His Steps*, had been published without his consent, and over 20,000,000 copies sold with no compensation. Since that time a moving picture has been made of it, still without the permission of the author or any compensation to him. Dr. Sheldon feels that the action of both the publisher and the motion picture company is unethical and immoral and suggests that there are some "moral" rights that are greater than "legal" rights. Discuss this suggestion. *The Christian Century*, Vol. L (Sept. 29, 1933), Part II, pp. 1206-1208 and Vol. LIII (Jan. 15, 1935), p. 84.

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Part Five

PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL MORALITY

Chapter XVIII

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

SINCE 1890 more than two hundred business and professional groups in the United States have adopted codes of ethics.¹ This is clear evidence of an awakening ethical consciousness on the part of these groups. To be sure, some of these codes are more or less perfunctory and are not taken seriously by the entire membership of the profession. Nevertheless, the fact that they are formulated means that they exert a pressure in the direction of higher standards. A growing alertness in distinguishing between what is merely temporarily advantageous and what is morally right or wrong can also be noticed. In this chapter we are concerned with professional ethics, reserving our discussion of business ethics until later. In the field of professional activities, ethical codes have been guiding forces for a considerable number of years. This is especially true of the medical and legal professions which have set up definite standards to which the individual members of the group must conform or lose their professional standing.

WHAT IS A PROFESSION?

A profession consists of a limited group of persons who have acquired some special skill and are therefore able to perform that function in society better than the average person.² Or, we may say that a profession is a calling in which its members profess to have acquired special knowledge, by training or by experience or by both, so that they may guide or advise or serve others in that special field.

Included in the general idea of a profession are, first, special prep-

¹Some two hundred of these codes may be found in Edgar L. Heermance, *Codes of Ethics, A Handbook*, Free Press Publishing Company, 1924. More recent codes may be obtained from the various trade and professional associations.

²In this and in other definitions in this chapter, I have been influenced by those given by Professor Carl F. Taeusch in *Professional and Business Ethics*.

aration or training. This preparation would include an accurate knowledge of the fundamental facts upon which his professional actions are based, also the ability to apply this knowledge in a practical way. The doctor, for example, is expected to know the scientific principles underlying the practice of medicine, but also to have skill in recognizing the symptoms of specific diseases and in administering proper treatment. The nature and the length of the period of preparation varies according to the needs of the different professions. In the medical and legal professions it is fairly definitely defined. In the ministry and in teaching the preparation demanded varies according to the views and standards of the employing agency and the position to be filled, although there is a tendency toward greater standardization.

A second characteristic is a clearly defined and comparatively permanent membership. All professional groups attempt to keep out the amateur as well as the "quack" or the "shyster." There are always persons who wish to perform the functions and to gain the dignity and the rewards without the necessary preparation or the willingness to assume the responsibilities of the calling. If the line of demarcation between the amateur and the member of the profession is not kept clear, the standards of the profession are seriously menaced. In recognition of this, most civilized countries and the individual states of the United States of America require members of most professions to obtain a certificate or a license in order to practice.

In the third place, the acceptance of the service motive as distinct from the money-making motive is characteristic of the professions as a whole. The purpose of the professions is not to make money, but to promote health, or knowledge, or good laws. The profession, however, is a means of livelihood, and the professional man needs and is justified in demanding compensation which will permit him to maintain a comfortable living, to dress well, and to purchase such books, magazines, and equipment as will enable him to perform his work well and to contribute to community enterprises. Without these success will be difficult. Without a reasonable expectation of such a standard of living it would also be difficult to attract the right

type of person to the profession. The ideal of the professions, however, is public service and not monetary gain.

The code of the engineer states that his first duty is to the public and that this duty is paramount to all other obligations. His duty to the public comes even before his duty to the company that employs him. The doctor's code makes it clear that no physician can retain his professional standing and use for his personal economic advantage any discovery which will alleviate pain or cure disease. A distinguishing feature of a professional man is "the priority of rendering service to the assurance of fees and charges." The quality of the service is not dependent upon the amount of remuneration received.

A number of years ago Professor Banting, at the University of Toronto, discovered insulin for the treatment of diabetes. By keeping the treatment a secret and by catering to wealthy patients, he might have built a great fortune. Instead, however, the discovery was made available to medical men the world over. More recently the papers have announced the development of an artificial "heart-pacer" for reviving persons whose hearts have stopped under certain conditions. Mr. Jacob Witkin, endower of the foundation which developed the heart-pacer, has announced that it will be put on the market on a non-profit basis and distributed free to hospitals. Many such examples, which illustrate the service motive as distinct from the money-making motive, may be found within the professions.

PROFESSIONAL CODES ARE NECESSARY

Why are professional codes of ethics necessary? First, because codes of ethics are important means of social control. They define professional conduct for the new member and help to keep the old member in line. The complexities and the specializations of modern society make it difficult often to decide whether or not a member of a profession has performed his duty. When interests conflict, such as between two members of a profession, or between the member and the public, which one is paramount?

Every profession has its own peculiar problems of conduct. The medical man finds himself in situations where his only appeal is to

his own conscience. A statement representing the best judgment of his profession may be a great aid. Should the teacher tutor his pupils for pay? In the light of the experience of the past his professional code defines the situation for him. The dignity or the standing of the profession is dependent upon the confidence which the public has in it.

Second, professional ethical codes are necessary to prevent control or interference by the government or by society through some one of its agencies. If a degree of standardization is desirable, who is to determine the bounds of good behavior? Should the law attempt to regulate in detail the behavior of doctors in dealing with patients or with other doctors? Should it regulate the relationship between the lawyer and his client, the teacher and his pupil, or between the engineer and his employer and the public? While such regulation is conceivable, it would seem to be highly undesirable. Law tends to be negative, while ethics points to the goal desired. While law is the most conspicuous means of social control, it should be used only where other methods of safeguarding personal and social rights are not operative. There are certain areas of human behavior where the law is not a satisfactory instrument of social control, where the ordinary principles of morality do not seem to apply, and yet where some standards and agreements are necessary. Professional men have preferred to organize and to establish standards within the group. These codes are needed for the protection of the group itself, as well as for the protection of the public. Some of the problems which are within the province of the ethical code are the relations between the professional man and his patient, client, pupil, employer, etc., and the duties of the members of the profession to the general public. Such questions are most adequately decided by the best judgment of members of the profession itself. Groups which maintain high standards are seldom interfered with by the government, which takes on regulative functions only where they seem to be necessary.

Third, ethical codes are important in developing higher standards of conduct. They are based upon what is considered to be the correct attitude and method of procedure. These understandings are

more easily and effectually carried out by the members concerned if they are definitely stated in mutually satisfactory codes. They crystallize what is usually the best opinion and judgment of the profession and thus they tend to eliminate misunderstanding and conflicts. They enable the group to bring pressure to bear upon those who would lower the standing of the group or cast reflection upon its good name.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL

Professional ideals vary greatly from group to group. Some of them are open to criticism from the point of view of the larger ethical claims. In considering particular codes, we need to ask such questions as these: Does the code attempt merely to protect certain selfish interests, to advance the profession from a monetary point of view, or is it concerned with the service which it may render to society? Professional societies have gone through and are now going through various stages of liberation from selfishness to a spirit of broad-minded public service. Mr. Robert D. Kohn, Fellow of the American Institute of Architects, has set forth five stages of development which will illustrate the general tendency.

The first stage of organization was to protect the members against unfair competition and to improve the profession in public consideration. Then followed the stage in which the relationships between members of the same profession were considered as most important; certain courtesies were to be extended from one member of the profession to another. Then they were bound together to prevent outsiders from interfering or to protect the profession against unjust laws. Next followed the movement to improve admission to practice; educational qualifications were established, and the schools were looked after. Finally, there was attained the stage in which permanent importance is given to the relationship of the profession to the service which it may be expected to render—that is to say, the stage where public needs are placed paramount to professional rights or even desires.³

Ethical codes also vary greatly in another respect. Some codes are general statements of purposes and ideals leaving the details to the

³R. D. Kohn, "The Significance of the Professional Ideal," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. CI (May, 1922), p. 4.

judgment of the individual member. Rotary International, the organization which has done most in promoting the development of professional and business ethical codes, believes that this is one of the main deficiencies in many present codes. Other codes contain definite sets of rules of conduct, so that less is left to the judgment of the individual member.

MORALS, LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

What is the relation between morals, law, and professional ethics? The term "morals" is the broadest term and includes any form of voluntary human activity where the judgment of approval and disapproval, or of right and wrong, may enter. Morality covers the extensive field of personal and social behavior. It includes many acts which are not of sufficient public concern, or not sufficiently amenable to social control, to come within the sphere of the law.

The law, on the other hand, is a command of the state, usually set forth in some statutory provision, which applies to all individuals in a specific territory, and which usually calls for some penalty for disobedience. Morals are basic, and laws tend to follow the moral ideals of the community and to change with the development of the moral consciousness. Since, however, obedience to the law is usually considered a part of moral behavior, all laws may be included in the moral realm.

Professional ethics, as distinct from morals and from law, gives attention to certain additional ideals and practices which grow out of a man's professional privileges and responsibilities. Professional ethics applies to certain functional groups and is the expression of the attempt to define situations which otherwise would remain indefinite or uncertain. The ethical codes are the result of the attempt to direct the moral consciousness of the members of the profession to its peculiar problems. They crystallize moral opinion and define behavior in these very specialized fields.

The fields of morals, law, and professional ethics are fairly distinct, yet they overlap in many ways. There are some acts which fall within one field only. Lying is considered immoral, although neither the law nor professional ethics takes cognizance of

the ordinary lie. Parking one's car longer than the specified time may be illegal only, for there are many laws which deal with issues not considered to involve the fields of morals and professional ethics, except insofar as the breaking of any law may be considered immoral. Advertising oneself is considered unprofessional, although it could hardly be classed as either immoral or illegal.

Some types of conduct concern all three fields. For example, misappropriation of a client's funds by a lawyer would be immoral, unprofessional, and also illegal. Again certain acts fall within two of the fields only. To steal under ordinary conditions would be immoral and illegal, but would be conduct with which the professional code does not concern itself. Professional neglect of a client, patient, or pupil would be immoral and unprofessional, but unless exceedingly grave the law would not concern itself with such a situation. Contempt of court would be both illegal and unprofessional for the lawyer, but probably not immoral. Thus we see that, while there is a clear-cut distinction between the fields of morals, law, and professional ethics, many acts fall into two or even all three of these fields.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN A PROFESSION AND A BUSINESS

Whereas in business the definite aim is the financial return which it offers to its owners or to its shareholders, the professional ideal includes an acceptance of the "service" motive. When a physician is consulted, his first consideration is not what he is going to get, but how he can help the person. When a business man is approached, the question which arises is how much he is going to make on this deal, and only secondarily, if at all, arises the question of how it will serve human welfare. This is perhaps in part due to the nature of the two types of occupation. In business one is likely to be dealing with commodities that are more tangible and definite. Such commodities are more often subject, quantitatively, to bargain and contract. Thus a certain number of commodities may be offered for a specific amount of money. In the professions the services are usually more qualitative. The doctor, the teacher, or the minister is unable to stipulate the exact amount of service he will be able to render for a definite sum of money. Even though he does not always live up to

the ideal, the professional man is expected to render his best service quite apart from the amount of reward whether it is much, or little, or even nothing. The public expects a social outlook and a type of service not demanded of the business man. Some business men are adopting the professional idea. The rise of codes of ethics in business may stimulate this tendency. At the present time, however, it is probably fair to say that the criterion of business is the financial return which it brings, while the ideal of a profession is that men, expecting to gain a living from it, nevertheless find their success measured in terms of the service they perform.

While the concept "commercialism" generally stands as the antithesis of professionalism, the professions have by no means remained true to their ideal. Some professional men are undoubtedly motivated by the desire for monetary gain, and today certain professions are in danger of losing the true professional ideal. At the Inter-Professional Conference one committee reported as follows:

The object of the Inter-Professional Conference is to discover how to liberate the professions from the domination of selfish interest, both within and without the professions, to devise ways and means of better utilizing the professional heritage of knowledge and skill for the benefit of society, and to create relations between the professions looking toward that end.⁴

REMUNERATION FOR SERVICES

While the professional man is usually dependent upon fees or a salary in order to live, such considerations, ideally at least, are not uppermost in his mind. The quality of the service should not be dependent on the fee which is expected. The extent to which the quality of the service depends upon the remuneration expected varies from profession to profession and from individual to individual. The principles upon which charges are based also vary in the different professions. In a few professions, like teaching and the ministry, there is a regular salary which is agreed upon before the work begins. There may be fees which have become more or less standardized, as in the case of the regular family physician. In other cases,

⁴C. H. Whitaker, "The Interrelations of the Professions," *The Annals*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

the professional man may consider his own standing or prestige and the financial standing of the patient or client and adjust his fee accordingly. This is a fairly common practice in the case of medical fees, especially for specialists and surgeons, and in the case of fees for legal talent. In still other cases fees may be figured as a percentage of the cost of the work, as in the case of some architects, or on the basis of the time required as in the case of many accountants.

The fees which professional men charge, and the form which they take, are largely traditional. Even where there are no published lists of fees, charges may be determined by custom, and the man who attempts to undercut the rate brings upon himself the disapproval of his professional colleagues. Where the individual or the firm has gained considerable reputation for some special skill or where the service is highly personal, fees and charges much above the average are likely to be found. Much dissatisfaction arises when fees are excessive and when the basis of calculation is not known by the person who pays the fees. The most satisfactory principle is probably that in which a knowledge of charges is available beforehand and where charges are based upon the time and skill required for the work. The principle of "service as received" is that in which the professional man bases his charge upon the real or supposed benefit of the service to the recipient. In this case the patient's or client's ability to pay is the chief determining factor. Such a practice may lead to serious abuses. Whether good fortune, or natural processes, or skill led to success cannot always be determined. This procedure gives the unreasonable or selfish man too much power over his fellows. The principle of "service as rendered" is found where the professional man bases his charges upon the time and energy and skill which he finds it necessary to give. His training and overhead expense may be taken into account in such charges. On the whole, the latter principle appears to be more reasonable and to lead to fewer abuses.

THE EXTENSION OF THE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL

Is the professional ideal a "way out" for society? During recent years we have witnessed the growth of the professional ideal and a

multiplication of professions. Will society continue to develop in this direction until all of the major functions in modern society are professionalized, or is this merely a minor back eddy in a civilization which will continue to be dominated by a drive for material gain? Is it possible for us to increase the number and the extent of the activities which are motivated by the true professional ideal?

Material incentives have their place, and the enjoyment of material satisfactions will undoubtedly continue to be a spur to greater activity. Material incentive must have as its purpose, however, social well-being rather than acquisitiveness or accumulation. If most persons appear today to be dominated by the money-getting drive, that is no reason to believe that it is inborn or that it must be so. The explanation may be merely that our business civilization has held before men the principle of getting as much as possible and giving as little as possible in return. During the World War, by subordinating the money-getting motive, we took one third of our workers and put them in the army or set them to work producing war materials, and yet the remainder enormously increased the supplies of the necessities of life.

Men may be motivated by things other than the desire for personal profit or material gain. Public approval, recognition, group loyalty, the creative impulse, the desire for power, and rivalry are all powerful motives. With the development of an increasingly complex and interrelated social order, we shall need to stress motives that are social.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Make lists of acts, or types of behavior, and show their relation to the classifications: morals, law, and professional ethics. Indicate whether these acts are: (1) included in all three, (2) outside of all three, (3) included in only one, or (4) included in only two of the classifications. If you have difficulty, consult the diagram and discussion in Taeusch's *Professional and Business Ethics*, pp. 79ff.
- ✓2. During the recent years important discoveries, including such things as insulin for the relief of diabetes, an artificial "heart-pacer" for reviving persons, new methods of producing vitamin D and impregnating food with it, have been made, and the discovery or knowledge in each case was made available to society with no attempt to use it as

a means of creating a fortune. One man is reported to have said when he was offered two million dollars for the exclusive right to exploit the discovery, that he did not wish to pervert his life work by commercializing his greatest achievement. Do you think that these men did right? If so, should persons who do otherwise be condemned? Does the type of discovery or invention make any difference?

3. Is there any justification for the practice of overcharging the rich and undercharging the poor by some professional men? On what basis may it be justified? What are its dangers?
4. Are there any reasons why a surgeon or a lawyer should "charge what the traffic will bear" and the teacher or the social worker be paid a fixed amount regardless of the service rendered? If so, what are they?

SUGGESTED READINGS

GENERAL

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ETHICS OF SPECIAL GROUPS

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Chapter XIX

MEDICAL AND LEGAL ETHICS

MEDICAL ETHICS

THE MEDICAL profession is one which directly or indirectly is tied up with the interests and welfare of the entire people. While admission to the profession is by state license, the medical societies share in maintaining standards and in keeping unworthy persons from entering the ranks. Closest to the individual physician is the county medical society. The county societies form the local divisions of the state medical societies, and these in turn form the national society, the American Medical Association (A. M. A.). About three fifths of the physicians in the United States are active members of the A. M. A., through its subdivisions.

When the A. M. A. was organized in 1848, it adopted a code of ethics. With slight alterations this was the code written by Dr. Thomas Percival and published in England about 1803. Percival had written it chiefly as a set of instructions for his son who was about to enter the profession. This code, however, embodied ideas which had been in the process of formulation for thousands of years. The laws of Hammurabi, the oldest surviving code of laws (2100 B.C.), deal with fees to be given a physician, and with the punishment where injury is done. The famous "Oath" of Hippocrates (B.C. 460-359?) also set forth the duty of the medical man. Since the code was adopted in 1848, the chief changes have been made in 1903 and in 1912.

While some communities, especially in earlier times, have attempted to regulate the profession by special statutes, the complexity of the problem, coupled with a willingness on the part of doctors to regulate themselves, have made detailed statutory regulation unnecessary. Society, as a whole, therefore, has not attempted to regulate the details of medical practice by law. It has satisfied itself by pre-

scribing certain minimum standards of training and by specifying that the candidate for license "shall be of good moral character." Within the profession, however, it has been found that certain conflicts of interest and other moral issues occur again and again. Consequently, principles of procedure or codes of conduct have arisen. The interests of the individual physician, the interests of his fellow practitioners, and the larger interests of humanity are to be considered and adjusted. No distinction is drawn, however, between certain matters of etiquette and the more fundamental moral problems relating to the profession.

Students should read carefully "The Principles of Medical Ethics" in their complete and latest form since only a sketch will be included here. The code as published in 1934 is divided into four short chapters. The first chapter is a general statement of two paragraphs, dealing with the physician's responsibility and indicating that service to humanity is the prime object of the profession and that "reward or financial gain should be a subordinate consideration." Groups of physicians or those who may be attached to clinics are subject to the same principles as is the individual practitioner.

The second chapter discusses the duties of physicians to their patients. Confidences entrusted by a patient to a physician "should be held as a trust and should never be revealed except when imperatively required by the law of the state." The possibility of other situations arising when the physician's duty to society requires him to speak is raised. Under the caption "Prognosis," it is stated that "a physician should give timely notice of dangerous manifestations of the disease to the friends of the patient. He should neither exaggerate nor minimize the gravity of the patient's condition." While a physician is "free to choose whom he will serve," he should "always respond to any request for his assistance in an emergency." Once having undertaken a case, the patient must not be neglected even though the disease is incurable. The physician should not withdraw from a case until after sufficient notice is given to the patient or his friends.

The third chapter, "Duties of Physicians to Each Other and to the Profession at Large," takes up about three fifths of the entire state-

ment of principles. The physician is called upon to uphold the honor of the profession and to associate with and support the medical societies. He should "conform to a high standard of morals, and must be diligent and conscientious in his studies." He should "expose without fear or favor, before the proper medical or legal tribunals, corrupt or dishonest conduct of members of the profession."

Certain practices are condemned:

Solicitation of patients by physicians as individuals, or collectively in groups by whatsoever name these be called, or by institutions or organizations, whether by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications, is unprofessional. . . . It is equally unprofessional to procure patients by indirection through solicitors or agents of any kind, or by indirect advertisement.

However "the publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards" is not improper.

It is unprofessional to receive remuneration from patents for surgical instruments or medicines; to accept rebates on prescriptions or surgical appliances, or perquisites from attendants who aid in the care of patients. It is unprofessional for a physician to assist unqualified persons to evade legal restrictions governing the practice of medicine; it is equally unethical to prescribe or dispense secret medicines or other secret remedial agents or manufacture or promote their use in any way.

The duties of physicians under certain conditions are rather specifically stated. These include the gratuitous professional services of physicians to each other and to members of their families since it is "unwise for a physician to treat members of his own family or himself." The duties of physicians in consultations are set forth in eight sections. These are followed by sections dealing with cases of interference. "The physician, in his intercourse with a patient under the care of another physician, should observe the strictest caution and reserve"; he should neither do nor say anything that would "tend to diminish the trust reposed in the attending physician." "A physician should avoid making social calls on those who are under the professional care of other physicians without the knowledge and consent of the attendant." Where such a friendly visit is made, there

should be no discussion of the case or the physical condition of the patient. Conditions under which a physician should and should not prescribe for the patient of another doctor, as well as the procedure when several physicians are summoned, are set forth. Differences between physicians, which cannot be promptly settled, "should be referred for arbitration to a committee of impartial physicians, preferably the Board of Censors of a component county society of the American Medical Association."

The last article in Chapter Three deals with compensation. This section is important, owing to the fact that so many problems center around fees and charges.

The poverty of a patient and the mutual professional obligation of physicians should command the gratuitous services of a physician. But endowed institutions and organizations for mutual benefit, or for accident, sickness and life insurance, or for analogous purposes, have no claim upon physicians for unremunerated services.

Under "Contract Practice" we read:

It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his services under conditions that make it impossible to render adequate service to his patient or which interfere with reasonable competition among the physicians of a community.

However, contract practice is not universally condemned and "each contract should be considered on its own merits and in the light of surrounding conditions." Commissions, or what is often popularly called fee-splitting, is condemned.

When a patient is referred by one physician to another for consultation or for treatment, whether the physician in charge accompanies the patient or not, it is unethical to give or to receive a commission by whatever term it may be called or under any guise or pretext whatsoever.

A final section condemns practice under conditions which give direct profits to lay groups.

It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of his professional attainments or services to any lay body, organization, group, or individual, by whatever name called, or however organized, under terms or conditions

which permit a direct profit from the fees, salary, or compensation received to accrue to the lay body or individual employing him.

Chapter Four deals with the duties of the profession to the public. Physicians "should give advice concerning the public health of the community" and they "should co-operate especially with the proper authorities in the administration of sanitary laws and regulations." "Physicians, especially those engaged in public health work, should enlighten the public regarding quarantine regulations," and also such things as measures for the prevention of epidemic and contagious diseases. Physicians should report to the proper authorities all cases of a communicable disease under their care, and they should warn the public against the devices and false pretensions made by charlatans. Physicians "should recognize and promote the profession of pharmacy; but any pharmacist, unless he be qualified as a physician, who assumes to prescribe for the sick," or who dispenses deteriorated or adulterated drugs, or substitutes one remedy for another designated in a prescription, should be denied such support.

A concluding paragraph calls the attention of the physician to the fact that these principles do not cover the whole field of medical ethics, and that besides these there are many duties and obligations. Under all conditions he should behave toward others as he desires them to deal with him.

Finally, these principles are primarily for the good of the public, and their enforcement should be conducted in such a manner as shall deserve and receive the endorsement of the community.

MEDICAL ETHICS AND PUBLIC INTEREST

Do the "Principles of Medical Ethics" embody the highest ethical ideals, or do they simply protect the self-interest of the physician? Is the code an evidence of high idealism, or is it a "conspiracy against the public"? Literature may be produced to support each position. If all medical men were conscientious in living up to the standard and spirit of the code, much of the criticism directed against the profession would have no justification. The profession has given considerable attention to matters of public interest and welfare. Many

of the laws on our statute books designed for the protection of public health have originated with the medical profession.

While the medical profession has had a long and an honorable history, and today ranks high among the professions in public esteem, the profession has lost considerably in public estimation during recent decades. A partial explanation for this would appear to include the following items: The attempt on the part of the profession to maintain the *status quo* of medical practice in the face of rapidly changing social and economic conditions; the failure to protect itself against the incompetent and the unscrupulous practitioner who seems to be protected by the code; the extent to which medical ethics and hospital etiquette interferes with the interests of the patient. Some go so far as to assert that medicine is becoming a private business rather than a public service. George Bernard Shaw, in speaking about the honor of doctors, says:

They have as much as any other class of men, no more and no less. And what other men dare to pretend to be impartial where they have a strong pecuniary interest on one side? Nobody supposes the doctors are less virtuous than judges: but a judge whose salary and reputation depend on whether the verdict was for the plaintiff or defendant, prosecutor or prisoner, would be as little trusted as a general in the pay of the enemy. To offer me a doctor as my judge, and then weight his decision with a bribe of a large sum of money and a virtual guarantee that if he makes a mistake it can never be proved against him, is to go wildly beyond the ascertained strain which human nature will bear. It is simply unscientific to allege or believe that doctors do not under existing circumstances perform unnecessary operations and manufacture and prolong lucrative illnesses.¹

THE MAIN ABUSES

The practice of fee-splitting is an evil which is fairly widespread and on the increase in the United States. It has grown with the development of specialization until today it is, in the words of a prominent medical man, "a menace to the public and a disgrace to the profession."² Fee-splitting is the secret division of fees for the

¹George Bernard Shaw in the "Preface" to *The Doctor's Dilemma*.

²James Fairchild Baldwin, "The Scandal of Fee-Splitting by Physicians," *Current History*, Vol. XXX, p. 1018.

purpose of securing patients. A specialist may agree to give a general practitioner, an internist, or others a percentage of the fee which he secures from patients referred to him. In this way incompetent men may build up large practices, since the man who pays the largest commission may be recommended. The way the practice tends to unnecessary operations, to untimely deaths, to excessive fees, and other abuses is presented in brief by Dr. James Fairchild Baldwin in an article "The Scandal of Fee-Splitting by Physicians." In concluding Dr. Baldwin says:

In a nutshell: such conspiracy tends to general professional demoralization, to many incomplete or unnecessary operations and resulting failure to secure complete recovery, to high fees, to unmerited praise of incompetent specialists, and to an enormous number of deaths.³

The medical profession has been lax in eliminating incompetent men from its ranks. While it has waged a vigorous campaign against the unlicensed quacks and other charlatans, the incompetent or the unscrupulous doctor within the profession has continued to practice. While there is no other profession in which the incompetent man constitutes so great a menace, there is no other profession which offers such protection against exposure.⁴ Dr. Baldwin, referring in an article to figures which had been given out by Dr. William T. Black, says:

If the statistics of Professor Black are correct, and no one has yet questioned their correctness, then not less than *four out of every five deaths* after major operations in the ordinary run of hospitals can be attributed only to incompetency on the part of the surgeon who operated.⁵

Unless the profession becomes more active in the protection of the public, the state may have to intervene and at least forbid a physician to practice surgery or other speciality unless he has shown competence in that speciality. Such regulation by the state or from without would appear to be less desirable than effective regulation from within the medical profession itself.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 1018-1023.

⁴Rita S. Halle, "Unfit Doctors Must Go," *Scribner's Magazine*, Vol. XC (1931), pp. 514-518.

⁵*Current History*, *op. cit.*, p. 1021.

PROBLEMS FOR THE FUTURE

Problems which the medical profession must face in the near future include: the elimination of "quacks" and the men who are incompetent, overcrowding and geographical maldistribution, the harmonizing of practice with ideals, and the high cost of medical care. The raising of the standards for entrance and for graduation at medical schools would keep incompetent persons from entering the profession and also help solve the problem of overcrowding. Systematic instruction in problems of professional ethics in the medical school might help to impress certain ideals upon the younger men right from the beginning, and while they are in an impressionable stage in their careers. Today, few, if any, medical schools give any systematic attention to the subject of professional ethics.

For a large majority of the people of the United States a serious illness in the family or the need for an operation is an economic disaster. More than two thirds of the population cannot afford to pay the full costs of the doctor's services and hospital charges. The rich are able to pay; the poor are often cared for by means of charity or the free clinics. Thus the cost of medical care falls as a great burden upon the middle class. The costs are so great that many persons defer consulting the physician until the disease is well established. The result is that there is an unnecessarily high mortality.

There are enough doctors and nurses in the United States to care for all sickness and to attend to nearly all the preventive work that we now know how to do. The three and a half billion dollars spent on medical services, good and bad, is probably sufficient to provide adequate, efficient care for everyone. Yet a considerable proportion of our population cannot afford to obtain medical care; few persons receive regular physical examinations, and much preventable sickness and many preventable deaths occur. A more even distribution of the costs of illness would be one factor in helping to remedy the present unsatisfactory conditions.

In the autumn of 1932, after five years' study, a Committee on the Costs of Medical Care under the chairmanship of Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, then Secretary of the Interior, made its final report. The

majority report advocated the "group practice" of medicine by physicians associated together in clinics, and for a fixed annual fee. The cost of such service would be from twenty to forty dollars a year for each person. The present system deals too little with the prevention of illness and too much with the meeting of emergencies; it costs too much especially for persons of small income; and it is inadequate to meet the health problem of the country. The cost of this service would be met by regular annual or monthly payments by members who have a right to service, or by taxation, or by some combination of both methods. The minority report favored the continuance of individualistic "free competition" and rejected the idea of the government competing with private practitioners. The student will do well to study the above reports as well as the numerous forms of group medicine and contract practice which are in existence today, such as factory physicians, health centers, medical co-operative societies, the Life Extension Institute, etc. Doctors as a whole appear to be opposed to such practices and organizations, although recent changes in the "Principles of Medical Ethics" leave the way open for recognition. The physicians are likely to find that in endeavoring to protect their group interests they are acting against the protection of public health.

During recent years there has been an increased demand for a partial or complete socialization of the medical profession. These demands have found supporters within the profession itself and have occasioned some lively discussions. The growth of the collectivist principle in economic and political affairs and the demand for more widespread social planning is likely to produce groups organized for the mass purchase of medical services or to create a more widespread demand for preventive medicine and periodic health examinations under the care and supervision of the community. If every child has a right to a public-school education under the care of the state, should not every child also have the right to the means of good health insofar as society can provide the means?

LEGAL ETHICS

Sentiment for the creation of standards or canons of ethics did not make much headway until the first decade of the twentieth cen-

ture, when legal shysters were increasing at an alarming rate. Such standards were essential in order to make clear what courts could require of lawyers, what lawyers were expecting of their colleagues, and what the public could expect from the profession.

The present code of ethics of the legal profession consists of a preamble, followed by forty-six canons, and concludes with a recommended oath of admission to the bar. The first thirty-two canons were adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908, canons thirty-three to forty-five were added in 1928, and in 1933 canon forty-six was added, and six of the earlier canons were replaced by substitutes.

The preamble of the "Canons of Professional Ethics" of the American Bar Association states that

the future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit the approval of all just men.

In his relation to the court, the code states that it is the duty of lawyers to maintain a respectable attitude towards the courts, to endeavor to prevent political considerations from outweighing judicial fitness in the selection of judges, to avoid marked attention and unusual hospitality to a judge, and to avoid communicating with him privately while a case is pending.

Likewise, a lawyer "must never converse privately with jurors about the case" and must avoid communicating with them.

All attempts to curry favor with juries by fawning, flattery, or pretended solicitude for their personal comfort are unprofessional.

A lawyer should also "always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and due consideration."

In his relation with other lawyers, he is to avoid encroaching upon the business of another lawyer. "All personalities between counsel should be scrupulously avoided." Yet

lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession, and should accept without hesitation employment against a member of the Bar who has wronged his client.

In the formation of partnerships for the practice of law, no person should be admitted who is not a member of the legal profession, duly authorized to practice, and amenable to professional discipline.

No false or assumed or trade name may be used, and if a member of the firm becomes a judge, his name should not be continued in the firm name.

In his relation to his clients,

a lawyer should endeavor to obtain full knowledge of his client's cause before advising thereon, and he is bound to give a candid opinion of the merits and probable results of pending or contemplated litigation.

Whenever the controversy will admit of fair judgment, the client should be advised to avoid or to end the litigation.

"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned." As a general rule, a lawyer should not testify in court in behalf of his client. Money or other trust property should be reported promptly upon receipt, and should not be commingled with his own funds.

A lawyer may decline employment, and he

must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a defense when convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong.

The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any lay agency personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary.

A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an association, club, or trade organization, to render legal services in any matter in which the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this employment should not include the rendering of legal services to the members of such an organization in respect to their individual affairs.

To see that justice is done, not merely to win the case of his client or to defeat his opponent, is the duty of the lawyer, as is seen in canons five and fifteen.

The primary duty of the lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the

secreting of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible.

Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster prejudice against lawyers as a class—than does the false claim,—that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause.

In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicane. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

A part of canon thirty-two, *The Lawyer's Duty in its Last Analysis*, says:

No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive nor should any lawyer render any service or advice involving disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial office, which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or persons exercising a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of the public.

But above all a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.

Advertising for, or soliciting clients, directly or indirectly, is improper. However, "the publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards," or the insertion in legal periodicals of a brief, dignified notice of a specialized legal service for other lawyers, is not improper.

But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews, not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional.

Stirring up litigation is one of the main evils in the profession. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit.

Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law.

It is disreputable for lawyers on their own initiative to work up litigation by searching titles for defects, or by seeking those with claims for personal injuries, or by employing agents or runners to do such things, or by rewarding policemen, members of hospital staffs, or other persons for furnishing information which may lead to litigations.

Since there is no attempt here to cover all the details of the canons, a statement regarding fees will conclude our summary.

In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid charges which overestimate their advice and services, as well as those which undervalue them. A client's ability to pay cannot justify a charge in excess of the value of the service, though his poverty may require a less charge, or even none at all.

No division of fees for legal service is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility. A lawyer should accept no compensation, commission, rebates, or other advantages from others without the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure. It is unprofessional to purchase an interest in the subject matter of the litigation.

Contingent fees, where sanctioned by law, should be under the supervision of the Court, in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges.

PROBLEMS FACING THE LEGAL PROFESSION

There are at least five serious problems facing the legal profession.

1. The overcrowding of the bar is one of the most important of these. A lack of high educational and other entrance requirements is partly responsible for this condition. In England and Wales there is one lawyer to 2271 persons. In the United States the proportion of lawyers is much greater, ranging from one for every 181 persons in the District of Columbia to one for every 1287 in one other state. While about 4500 lawyers are needed each year to fill up the ranks, about 9500 new men are appearing each year.

High quality professional service depends upon knowledge as well as upon character. If either is deficient or missing, there is likely to be a grave miscarriage of justice. Today, in most states, examining boards have been set up by legislative enactment. These

replace the earlier method of admitting men to the bar by a court order following what was usually a perfunctory examination by a committee of the bar. The examining boards centralize responsibility and give a more impersonal approach. Higher standards of selection are needed.

Some states do not require a high-school education as a prerequisite to admission to the bar, and no states require a college degree. In 1921 the American Bar Association passed a resolution favoring as a minimum preparation two years of study in college and three years in a law school. Today the better law schools require such preparation for a degree.

2. The prevalence of abuses within the profession is due in part to overcrowding and to the absence of strict disciplinary control. In the legal profession we find a marked contrast between a fairly lofty ethical ideal on the one hand, and practices which fall far below this ideal on the other hand. While we do not wish to cast any shadows across the careers of the many lawyers who have caught the professional ideal and who exhibit a spirit of unselfish service, far too many use the profession as a means of money-making and political advancement.

During recent years the "ambulance chaser" has come into considerable prominence. A firm or a private practitioner may work up litigations and "business" in various ways. Agents and "runners," such as policemen, nurses, reporters, or others, keep on the watch for possible clients and receive a commission for such services. Accidents and deaths are recorded. Some may go over titles to property and other legal papers in the hope of finding flaws or errors that will afford the basis for suits. Others read the papers for slips that may lead to libel suits, or attempt to discover "episodes" in the lives of men or women from which divorce suits may develop. In its attempt to prevent these abuses, the canon of professional ethics prohibits the solicitation of clients, directly or indirectly.

The above practices are closely linked with the contingent fee. In this case the client agrees to pay the lawyer a certain percentage (usually high) of the money gained in case of success in a pending suit. The lawyer then becomes a partner in a business enterprise,

and there is strong pressure upon him to win at all costs. Contingent fees are not absolutely condemned since there are poor men who have valid cases and who would be unable to pay except after a favorable verdict. Recognizing the justice of such cases, and hoping to prevent the abuses, canon thirteen reads:

Contingent fees, where sanctioned by law, should be under the supervision of the Court, in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges.

Among the lawyers who deserve condemnation are those who in order to serve their clients seek technicalities, delays, and other means which may go to the extent of bribery and perjury. Such persons bring the law into disrepute and make justice a mockery. In this connection we are likely to observe the shyster who frequents the police court, and to overlook the depredations of the corporation lawyers who do the same things for their wealthy employers, or the lawyers who serve bankruptcy rings, or who use every conceivable device to protect criminal gangs.

3. The tendency of the profession to develop into a trade is causing considerable concern to persons both within and without the profession. The lawyer is closely associated with the business life and activity of his community and readily adopts its outlook and sanctions its practices. Some years ago Woodrow Wilson observed that "the lawyer is in danger of being engulfed by special business interests." Many men in the profession devote their time to pleading for special tax legislation or for tariffs or subsidies. A considerable group of lawyers spend their time helping special business groups do what they want to do, quite regardless of the social consequences.

The following statement appearing in *The Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science should give the profession much concern:

On all sides we hear complaints of lowered standards of the bar, weakened ethics, misuse of clients' funds, ambulance chasing, legal cadets (witness Judge Seabury's revelations), tales of shaking down the client, the commercialization of law practice, and even the assertion that many lawyers must be grouped as anti-social allies of the criminal and the profes-

sional malefactor. In a word, the law has largely come to be looked upon in the layman's eyes, as a business or a racket, not an honorable profession.⁹

Is part of the present criticism due to the failure to distinguish clearly between the merely legal and the ethical?

4. The almost total lack of a social consciousness on the part of the members of the profession is an unfortunate state of affairs. The conviction is left, not only after considering the shyster lawyers but also after examining the careers of some of the greatest lawyers of today and of recent years, that a great many members of the profession are ready to sell their services for almost any cause and to the highest bidder. Outside of their profession these men may be devoted to human welfare, yet in their professional activities they are the hired servants of their clients. Men, eminent in their profession and in good standing in the bar associations, may spend their time and talent in advising individuals and corporations how to get around the exact letter of the law, while conducting practices in opposition to the spirit and intent of the law. For instance, consider the number of wealthy men who are able to evade an income tax through the advice of their lawyers. While in theory the attorney is a part of the court and as such his services are dedicated to the pursuit of justice, in practice he is not greatly concerned with social consequences, but only with the success of the one to whom he has sold his professional services. A keener social consciousness on the part of members of the profession would result in an interest in eliminating technicalities, in closing loop-holes and in preventing wrongdoing within the law. There is urgent need for more lawyers who will not only refuse to prey upon the misfortunes of others, but who will help mold the law to meet the demands of present-day society.

5. Lawyers are not only a part of, but help to propagate a system which is antiquated and which in too many cases leads to a miscarriage of justice. Space will not permit a detailed discussion of

⁹I. Maurice Wormser, "Legal Ethics in Theory and in Practice," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. CLXV-CLXVII (1933), p. 195.

the shortcomings and inadequacies of many elements in the administration of justice. An examination of recent works on criminology, and of the reports of various commissions making crime surveys, will furnish evidence. A recent Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court has been quoted as saying that "the administration of criminal law in the United States is a disgrace to civilization." Why should the ordinary criminal trial consist of two partisan groups each trying to win a victory, rather than a group of experts using every fair means to determine the facts of the case and the condition of the offender, and recommending a disposal of the case after consideration of the interests of society and of the offender? Does not the new technique now being used in some of our best juvenile courts point the way in the right direction?

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What must the physician do who learns that his patient is afflicted with one of the social diseases, and yet is about to be married to a woman who does not suspect the truth? Is he bound by professional duty to remain silent; or, is it his duty to inform the woman or her family, provided the man refuses to inform them, or to postpone the wedding? If a doctor gains information as to the identity of criminals who are sought by the police, what is his duty?
2. Is there any point to the following criticism by a Chinese, of American medical practice? Discuss the issue which he raises.
"The more I study Americans, the more I am convinced that they are mentally diseased. Instead of doing everything in a common-sense manner, they try all they can to do it in the very opposite way. At home, for example, you and the other members of your Mutual Health Association would pay Dr. Wun Lung and his assistants each a liberal salary to keep you all well, and pay nothing when you are sick. On this account he and his young men work very assiduously in calling regularly and examining every member of the union, and all of you enjoy comparative immunity from illness. Here in America a physician is paid by the amount of your sickness, and the less you are able to earn any money, the larger and more onerous is his bill. As a result some doctors, I am told, yield to temptation and keep their customers sick. The consequence is that those who have the largest number of sick and dying are the richest, most esteemed, and influential, while in China

they would be ostracized and not allowed to practice." Quoted by H. H. Moore, *The New Public Health*, pp. 373-374.

3. In 1929, Dr. Louis E. Schmidt, a medical practitioner and a professor in the medical school of Northwestern University was expelled from the Chicago Medical Society. His offense was that he was associated with the Illinois Social Hygiene League, a non-profit association organized to combat social diseases and to give service to the poor at a small fee, or even free if they cannot pay for the services. The Social Hygiene League was connected with The Public Health Institute which advertised these services. Was Dr. Schmidt doing anything anti-social? Was his conduct immoral? See *The Literary Digest*, Vol. CI (May 11, 1929), pp. 12-13, for details and comments.
4. Discuss the following practices from the point of view of morality:
 - (a) The practice of doctors in protecting each other, even to the extent of failing to expose incompetence.
 - (b) The practice of doctors in giving bread pills to patients who have some form of an imaginary invalidism.
 - (c) The use of legal technicalities by lawyers to enable their clients to evade what is the clear intent and spirit of the law.
5. In a mid-western city, it was discovered that some druggists were selling cocaine to schoolboys. Such a practice was illegal and led to court actions. However, the sale of other similar narcotics, such as eucaïne, was not mentioned in the law. The druggists and their lawyers discovered and profited by this loophole. Members of the legal profession sat in judgment upon the cases and decided them on the basis of the law, but did nothing to remedy the situation. To what extent is a lawyer who is conscious of loopholes and inconsistencies in the law under any obligation to work for their elimination?
6. A district attorney in a criminal trial interviews a number of witnesses who appear to be about equally intelligent and honest. The testimony of two of them tends to prove guilt, while the testimony of the others tends to prove innocence. Since the district attorney is prosecuting the case, he puts the first two witnesses on the witness stand, and tells the others to keep out of sight. The highest court in one state has declared that "a prosecuting officer is violating no canon of legal ethics in presenting evidence which tends to show guilt while failing to call witnesses in whom he has no confidence, or whose testimony contradicts what he is trying to prove." Comment on the above case, and upon the declaration of the court.

7. A client brings a contract to his lawyer and requests that it be broken. The lawyer discovers that there is a technical defect, on the basis of which it may be possible to have the contract invalidated. However, the contract was signed by both parties in good faith and its annulment at this time will result in a grave injustice to the other party. Is it the lawyer's duty to serve his client's interests, or to consider the unfairness to the other party?

SUGGESTED READINGS

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Chapter XX

THE ETHICS OF TEACHERS AND OF STUDENTS

WHEN A PROBLEM arises in modern society, whether it be the issue of war and peace, labor troubles, racial conflict, or problems of social organization, someone is almost certain to say that education is the cure for such problems. This assertion, however, cannot be accepted without qualifications. The important thing is not just education, but the kind of education. Education may bind persons to the past; it may be narrow and bigoted; it may lead persons to be militaristic; and it may make persons extremely self-centered. On the other hand, education may train persons to face the future with vision, to be broad and tolerant in outlook, to be seekers after peace, and to consider the rights of others. Mere education or mere teaching is not enough. Teachers are, at least in part, responsible for the kind of education which exists and for the individual and social attitudes which arise from the educational process.

EDUCATION AND THE CHANGING WORLD

In the past, education has been too limited in its objectives to serve these larger social interests. Teachers have been absorbed in imparting a particular body of facts in a specialized field, and they have been training their pupils to be good competitors and to fit into the *status quo*. Today, it is becoming increasingly evident that children who are being trained to live in society as it is now, may graduate in a few years only to find that they have not been trained for the society in which they must live. After five years of study, the Commission on the Social Studies of the American Historical Association pointed out what they considered to be the obvious fact that American civilization, in common with Western civilization, is passing through one of the great critical ages of history, is modifying its traditional faith in economic individualism, and is embark-

ing upon vast experiments in social planning and control which call for large-scale co-operation on the part of the people.¹

The social environment is making new demands upon education and placing new responsibilities upon the teacher.

A greater degree of social co-operation and of planning will be possible only if the members of society are capable of sustained effort in the direction of social welfare. Modern schools must impart to students an understanding of contemporary society and the changes through which it is passing, as well as a keener sense of personal and social responsibility to aid in establishing a more wholesome social order. New attitudes and a loftier social morality are needed. Since the atmosphere and attitudes prevalent throughout the school system are created mainly by the staff, the conduct and the ethical ideals of the teacher are exceedingly important. In this chapter we shall consider the ethics of teachers and of students. We shall have in mind the public-school teacher and the college student. Since this text will be used chiefly by college students, many of whom will be going out to teach in the public-school system, this presentation seems desirable.²

THE TEACHER

Teachers have been slower than the members of some other professions in developing a code of ethics. Today, however, they are gradually becoming aware of the need of self-regulation. Certain standards of conduct, which members of the profession were expected to follow, were in the past largely taken for granted, but an explicit code written for the profession as a whole was comparatively late in appearance.

Since education in the United States is administered largely by the various states rather than by the national government, nearly all teachers' codes of ethics have been drawn up by state educational associations. Beginning with the State Teachers' Association of Georgia in 1896, most of the state associations have adopted codes of ethics.

¹ *Conclusions and Recommendations*, Report of the Commission on the Social Studies, American Historical Association, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934.

² For a code of ethics for college professors see "A Code for Professors," by A. G. Ruthven, *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors*, Vol. XXI (Oct. 1935), pp. 482-486.

In 1929 after four years of work a committee presented a code of ethics for the profession of teaching, to the meeting of the National Education Association of the United States. This committee, wishing to proceed from facts, had made a survey and analysis of existing state and local codes of ethics for teachers, had consulted codes in use in other professions, and then had resorted to questionnaires to obtain additional information. From the above a group of ethical principles was compiled and this, in turn, was sent to over 3000 teachers (including executives) who were asked regarding the ethical value of each statement. From the answers received, the committee drafted a tentative code of ethics for teachers. A history of the work of the committee, with much valuable material, including tables, is given in the pamphlet "The Ethics of the Teaching Profession," the final report of the Committee on Ethics of the Profession.

In answer to the request to list the six most unethical practices observed and of which a code of ethics should take cognizance, fifty-three unethical practices were listed ten times or more, and twenty-three practices were listed more than fifty times. The first twenty-three are as follows:

Gossiping about and criticizing other teachers.

Slurring the profession.

Breaking a contract.

Applying for positions not known to be vacant.

Exaggerating qualifications, and failure to give all pertinent facts when writing recommendations.

Cultivating friendship among board members and their families in an attempt to exercise a "pull."

Failure to be a progressive student of education.

Failure to support school policies until they are changed.

Underbidding for a position.

Going over the head of an administrative superior.

Discussing pupils in such a way as would embarrass them or their parents.

Permitting selfish reasons to influence one's actions toward pupils.

Possessing bad personal habits.

Failure to participate in activities for community betterment.

Using the profession as a stepping stone to another vocation.

- Failure to defend other members of the profession when they are unjustly attacked.
- School officials making policies without consulting their administrative subordinates.
- Dismissing teachers without giving them ample notice and an opportunity to be heard.
- Violating official correspondence or conversation.
- Failure to withdraw outstanding applications when a position has been secured.
- Endeavoring to secure or maintain position by innuendo, exploitation, complimentary press notices, or advertising.
- Applying for a position directly to the board of education instead of to the superintendent.
- A school official going to a teacher to persuade her to accept a position with him before he has conferred with her present officials.³

THE CODE OF THE NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

PREAMBLE

In order that the aims of education may be realized more fully, that the welfare of the teaching profession may be promoted, that teachers may know what is considered proper procedure, and may bring to their professional relations high standards of conduct, the National Education Association of the United States has developed this code of ethics.

ARTICLE I—RELATIONS WITH PUPILS AND TO THE COMMUNITY

Section 1. The schoolroom is not the proper theatre for religious, political, or personal propaganda. The teacher should exercise his full rights as a citizen but he should avoid controversies which may tend to decrease his value as a teacher.

Section 2. The teacher should not permit his educational work to be used for partisan politics, personal gain, or selfish propaganda of any kind.

Section 3. In instructional, administrative, and other relations with pupils, the teacher should be impartial, just and professional. The teacher should consider the different interests, aptitudes, abilities, and social environments of pupils.

³*The Ethics of the Teaching Profession*, p. 19. This is the Final Report of the Committee on Ethics of the Profession, presented July 1, 1929, at the meeting of the National Educational Association, Atlanta, Georgia.

Section 4. The professional relations of the teacher with his pupils demand the same scrupulous guarding of confidential and official information as is observed by members of other long-established professions.

Section 5. The teacher should seek to establish friendly and intelligent co-operation between the home and the school.

Section 6. The teacher should not tutor pupils of his classes for pay.

ARTICLE II—RELATIONS TO THE PROFESSION

Section 1. Members of the teaching profession should dignify their calling in every way. The teacher should encourage the ablest to enter it, and discourage from entering those who are merely using the teaching profession as a stepping stone to some other vocation.

Section 2. The teacher should maintain his efficiency and teaching skill by study, and by contact with local, state, and national educational organizations.

Section 3. A teacher's own life should show that education does enable.

Section 4. While not limiting his services by reason of small salary, the teacher should insist upon a salary scale suitable to his place in society.

Section 5. The teacher should not exploit his school or himself by personally inspired press notices or advertisements, or by other unprofessional means, and should avoid innuendo and criticism particularly of successors or predecessors.

Section 6. The teacher should not apply for another position for the sole purpose of forcing an increase in salary in his present position. Correspondingly, school officials should not pursue a policy of refusing to give deserved salary increases to their employees until offers from other school systems have forced them to do so.

Section 7. The teacher should not act as an agent, or accept a commission, royalty, or other reward, for books or supplies in the selection or purchase of which he can influence, or exercise the right of decision; nor should he accept a commission or other compensation for helping another teacher to secure a position.

ARTICLE III—RELATIONS TO MEMBERS OF THE PROFESSION

Section 1. A teacher should avoid unfavorable criticism of other teachers except such as is formally presented to a school official in the interests of the school. It is also unprofessional to fail to report to duly constituted authority any matters which involve the best interests of the school.

Section 2. A teacher should not interfere between another teacher and a pupil in matters such as discipline or marking.

Section 3. There should be co-operation between administrators and classroom teachers, founded upon sympathy for each other's point of view and recognition of the administrator's right to leadership and the teacher's right to self-expression. Both teachers and administrators should observe professional courtesy by transacting official business with the properly designated person next in rank.

Section 4. The teacher should not apply for a specific position unless a vacancy exists. Unless the rules of the school otherwise prescribe, he should apply for a teaching position to the chief executive. He should not knowingly underbid a rival in order to secure a position; neither should he knowingly underbid a salary schedule.

Section 5. Qualification should be the sole determining factor in appointment and promotion. School officials should encourage and carefully nurture the professional growth of worthy teachers by recommending promotion, either in their own school or in other schools. For school officials to fail to recommend a worthy teacher for another position because they do not desire to lose his services is unethical.

Section 6. Testimonials regarding a teacher should be frank, candid, and confidential.

Section 7. A contract, once signed, should be faithfully adhered to until it is dissolved by mutual consent. In case of emergency, the thoughtful consideration which business sanction demands should be given by both parties to the contract.

Section 8. Due notification should be given by school officials and teachers in case a change in position is to be made.⁴

The Committee of the National Education Association urges the teachers' organization of each state to establish a committee on professional ethics if they have not already done so. The state committee will have the duty of interpreting the code, investigating reported violations of the code, and crystallizing sentiment in support of the code. Any person accused of a violation should have an opportunity to defend himself. It is suggested that the findings of the committee be published in the journal of the state organization in such a form that identification is not disclosed. In this way practice cases may be built up for future guidance.

⁴*The Ethics of the Teaching Profession*, pp. 4-6.

To comment upon the ethical significance of each section of the code is not possible in the space available. We shall, however, comment briefly upon some of the more important questions which are raised. The various sections of the code are intended to point out the general direction in which ethical conduct is to be found. Interpretation and application will be a continuous process.

The first and highest obligation of a member of the teaching profession is to his pupils. This principle is stated in various state codes but is lacking, in explicit form, in the national code. The development of the personality and skills of the child along the lines for which he appears to be best fitted to serve his community and age seems to be the ideal. If this is true, then courses, grades, and methods are secondary or are merely means to that end. Really to place the personality of the child first would probably require many changes in our educational set-up.

While the teacher "should exercise his full rights as a citizen," as stated in section 1 of Article I, very few teachers may become active in political life or run for office without incurring some animosity from members of the board or of the community. To engage actively in politics will make it exceedingly difficult for him to "avoid controversies which may tend to decrease his value as a teacher." One small town of which we know has a superintendent of schools who is also the mayor. In small communities where party politics do not play an important part and where the demands of office are light, such a combination of interests may be possible. The teacher must keep in mind, however, that the interests of his pupils must not be sacrificed. In the majority of cases the acceptance of public office will make it advisable for the teacher to resign his position.

The guarding of confidential information is as necessary for the teacher as for the doctor or the minister. To divulge such information leads to a loss of confidence and respect and is the cause of considerable bitterness. Consequently, teachers must exercise care in keeping confidences, in refusing to discuss the weaknesses of one student in the presence of another, and in refusing to tell jokes based upon the mistakes or weaknesses of their pupils.

Why should the teacher "not tutor pupils of his classes for pay?"

There are cases where a student has been absent for some time, needs tutoring in one or more subjects in order to catch up with the class, and is willing and able to pay for such extra time. In such cases it appears unfair to burden a teacher with such extra work without compensation. The practice, however, if permitted, leads to abuses, real or imagined. If teachers permit the practice of tutoring their own pupils for pay, they leave themselves open to the criticism of mercenary motives whenever a pupil fails in a course or test or is warned of failure.

Diligence in maintaining his efficiency and teaching skill is an obligation which the teacher cannot ignore except at grave peril to himself and to his pupils. Professional advancement is second only to his obligation to place first the interest of his pupils. In fact, he cannot serve the best interests of his pupils unless he is also growing. The teacher as well as the pupil must grow in knowledge, in breadth of vision, and in skill. To this end, as the code makes clear, he should support professional organizations, and he should keep in touch with current literature and new ideas and methods. Teaching, for him, must be regarded as a life work and not merely as a stepping stone to some other occupation.

"Gossiping about and criticizing other teachers" and "slurring the profession" came first in the unethical practices listed earlier in the chapter. It was natural, therefore, that a section of the code should deal with "unfavorable criticism of other teachers." When such criticism is voiced in the community at large or before pupils, it tends to lower the standing of the teachers concerned and to cast reflection upon the profession as a whole. It is reasonable to require that such criticism, if needed in the interests of the school, should be presented to the proper school officials. Only if such procedure fails to lead to the elimination of grave abuses which are undermining the efficiency of the school is the teacher justified in appealing to the larger community to assist in remedying the abuses.

The statement that "a contract, once signed, should be faithfully adhered to until it is dissolved by mutual consent" needs some elaboration. This obligation protects both the teacher and the community, and there is just protest when one party breaks the contract

during the course of the year's work, except under unusual conditions. In some communities, however, it is not considered unethical to break the contract if work has not actually begun. A school board usually feels that to force a teacher to remain against his will, or to prevent him from accepting a more responsible position is not a good policy. Professor C. F. Taeusch takes the position that "any teacher receiving a salary less than the average prevailing in the community is justified ethically in accepting a position elsewhere, provided one month's notice is given the principal or superintendent."⁶ There is need for a more general understanding upon such questions.

PROBLEMS FACING THE TEACHING PROFESSION

The problem of maintaining freedom of thought and of speech in an age that is witnessing a swing toward autocracy is of vital importance both for the teacher and for human destiny. In the past, states, communities, and special groups have sought to dictate to the teacher what he shall think and teach. How is education to be kept free from the influence of pressure groups?

Teachers must insist upon their right to freedom of investigation and to freedom in the exposition of their own subjects. While insisting that teachers are the best judges of truth in the fields in which they have special training, a teacher should not claim as his right the privilege of discussing with his pupils in the classroom controversial topics outside his own field. Outside the classroom the teacher should have the same right of expression as do other citizens.

In the second place, the teacher should demand for his pupil the freedom to grow and to develop his own personality. The development of intelligent understanding and the power of self-direction are among the central aims in education. The person who is forced to accept without question the ideas of another is not likely to develop the capacity to grow. The moral autonomy of each person is a basic value which should be cultivated and not warped by the educational process. In the past teachers have too frequently served as exponents of the *status quo* instead of the development of a culture

⁶Carl F. Taeusch, *Professional and Business Ethics*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1926, p. 163.

more adapted to the needs of expanding personality. An education that is authoritarian will discourage independence of thought and encourage passive acceptance; it will not prepare growing minds to face constructively the problems of a changing society.

ETHICS AND THE COLLEGE STUDENT

In college, as elsewhere, we find persons who are upright and persons who are morally lax. The main problem with the latter group is one of perverted vision rather than of wilful deviation from accepted standards. The college student is peculiarly susceptible to school spirit, to group standards, or to the consensus of opinion prevailing on the campus. His conduct in scholastic, social, and athletic activities is often a curious blend of personal ideals and habits on the one side and group conventions and traditions on the other side. Lack of a high ethical standard is usually most frequently seen in examinations, in the authorship of written work, in excuses given for neglect of duty, in the failure to make the best of the opportunity given by parents and school, and in athletic contests.

A high sense of personal honor is one of the most important things that a student can develop. Administrators, faculties, and student groups have spent much time in considering the conditions most conducive to the development of a true and active "honor spirit" on the campuses. The problem is made more difficult by the attitudes which many students bring from the high school, by the general moral confusion of the age, and by elements within the college system itself, such as the undue emphasis upon grades in many institutions.

A number of colleges and universities have "honor systems" of various kinds. These vary from the simple relations of mutual confidence between teachers and students, which may affect one department or an entire school, to the form where the student is responsible not only for his own conduct but also for the conduct of others in that he is expected to report infractions of the code and assist in maintaining the code of honor. An intermediate form may require the student to sign a written pledge of adherence to the honor code, but does not make failure to report violations a case of dishonor.

Where the honor system is a success, as at the University of Virginia, it has become a tradition ingrained in the lives of students and permeating the life of the institution. The effectiveness of the code depends upon keeping both students and faculty committed to it so that public opinion is a unit in its enforcement.

Those who have observed the honor system under many different conditions tell us that it is the best or the worst thing for a student body. It may develop character, or where sentiment is not behind the plan and where violations are "winked at" or considered "smart," it may shelter hypocrisy and falsehood. Those who support an honor system say that it provides a greater opportunity for moral self-development and for the formation of habits of honesty. Those who oppose the system say that it is artificial and not in harmony with the conditions of everyday life where laws and regulations are enforced, and that it prevents the development of a higher kind of honor that is indifferent to supervision or lack of supervision.

Students occasionally object to the feature of some honor systems which requires students to report on their fellow students. In a number of schools where the honor system has been replaced by a proctor system, this feature has come in for the most severe criticism. Only a strong conviction that dishonesty is a serious offense, coupled with strong loyalty to the welfare of the school, is able to overbalance this revulsion against "tale bearing." Where this conviction and this loyalty are absent or undeveloped, an honor code which requires reporting is unlikely to succeed.

A college by its methods of teaching, testing, marking, and graduating may tend to develop habits of pretense and evasion. Professor George A. Coe, discussing "By-Products of the College Classroom," says:

A dominant classroom force is the marking system. Theoretically it is a means of ascertaining and recording certain facts; practically it is a system of motivation. . . . First, the student avoids revealing his ignorance. He feels that he cannot afford to display the vacant places, even though displaying them be a condition of having them filled. The constant demand of the marking system is that he should make a show of what he knows, or at least remembers, not what he still lacks. Thus

arises a desire to appear to know. It is not invented by the students, and they must not be held wholly responsible for the consequences; it is the omnipresent drive of the officially invented and maintained system. . . . Outright dishonesty in tests follows, of course; for the system invites and rewards it. More than this, the system provides the means and the process whereby initial honor, if it be there, is gradually undermined. . . .

"Cribbing, accordingly, is the joint product of professor and student—rather, since the professor is under pressure to work a pre-established system, it is the joint product of the student and the college as a teaching entity. College officers who think they are engaged in education support and prolong a system that produces concealment, evasion, and lying.⁶

These are strong words. In their support, however, we might point out that a number of schools which have changed their educational procedure, so as to place less emphasis upon grades and more upon achievement, report a more wholesome attitude toward studies and courses on the part of students.

The desire to learn, which is honor toward one's own mind, needs to replace the desire to appear to know. Dean C. S. Boucher of the University of Chicago comparing the old plan and the new plan at that University says,

Under the old plan the term "student activities" was applied to athletics, social affairs, dramatics, publications—activities in which only students were primarily concerned; the pursuit of knowledge and scholarship was regarded as a "faculty activity," one in which only faculty members were primarily concerned. Under the new plan, with students attending classes voluntarily and not under compulsion, with students asking for examinations, with students asking to have the library open longer hours, with students asking for the privilege of laboratory experience and training, with students asking for extra discussion group meetings, with students seeking more individual tutorial conferences with instructors than ever before in spite of knowing that the instructor awards neither course credit nor grade points, it seems that the pursuit of knowledge and scholarship is becoming a major "student activity."⁷

⁶George A. Coe, "By-Products of the College Classroom," in *Am I Getting an Education?* Personal Problem Series, No. 8, Association Press, 1929.

⁷C. S. Boucher, "New Freedom and New Responsibilities in College," *The University of Chicago Magazine*, Jan. 1933, pp. 117-118.

The ethical problems which arise in connection with student life are too numerous to discuss. We suggest that students read the following code of ethics for college students, and then criticize and revise it so that it will apply more adequately to their local situation. The code is a student product arising out of a series of discussions in a course in ethics given at Denison University, a coeducational college of less than one thousand students. The social life of the school revolves largely around a group of fraternities and sororities.

A CODE OF ETHICS FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS

GENERAL STATEMENT

1. The purpose of education is development, which includes intellectual, spiritual, social, and physical enrichment. While emphasis upon any one phase of life to the exclusion of others is undesirable, the primary purpose of a college is intellectual development; hence this should take precedence over social life, athletics, and mere grades. If a student is not in college for this purpose, his position is ethically indefensible, since he is wasting both his own and others' time and money.
2. The college student should keep mentally alert and be open-minded and tolerant, not only in his studies and classes, but in following the affairs of the world at large.

PERSONAL FACTORS

1. A student should regard his personal honor as of supreme importance. He should avoid the philosophy that any means are justifiable to procure good grades. He should be honest and fair, during examinations as at all other times, to himself, to his fellow students, to his professors, and to the school.
2. The student should be prompt in keeping appointments and in class attendance, since delays cause loss of time and inconvenience to others. Promptness in completing assigned work is important for one's own character and self-respect and is also essential for the efficient conduct of a class.
3. Students should remember that they represent a large investment of time and money, which only efficient public service will justify. Later on, human lives may depend upon their knowledge and skill.
4. The college student should, at all times and in every way in his power, keep physically fit, realizing that the best kind of creative living

is made possible by good health. A reasonable amount of attention should be given to personal appearance.

INTER-STUDENT RELATIONSHIPS

1. Students should recognize the need for student government and should co-operate with the officers of such organizations. Students should realize the purpose of rules and regulations and aid in their enforcement. Where the duties and responsibilities of office call for the enforcement of rules, students should support an officer for rigidly living up to the duties of office. Laxness, rather than faithfulness, should lead to censure.

2. Rules set up by student associations or administrative orders should be respected and obeyed. A student is free to voice his opposition to such rules and to propose changes at any time. His only honorable courses of action are: (1) To obey a rule. (2) While obeying the rule, if he considers it to be unwise or unjust, and of sufficient importance, to study its effect and to present relevant facts, and his own views, to the proper officers of the student association or to the administration of the school, and ask for a reconsideration of the rule. (3) To leave the school and register at an institution where he can be happy and retain his self-respect. He should not resort to the demoralizing practices of secrecy and evasion.

3. A student may help another student where the help is for the purpose of instructing or of clarifying the work. In no case should a student do another's lesson where this merely relieves the other of work and prevents him from receiving the discipline and training which such work brings. It is dishonorable to assist or to permit others to receive help from one's papers.

4. A student should recognize the value of a wide and deep circle of college friendships. He should not judge another student on the basis of money or of clothes, nor let fraternity lines prejudice his opinion. Class, fraternity, or sorority prejudice must be avoided. Individuals must be judged on the basis of personal and intrinsic worth alone.

5. Relationships between fraternities and sororities should be that of cordiality and friendly co-operation. A student should not speak disparagingly of another social group; especially should he refrain from talking to prospective students about other social groups in such a manner as to lower them in the eyes of the prospective student. To discriminate against students because of membership or lack of membership in any social group is unethical.

STUDENTS AND EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

1. A student should take responsibilities and co-operate in his college or class activities in so far as these do not jeopardize his scholastic advancement. If he accepts responsibility or membership in a group, he should contribute to it the best of his ability.

2. A student should not accept more employment or "student aid" than he can adequately handle along with his studies and extra-curricular activities. He must be thoroughly honest in recording his time.

3. Students should not accept "student aid" if they do not need such financial help, especially if another person who needs the help is thereby deprived of it.

4. Where scholarships and fellowships are granted on the basis of need, and are not merely a recognition of superior scholarship, a student who does not need such help should refrain from applying for it.

5. A student should maintain a high ideal of sportsmanship at athletic contests, whether as a spectator or as a participant, realizing that clean sport and fair play are more important than victories. The decision of referees should be respected by players and by spectators.

6. A student should not play politics in school affairs. Organizations and teams should be free from group politics.

STUDENTS AND THE UNIVERSITY (INCLUDING FACULTY AND ADMINISTRATION)

1. A student should be courteous and respectful to members of the faculty and regard them as fellow-students and advisers. He should, however, have and exercise the right of free thought and open discussion in and out of the class room.

2. When choosing a course, the subject matter of the course and his own immediate or future need of it should be a student's first consideration, not the fact that it is considered "a snap" or that he may be able to make good grades in it.

3. College property, laboratory equipment, and library books should be handled with the same care that he would give to his own property. Since he is only one of many who may need such books and material, regulations regarding their use should be rigidly observed.

4. The student should refrain from destructive criticism, but he may make any necessary constructive criticism to the responsible parties. He should not criticize the school or its members in public unless real grievances continue which private criticism and discussions have failed

to remedy. He should keep the welfare of the school always in mind, and neither by word nor by act reflect upon the good character and high standing of the college.

5. Efforts should be made to cultivate a relationship of mutual friendliness between students and members of the faculty.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. A business man sends a letter of inquiry to a teacher. He wishes to learn the qualifications of a certain senior who is applying for a position. The boy in question has been known to cheat, but he possesses a number of admirable qualities. The position is a good one and offers a splendid opportunity for the boy. Should the teacher mention the cheating in his letter and perhaps decrease the boy's opportunity of getting the position, or should he disregard the cheating and stress the admirable qualities?
2. Comment upon the following incident, indicating whether you approve the method used to break the contract. A contract signed May 1 was terminated by the following letter written June 17:
- "Dear Sir:
- "Due to an offer, with a larger salary, and within fifteen miles of my home, I am resigning the position as second-grade teacher in your schools.
- "I regret very much to do this, but I find, because of this opportunity for me to be so near my home I cannot let it go by. I am sure you, as a school man, can see my point of view. I hope this will not inconvenience you too much and that you will have the best of success in securing a teacher in my place." Quoted in A. R. Brubacher, *Teaching: Profession and Practice*, p. 250.
3. When the State of Massachusetts passed a law requiring all teachers in the state to take the oath of allegiance, such as is required of officials of the state, certain professors at Harvard University, and other institutions protested vigorously. They objected because of the fact that teachers were singled out from other groups, and because such loyalty oaths seemed to be veiled attempts to control teachers, and to transfer to officials appointed by partisan governors a responsibility, which has constitutionally resided in non-political quarters. What do you think of teachers' loyalty oaths? Do you think that a teacher should take the oath to hold his position if he feels that such oaths are wrong?

4. Certain states have laws requiring, or permitting school boards to require, students to salute the flag. Some children have refused because the religious sect to which they belong does not permit a salute to any flag. They have been expelled, in a number of cases, rather than permitted to continue in school as "conscientious objectors." What do you think of the law requiring students to salute the flag? Do you think that officials have any justification in withholding education from those who refuse to comply?
- ✓5. A student unable to attend the Home-coming football game at his college offered his student activity ticket, intended for students only, to one of the recent alumni of the college who was anxious to see the game. He was glad to get the ticket and went to the game. Since he was not known by the ticket collector at the gate, he entered as a student who had paid the fee for the ticket. Comment upon the conduct of the student, and of the alumnus.
6. A football coach, who is having difficulty in getting all of his squad to abide by the rule against smoking during the season, finally announces that he will remove from the team any player whom he catches smoking. Soon afterwards he finds one of his star players smoking a cigarette. If he drops him from the team, he will undoubtedly lose one or two, if not more, of the games on the schedule yet to be played. Should the coach drop the player, lose the games, and incur hostility from the various groups that want the team to win, or should he overlook his threat or promise? What, in your opinion, should the coach do, and why?

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Chapter XXI

THE ETHICAL STANDARDS OF BUSINESS

SOME OF THE most serious moral problems of our time are those connected with business and industry. A complex industrial civilization has developed with such amazing rapidity that our ethical standards and ways of thinking have not been able to keep pace.

A CHANGING INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM

One hundred years ago, in most parts of the United States, the isolated homesteads and cross-road villages were very largely independent. Men gained their living chiefly by hunting, fishing, cattle raising, or tilling the soil. The industrial pursuits were carried on under what we know as the domestic or handicraft system. Characteristic of this period was the fact that work was done in the home or in a shop nearby, that men had ready access to raw material, that there was an intimate personal type of relationship, that men owned their tools which were simple, that they made articles for use, that they worked on an entire process and then usually sold the product of their labor to someone whom they knew.

With the spread of the industrial revolution and the growth of the factory system, each of the above characteristics was slowly changed. Men worked in factories as hired labor, there was no ready access to raw material, relations within industry became more and more impersonal, machines were expensive and elaborate and owned by the employer, articles were made for profit under conditions of increasing specialization, and then sold to distant buyers.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century the rapid development of banking and credit, the establishment of limited liability in joint-stock corporations, the separation of ownership and management, and ever greater technological advance and concentration have multiplied our social, economic, and political problems.

During the nineteenth century most business men accepted the theory of individualism or *laissez faire*. This social philosophy which arose during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries demanded the minimum interference by the government in economic and social affairs. Business men resented any attempt on the part of society to interfere with what they regarded as their right to make money as they saw fit. Government should restrict itself to keeping peace and order, and should let natural laws, such as the law of free competition and the law of supply and demand, reign supreme.

The doctrine of *laissez faire* was in part a reaction against the excessive and irritating restrictions placed on trade and business by the grasping monarchs of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Some of these restrictions were relics of the guild system and even of feudal days. Not only business, but the free movement of labor, had been hindered. Another cause was the doctrine of "natural law" and "natural rights," held so strongly during the eighteenth century. Men believed that there were natural laws which, if left to themselves, would work for the best interests of all, and that nature would regulate wages, prices, supply and demand in the most equitable way. During the latter part of the nineteenth century this belief expressed itself in the biological form of the doctrine of natural selection and the survival of the fittest. In the United States, especially, individualism was strengthened by pioneer conditions. As settlers moved westward and faced hostile Indians and the obstacles of nature, they could not be bound by plans or regulations. Individualism probably was the best means of conquering a rugged continent. An increasing number of persons, however, are questioning its adequacy to deal with the problems of the intricate industrial mechanism of the twentieth century. The philosophy of the days of the oxcart may be inadequate for the days of automobiles and airplanes.

Two movements or trends are in evidence today. One is the attempt on the part of our business and industrial leaders to control the mechanism from within through self-regulation. The other is an attack upon certain features of the industrial system itself and an attempt on the part of society to regulate business and to take some functions outside the realm of private business. In this chapter we

shall consider the attempt by business men to set their own house in order through the setting up of codes or standards of correct practice. Business men are coming to see that unless they establish high ethical standards for business, society is almost certain to set up regulatory measures or even to take more functions out of the hands of men in private business.

DEVELOPMENT OF BUSINESS ETHICS

The business man of earlier days was likely to operate on the policy of *caveat emptor*—let the buyer beware. Business was business, and he was “not in business for his health.” He might have two ways of dealing—one for the people he knew and with whom he expected to conduct future business, and another for the stranger who would probably not come his way again. He must tell the truth to his regular customers or they would patronize a rival in the future, and a rival was regarded as an enemy to be distrusted. The merchant felt that he had a right to ask any price that he pleased. Was not the business his own and did he not own the articles? He might ask a big price in the beginning and then reduce it if there was a chance that he would lose the sale otherwise. Business proceeded on the theory that the man who was purchasing was expected to take care of himself in the transaction.

In contrast to the above, the business man of today is more likely to operate on the slogan “the customer is always right,” or at least on a money-back guarantee if the article is not as specified. Reputable firms operate on a one-price policy and aim at truth in advertising.

Since the beginning of the century there has been a constant demand on the part of enlightened business leaders and of the public for an improvement in business standards. This movement has expressed itself in such diverse ways as Theodore Roosevelt’s campaign against corruption, the emphasis upon the “social gospel” in the churches, and in the development of hundreds of codes of ethics for business and professional groups.

The American “trade association” represents the voluntary regulation of an industry from within. It is an organization of business men or employers and is to be clearly distinguished from the trade

union which is an association of workers. Business men, through their trade associations, are attempting to elevate and to standardize their practices just as they are also attempting to standardize terms, forms of contract, products, and the like. Hundreds of codes of ethics have been adopted by trade associations and other groups of business men.¹ Two organizations have been especially active in promoting the movements for higher ethical standards and practices—Rotary International and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America.

In 1910 the National Association of Rotary Clubs was formed and the president appointed a committee on business methods whose task was the promotion of fair dealing in business. During the years 1921-23, in the post-war period when business standards were at a low ebb, Rotarians were urged to use their influence as members of their trade associations to secure the adoption of a written code of correct business practices, or to improve existing codes. By 1924 fifty-one trade associations had written and adopted codes, and since that time the number has grown rapidly.

Up until 1921 many of the codes were high-sounding phrases and business platitudes, so indefinite and general that they had little practical significance. They were, however, steps in the right direction, and they tended to prepare men's minds for more specific codes of standards of correct practice.

Rotary International in its pamphlet, "Codes of Standards of Correct Practice," points out and illustrates six unsatisfactory types of written codes. They are: (1) The old type which was made up of general statements of ethical conduct in business. To advocate a "true spirit of justice" does not tell the person in doubt what to do. (2) Codes of the creedal or pledge type. To pledge oneself "to truth, justice, and courage" may leave one's views and practices unchanged. (3) Statements of general business principles. To give "equitable consideration" to "capital, management, employees, and the public." (4) Selfish or self-interest codes. Principles contrary to public welfare are out of place in a code of ethics. (5) The resolution type of code. Resolutions passed at different conventions cannot be

¹See Edgar L. Heermance, *The Ethics of Business*, Harper and Brothers, 1926,

kept in mind for the guidance of actual practice. (6) Codes which are not complete in the sense that they omit one or more of the important trade or craft relationships, such as that between employer and employee.

ROTARY'S FRAMEWORK FOR AN ADEQUATE CODE

An adequate code, according to Rotary, covers five and possibly six principal business relationships,

(a) The relationship between employer and employee. (b) The craftsman's relationship with those from whom he makes purchases. (c) The craftsman's relationship with his fellow-craftsmen. (d) The craftsman's relationship with the general public and with the government. (e) The craftsman's relationship with his patrons and prospective customers.

Certain businesses have an additional relationship with an interlocking profession, as for example, the druggist with the doctor, the builder with the architect. In such crafts, there are six relationships necessary in the adequate code.²

In order to guide trade associations in the formation of adequate codes, Rotary International has prepared a skeleton code which gives the framework, topics to be considered, etc. It is hoped that this will prevent serious omissions and that the building of national codes around a fairly uniform plan will facilitate the drafting of composite codes at some later date when an international code for each craft may be possible. Such a development would help to eliminate misunderstandings between the citizens of different nations and be a force in fostering international peace and good will. The suggested skeleton code is as follows:

A preamble stating the exact title of the craft for whose guidance the code is written, the qualifications for membership, and the personal character qualifications of the proprietor or executive officer, if it be a corporation.

Section 1. The Relationship of Employer and Employee.

The rules of conduct under this section cover methods of employment, assimilation of new employees, opportunities for advancement, training,

²Pamphlet entitled "Codes of Standards of Correct Practice," Rotary International (211 W. Wacker Drive, Chicago), 1931, p. 28.

permanency of occupation, working conditions, discharge from service, disputes, recreational facilities, etc.

Section 2. The Craftsman's Relationship with those from whom he makes purchases.

The rules of conduct under this section include treatment of salesmen (audience, interviews, truthful statements of facts, etc.), purchasing methods, conditions of purchase, containers, f.o.b. delivery, quality purchases, etc.

Section 3. The Craftsman's Relationship with his Fellow-Craftsmen.

The rules of conduct under this section deal with co-operation, unfair practices, provisions which work for the benefit of each and all in the craft, etc. (Note: the rules under this section must not be written in the narrow spirit of craft clannishness, which seeks only mutual self-interest.)

Section 4. The Craftsman's Relationship with professional men whose professions are interlocked with the craft (such as druggists with physicians, builders with architects, etc.).

The rules of conduct under this section are quite technical in character, but are necessary to the code. Professional codes should include similar rules of conduct, so that the reciprocal relations of the professional craftsman with the business craftsman are covered.

Section 5. The Craftsman's Relationship with the public in general and with the government.

The rules of conduct under this section cover the maintenance and observance of local, state, and federal laws, public service, and participation in community betterment movements (civic, charitable, and philanthropic).

Section 6. The Craftsman's Relationship with his customers or clients.

The rules of conduct under this section deal with advertising methods, quality of goods, delivery, physical equipment of the plant, etc.; and the unethical practices of substitution, adulteration, etc.

Section 7. The Making and Executing of Contracts, with special reference to specifications.

This is included as a special heading not only because of its importance, but to avoid splitting the topic in its phases under six previous sections. The rules of conduct under this section specifically define the making and executing of contracts, and the framing of specifications, so that all parties to the contract are mutually benefited.

Section 8. Wrong Practices.

The rules of conduct under this section are general rules of conduct which cannot be included logically elsewhere, particularly rules of conduct seeking the elimination of commercial bribery (commonly called "graft").

*A concluding section, or rearword, placing an obligation on all members of the craft to a fearless and faithful performance of the duties prescribed, and required observance of the code by those who desire to continue membership in the association.*³

ACTIVITIES OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States has also encouraged business men to give more attention to elevating the standards and practices of business. A resolution passed in 1924 stated that "the function of business is to provide for the material needs of mankind, and to increase the wealth of the world and the value and happiness of life."⁴ During the same year fifteen Principles of Business Conduct were set forth in part to codify the habits and standards already in existence and to aid and guide in constructing a practical, ethical business platform. As will be seen below, the statements are general and somewhat vague. They do, however, represent a step in advance and point out the direction toward which more specific instructions should go.

I.

THE FOUNDATION of business is confidence, which springs from integrity, fair dealing, efficient service, and mutual benefit.

II.

THE REWARD of business for service rendered is a fair profit plus a safe reserve, commensurate with risks involved and foresight exercised.

III.

EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION is due in business alike to capital, management, employees, and the public.

³ "Codes of Standards of Correct Practice," *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

⁴ Pamphlet entitled "Principles of Business Conduct," a resolution passed at the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States at Cleveland, Ohio, May 8, 1924,

IV.

KNOWLEDGE—thorough and specific—and unceasing study of the facts and forces affecting a business enterprise are essential to a lasting individual success and to efficient service to the public.

V.

PERMANENCY and continuity of service are basic aims of business, that knowledge gained may be fully utilized, confidence established, and efficiency increased.

VI.

OBLIGATIONS to itself and society prompt business unceasingly to strive toward continuity of operation, bettering conditions of employment, and increasing the efficiency and opportunities of individual employees.

VII.

CONTRACTS and undertakings, written or oral, are to be performed in letter and in spirit. Changed conditions do not justify their cancellation without mutual consent.

VIII.

REPRESENTATION of goods and services should be truthfully made and scrupulously fulfilled.

IX.

WASTE in any form—of capital, labor, services, materials, or natural resources—is intolerable, and constant effort will be made toward its elimination.

X.

EXCESSES of every nature—inflation of credit, over-expansion, over-buying, over-stimulation of sales—which create artificial conditions and produce crises and depressions are condemned.

XI.

UNFAIR COMPETITION, embracing all acts characterized by bad faith, deception, fraud, or oppression, including commercial bribery, is wasteful, despicable, and a public wrong. Business will rely for its success on the excellence of its own service.

XII.

CONTROVERSIES will, where possible, be adjusted by voluntary agreement or impartial arbitration.

XIII.

CORPORATE FORMS do not absolve from or alter the moral obligations of individuals. Responsibilities will be as courageously and conscientiously discharged by those acting in representative capacities as when acting for themselves.

XIV.

LAWFUL CO-OPERATION among business men and in useful business organizations in support of these principles of business conduct is commended.

XV.

BUSINESS should render restrictive legislation unnecessary through so conducting itself as to deserve and inspire public confidence.⁵

VALUE OF WRITTEN CODES FOR TRADE ASSOCIATIONS

Why have codes of conduct been written by several hundred trade associations and other groups? Business life today is exceedingly complex. Each new specialty and each new relationship adds to the difficulties of maintaining correct standards, and of knowing which business practices are right and which are wrong. If there is a clear-cut statement representing the best minds of the members of the group, it is a definite aid in helping men to act honorably. An individual knows what is expected of him, and what he may reasonably expect of others. Even though a man earnestly desires to do the right thing, that desire in itself does not guarantee that he will do the right and wise thing. The practices of conscientious men vary widely. The written code, if sufficiently specific, and if it represents the mature judgment of the group, replaces the caprices of individual judgments with consistent ethical standards.

Some trade associations which do not as yet have written codes say that they have a "gentlemen's agreement" to maintain high ethical standards, others state that they accept the Golden Rule as a sufficient guide. The difficulty, however, is that the individual needs guidance as to what is honorable conduct in specific situations or as to just what the Golden Rule means when applied. If each individual does what he wishes others to do in dealing with him, there may still be a confusion of practices since individual wishes vary.

⁵ "Principles of Business Conduct," *op. cit.*

Written codes ordinarily deal only with those problems about which there is or may be an honest difference of opinion. They do not attempt to duplicate the general moral code, nor to condemn ordinary intentional dishonesty. They help a man who wants to do the right act to know what that right act is in the particular situation.

FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE

When we turn from the ethical codes which trade associations have set up, to the actual practices of business men, what do we find? There is a considerable degree of agreement on the part of students of business ethics that the business man has not applied his ethical ideals in his business practices as fully as might be desired and expected.

Most business men are quite frankly motivated by the desire to make money. Consequently, they have tolerated practices which forward that end even though those practices have tended to exploit the public. In recent scandals involving both political and business leaders, such as the Teapot Dome episode, the guilty public officials were ousted in disgrace whereas the business men continued to retain their positions. Business men scorned the governmental investigating committees rather than the officials and practices which were exposed. Business men have permitted to continue a great many practices which the moralist must condemn. One observer says, "If private corporate management were subject to the same scrutiny and publicity as community management, the scandals would shock the nation."⁶

The general public has found it difficult to understand why business organizations have contested so bitterly the passage of the pure-food laws and other regulatory and social legislation. Such actions on the part of business men have led some of their more bitter critics to refer to modern business as "a conspiracy against the public interest." One critic says:

But while their code proclaims undying devotion to their country and their flag, they are frequently engaged, while sitting around those tables, in discussing how they can circumvent their country's laws and squeeze more profits out of their countrymen. Many of these sweet, ethical love

⁶J. T. Flynn, "Business and Ethics," *Forum* LXXX (1928), p. 542.

feasts around the table have kept the Federal Trade Commission, the utility commissions, the grand juries, district attorneys, and other agencies busy protecting the public from the glorious consequences of the newer ethics.⁷

The same writer goes on to say.

When the great corporation official who exploits his corporation is written down by business men as a grafter, like the public official who exploits his city and country, then there will be some excuse for boasting of the "morals of modern business."⁸

The unethical practices with which the business man must deal include the following: bribery, called the greatest curse of modern business and often put in the form of presents, commissions, checks in the mail, and even trips to Europe; adulteration; misbranding; misrepresentation in advertising; disparaging competitors and hiring employees away from them; breaking contracts; profiteering, and the like.

An examination of the bulletin, *Notices of Judgment Under the Food and Drugs Act*, of the Food and Drug Administration of the United States Department of Agriculture will disclose the details of a large number of cases of adulteration and misbranding of foods and drugs. In most cases a fine or a decree of condemnation and forfeiture was imposed by the court.

The codes of ethics which have been accepted among business groups have given more attention to the relations among competitors, and it is in this field that the greatest changes have taken place. If this does not mean merely getting together to make the public pay, then it registers a step in advance. Undoubtedly there is room for a great improvement in relationships between business and laboring groups, and in the development of a sense of social responsibility where the interests of the consumer are at stake. One weakness of this attempt to elevate the practices of business men is that there is no guarantee that trade associations will act in the public interest.

On the other hand, the growth and complexity of modern indus-

⁷ Flynn, *op. cit.*, pp. 541-542.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 544.

try, and especially of our financial and credit mechanism is an indication of a widespread standard of integrity. The "Truth-in-Advertising" movement carried on by the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World, and the work of the Better Business Bureaus have done considerable in the way of raising standards of practice. Good will and confidence are essential elements in the whole scheme of business activity as conducted today.

ENFORCEMENT OF BUSINESS CODES

Is it desirable and possible for business men to use any methods of enforcement of their codes? In the past the only sanctions widely used have been the business man's own desire or conscience and the pressure of public opinion. Yet if business men are not to be rigidly controlled by law, they must regulate their own businesses.

Each trade association might well set up a standing committee on business ethics and practices. Such a committee could receive complaints both from members and from the customers of members, investigate these complaints, and recommend action where necessary. The collection of cases which have presented actual problems for business men, together with their analysis, explanation, and adjudication by a competent committee, would provide for a cumulative set of precedents. Such material would be an invaluable aid in dealing with new cases or problems. Today the business groups which make any effort at enforcement are in the minority. The codes are "explanatory and illustrative, but not administrative."⁹ The business man dislikes mandatory rules, especially sanctions which subject him to penalties. He relies more upon public opinion and the establishment of inner control.

Each person may do something to help improve business standards and practices. Each citizen exerts not only political influence, but also some economic power. If he is careful to purchase merchandise made and sold under fair and honorable principles and conditions, he will help raise the ethical standards of business. The problem for the consumer is how to find out what merchandise is of high quality and made under fair conditions. A beginning is being made, since

⁹Taeusch, *Professional and Business Ethics*, pp. 263ff.

some information is available from such organizations as Consumers' Research, Consumers' Union of the United States, Consumers' League, and Co-operative Distributors. Professor Heermance says,

To know the codes of ethics of the tradesmen and professional men with whom you are dealing, to know what you as customer or client have a right to expect of them, to hold them to their standard, to lend them your support in putting down unethical practices, to follow those standards yourself in your dealings with them—will help to build up the community sentiment which is the basis of all social ethics.¹⁰

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Write a brief report upon the "codes of fair competition" and the "code authorities" set up under the National Industrial Recovery Administration. These interesting experiments, while different from the efforts on the part of a group to establish higher standards for itself, represented attempts on the part of the government to bring together representatives of conflicting interests for the purpose of formulating a fairer code of competition.
2. John Robbins, after working for three months as supervisor of a specialized process in a knitting mill, is refused more salary. The superintendent took the ground that his first month was really a training period at the expense of the company and that they could not give a raise so soon. Shortly after this John stops after work at the office of a competing mill where his friend is employed. This mill needs an additional supervisor and John is offered the position at a substantial increase in salary. The situation involves John and his wife, his superintendent, the official in the competing mill, and also his fellow employees. Here are rival claims and the possibility of ill feeling. What should be done? *Business and Ideals*, The Inquiry, 129 East 52nd St., New York City. For discussion of the problem involved in the above case, see pp. 12-22.
The following cases are quoted from E. W. Lord, *The Fundamentals of Business Ethics*, The Ronald Press Company, pp. 175, 181, 187.
3. " 'Mocha and Java' is a trade name of a high-grade coffee, presumably imported from the East Indies. A coffee importer sells a mixture of Santos and Colombian coffees—grades costing much less and usually considered less desirable—under the name 'M. and J. Coffee.' The

¹⁰ Edgar L. Heermance, *The Ethics of Business*, Harper and Brothers, 1926, p. 218.

price asked is less than that of Mocha and Java, but considerably above that for Santos and Colombian. Is it ethical?"

4. "In an eastern city building contractors have a secret organization. When an architect asks for bids, the contractors agree among themselves which one of their number shall get the award and fix the amount of his bid at a figure high enough to assure a large profit. The others present bids just enough higher to make it appear that they are competing. In this way the contractors are able to divide the business proportionately among themselves and to avoid loss through under-bidding. Comment on the ethical points involved."
5. "The Primo Pen Company, manufacturers of fountain pens, puts out pens priced on the label at fictitious figures, far above cost, thus making possible apparent great reductions. A retailer handling these pens advertises 'Five dollar pens at \$1.25.' At \$1.25 the pen is fair value. Can the transaction be defended?"
6. "The Boreas Milling Company sells common corn meal, packed in two-pound cartons labeled 'Mazatone,' as a breakfast cereal. The meal, which is worth about two cents a pound in bulk, in this guise is sold for five cents a pound. Comment on the ethical aspects of the business."

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Chapter XXII

MORAL PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

IN THE PREVIOUS chapter we pointed out the attempt on the part of business men to raise the standard of practice in business. Business men usually assume that the system itself is satisfactory and that all that is necessary is to eliminate certain abuses or evil practices. In the present chapter we shall consider certain ethical problems regarding the industrial system itself.

We live in a commercial or industrial civilization. Just as medieval society built cathedrals and stressed salvation, so our modern society builds factories and stresses profits. Capitalism is that doctrine which emphasizes the private ownership of the instruments of production, distribution, and exchange, and operates them under a system of open competition and individual initiative for private profit, with a minimum of governmental interference.

CRITICISMS OF THE INDUSTRIAL ORDER

An examination of recent literature, as well as conversations with widely separated groups in modern society, will convince one that there is widespread dissatisfaction with present social and industrial conditions. A few of the main criticisms directed against the present industrial order from an ethical point of view will be considered.

Extreme and Unfair Inequality

When the writers of the Declaration of Independence declared that "all men are created equal," they were not stating a fact but a moral ideal. During recent centuries there has been a tremendous drive toward greater equality and toward the elimination of artificial and unfair inequalities. In the past we have seen this movement break down barriers of race and class distinctions, such as property quali-

fictions, religion, and sex. The struggles for civil and political equality, the fight for emancipation of the slaves, and the woman suffrage movement have been parts of the drive toward greater freedom and equality. Today men are complaining of the inequalities in connection with wealth, power, risks, and work.

(1) *The Inequality of Wealth.* The ownership of the great wealth produced by industrial nations is highly concentrated, so that fabulous riches exist side by side with the most degrading poverty. Recent studies show how much more rapidly wealth and income accumulate among those having the larger incomes. Between 1922 and 1929 while the total income of the United States increased 16 per cent, the incomes of persons having \$5,000 a year or more were increased 126 per cent. In each case, as we move to the higher income brackets, the percentage of increase is greater. Incomes of \$1,000,000 or more increased over 665 per cent.

In 1929, J. P. Morgan and his seventeen partners are said to have held ninety-nine directorships in seventy-two corporations with combined assets of about \$20,000,000,000. A study of industrial and financial corporations in the United States, of the salaries and bonuses paid, and of the ways in which fortunes are often made by manipulation and speculation is an amazing revelation. Yet in 1929, at the end of a "prosperous era" when it was estimated that an income of about \$2,000 was the amount needed to support a family in health and decency, more than 16,000,000 families, or 60 per cent of the total, had incomes below that standard. Nearly 6,000,000 families, or more than 21 per cent were getting incomes of less than \$1,000 a year.

The great fortunes of the few tend to pile up so rapidly that the masses of people with their small incomes cannot possibly buy the goods which they produce. Consequently, we have such amazing spectacles as shoe workers going barefooted because purchasing power is so unequally divided that they cannot buy the shoes which they make, when these shoes are put on the market for sale. We also see the destruction of foodstuffs in an attempt to keep prices up while at the same time large sections of the population are hungry. Professor H. A. Overstreet thinks that "a maturely moral society will be one in which the very thought of large fortunes will elicit the same

kind of disgust as is elicited by an act of boorishness or poor sportsmanship."¹

(2) *The Unequal Distribution of Power.* The unequal distribution of wealth means an unequal distribution of power. Men with great wealth and property gain control over the lives, the thoughts, and the standard of living of many others. Today a comparatively small group of men control our natural resources (iron, coal, oil, gas, etc.), our industries, our public utilities.²

Even more serious than the control of material resources is the control over the avenues of opinion made possible by the concentration of wealth. The newspapers, radios, and movies are not free from control. Our newspapers are great business enterprises whose policies are determined in the main by monetary considerations. They print what will sell and what will help their business interests and please their advertisers. In the selection of the facts to be printed, a presentation of one half of the truth, or of one side of an issue may be even more insidious in its distorting effect upon public opinion than printing the false. The totally false is more easily denied or refuted. The blue-penciling of speeches for the radio, and block booking in the moving-picture industry, must also be taken into account.

(3) *The Unequal Distribution of Risks.* While the risks to life, limbs, and health are the most serious of all, in this section we are thinking more directly in terms of economic risks. Some persons and classes appear to bear an unfair proportion of the risks involved in our business organizations. Depletion, obsolescence, depreciation funds, and other reserves set aside to meet the risks of the depletion of mines, the replacement of factories and their equipment, and the payment of dividends during idle periods are recognized by our courts as legitimate charges against running expenses. Until recently no such provision for the care and security of the workers in these enterprises has been made.

A modern economist, discussing business risks, states the issue very clearly in the following paragraph:

¹H. A. Overstreet, *We Move in New Directions*, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1933, p. 62.

²W. H. Laidler, *Concentration of Control in American Industry*, T. Y. Crowell Company, 1931.

The contrast between our current methods of paying laborers and the methods of remunerating investors and owners throws more light on the problem of unemployment than do the conditions of modern industry. When it rains or freezes, when it is too hot or too cold to work, when slack seasons and slack years, or inefficiency and miscalculations of management temporarily interrupt the flow of work, the wage-earner is required not only to wait until the management can use him, but also to do it at his own expense. Such waiting is not considered a cost of the industry in which he invests his labor and he is not paid for it. Similarly when managerial efficiency and technical improvements displace or render laborers obsolete, industry cuts off their income.³

After telling how dividends and interest payments have been stabilized by building up reserves for the purpose, he says:

In contrast with this doling out of dividends to investors in periods when their industries are not working or only partly working, consider what the same business managements do to their wage-earners. During the year 1930 while business was so seriously depressed, yet maintaining and increasing dividend and interest payments, the wages of working people declined by almost \$10,000,000,000.

While the incomes of wage-earners fluctuate in correspondence with business cycles, the incomes of the investment entrepreneur classes (excepting farmers) mount steadily upward.⁴

(4) *The Unequal Distribution of Work.* The last inequality which we shall discuss here is the circumstance that some persons work hard all their lives and even then eke out only a bare subsistence, while others live their entire lives in luxury and do little or no work at all. Some persons live on the income of property alone, even though they may have secured their possessions through no social contribution whatever.

While men may amass fortunes through the exercise of great ability and through social inventions, they also do amass them by such means as monopolies, adulterations, speculation and manipulation, racketeering and other forms of graft, and by inheritance. When

³W. M. Leiserson, "Who Bears the Business Risks?" *Survey Graphic*, March, 1931, p. 596.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 597.

some men live without working, or by work which is essentially parasitic, they cause others to bear an extra burden.

During recent years owing to the codes established under the National Industrial Recovery Administration, to the efforts of labor unions, and to other causes, there has been a reduction in the hours of work. Just a few years ago, while some men were working twelve hours a day, millions of other men could find no work at all. Some men were degenerating because of long hours and excessive fatigue, while others were becoming demoralized because they could find no work. Are we to face increasing unemployment brought about by efficient methods of management, improved machinery, and new processes of manufacture? Is it any comfort to tell us that those who are employed shall earn more, if fewer and fewer shall be called to work and more and more added to the lines of the unemployed? Should one class, or should society reap the rewards of new inventions? Should a single class, or society as a whole, bear the burdens of social adjustment? These are not merely economic problems, they are also ethical issues. Recent legislative enactments have attempted to meet this problem in a way which has not been done before in this country.⁵

Waste and Inefficiency

Why is it, in an age of machinery and power, that everyone does not have an abundance of food and clothing and the other good things of life? A part of the answer is that the aim of the industrial system is not primarily to supply human needs, but to make money. A part of the answer is also that the system is wasteful and inefficient. For the details and the evidence the student should consult the large and growing number of books and articles on this topic. Here, I shall merely point out briefly a few of the fields where the greatest wastes are to be found.

Waste and inefficiency in methods of production account for a considerable loss in human effort. These wastes include excess plant capacity causing greater overhead expenses, failure to standardize the

⁵For example, the Social Security Act and the Work Relief Act of 1935, as well as numerous acts designed to assist in the stabilization of industry.

product and to take advantage of improvements, failure to plan and to co-ordinate the industry on sound engineering principles. The waste along these lines is sometimes estimated to run as high as 50 per cent in some industries. To productive inefficiency must be added the waste due to the production of useless or even harmful commodities which detract from, rather than add to, human welfare. This would include such things as the drug and patent medicine traffic, adulteration of other goods, and super-luxuries.

Waste in methods of distribution can be illustrated by the cross-hauling of perhaps a dozen milk delivery cars in an area that could easily be supplied by one or two cars, if the delivery were made on some systematic basis. In the United States we hardly need one retail store for every twenty-six families as at present. When we add to this the expense of high pressure salesmanship and advertising, the loss in excess man power runs into millions.

Even during prosperous periods one to three million men are out of work. In the United States the figure during the last few years has probably not fallen below ten million men. This is a burden which society can hardly afford to carry. Most of these men desire to work, but society as now organized is unable to provide opportunities for employment. With an abundance of raw materials and a considerable section of the population underfed and underclothed, this condition is deplorable.

From many sources we hear protests against the criminal exploitation of our great natural resources, such as the forests, mines, oil, natural gas, and soil. As a nation we have carelessly used or wasted what should have been the heritage of future generations. In the case of oil we have been told that, in the drive for immediate profits, methods have been used which have led to the loss of an amount equal or greater than that which has been refined and used. Our natural resources are too limited to excuse the wasteful exploitation that now prevails. If they are to remain in private hands, greater public control will probably be necessary.

During the World War when nearly a third of the industrial workers were in military service or engaged in producing military supplies, the remaining workers were able to supply the army and

the civilian population with the necessities of life and in addition send great quantities of goods abroad. Stuart Chase has pointed out that, if society could be organized as an engineer might organize it, the present workers in America could probably substantially raise the standard of living and abolish poverty and ugliness, while working shorter hours and using less raw material.

Lack of Planning from a Human Point of View

A third indictment of present-day society is the lack of planning from a human point of view. There is a growing conviction on the part of thoughtful, well-informed, and unbiased persons that some form of social planning is necessary. These persons demand that we apply the same foresight, rationality, and organization that we apply to our businesses, to the abolition of human misery and economic maladjustment, and to the raising of the standard of living for the masses. If we were planning from a human point of view, child labor and sweat shops would go at once, the aged would be cared for, and the workers would be insured against unemployment. A way would also be found to bring about some redistribution of income so that there would be an effective money demand for the goods which our factories are able to produce. Collective action for the good of all persons would seem to be a demand of mature morality.

An objection frequently raised against social planning is that men should not interfere with the natural laws which are said to operate in the field of economics. Three considerations should be taken into account. One is that a failure to plan is probably in part responsible for the increasing severity of the depressions and of much of our present maladjustment. Another is that we do not hesitate to control the action of natural laws in such fields as physics, chemistry, and physiology. We manipulate these laws so that they will produce health rather than disease, and serve our interests in other ways. In like manner, we must control "economic laws" so that they will operate in the direction of abundance and a higher standard of living, as bases for the development of a good life. If the use of intelligence is valuable, then it is an ethical demand. Moral action is intelligent

action. A final consideration is whether what we sometimes call "economic laws" are really laws at all. They may be merely tendencies toward a particular action under certain conditions. When these conditions are changed, other results are in evidence. These "economic laws" are based on assumed human reactions which are not inevitable or unchangeable.

ADDITIONAL MORAL PROBLEMS

Competition and Self-interest

Among the many problems of our modern industrial civilization, the question of the validity of our methods of competition under private enterprise is an important one. Economic competition is rivalry in the buying and selling of goods and services. Society in effect says to each person:

Choose your own occupation. Produce what you like. What you do, to whom you sell, what or from whom you buy, the prices you get or give, are all your own concern. You are free, subject to a few restrictions, to produce whatever you wish regardless of whether or not it is needed, regardless of whether or not too much of it already exists. You are likewise free to refrain from engaging in any occupation no matter how acute may be the shortage of goods or how pressing the need for your help. You are free to buy from whoever is willing to sell and to sell to whoever is willing to buy. You are equally free to refuse to buy or sell whenever you please and for any reason or no reason.⁶

An ardent defender of capitalism thinks that, if everyone had a fair start, it would be difficult to devise a system more likely to produce good results from human nature.

The present system under which we work and exchange our work for that of others is that commonly described as Capitalism. Under it each one, male or female, can choose what work he will try to do and what employer he will try to serve; if he does not like his job or his employer, he can leave it or him and try to get another. He cannot earn unless he can do work that somebody wants to buy, and so he competes with all

⁶S. H. Slichter, *Modern Economic Society*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1931, p. 36.

other workers in producing goods or services that others want and will pay for.⁷

Competition was not only the "life of trade," according to early business conceptions, but ethical justification was found in the theory that if business men sought their own self-interest through competition, the result would be social well-being and progress.

Today few persons, if any, would defend the position that the pursuit of self-interest will usually promote the common good. Competition alone is inadequate, under modern conditions, to make a fair adjustment between wages, profits, and prices, or to secure the interests alike of workmen, employers, and the general public.

The ethical problems which have arisen in connection with competition are due in the main to changes in the conditions of business and industry. Under the handicraft system of earlier days the purchaser bought merchandise whose price and quality he was usually able to judge. Under modern methods of mass production, corporation control, advertising, and salesmanship, the buyer is often at the mercy of a system which he does not clearly understand. Larger and fewer units are the order of the day. Concentration of ownership and control is proceeding rapidly in nearly all lines of production.

Is "free competition" any longer a reality? One may be legally free to compete with some of our billion-dollar corporations, but is such freedom anything more than theoretical? There is a strong drive in modern industry toward the elimination of competition, and we are witnessing the truth of the statement that competition tends to beget combination. The rise of trusts, mergers, and trade associations is evidence of the tendency to eliminate or to restrict competition. With the narrowing of the area of competition, there is a growing demand for society to regulate and control essential industries or to take such activities out of the realm of private enterprise and run them as public services.

When the market is controlled or manipulated by private individuals or small groups, do we have any assurance that the market

⁷Hartley Withers, *The Case for Capitalism*, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1920, p. 13.

price is a fair or just price? Changed conditions have upset the balance between supply and demand. To restrict the output and to raise prices may be for the business man's advantage. From the point of view of human welfare it may be distinctly harmful. Recent investigations have disclosed such discrepancies in price as that of codliver oil landed in the United States for seven cents but selling for \$1.25. Cases have been found where the retail price is five, ten, and even fifty times the manufacturing cost. From the standpoint of morality, no man can claim a right to do anything which will detract from the total value of human living.

Dominance of the Profit Motive

Profit, in the modern sense, is the surplus earning of a business after costs of production, including implicit costs, have been met. The profit motive is the pull which comes from the possibility of making money in this way. Under the corporate form of business organization where managers in the larger establishments are usually salaried employees, profit is the surplus which is left over after all the costs of the business are taken into account. Thus the word "profit" should not be used as synonymous with income, since there are many forms of income, including wages, salary, rent, interest, dividends, gifts, commissions, and royalties.

The profit motive appears to be merely one of a number of incentives to labor. Along with it must be mentioned the creative urge, the desire for security, the desire for power, public approval and recognition, one's loyalty to a family or group, rivalry, fear, love, religion. There is probably no close relation between creative mental effort and monetary reward. In fact, if a man is thinking primarily in terms of money instead of his workmanship, he will usually not make as good a manager, a laborer, a doctor, or an engineer as he would otherwise.

During the World War when the munition plants after repeated efforts were unable to discover the secret of making platinum gauze which was essential and which was being made by secret processes in Germany, they appealed to the government. A metallurgist in the Philadelphia mint, B. T. Wirth, was assigned to the task. After

continued and repeated effort he solved the problem. For this Wirth received no more than his regular sixty dollars a week and was well satisfied. If monetary reward were the only motive, this result would not have been achieved. Here was a man who for love of his work and love of his country achieved what seemed almost impossible.

The chief indictments of the profit motive are as follows: that an unsocialized type of motivation is used in place of social incentives; that the profit motive frequently leads to waste in production, absurd duplication in the field of distribution, and the promotion of scarcity in the field of consumer's goods; and, from a personal point of view, that it leads to the development of anti-social qualities, in that each man seeks his own interest and becomes the exploiter instead of the protector of others, the weak included. Greater profits may be possible through action which is opposed to public welfare, such as the restriction of the supply of needed articles so that the price may be increased.

The profit motive is the foundation of an acquisitive society in which men reverence the possession of wealth and admire those who get rather than those who give. Men who do not possess wealth may even be considered somewhat unrefined or at least weak. A pressing ethical problem is to discover the conditions under which the profit motive may serve the enrichment of personality, or to supplant this motive by some loftier appeal. As men grow in moral insight, they will increasingly come to emphasize and to stimulate incentives which are social. In discussing this subject, Mr. J. A. Hobson says:

Where a competitive system allows enormous pecuniary rewards for certain sorts of skill and enterprise, these rewards will be sought and claimed, partly for their own sake, partly as the index of success. But were they unattainable, other motives might operate with equal force. Self-assertion, power, good fellowship, exercise of skill and judgment, reputation, not to speak of the satisfaction of doing good useful work—these motives also belong to ordinary human nature. An ordered economic system might make so much of them that the extravagant pecuniary rewards at present paid to lords of industry and professional stars might become unnecessary.⁸

⁸J. A. Hobson, *Economics and Ethics*, D. C. Heath and Company, 1929, p. 252.

In a later chapter we shall discuss some additional problems raised by the corporate form of business organization.

Private Property

Our present economic order of society takes for granted the institution of private property. Private property is the exclusive right to own, enjoy, and dispose of a thing. At an early time such articles usually consisted of clothes, tools or weapons, ornaments, the family hut or shelter, and food in the hut. There was no common practice concerning land, which might be communal or private. Private claim to the ownership of land probably arose with the development of settled agricultural pursuits and with the conquest of one tribe by another. Today the concept, "property," has come to include a wide range of claims.

Who gives the individual or some group within society the right to the exclusive ownership of certain things? Obviously the right is granted by society and may be changed from time to time through changes in custom or in law. If, then, the right to property has been granted by society, why has it been granted? What is its ethical justification?

Private property is justified in so far as it is an instrument in the development of personality. After pointing out the possible value of property in the realization of personality, Hobson says:

But if private property is justified and rationalized by its contribution to personality, two conditions seem to follow. First, every person has a right to acquire property, and a social order which fails to secure this right for all is condemned.⁹

A man has a right to own what he has "mixed his labor with," especially if he uses such things to meet some personal need or to bring enjoyment. But even here a man's rights are limited by the similar claims of others where the material for use is limited. In the case of land, no man is ordinarily allowed to cultivate more than his share. Exclusive rights to any spring or forest or natural resource were not recognized. The second condition Hobson sets forth is that

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 144,

No one has a right to acquire or possess property, excessive in amount, or damaging in the conditions of its making or its utilization, such property being injurious to the personality of its owner, and usually to the personality of others, stinted of their proper share, or otherwise oppressed by the power of an economically stronger person.¹⁰

Private property appears to be justified where a man has contributed to its making, and is capable of utilizing it, and where his possession of it does not interfere with the rights and welfare of other persons. Consequently, the view that all private property is vicious must be rejected. During earlier days property in land and tools was defended because such things were indispensable conditions through which food and clothing, and hence health and efficiency, were provided. The protection of property was therefore the protection of work. With the growth of society, property has come to be an instrument for the acquisition of wealth and the exercise of power. Thus ownership and use have often been divorced. Property, from being a condition of work, has become for many a condition of idleness, and as one writer points out, functionless property is the greatest enemy of legitimate property.¹¹

Private property is ethically indefensible where it is merely a form of private taxation, which one man is permitted to levy on the industry of others. In the development of modern industrialized nations these principles have been largely ignored. In recent times the claim of personal property has been extended to include great areas of land and other natural resources and vast accumulations of capital, even including anticipated profits.¹² Today a small group of men possess vast aggregates of property for which they contributed little or no labor, and which is more than is necessary for the development of their personalities. The only relation which these men often have to their property is that it yields them income since they are the legal owners. Under the modern corporation the owner of property may not even know the nature of the property which he owns, and

¹⁰Hobson, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

¹¹R. H. Tawney, *Acquisitive Society*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1920, chap. V.

¹²J. R. Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, The Macmillan Company, 1932.

therefore he feels no personal responsibility for the effect of the use of this property on human welfare. The modern owner of property may be engaged without his consent in the promotion of war, in the liquor trade, or in the promotion of sweat shops. Mr. R. H. Tawney says:

A mill-owner may poison or mangle a generation of operatives; but his brother magistrates will let him off with a caution or a nominal fine to poison and mangle the next. For he is an owner of property. A land-owner may draw rents from slums in which young children die at the rate of 200 per 1000; but he will be none the less welcome in polite society. For property has no obligations and therefore can do no wrong.¹³

The transition from property for use, to the great accumulations of property for power in the hands of a few, has given to these few persons great power over the lives and destinies of the many. The fact that men have amassed fortunes is no sign that they are qualified to spend that money for the good of others. In fact, this accumulation is in large part responsible for the poverty of the masses, and of the inability of society to render to them an effective service.

A growing recognition of the functional nature of property is seen in the doctrine of "property affected with a public interest." Our courts have recognized the validity of the principle involved, as illustrated by the legislative restrictions placed upon the railroads and other public utilities. Society claims the right to control private property when it is devoted to public use. When a man offers his property for community use, he thereby grants to the community not only an interest in that use, but also the right to regulate it for the common good.

Relations between Capital and Labor

During the early years of the industrial revolution the new machine workers were probably not so well off as they were before these changes had taken place. They often worked as many as sixteen hours while wages were pitifully low. Women and children were drawn into the factories to work under deplorable conditions. The workers and their families lived in poor dwellings without

¹³Tawney, *Acquisitive Society*, p. 80.

proper light, heat, water, or sewage disposal. In these slums disease was prevalent.

When workers attempted to act as individuals, they were helpless. Therefore they organized unions in order to deal more effectively with organized capital, which employed them. While various causes have operated to improve the conditions of labor, laborers have turned toward unions as a means of improving working conditions, of raising the standard of living, and forcing recognition of themselves as persons. These unions may be trade unions organized on the basis of some craft in which the members are working, as the Moulders' Union of North America; or they may be organized along industrial lines including all employed in a particular industry, such as the United Mine Workers.

Today in most industrial communities there is a clear-cut division between employers and laborers, often referred to as "capital" and "labor." It is part of the age-old conflict between those who have and those who have not. The conflicts of interest include: the division of the earnings of the industry between wages and profits; the control of the conditions of labor, including security of position; and the question of relative bargaining power, since each party seeks to strengthen itself economically and politically. Let us briefly consider these three conflicts.

(1) What is an equitable division of the earnings of industry? Shall the employer pay as little as he can, a policy which is short-sighted, even from his own point of view, in the long run? Shall he pay the market scale of wages, which will help him to keep upon good terms with his competitors? Or, shall he pay what he considers to be a comfortable living wage, or even more if business conditions warrant it?

A business is really a co-operative venture. The business man borrows money for which he pays a regular interest rate; he hires managers to whom he pays a salary; and he hires laborers to whom he pays wages. All of these groups make contributions and bear part of the risks. The community also makes its contribution and bears a considerable portion of the risks involved. If there is a surplus from the joint efforts of these groups, to whom should it go? The

surplus may go to the employer-owner in profits, to managers in larger salaries, to the workers in higher wages, or to the public in lower prices or higher quality. In the past the surpluses have gone almost entirely to the owner-employer group regardless of whether the gains have been due to community growth, to science and invention, to education, to efficient management, or to other factors over which the employer may have had little or no control.

(2) Does a worker in an industry have a right to a voice in the control of the conditions under which he works and lives? In America, it is assumed that each citizen has a right to share in the control of the political conditions under which he lives. This right to a share in control has not been extended to industrial relations. We have inherited a tradition of legal and political equality, along with a tradition of economic inequality.

The employer regards the business as his business and, consequently, if workers do not like the conditions which they find, they may look elsewhere for work. The worker, on the other hand, feels that if the democratic ideal is good in political life, it should also apply to what for him is the more important realm of his economic relations. He wants to be considered as a human being and not merely as a commodity to be bought and sold.

(3) If employers have the right to organize, why should not laborers also have an equal right to organize and to present a united front? In organization there is strength, and relative bargaining power may determine whether the surplus shall go to the employer in profit, to the workers in wages, or to the consuming public in lower prices. In the past the employer has had a distinct advantage in bargaining power. This has been made possible by the fact that the state has recognized and protected his property rights in his business, while it does not recognize nor protect the rights of workmen to an adequate standard of living. A second factor in the stronger strategic position of the employer has been the development of the modern corporation with tremendous financial power. The single laborer, or even an organization of workers, is at the mercy of the great billion-dollar corporation.

If bargaining power is not kept fairly equal, the laborer fears

that he will get little or no consideration. Therefore, some of the most bitter labor struggles have centered around the recognition of the labor unions and collective bargaining. The laborer reasons that if the employer may limit his output in order to increase prices and profits, why should not the laborers organize into unions, limit work, and raise wages. He feels that he is treated unjustly when his employer and the public object to his methods.

The right to life is meaningless unless it includes a right to the particular things that make life possible under existing conditions. The development of modern civilization has taken the ownership and control of the instruments of production out of the hands of workers and has left the workers in an extremely precarious position. The laborer feels that he has a right to work, to receive a living wage, and to feel secure in his position.

The Problem of Distribution of Wealth

The question of how wealth and income are distributed among the members of society is most important from the standpoint of ethics. Problems of social welfare and justice are closely related to this problem, and the student of ethics will do well to ask which of the several possible methods of distribution are most conducive to the development of a wholesome society. Five of the methods are as follows:

(1) *Give every man what he produces.* On first thought this seems to be just and to be a practical working plan. This plan was supported by the classical economists of the eighteenth century who believed that a system in which each man looked to his own self-interest would tend to bring the greatest happiness and prosperity to all men. In a simpler industrial society where the labor of one man is the only factor to be considered, this scheme might work. Under methods of mass production it is usually impossible to say what a man produces. The making of a modern desk includes the work of the foresters, woodmen, lumbermen, sailors, railway officials and hands, carpenters, and merchants, to mention only a few of those involved. Here it would be impossible to determine remuneration by what the man produces. A great portion of the world's work is in

the form of services of an intangible sort. What does the doctor, the fireman, the artist, or the housewife produce? Some of the greatest examples of social service, such as motherhood and the rearing of a family, are not paid for at all in any direct way. This approach ignores the moral claims of needs and efforts.

(2) *Let every man get what he can get.* This is "the good old rule, the simple plan, that they shall take who have the power, and they shall keep who can." This is the actual way in which the system of reward according to production works out in contrast to what the traditional economists like to picture. This is the system of distribution with which most persons are familiar. In the struggle for advancement, mental ability, experience, advantageous position due to inheritance, social contacts, or chance, would all enter into the outcome. If a person were selfish or cruel as well as clever, he might become rich. While a merchant would not be allowed to pick your pockets, he could overcharge you and get away with it, if you permitted him to do so. New laws, as well as enlightened public opinion, are constantly restraining the working of this principle.

(3) *Give every man an equal share of what is produced.* Since it is impossible to establish a close relation between money and work, and money and character, and since poverty among the members of any class is degrading to society as a whole, Mr. Bernard Shaw advocates the above method of distribution for society. One condition of a good society is that every person must have enough to enable him to live in health and decency. Except by some small groups of persons and by partners in different lines of activity, this method of equal distribution has not been tried by society. At most, only the superficial things can be shared equally, since it is only these that the laborer, the manager, the artist, and the scientist have in common. The disadvantage of this approach which would treat all persons equally is that the abilities and tastes of men vary widely and what would satisfy the needs of some would be quite unsatisfactory to others. Such a plan is also socially impracticable from the point of view of getting all men to put forth their best efforts.

(4) *Give every man what he needs.* The formula here is "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." If a

man has special ability or skill, his obligation to society is greater than it would be otherwise. Our knowledge and our skill are inheritances which have been built up by countless generations of men and women. They belong to society and not merely to the individual possessor of them. Each man owes a duty to his group, and in turn each man has a right to those things which are essential to a good life insofar as these needs can be met by society. This principle appears to be the accepted mode of procedure in many families where each member does his best to contribute, and then satisfies his needs as they arise from the common store. It is approached rather closely by nations in times of crisis and increasingly during periods of war. It recognizes men as personalities, and yet as differing in desires and capacities. The approach, however, does not recognize sufficiently the relation between distribution and production. In some cases, at least, the claim of needs should be modified in favor of a willingness to produce. Otherwise, the approach might curtail production and be detrimental to human welfare.

(5) *Give each person that which is conducive to a harmoniously functioning society.* A functional society, according to R. H. Tawney, seeks to find what standard of living is conducive to a good society.

A society which aimed at making the acquisition of wealth contingent upon the discharge of social obligations, which sought to proportion remuneration to service and denied it to those by whom no service was performed, which inquired first not what men possess but what they can make or create or achieve, might be called a Functional Society, because in such a society the main subject of social emphasis would be the performance of functions.¹⁴

The well-being of all persons, considered individually and socially, would be the criterion of distribution. All persons would need to receive an income necessary for a decent standard of living and for self-realization. Yet some additional consideration would be made for faithful or special service. For special hazards or for unpleasant tasks larger reward could be given. This approach recognizes hu-

¹⁴Tawney, *Acquisitive Society*, pp. 28-29.

man needs as well as special problems of production, yet its standard is human welfare or a good society.

CAN THE SYSTEM BE REFORMED?

Persons of ethical insight are asking whether the industrial system can be reformed or whether the evils are so deep-rooted that some basic alterations must be made. Recent changes, both in the United States and in the world at large, add to the urgency of the question as to whether we are to cling to the old order or to seek a new one. Institutions do not exist as ends in themselves but derive their value from their contributions to human welfare.

At least three lines of approach are in evidence in the attempt to adjust social organization to human needs. First, in the attempt on the part of business men to establish higher ethical standards and practices in business. In this way many evil practices may be eliminated, and business men will come to feel a keener sense of social obligation. This was discussed in the preceding chapter. Second, in the attempt on the part of society through laws of various kinds to control industrial operations more completely and to guard the interests of consumers, laborers, and even the business man himself. Included in this would be anti-trust legislation, factory laws, pure food and drug acts, and the entire range of recent liberal legislation.

In the third place, there is the tendency, in evidence for a century or more, to take more and more functions out of the realm of private enterprise and profit and to operate them as public services. To-day society operates in whole or in part such public services as the police, post office and parcel post, education (schools and colleges), roads, streets, bridges, parks, museums, art galleries, libraries, provision of weights and measures, shipbuilding, banking, money lending, life insurance, tramways, power plants, waterworks, forestry and irrigation, farming, lighthouses, pilots, ferries, piers and wharves, etc. Nearly all of the functions which could not be included in the above list are subject to some sort of social control in that they are registered, or inspected, as, for example, public conveyances, factories and manufacturing plants, limited companies, doctors, lawyers, brokers, sea captains and mates, legal papers, the hours and conditions of

work, when and how wages shall be paid, the kind and labels of packages in which articles are sold, etc. These restrictions upon the areas of private enterprise have been established by men dedicated to the ideal of liberty and private initiative, yet with a realization that complete personal liberty with unregulated private ownership of the means by which the members of the community live is irreconcilable with the greatest human welfare.

While an examination of all the various types of social philosophy is not possible here, the student will do well to acquaint himself with their fundamental principles and then to evaluate them in the light of their actual or possible bearing upon human welfare. We shall conclude our discussion by suggesting some principles which should be kept in mind during the period of social change.

(1) Our problem is so to direct social changes that there will be a continuous readaptation of institutions to human needs. Our present industrial order is not entirely good nor entirely evil. Social life tends to grow and to expand. This expansion is not always uniform in all phases of society, and hence we have not only social change but social maladjustment. Our task is to recognize these disorders and to work for their elimination.

(2) Certain methods of meeting social problems will lead to disaster whether used by conservatives or by radicals. These include: dogmatic appeals to authority; emotional outbursts or appeals to the mob mind; propaganda and trickery; and brute force. If social changes are more or less inevitable, then we need an openminded, experimental attitude toward the social order of which we are a part.

(3) The democratic ideal is to be accepted as over against the autocratic. Democracy is an ethical ideal as well as a political program; a theory of character as well as a theory of social organization. Democracy must rest upon a free and educated electorate.

(4) The attempt to succeed at the expense of others must give way to the realization that each succeeds in proportion as everyone else succeeds. Co-operation must replace the law of the jungle. We live in a social world of which each person is an integral part.

(5) Finally, persons are ends in themselves. Any institution, or social class, or method that regards persons as "means" instead of as

"ends" is to be condemned. Privilege or position which is gained or maintained at the expense of others, or in the face of the insecurity of others is unethical.

For a better society, we need transformed individuals. A change of systems or programs is not enough. Selfish, dishonest, narrow individuals may ruin any system. Yet the system may predispose men to selfishness or to social service. A system that emphasizes co-operation and social welfare and intelligent planning will make the development of noble individuals possible where it is exceedingly difficult otherwise. *What we need is good men, who are intelligent, and who live in a just society.*

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. List the restrictions or limitations upon private property in modern society, and consider the justice of these restrictions.
2. Society demands special training and proof of competence from the lawyer, the doctor, the sea captain, and the railway engineer. From the business man nothing is expected except the ownership of property or the power to secure the necessary credit. Again, society does not permit the lawyer, the doctor, the sea captain, or the railway engineer to hand over his trade to his son unless the son also has obtained the training and competence required. The son of a business man, however, may inherit his father's business without regard to his training or his mental qualities. Do you think that any evidence of competence or any qualities of character could be demanded of the employer of men? Could any supervision be exercised to see that capital invested was directed into socially valuable production?
3. Two groups of men were involved in the Teapot Dome oil scandal—a group of politicians and a group of business men. The guilty public officials were ousted in disgrace within a comparatively short time, and the United States Senate worked hard, and against considerable opposition, to clean house. The business men involved, on the other hand, hung on to their positions, and business as a whole appeared to be more irritated at the governmental investigations than at the persons involved in the scandals. How is this to be explained?
4. A large manufacturer of food is considerably perplexed. In order to secure certain large orders he must give personal tips and favors (e.g., a trip to Europe) to the buying agent or salesmen of a certain large

concern. He needs the business to keep his plant going and his men working, yet he disapproves of these commissions or tips. Should he give the favors or let his competitors have the business?

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Chapter XXIII

MARRIAGE AND SEX RELATIONS

THE FAMILY or the home is the basic institution of human society. Like other institutions the family is the objectification of certain physical and psychological needs of man. The family at its best serves biological, social, and spiritual purposes. As a biological institution the family provides for the propagation of the race. As a social institution the family provides for the social and spiritual development of man by meeting the need for companionship with a person of the opposite sex and by cultivating sympathy, love, and mutual care.

The family is based on the sex impulse which is a natural craving. The sex impulse is found in all normal, healthy persons. Like hunger, it is a normal desire; yet unlike hunger it does not need such constant satisfaction and it is more easily sublimated or expressed through other channels of activity. There is nothing unclean nor evil about the sex impulse. By itself, it is morally neutral. The sex impulse may be expressed in ways that lead to great happiness and richness of life, or in ways that lead to unhappiness and degradation. The view that matter and the body, and hence the sex impulse, are evil came into Western thought from the East and influenced Christian thinking, especially during the medieval period. Today men realize more fully that the sex impulse is an important part of the self and that its wholesome expression is a condition of self-realization.

Nature has so made men and women that they are not complete in themselves. Every normal person yearns for a mate of the opposite sex, and for the completion and realization of oneself which only such a union can bring. Beginning with adolescence the urge, common to the members of the race, appears, and new interests are in evidence. The majority of young men and women, after a time of waiting or of courtship, are married.

COURTSHIP

Courtship, or the act of wooing, provides opportunity for two persons of the opposite sex to get acquainted with each other and to discover whether they wish to marry. Courtship gives an opportunity for the development of those interests and mutual affections which lead to marriage. Ordinarily the man plays the aggressive role and the woman is expected to be more or less passive, although there is a tendency today in the direction of more initiative on the part of the woman. The woman has played a more active part than has often been realized. Whereas the man adopts the method of active and open search and chase, the woman has had to reach her goal by more indirect and subtle means. A discerning wag once remarked that "courtship is chasing a woman until she catches you." This tendency toward mutual or bisexual selection is, we believe, in the right direction, although the woman will need, in most cases, to continue to emphasize indirect methods.

For considerable sections of the population opportunity for courtship is a real problem. Small apartments and congested quarters provide little opportunity, consequently the automobile to a large extent is taking the place of the parlor of a generation ago. The danger of the automobile is that with privacy it also gives anonymity. Churches and other social organizations that deal with young people can render a fine service by providing wholesome opportunity for courtship. Financial barriers may also restrict courtship, yet the boy with money is not always the boy who will make the best husband. In this connection, the tendency for the girl to insist upon paying her own way is to be encouraged, especially where the boy is no better able to pay for two than is the girl to finance her own entertainment. A girl may also help many times by suggesting things to do which do not involve a large expense.

Courtship may pass through various stages from a mild flirtation to the point where the two fall in love and their engagement follows. The courtship should be of sufficient length so that the couple may become convinced, emotionally and rationally, of the advisability of marriage. Yet a very long engagement period is not advisable. Too

lengthy a period of indecision or too great eagerness on the part of one may lead the relationship to break off. Thus courtship is not an end-in-itself. Some persons derive so much pleasure from winning attention that when one adventure begins to get serious, they break it off and start another one. Other persons go from one "crush" or serious love affair to another until soon it becomes more or less habitual. Such persons are often unable to live a happy married life. Hamilton and MacGowan say in the conclusion of their work:

We believe that almost any unmarried man or woman who has already had ten or a dozen serious love affairs had better go on loving and losing—or running away—instead of loving and getting married.¹

How much "freedom" should a person permit the other party in courtship? For young persons with high standards this is a serious question and one which is frequently asked. It cannot be answered by any set of rules, since it depends partly on the persons and on the stage of the courtship. The girl or boy who errs on the side of modesty is usually respected more than the one who is "easy" or "soft." If the young woman permits the freedom expected by some young men, she may lose her own self-respect, yet if she is too aloof she is uninteresting and may be dropped. One young woman remarked to me that she was uncertain as to whether she wanted to marry the young man who was courting her until after they had had such physical contact as kissing. On the other hand, the "petting party" may involve serious emotional and psychological damage and is to be condemned.

Some modern youths carry love-making to the point where it becomes an end-in-itself. When petting results in nervous tension, in irritability, or in excessive daydreaming its effect is definitely unwholesome. Emotional attachments need to be built around comradeship and love rather than upon the physical aspects of sex. The important thing is that the expression of love shall increase mutual confidence and self-respect.

¹G. V. Hamilton and K. MacGowan, *What Is Wrong with Marriage*, Albert and Charles Boni, Inc., 1929, p. 288.

MARRIAGE

The wedding closes the period of courtship, and the two lovers become man and wife. The honeymoon gives the newly married pair an opportunity to make the adjustments to their new status and to face the problems of married life. A simple ceremony followed by a quiet departure that would avoid the nervousness and fatigue so likely to give the marriage relationship a bad start might well become a matter of wedding etiquette and ethics.

The great majority of young persons marry with the hope of genuine happiness and with the expectation that the union will be a permanent one. While a great deal of experimentation has been carried on in the past, the permanent monogamous family has gradually emerged as the one relationship which is considered moral and legal, at least in Anglo-Saxon countries. Promiscuity has never been morally approved. Group marriages have been found among some primitive tribes. Polyandry has existed in a few places under conditions of extreme poverty combined with a scarcity of women. Polygamy has existed among the ruling or wealthy classes in some authoritarian civilizations. Such a relationship probably could not exist in any society where women were respected as free personalities on an equality with men. Thus after numerous experiments in which other forms of sexual relationship have been tried and found inadequate, society in general has arrived at the conviction that sexual intercourse apart from a lifelong monogamous marriage is morally wrong.

Human society has always exercised some control over the sex impulse. This is true both in primitive and in modern times. On the whole, control has taken the form believed by the group to be in the best interests of the individual and of the group. Men do not live alone, but in a world where their actions affect other persons. Apart from the direct effect, their actions tend to weaken or to strengthen the means of control established by the group. Sex mores have perhaps been more deeply rooted and more heavily charged with emotion than other social regulations. Psychologically and socially, the way of sex transgression may be hard.

Upon what facts or conditions is the ethical justification of monogamy based? There are at least three facts that need to be considered. In the first place, society cannot survive unless it can provide stable and wholesome conditions for the propagation, rearing, and nurture of children. The prolongation of infancy in the human species is a fact that cannot be ignored without danger. An examination of the physical, social, psychological, and moral conditions necessary for the healthy development of children will indicate that monogamy is based in part upon the rights of childhood.

In the second place, monogamy is in part a response to the demand for security especially on the part of the woman. Because of her more personal and intimate relation to the birth and rearing of children, the wife does not want to risk being left alone at such a critical period. The same ethical advance that has led to a recognition of the rights of women has tended to strengthen the monogamous family. On the other hand, the husband feels that he has the right to some assurance that it is his wife and his children that he is helping to care for and support. There are mutual rights and mutual duties conducive to the welfare of the individuals and of society that monogamy seeks to respect.

In the third place, love and the higher spiritual qualities which grow out of the marriage relationship are inseparably connected with the ideal of permanence. Sex is as much psychological as physical. Certainly love is much more than physical sex appeal. Apparently the greatest happiness, in the long run, is to be found through exercising the self-control and accepting the limitations of the ideal of monogamy. It provides for mating, for sexual satisfaction, for the security of all members of the family in a way that contributes to man's higher life and to the realization of his personality.

SEXUAL IRREGULARITY—EXTRA-MATRIMONIAL RELATIONS

The immorality of sexual irregularity is not a mere taboo or a puritanical convention if we judge by certain facts which are available. The studies made by Hamilton and MacGowan and by Margaret Sanger agree in indicating that those who were chaste or vir-

gins at the time of marriage were more happily married than the others, and those who had had physical relations with the mates they married or with other persons were distinctly below the average of married happiness.³ In speaking about pre-marital promiscuity, Mrs. Sanger says, "More than any other single factor this has been destructive of mutual happiness in the lives of married people." She points out that physically and mentally the first twenty years or more of life should be a period of conservation and upbuilding. To waste life at an early age in any sexual irregularity is to sacrifice later virility and happiness.

When physical relations are divorced from genuine love for the other person, there is an even greater sense of immorality. Bodily or material values are here placed above the values of the person, and love has been reduced to the mere physical level.

Prostitution represents one of the lowest forms of sexual immorality. This sale of self for money on the part of a woman is a denial of the very heart of morality. Moreover, he who contributes to such practice is supporting an institution which demands the sacrifice of a large number of human beings whose lives are thereby degraded and shortened. Such a person is using another as if she were not a person but a thing. In addition there is the constant risk of disease which may destroy one's own life, contribute to the sterility or invalidism of a wife, or result in the blindness, disease, or death of a child.

Apart from the above considerations, whoever breaks the sex standards of his group helps to undermine an institution which appears to be indispensable for the cultivation of the best life. To claim that one is a willing party to the venture does not justify it. As Canon Streeter points out, publicly to break a regulation which is in the interest of human welfare is an anti-social act, privately to flout such standards encourages secrecy and evasion which tend to be demoralizing. The punishment, in the form of strong public disapproval, which the person who disregards the sex mores has to face in most communities is often severe. If irregularity

³Hamilton and MacGowan, *What Is Wrong with Marriage*, p. 284; Margaret Sanger, *Happiness in Marriage*, Blue Ribbon Publishing Company, 1930, p. 16.

before marriage or infidelity during marriage means the breaking of a socially valuable standard, it is immoral and to be condemned.

CAUSES OF FAILURE IN MARRIAGE

Why are so many persons unable to gain the complete happiness which they hoped for and expected when they entered marriage? Assuming love to begin with, and a marriage should be based upon love to be secure, why does love frequently depart and leave disappointment and a desire to escape? Let us suggest a few causes of failure in marriage.

1. There are various causes related to the sex impulse and act. Undoubtedly sexual maladjustment causes many marriages to end in disaster. Persons who for one reason or another are matrimonial incompetents or are mismated seldom can give or find the happiness which is expected. Persons who are impotent or homosexual, boys who have a mother fixation, or girls who are abnormally attached to their fathers should consult a psychiatrist or a physician before they seriously consider marriage. Pre-marital and extra-marital love affairs are likely to lead to unhappiness, as we have already seen. Ignorance of the fundamental facts concerning sex is a serious barrier to success in marriage. Speaking about the woman, Hamilton and MacGowan say:

If she is badly brought up in childhood and given all manner of prudish revulsions against sex, she is going to become a woman incapable of the complete satisfaction which marriage must give if it is not to be almost unbearable; and if she marries in the face of such disability, she must almost inevitably become a serious mental invalid.³

2. Temperamental differences as well as disparity in education, ability, and general cultural background may lead to friction and to antagonisms which endanger the strengthening of love. Mannerisms, personal habits, and certain traits of character may irritate one's mate. A difference in moral standards and general outlook upon life reveals itself more fully in the closer contacts of married life. Other things being equal, the larger the number of common interests and sympathies and the wider the range of elements in the

³Hamilton and MacGowan, *op. cit.*, pp. 297-298.

common cultural background of the two persons, the greater is the likelihood of happiness.

3. Financial or economic problems and differences are another source of possible friction. Poverty and the inability to save money may become sources of strain. A period of unemployment may cause separation and the wife may lose confidence in her husband or he may lose self-respect. Extravagance and selfishness in the spending of money may lead to quarrels. The employment outside the home of the wife and mother may put an added strain upon the home relationships. Some measurement of agreement is essential for a harmonious relationship.

4. Additional causes of failure in marriage would include disordered or psychopathic personality traits, lack of personal freedom, trouble over children, and friction concerning relatives. In connection with this last point, young married persons should have their own home wherever possible. To live with parents or with relatives is to endanger the marriage relationship from the beginning.

DIVORCE

For various reasons a considerable number of marriages end in failure or in unhappiness and incompatibility. This is the case, whether society grants divorces or refuses to grant divorces to such persons. Granting that the lifelong, happy, monogamous marriage is the ideal and the goal to be sought, what is to be done when love ceases and estrangement results? Is the second best thing to continue the demoralizing marriage relationship, or to attempt to remedy the mistake or failure by means of divorce?

One group of persons, supported by certain religious organizations, maintain that divorce is an evil to be denied upon any grounds. Marriage, they say, is an indissoluble sacrament. A modified position would permit divorce on the grounds of adultery only. These positions are often supported by biblical passages. In Mark and Luke divorce is condemned with no exceptions stated. In Matthew the condemnation excepts the cause of fornication. Is the insertion of the exception in Matthew an attempt to make the statement of an ideal into a rule? Jesus undoubtedly set forth the ideal of monogamy

and indicated that divorce was a calamity. It was not his practice to state rules, but to teach principles in the form of parables and paradoxes. Even marriage was established for man.

Those who would deny the granting of divorces also usually argue that the home should be kept intact for the sake of the children. In this connection a statement from the work of Hamilton and MacGowan is interesting. They say:

We believe that seriously discordant couples who go on living together only because they have children ought, as a matter of fact, to get unmarried as soon as possible simply for the sake of these children.⁴

A home from which all love has departed and in which parents are quarreling is not a wholesome environment in which to rear children.

To be sure, children have to be considered. The psychological effect of a broken home upon children is serious and not to be lightly dismissed by parents. Even when they are not entirely happy, many parents who can control their emotions and tempers may do much better to sacrifice a little personal happiness for the sake of their children. When there are children involved, probably they should be the first, but not the only consideration. If as we said, a peaceful atmosphere cannot be maintained, it would probably be best to risk the psychological dangers of the "broken home." In either case children are likely to suffer.

At the opposite extreme is the view that divorce should be so easy that it could be had upon request, with or without stating any grounds. With mutual consent it could be obtained in a short time, or after a longer period where only one party makes the request. This approach is likely to be presented by persons who resent social restrictions upon the actions of the individual. If this practice encouraged more hasty or ill-considered marriages, or led persons to separate hastily after minor differences appeared, it would seem to be opposed to man's best interests.

A third view which goes to neither extreme regards divorce as a method by which some unfortunate mistakes may be remedied. The evil is the mismating or the demoralizing marriage. To force such

⁴Hamilton and MacGowan, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

persons to continue to live together is to warp the lives of the mal-adjusted pair still further. To make divorce too easy would be to overlook the possibilities of adjustment and renewed understanding. No individual is perfect, and adjustments and compromises are necessary. To make divorce impossible may be to increase the evil and spread it over an entire lifetime. If the marriage does not lead to the wholesome development of the persons concerned, and if they cannot be their best selves, then the relationship should be dissolved. An increase in divorce does not necessarily mean that more marriages are failures or that there is more unhappiness. It may mean that more people are attempting to rectify a situation which a generation or two ago might have been endured. The remedy for divorce is not absolute denial, but better marriages.

FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF MARRIAGE

In recent years suggestions have been numerous as to what to do to improve the marriage relationship and to reduce the number of divorces. From among the various proposals the following are set forth as worthy of consideration.

1. Greater emphasis on education and knowledge in questions of sex, marriage, and parenthood is needed. Many marriages go to pieces because of sheer ignorance, or because of conditions which could have been overcome if additional information had been available. Such knowledge could be imparted through the public schools and colleges as well as by parents, specialists, clinics, and courts of domestic relations. Knowledge of the physical and psychological aspects of sex should be a part of the growing knowledge of the child. It should be presented in a natural manner apart from anything suggestive of shame or embarrassment. Because of its importance and the attitude frequently taken toward it by social groups, the subject of birth control needs additional attention. Knowledge of the means of preventing conception should be available to married persons. Such knowledge would make possible earlier marriages, children would be spaced and receive better care, and much poverty and misery would be eliminated. In Holland where numerous birth control clinics are in operation under government sanction, the people are

physically and morally improved. While the birth rate decreased 25 per cent, the infantile death rate decreased 66 per cent, leaving an actual increase in the number of children who lived.⁵ Where such knowledge is forbidden or suppressed, the over-bearing of children is widespread, especially among the poor, and many children are hopelessly handicapped and tend to increase the social problems of society. Unfortunately the classes that most need such information are those that do not have it. In this, as in other fields, moral conduct is intelligent conduct and not impulsive behavior.

2. An examination before marriage by competent specialists, with the granting of a health certificate as a condition of obtaining a marriage license, would eliminate some unhappy marriages. Where hereditary diseases or defects and communicable diseases are present, such certificates would not be granted. Both individual happiness and community welfare demand such restrictions. In some cases, marriages might be permitted after sterilization. Until the time comes when the state sees fit to set up such regulations for society as a whole, persons who have communicable diseases should feel morally bound to refrain from contact with other persons, and those who have hereditary defects should refrain from bearing children. The examination suggested above, if thorough, would include mental fitness for marriage. Persons with decided personality defects or mental disorders which would endanger the marriage relationship might also be debarred.

3. Hasty and ill-considered marriages should be prevented. The tendency of states to require a short waiting period between application for a license and the actual granting of a license is a movement in the right direction. In earlier days, the practice of publishing the bans served the same purpose. After young people have gained their growth, fairly early marriages are, on the whole, desirable. Such persons become adjusted to each other while their natures are plastic and before habits have become too rigid. Sex-repressions and sex "adventures" are less likely.

4. A wide comradeship between boys and girls should be encouraged. To this end greater opportunity, under wholesome con-

⁵W. J. Fielding, *Sanity in Sex*, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1927, chap. XX.

ditions, for the acquaintance of young people of approximately the same ages and cultural backgrounds needs to be provided. While the boy and girl may have separate and personal interests, there needs to be also a wide community of interests. If such comradeship is to continue after marriage between husband and wife, they must learn to do and to enjoy things together. They need to play together, to work together, and to maintain relationships with other groups. Such companionship should grow and expand with an ever-widening variety of experiences.

5. Society should give greater attention to the unsuccessful marriage. When a divorce is suggested by one or both parties, a competent person, a group of specialists, or the members of the staff of a court of domestic relations might perform great service to such persons and to society by giving expert advice. Difficulties might be removed, quarrels made up, and happiness restored. In any case, a delay should be required between application and the granting of divorce. This delay might be a year or longer, especially if there are children or if only one of the parties makes the request. The experience of such countries as Norway might well be studied in this connection. If a divorce is finally necessary, there should be no publicity, except the bare statement of the fact, and no heavy expense. The arrangement of details and the care of the children could be handled by such a group or a court as that suggested above. In each case the decision would need to be made on the basis of the needs of the individuals and the facts involved.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Today it is often asserted that a double standard of morals prevails, one for a man and another for a woman. Should this be so, or should the same moral standards apply to both sexes?
2. To what extent should there be different conventions and customs applying to men and to women? Are there any fundamental bases for these different conventions which seem to justify them? For example, is there any difference whether it is a girl or a boy who walks around a city park late at night? Is the girl or the boy more likely to be insulted or to be placed in danger?
3. James is a freshman at a coeducational college. He can stay out as

late as he wishes and no one will ask him any questions. He is under practically no rules. His sister, Helen, is two years older and a junior in the same school. She must be in the dormitory at ten o'clock. She insists that she has as much intelligence and is as able to take care of herself as he is. She does not see why she has to live her life within a group of irritating and restricting rules. She, too, wants unlimited freedom. What are the problems involved?

- ✓4. Is "petting" ethically defensible? If so, to what extent, and under what conditions? Among other considerations you might ask whether it is merely sensual gratification or the mutual expression of love and respect, whether it excludes other types of enjoyment, whether it might lead to a loss of rational control, and whether it is socially acceptable.
5. A man who thoroughly enjoyed the parade of fine stock at the county fair, said that he was later depressed at the sight of numerous scrubby-looking children with sore eyes and scabby skin who were looking through the fences and playing in the neighborhood outside the fair grounds. He wants to know why we do not have some form of regulation in regard to human breeding. Do you think he has a good case? If so, what do you think could be done?
- ✓6. What are the problems in connection with the employment of married women? To what extent is a woman justified in foregoing children for the sake of a position or a career?

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Chapter XXIV

MORALITY AND THE STATE

WHEN POLITICAL institutions are examined in the light of moral standards, where do they stand? Do they minister to the realization of human personality, and do they respect and fulfill the main human rights? Since the state and its institutions are playing an increasingly dominant role in our lives, it is exceedingly important for us to find out what is the true function of the state and what is the best form of government.

The social institutions under which men live affect their outlook and their characters profoundly. Just as a man's occupation tends to leave its impress upon his attitudes, so the state in which he lives tends to mold his life. The state is one of the important means of regulating human behavior. It tells a man that he must do certain things and refrain from doing other things. It also imposes penalties for the infraction of its regulations or laws. Even before the individual is aware of its presence, it has registered his birth and made regulations regarding him. Later, it takes part of his income and exercises some direction throughout his life.

In order to understand the present political situation, it is necessary to keep in mind the rapidity with which political questions have increased in scope and in complexity during recent centuries. During the latter part of the eighteenth century, when the American constitution was written and governmental machinery set up, quite different conditions were present. Men lived and thought amid the simple surroundings of an agricultural age. In this pre-industrial and pre-scientific age there were no corporations to be regulated nor such diverse interests to be reconciled as we face in modern society with its specialization and its concentration of wealth. In those earlier days, men thought more in terms of static and fixed institutions. Even Thomas Jefferson hoped that the country would remain

agricultural and that factories to supply our other needs would remain in Europe. Since the government was established during a revolutionary age, men were suspicious of all governmental authority. To grant any one branch of government too much power was dangerous, consequently numerous checks and balances were provided. The main function of government was to keep order and to help individuals get a fair chance in the world.

Today, however, political questions are so complex that the average citizen finds it difficult, if not impossible to follow them. Specialization, both in government and in the occupational pursuits of the people, have gone so far that political affairs are now left almost exclusively to politicians or to special-interest groups that are seeking favors from the government. Most political issues involve large amounts of money and have an economic basis. Consequently, some groups have a tremendous stake in influencing governmental action.

THE STATE AND THE CITIZEN

Man is born into a social group. With the development of social consciousness he becomes aware of his family, the neighborhood, community, and later the nation or state. The state is a fairly permanent body of persons inhabiting a definite territory and organized under a government which is independent of external control and which imposes and enforces laws within its boundaries. The essential elements of a state are sometimes listed as: (1) a population or a group of persons, more or less numerous, (2) a definite territory, (3) political organization or machinery of government, which organizes the group into a "body politic," and (4) sovereignty. Sovereignty has two aspects. It implies external independence and internal authority or the power to enforce laws and command obedience. The term "government" refers to the persons who have the function of political control for the time. The members of the government are distinguished from the ordinary citizens who are members of the state, but not a part of the governmental body. The term "nation," while often used synonymously with the term state, may have a racial significance and refer to a group of persons united by common descent and a common language.

In order to understand the modern state and to consider its purposes more adequately, it is necessary to take into account the conditions surrounding the emergence of the traditional doctrine of sovereignty. This doctrine arose in the sixteenth century as a justification for the national monarchic state then evolving in Western Europe. It served the double purpose of elevating the sovereign above the pope and the emperor, on the one hand, and above the nobles, self-governing towns and guilds, on the other hand. The sovereign was supreme. He made the law, but he was not subject to it. With the change in the form of the political state from monarchy to democracy, the doctrine has persisted. The conception of the goal of the state as power, and the tendency to separate politics from ethical considerations, have had far-reaching and occasionally unfortunate effects.

What is the ethical justification of the state? Two views which appear inadequate in the light of the ethical ideals which we have been discussing will first be presented. One is the view of the state as power and as an end-in-itself. According to Machiavelli, and his modern supporters, the state rests on force, and material prosperity is its conscious aim. The ordinary rules of morality do not apply to the realm of state craft. Any means may be used for the glorification of the state. For the modern fascist the state is totalitarian or unlimited in its power. The state is absolute and all individuals and groups within the state are therefore relative. Fascist states reject the ideals of democracy, of freedom, and of peace. They tend to glorify rigid obedience to dictatorial authority, military power, and the racial stock.

A complete analysis of the fascist ideal will not be possible at this point. Most of the issues which are raised are considered in the text. The ideal should be studied in the light of our discussions on the evolution of morality, authoritarianism, freedom, democracy, military preparedness, and race relations. In the light of these discussions the question might be asked as to whether or not fascism is essentially reversionary, or a step backward.

The other view, which appears inadequate, is the position that the state is unnecessary, that force in itself is evil, and that state compul-

sion should be eliminated. In place of the state, voluntary associations of persons would combine for the realization and protection of their common interests. The inadequacy of such groups in the modern world and the lack of a body with authority to settle conflicts is evident at once.

Two additional views of the state are more widely supported in modern democratic countries. One is the individualist view which would limit the powers and jurisdiction of the state to the protection of life, liberty, and property, and to the maintenance of peace and order. This view arose during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and was at its height during the nineteenth century. As seen in Chapter Twenty-One, it was the idea held by most business men in the nineteenth century and was often called the doctrine of *laissez faire*. Supporters of this view contend that each individual knows his own best interests and should be left alone. Governmental regulation tends to kill initiative and progress. The biological law of natural selection and the "economic laws" of competition, supply and demand, etc., should not be interfered with.

In contrast to the individualist view, which has been increasingly denied both in practice and in theory, is the social-service view of the state. The state is a desirable and necessary conservator of human welfare. New economic and social conditions call for positive regulative action in many different fields. Consequently, the functions of government are increasing at a rapid pace. While such regulation does restrict freedom along some lines, it also makes possible a larger degree of freedom for the people as a whole.

The social-service view of the state is the one which, in the opinion of the author, is most adequate. Such a state aims to maintain order, security, and justice among the citizens of the state; to give attention to the larger needs of social welfare through the promotion of conditions that make for the highest welfare of the governed, collectively as well as individually; and to co-operate in the promotion of peace and progress among all the nations of the world.

The citizen of the state has both rights and duties. While from a strictly legal point of view the state can do anything that it wills, most modern states have established constitutions or other guarantees

which give the individual citizen certain rights. Other rights of the citizen are recognized through custom and laws. In the last analysis, rights are social and rest upon the traditions and beliefs of the citizens at large. In return for the protection of his rights and the promotion of well-being, the citizen has obligations and duties. He owes allegiance to the state and obedience to the government. Unless laws are obeyed, no government can be effective. The citizen may also be called upon to perform some service for the state. This may take the form of military service, aiding law-enforcement officers, jury service, and the payment of taxes in support of governmental activities.

THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL

The democratic ideal is firmly entrenched in Anglo-Saxon countries. Especially in the United States and in the British Dominions, the ideal of equality of opportunity, universal suffrage, and social justice are vigorously defended. Democracy is that system of government in which the power rests with the majority of the people and is administered through chosen representatives. In the famous phrase, it is "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." In a democracy the citizens of the state share in a greater or less degree in making the laws.

During recent years democracy has been vigorously attacked. The arguments against democracy include the claims that it is government by the average, the mediocre, by those who do not know, that such persons are easily swayed by emotion and led astray, that it is inefficient and slow in action and therefore likely to be unstable, and that it gives greater opportunity for corruption and manipulation by special interests or by an "inside ring" of politicians. During the last decade or two the fascists have attacked the very basis of representative government, including the ideals of freedom and equality. The state is totalitarian or absolute and government is in the hands of the "rare, great minds."

Those who defend democracy point out that this form of government is least likely to sacrifice the welfare of the majority to the interests of special groups and classes. Laws are more likely to benefit all persons, and the mass of people are on the whole more contented.

When there is discontent, it is more easily expressed. While men are not equal, they have an equal interest in justice and in social welfare, and therefore they should have equal rights to a voice in government. Democracy tends to educate the citizens and to call into activity their intelligence and enthusiasm. While democracy has its defects, experience seems to indicate that, in the long run, these defects are less dangerous than those of more autocratic forms of government.

When men act merely because of the compulsion of law and custom, they tend to become mechanically responsive, rather than free and reflective moral agents. The man who is trained only to obey orders given by another tends to become a tool with a slave mind. In a democracy the citizen shares in making the regulations which are to control his conduct. Democracy gives training in responsibility and is a theory of character as well as a theory of government. Autocratic forms of government tend to stifle freedom, responsibility, and character. Democracy thus appears to be the social condition necessary for the richest personal development.

For the more satisfactory working of democracy certain conditions appear desirable. These include an educated electorate, a "civic sense" among the citizens, opportunity for free and informed discussion of public issues, a disposition to elect men of high character and training to public office, and a more equal distribution of wealth. Since the last point is most likely to be questioned, a word of explanation is necessary. Governmental regulation tends to operate in the direction of the effective demand which is made upon it. Those who control the economic and financial resources of a country and the agencies for the expression of public opinion, are able to create a demand out of all proportion to their numbers. Thus class rule may result in fact, if not in theory.

If the present widespread corruption, graft, and control of many instruments of government by political "rings" or "machines" and by vicious special-interest groups is to cease, certain changes or reforms in our democratic machinery will probably be necessary. Some of the reforms which have been advocated will be set forth. They may not be the best way to meet the situation before us. In fact, it

is possible that some of them might bring more harm than good. They are all "solutions" which have been proposed, and they are worthy of serious study and consideration. Some or all of these proposals may aid in reducing corruption and in facilitating the effective working of the democratic system.

(1) *The separation of the administration of justice and other functions from politics.* The election of judges and the practice of changing many police officials after elections tend to place such officials within the influence of party "machines" and to bring justice into disrepute. Such officials should be selected by some method, such as civil service, or perhaps appointed by some responsible executive official because they have special qualifications for the office, and then retained in office as long as they are efficient and maintain good behavior. The post office, public utilities, and other functions carried on by the state might well be more completely separated from politics and operated by impartial and expert directors.

(2) *The shorter ballot.* With the extension of the activities of government the number of officials for whom the citizen must vote has increased to the point where it is impossible to know them all or to watch their records. Such a condition encourages persons to vote the party ticket. To elect fewer men and to hold them responsible for the records of their appointees would probably make for more efficient and more responsible government. Unicameral legislatures in the "states" and possibly in the Federal government might make for a shorter ballot and expedite legislation.

(3) *Changes in the electoral system to permit preferential voting and proportional representation.* Preferential voting would enable the voter to register not only his first, but additional preferences. This would eliminate the possibility of the election of a minority candidate representing a small clique, because the other voters were divided in support of a number of other men. Proportional representation would enable each party to be represented approximately according to its numerical support. By these methods manipulation and corruption would be more difficult. These proposals have disadvantages which may outweigh the advantages, but they are proposals which should be seriously considered.

(4) *More rigorous tests for membership in legislative assemblies.* While any test should respect the principle of equal opportunity and not set up permanent barriers, the present test of age is not the most adequate. A minimum educational requirement might be advisable.

(5) *Extension of the civil service.* Appointments to the permanent civil service should be made on the basis of competitive civil-service examinations. A splendid beginning has been made, but additional offices should be placed beyond the reach of the henchmen of political "rings." As at present constituted, however, civil-service examinations do not take sufficient account of traits of personality. In addition to a minimum of knowledge, such persons must be able to co-operate with others. Merit, rather than "pull," should figure in their selection, although a chief executive should have a fairly free hand in the selection of his cabinet since it is a policy-forming group whose members need to be able to work together.

(6) *A reconsideration of the problems of centralization and of decentralization.* There are some functions now carried on by local bodies which might well be placed under the jurisdiction of the national government. For example, if marriage and divorce laws, the criminal code, and factory regulations were made uniform, it might eliminate much inefficiency and confusion. On the other hand, the tremendous pressure of work before most modern legislatures might be relieved by delegating many issues and details to subordinate bodies. Problems that are sectional or local might be handled by locally elected bodies. A subordinate body might handle purely industrial problems. Bodies like the Interstate Commerce Commission might handle certain technical problems in special fields of activity.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

In the making and the enforcement of laws is to be found one of the chief functions of the state. Through its laws the state determines what conduct is legal and what is illegal. Laws are justified when their results are beneficial in the lives of the citizens. To be effective they must have public sentiment behind them and be respected. Since social conditions change, laws need to be revised frequently and brought up to date. In the application of laws it is unfortunate that

appeal is made to tradition or precedent rather than to the facts in the total present situation.

Traditional practice and theory of court procedure, and the whole treatment of criminals, are open to serious criticism. In the usual criminal trial there are two partisan groups, each trying to win a victory. The members of each group are usually more interested in winning the case than in seeing that justice is done. The object of the trial is simply to find if the defendant committed some particular crime with which he has been charged in the indictment. Should he be convicted, the legislature has determined perhaps years in advance how he should be treated or punished.

In place of the present legalistic and technical system with its emphasis upon a particular crime, we need to shift our emphasis to the criminal and put his treatment in the hands of specialists. Such persons are not concerned so much with a verdict of "guilty" or "not guilty," but in ascertaining all the facts regarding the offender and why he acted as he did. In the light of all the circumstances they seek to determine what is best to do with him.

The failure of the methods of punishment which society has used in the past is well known to students of the problem. Since about 98 per cent of criminals are given jail or prison sentences, does this method of punishment justify its existence? We are usually told that this punishment is necessary: (1) to prevent or deter persons from committing crimes, (2) to protect society, and (3) to reform the criminal. Fairly conclusive evidence¹ indicates that no one of these purposes is accomplished to any great extent. Few criminals stop to think about the penalties for their act. When they do, it occasionally makes the act more alluring. The experience of the past seems to indicate that public and severe punishments tend to brutalize the criminal and society and lead to more rather than less crime.

While the public is protected for a short time, it is after the crime has been committed, and only for a short time—except in the case of life imprisonment or death. Most criminals serve their terms in jails where the average term is a few months. For those who go to our prisons the average term is a few years. Probably never more

¹E. H. Sutherland, *Criminology*, J. B. Lippincott Company, chap. XV.

than one tenth of the criminal group is in jail or prison at any one time. If we place the offender in prison for social protection, does it not seem absurd to release him at the end of say two years even though he may be more dangerous than the day he went in? Do we really think that we can "protect" society by isolating the criminal from all normal, wholesome contacts and by placing him in a vicious, depraved environment there to remain for a few years, and then to be released into society again?

The testimony of prisoners, prison officials, and trained investigators makes it clear that most persons discharged from prisons are not reformed. Such punishment often creates a hatred of society and a desire for revenge, the acquisition of a technique of crime, a loss of self-respect, and personal disorganization as well. One of the most thorough studies of what one of our reformatories is doing is contained in *500 Criminal Careers*, by Glueck and Glueck. Dr. Richard C. Cabot, who writes the foreword, points out that 80 per cent of the men released were not reformed five to fifteen years later. These men continued to commit crimes after their discharge from an institution which probably ranks high among its kind. Since the bulk of the men in our jails and prisons are committed over and over again, it is evident that they are not being reformed.

The purely legal approach to crime is quite inadequate. Two men may each steal an amount of money. Assuming that the distinction between grand larceny and petit larceny is twenty-five dollars, if one man steals twenty-six dollars and the other only twenty-four dollars, the first man, in the eyes of the law, is a more dangerous criminal and the punishment is greater. However, from the point of view of morality the man who stole the smaller amount may be a much more dangerous character. It is becoming increasingly evident that society must place the emphasis upon the condition of the criminal rather than upon the crime. Where punishment is of value, it must be near enough in time so that the pain or loss will be connected with the evil deed. The person must come to hate the evil and not the person or group that administers the punishment. The punishment must also be considered fair or just by the offender. Punishment that is not in some sense remedial is probably immoral.

Society may take a hostile attitude toward offenders and merely insist that they be made to suffer some penalty. On the other hand, society through its representatives may attempt to understand the offender and endeavor to discover the causes of his wrongdoing and work out a program of control so that the offender may be reinstated as a normal member of society. Those who cannot be reformed by known methods will need to be segregated permanently. Those who can be reformed should be given proper care in hospital, school, farm colony, or on probation, according to their needs and condition. They should be returned to society when the causes of the anti-social behavior have been removed and not before. Both the criminal, as a person, and society have rights that must be respected.

ISSUES OF WAR AND OF PEACE

One of the most important issues of the modern world concerns the relationship of states or nations to one another. Are we destined in the near future to move into an era of peace and international understanding and good will, or will war and international anarchy remain with us? During recent years two groups of forces have been opposing each other. There have been powerful forces leading us in the direction of war, and also movements which are working toward peace. Each one of these forces or movements deserves a separate study which we cannot give. We can only outline them briefly here.

Among the forces leading toward war are:

(1) *Grave misunderstandings in the international sphere.* These are aggravated in many cases by serious territorial disputes. We all know how easy it is for misunderstandings to arise, even between friends. But when there are differences of speech, customs, and traditions, the possibilities of misunderstanding are much greater. Today these misunderstandings are increased by an intense hatred carried over by the victims of the World War. After the "war to end war" there were more territorial disputes than ever before.

(2) *Extreme forms of nationalism.* While nationalism and patriotism may be good, they are easily perverted and over-emphasized. The intense nationalism and uncritical patriotism which has flared up so strongly since the World War is a serious menace. The bigoted type

of nationalism is the belief that the interests of one's own nation are to be promoted without regard for the interests and rights of other people. It tends to emphasize what is peculiar to a people, not what is common to all mankind. It tends to the belief that the state can do no wrong. A false view of patriotism and nationalism often leads to insults, to acts of aggression, to the creation of hatreds and suspicions, to artificial economic barriers, and to other acts that lead to war. We live in a world that is so interdependent that acts in any part of the world have reverberations all around the earth.

(3) *Militarism and reliance upon force.* Competitive armaments are among the most important causes of international suspicion and fear. When there is a great war machine ready and men have been trained to fight, their minds immediately turn in that direction when crises arise. Then, munition makers usually maintain powerful lobbies and propaganda agencies, endeavor to check peace programs, advocate defense days and war preparations, and are ready to fan any war rumors. The spirit of militarism is a menace to the peace of the world.

(4) *Economic Imperialism.* Imperialism implies the control and economic exploitation of backward countries, either through annexations and protectorates, or by "peaceful penetration" due to economic or political pressure. The attempt on the part of industrial countries to control backward countries and the competition for sources of raw material and for markets have been, and are today, major sources of war. These backward areas are profitable fields of investment since political control makes the venture safe. By 1914 all of Africa, except Liberia and Ethiopia, had been seized. Penetration by industrial nations is also proceeding rapidly in Asia, Central and South America, and in the islands of the Pacific.

There are, however, other forces opposing the above groups. These movements which we shall now consider would lead us in the direction of peace.

(1) *The movement toward arbitration.* Arbitration is the settling of disputes by submitting them to an impartial person or group of persons. In spite of the numerous wars of the past, thousands of international disputes have been settled in this way. This movement

has been growing. Whereas in the early nineteenth century there was but one case on the average of each two years, just before the World War it had grown to four and a half cases each year. Since the World War, many nations have agreed to arbitrate all disputes between them and their neighbors. There are also many general pacts in existence, like the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Pacts, and the Anti-War Pact. Considerably more than a score of nations have signed the optional clause of the World Court providing that certain kinds of disputes shall go automatically to that court. The arbitration movement is a factor working toward peace and good will.

(2) *The movement toward disarmament.* Since the World War, the problem of disarmament has occupied a large part of the time and attention of the leading statesmen of the world. Progress was made at the Washington Conference of 1921 and at the London Naval Conference of 1930. The Geneva Conference in 1927 broke down, partly because of the fact, as we found out later, that certain shipbuilding interests had paid men to go there and work for its failure. At present the general disarmament movement, including the World Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations, is at a standstill because of the fear complex, the extreme nationalism, and the imperialistic ambitions of two or three nations that have disregarded world opinion and moral condemnation for the sake of national expansion. Disarmament is largely dependent upon the feeling of security and the development of other methods besides war for settling disputes.

(3) *The growth of international organizations.* The League of Nations, the World Court, and the International Labor Organization are organizations which have been formed for the purpose of giving expression to the ideas and ideals of international peace and co-operation. If men want peace, they must work for it and organize for peace as diligently as they have been preparing for war. If we want co-operation and good will, we must co-operate and we must express good will. Organization is essential for the accomplishment of any purpose. While the League of Nations has accomplished much, its noblest efforts have frequently been checked by the militaristic and nationalistic spirit of many of the member nations.

While there are still things to be criticized and to be improved in connection with the covenant and the organization of the League, it has proved itself of genuine value. Should the League of Nations go to pieces as the result of another international conflict, it will be necessary at some future date to create new organizations to deal with common world problems. Space does not permit a consideration of the World Court and the International Labor Organization, which already have notable achievements to their credit. But these international organizations are forces working toward peace and good will.

(4) *A growing sentiment in opposition to war.* This sentiment has been fostered in part by the numerous peace societies which exist in the United States and in every other civilized country. While we could be swept off our feet by war propaganda, there are nevertheless many more people in all countries today who have become familiar with propaganda methods. These people are not quite so gullible as most persons were in the last war, and they are more likely to cause a delay, and to raise critical questions. Recent peace demonstrations in the colleges and the popular opinion behind the neutrality legislation recently passed by Congress is an indication of the desire for peace. This desire is reinforced by the knowledge, on the part of many who participated in the last war, that they were fooled. Regardless of the truth, men were told the things that would make them hate and fight. Instead of ending war, the last war sowed the seeds for new wars. Instead of saving democracy, it nearly scuttled democracy. The only saving factor in the situation is that the evils which came as a result of the last war caused a revulsion of feeling in the minds of many people against the whole war system.

THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE

One of the greatest issues of our time is whether we are to settle disputes between nations by the peaceful means which are available, or whether we are to send out millions of our ablest young men to kill off millions of other peace-loving persons, or to be killed by them. Practically no one today wants war. At least in democratic countries men are hoping for peace. The issue which really divides this and

other nations is: How are we going to get peace? There are two ideals or programs among those who claim they want peace. One group says that the way to get peace is to prepare for war, to arm to the teeth, and to develop a big army and a big navy so that other nations will fear us, and fearing us, they will not attack us. The other group directly challenges this philosophy at every point. They say if we want peace we must work for peace and set up instruments for the peaceful settlement of disputes. They say that if we plan for war we will get war.

Undoubtedly, there are many sincere persons on each side of this issue. The more the writer studies and thinks about it, the more he is convinced that the first method is the way of folly, and that the second approach is the only one which can eventually lead us away from destruction. The reliance upon a big army and navy for peace seems to be both logically and psychologically unsound. Logically, how can we expect a nation to be secure by being stronger than any other? It is clear that only one nation can be the strongest at any given moment. If that is our advice to the United States, would we give the same advice to France, Germany, England, or Japan? If one nation becomes the strongest for a time, must not some other one overtake her, if it is in its turn to become secure? Can all nations be secure in this way? Obviously not, and when other nations fear, they begin to arm to the teeth or to combine against those whom they fear, and there is a vicious circle which leads to war.

Psychologically, the same thing holds true. If men are preparing for war, and thinking in terms of war, they create war. If they live in a warlike atmosphere, the tinder is always there and what a small spark it takes to ignite the whole thing! Two men may quarrel over a trivial thing. Under ordinary circumstances the matter may blow over or be settled in some peaceful way. But let those same men quarrel when each man holds a loaded pistol in his hand and who can answer for the consequences?

In order to avoid misunderstanding, let the writer add that he realizes that we cannot discard all our armaments overnight. As a matter of fact, that is not the most important phase of the issue. We do need to have a general lowering of armaments in all countries, in-

stead of increases as at present. It appears not only silly but downright immoral to spend so much money on weapons of destruction when we might be using the money for something constructive, such as the promotion of health, a higher standard of living, education, and for cultural development along many lines. The most important thing at present, however, is to disarm our minds, to think in terms of peace, and to promote good will and understanding.

While the accident of birth makes a man a member of a specific nation, it also makes him a member of humanity; He may be loyal to humanity without being disloyal to his own state and his own kindred. When a man sees the rights of other persons and of other groups to be as sacred as those of his own, he is approaching moral maturity.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. In a city in Ohio in the autumn of 1935, a police radio cruiser on an emergency run struck another car and injured and crippled a four-year-old child. The hospital bills for the child were reported to amount to \$900. The father, who earns \$20 a week, was told by city attorneys that he could not collect any damages through legal channels since the car was on an emergency run at the time of the accident. Comment upon the ethical aspects of this case.
2. Wire tapping has gone on for years, and it is reported that there is more of it today than ever before. Detectives, narcotic sleuths, and other agents are alleged to use this method for listening in on the conversations of suspected dope sellers and other criminals. What is your reaction to such practices?
3. Is there any justification for lynchers or for vigilantes in taking the law into their own hands? Give your reaction to the following statement:—"If a man murders another man and is seized by a mob and lynched, the first man is a criminal, but the mob are conspirators and rebels, as well as assassins; for by depriving the murderer of his right of trial and conviction by a jury of his peers and of sentence carried out according to the terms of the law, they have defied the whole system of constitutional government, and if they go unpunished they have weakened it and exposed it to further contempt.

"If a striker throws a brick through a factory window or beats up a strike-breaker, he should be arrested and dealt with as the law decrees. But if a mob of vigilantes drags him out of his house and attacks him

- and threatens his life, the vigilantes are the dangerous revolutionaries and the striker by comparison is a mere petty lawbreaker." "A Plea for Democracy," by Freda Kirchwey, *Journal of the American Association of University Women*, Vol. XXIX (Oct. 1935), p. 4.
4. A professor of an Eastern university, a citizen of Canada, applied for citizenship in the United States. The only question which he failed to answer in a satisfactory manner was the question regarding his willingness to bear arms in war. He wished to qualify his willingness to bear arms only to the extent of refusing to participate in any war which he might consider morally wrong. His allegiance to God, he felt, should come before his allegiance to the state. The courts refused to grant him citizenship. Discuss the ethical implications of this decision, and indicate the reasons why you think it was or was not justified.
 5. In recent years the United States has sent troops into Central American countries, Japanese troops have occupied territory in North China, the British maintain forces in several backward countries, and the Italians have seized parts of Ethiopia. Are the desire to protect citizens, the interest in trade, the introduction of methods and appliances of modern culture, sufficient justification for the subjection of the inhabitants? Give reasons for your answer.
 6. In August, 1935, a Cleveland judge, according to news reports, sent a man back to the Ohio Penitentiary because of a legal technicality. The law denies a new trial unless the new evidence is filed within 120 days after conviction. However, 137 days after the conviction, another man confessed that he committed the robbery for which the man was serving time. Raymond B. Fosdick in *American Police Systems*, chap. I, tells about various cases where criminals were let off because of some minor technicality. For example, a man convicted of assault with intent to kill was freed because the copying clerk omitted the letter "e" in the word *malice*. What do you think of the practice of permitting technicalities to destroy the intent and spirit of the law?
 7. For a collection of thirty cases of a similar nature, see D. S. Robinson, *Political Ethics*, pp. 266-278.

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Chapter XXV

MORALITY AND RACE RELATIONS

As we look around the world, we see people who exhibit different physical characteristics in regard to color of skin or eyes, texture and color of hair, features, etc. The word "race" represents the attempt to separate and to classify these peoples who through selective breeding and environmental conditions have come to have characteristic features which distinguish them from others. A race is a division of mankind having in common certain physical characteristics, transmissible by descent, which distinguish its members from those of other groups. Most anthropologists group the people of the earth in three primary stocks, the Caucasoid, the Mongoloid, and the Negroid. Within these three groups are the divisions called races. Within the Caucasoid are found four racial groups: Nordic, Alpine, Mediterranean, and Hindu. Within the Mongoloid division are found the Asiatic mongoloids, Malay groups, and the American Indian. Within the Negroid division are found the African Negro, the Oceanic Negro, and the Pygmy blacks of Africa.

Students of racial groups tell us that there are no pure and unmixed races existing at the present time, since all peoples at an earlier or a later time appear to have undergone some racial mixture. Attempts to define race in terms of such characteristics as texture and color of skin or hair, nasal form, stature, shape of head or eyes are only approximate, since there is much overlapping. The differences are in part at least due to long periods of selection under diverse climatic conditions. Of the two the Negro is better fitted to live under tropical conditions, and the Nordic to live in the temperate zone.

ARE THERE DIFFERENCES IN RACIAL ABILITY?

Certain writers in America and in Europe who are strong believers in heredity maintain that there are superior and inferior races. Since

the superior race is a later product of evolution, cross breeding tends to produce progeny of the lower type or strain. According to many of these writers the Nordic is the white man *par excellence*, but when he mixes with inferior groups the result of the union is a race which reverts to the lower type. Consequently, race mixture and the "melting pot theory" are vigorously condemned.¹

Another group of writers, including many anthropologists, attack what they call the "Nordic myth," as set forth above. They consider that all present-day races, including the Nordic race, are already mixed, and that there is no evidence that intermixture produces an inferior type. Similar intellectual capacities and emotional attitudes are found among all groups of people. The association of race, considered as a group of hereditary, biological traits, with certain customs and cultural traits may be due largely to historical circumstances and to cultural diffusion.²

An examination of the evidence, as distinct from the attempts at self-glorification and from racial bigotry, seems to indicate that, if there are differences between racial groups, they are slight. While one race may have a few more men of exceptional ability, the great mass of persons in the two racial groups are comparatively equal. It is also well to keep in mind that the status of a race at any particular time is no final index to its possibilities. Only in recent times has the Nordic race been in the vanguard of civilization. When we consider national groups, this fact is very clear. Witness the status of Japan a few generations ago and today. Whatever the difference between racial groups, it is evident that the difference between individuals in any one racial group is very much greater. There is certainly no justification for contending that all the members of one group are superior to all the members of any other group.

RACIAL PREJUDICE

In Chapter Fifteen we listed prejudice among the obstacles to thinking. A prejudice is a mental bias which leads us to make a

¹M. Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923; L. Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920; E. A. Ross, *Standing Room Only*, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1927.

²See the works of Franz Boas, R. H. Lowie, R. E. Park and others,

judgment in advance without examination of the evidence. Prejudice is found in many fields, and especially in the realm of race relations.

Prejudice is not born in us. It is acquired during the process of our development and training. It arises and is directed most easily toward those who are different from ourselves. If not accustomed to them, we feel a sense of strangeness, and perhaps antipathy, when we are in the presence of those who differ from us in color, physique, speech, and habits. Race prejudice is also closely related to class prejudice and is intensified by economic competition. If John Doe, a member of the white race, loses his position and it is filled by a member of his own race, he may feel some resentment but no race prejudice. On the other hand, if John Black, a Negro, gets his position, John Doe not only feels resentment against his successor, but this resentment may take the form of an attack upon the race of John Black.

Where there are differences of race or class or religion, we tend to make hasty generalizations. After an unfortunate experience with one person we may transfer our resentment to those who associate with that person, or to the groups to which the person belongs. After a trip around the world a man with whom the writer is acquainted had a strong dislike for the Chinese, but admired the Japanese. These attitudes were explained, it was discovered later, by certain very pleasant contacts which he had made in certain Japanese centers at which he touched, and by an unfortunate incident that happened when he was in a Chinese port.

For most persons race prejudice arises from contact with other persons who are themselves prejudiced, or from some unfortunate contact with a member of another race. Children are given prejudices by hearing the remarks and observing the attitudes of parents, nurses, and other children. If they are told that they must not associate with Jews or Italians or Negroes, or if unpleasant names are used in describing those groups, prejudice is almost certain to arise. From slogans and newspapers, unwholesome attitudes may be acquired.

Race prejudice is one of the most serious evils in our social life. Under its emotional drive men may attempt to justify cruelty,

violence, and numerous forms of inhumanity. Laws may be flouted and the administration of justice made ridiculous. In their misdirected zeal to attain a superior status, the members of one racial group may disfranchise the citizens of another race and even encourage the continuance of ignorance and wretched social conditions.

THE NEGRO

To trace the story of the American Negro from his native land in Africa to his home in the new world, to consider slavery, the plantation system, the condition of his release from slavery and the resulting resentment, would carry us too far afield. Fortunately, most Americans are familiar with the general outline of that story. The Negro was brought to America against his will. At the present time, however, he is an American citizen with equal rights to remain and to be treated as a human being. The Negro must be judged in the light of his history and of the progress which he is making today.

The Negro in America desires to develop. The thinking Negro at least desires much the same things for himself and his family that other men desire. On the one side, we have the desire of the Negroes for a fuller and more complete life. On the other side, we have the desire on the part of a large number of whites to keep the Negro definitely in a position of inferiority. The problem is not simply what we are doing with the Negro, but it is a problem of what we are going to do with our own social order and its institutions.

During recent decades the Negro has been making rapid cultural and economic progress in spite of tremendous handicaps. Probably no other group of people have made such rapid progress in so short a time, although the fact that they were living in the midst of a high civilization offers a part of the explanation. In literature and art, and especially in music, the Negro has made original contributions. He has developed his own religious organizations, and a considerable proportion of the Negro population has taken full advantage of the educational opportunities which have been offered. Economically, although he is usually forced to accept the most menial positions, which are often very insecure, still he has made considerable progress, and some members of the race own valuable business establishments.

The barriers to progress on the part of the Negro have been many and varied. In spite of the fact that the Negro has been charged with being inferior in ability, violence, oppression, and injustice have often been used to prevent his advancement. Disfranchised in many parts of the country in spite of constitutional guarantees, the Negro has few rights which all the white members of the community have felt bound to respect. Segregated in the poorer residential districts, often refused equal accommodation in transportation facilities and public resorts, facing professional, social, and educational barriers to advancement, his struggle for a higher standard of living has been made difficult.

Wherein lies the greater peril, in permitting and encouraging the progress of the Negro, or in keeping him in ignorance and in a position of racial inferiority? To ask the question is almost to answer it. There is not only no danger in the progress of the Negro, but the demands of morality and national welfare require it. We all know that if any group within our community is ignorant, poor, sullen, and living under conditions that create ill health and delinquency, the entire community is in danger. Why anyone should advocate a policy for the nation which would be disastrous for a community is hard to explain. Where the Negroes and other minority groups are succeeding and are intelligent and law-abiding, the country is richer, each life is safer, and there is more order and happiness in the state.

To continue to keep the Negro out of his legal and human rights is to destroy our own peace of mind and undermine our institutions. As E. G. Murphy in *The Basis of Ascendancy* points out, in society "human life in general tends to become as cheap as the life of its humblest representatives." If a court finds it difficult to dispense justice except in relation to a man's color, it soon finds that justice is influenced by wealth or party or family, and soon the administration of justice becomes a matter of "pull" and convenience. The self-respect of one man cannot be promoted by destroying the self-respect of another.

Some of those who oppose greater opportunities for the Negro, do so, as they claim, in order to prevent intermarriage with whites. In reply to this, it should be pointed out that the fusion of Negroes and

whites is taking place at the lower rather than the higher cultural levels. Education tends to create pride of race and self-respect. To force the members of the Negro race to live in poverty and destitution is to encourage persons to try to cross the color line.

To present the facts in regard to the race relations has not been the popular approach; emotional acceptance of rumor and half-truths crowd back the sober consideration of facts which would further inter-racial harmony. For example, if the same attention were given to the attacks of white men on colored women as is given to attacks of Negro men on white women, it is indeed doubtful whether much more would be said about the superiority of the whites in regard to morals!³

Many of the most frequently criticized faults attributed to the Negro are the result of his past experiences and his economic and cultural status. Members of the white race who live under similar conditions show similar faults. To deal alike with the cultured and the uncultured appears to be entirely unjust. To declare that the personal worth and the political and cultural capacity of the superior Negro is below that of any white, and to accord to the most uncultured white person privileges which would be refused to the cultured leaders of the Negro race, appears to be moral heresy. If the Negro were really considerably inferior to the white man in intelligence and ability, no artificial barriers would be needed to "keep him down."

What is the way out of friction between the whites and Negroes? One answer is to segregate the Negroes. Let them have zones or areas in cities and towns and perhaps their own villages and rural districts where they will be able to participate in social life and develop their own institutions and their own culture. Since the two races are somewhat different, this would give them an opportunity to progress along their own lines and to discover leadership. It might even be possible to work out a system of "curial representation," as in New Zealand where the native brown men (Maori) and the whites vote for a fixed proportion of representatives in the legislature or in executive offices. In opposition to segregation, it may be pointed out

³Gillin, Dittmer, and Colbert, *Social Problems*, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1928, p. 209.

that segregation in itself is always a source of friction and jealousy, especially as groups need to expand or as population develops. There is also the danger that the group that has the greatest power is likely to abuse its privileges and arrange for unequal accommodation. Today the Negroes object to *segregation* because it means inferior service or accommodation.

A suggestion at the other extreme is to encourage intermarriage and amalgamation in order that the problem may finally disappear. While there are apparently no biological barriers to intermarriage, most states today forbid it. Socially such marriages usually end in disaster since the members of the mixed marriage are generally ostracized by both the whites and the Negroes. It is possible that we shall have a richer culture if racial groups retain their identity and contribute according to their peculiar genius.

A third way out would be to encourage political and social equality in the sense of equal privileges and opportunities, either forbidding intermarriage, or with no restrictions whatever. Color, after all, is an artificial distinction. Why not accept all men on the basis of personal worth regardless of more trivial distinctions?

IMMIGRATION

Throughout most of our history, there has been a fairly large stream of immigrants entering the United States. During the early days people from the state from which the original settlers had come were especially welcomed, but others were regarded with suspicion and, in some cases, they faced actual hostility. The appeal of the fertile, sparsely settled country was often reinforced by the activity of steamship agents and the efforts of European governments to get rid of undesirables.

Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, the majority of the immigrants came from Northern European countries, and they were easily assimilated. At that time, however, the immigrant tide was rapidly shifting to south and east Europe, and people were entering the country who, from the point of view of racial stock, traditions, and customs, were quite dissimilar to the native stock or the older immigration. Since 1882, when the first general federal immigra-

tion law was passed, the country has been increasingly asserting its right to protect itself in the way of excluding more and more classes and in the deportation of undesirables.

Throughout most of our history the problem of immigration has been considered as an economic issue, and the interests of the business man, rather than the interests of social welfare, have been dominant. A surplus labor supply and expanding markets were demanded by business interests. The evils of such a shortsighted policy may now be seen in the mass of illiterate, unskilled, and unassimilated people in the slums of our cities. The great volume of immigrants just prior to the World War was tending to lower the cultural level of the country, and to create an unassimilated group easily manipulated by unscrupulous politicians and exploited by contractors of labor.

There is a considerable amount of evidence which indicates that recent immigration has been replacing the native stock rather than adding materially to the total population. On the other hand, the stream of emigrants from the countries of Europe has not relieved the problem of overpopulation in those countries. The increased birth rate has kept the population pressure fairly constant. These facts have an important bearing upon the moral problems involved. If one country was overpopulated and another country was sparsely settled, there might be some moral claim against the latter to relieve the former. In the light of the facts available it would appear that intelligent birth control rather than emigration and immigration is the solution of the problem.

If there is justification for excluding Orientals and rigidly limiting the immigration of Europeans, there would appear to be equal justification for restricting more carefully the entrance of persons from other countries in the Western Hemisphere. Many Mexicans and Latin Americans who are entering this country are of a low cultural status and are even less desirable than many Europeans who are excluded. In the light of present economic and cultural conditions, as well as the existing animosity toward people who are quite different from ourselves, it would appear to be justifiable to exclude or to restrict to a low number all persons who would not

readily become assimilated. Persons of the white race would be admitted only if they were believed, after examination, to be of sound human stock.

Most immigrants come to the United States with great hope and expectation. For many of them it is the promised land of their dreams. Disillusionment and disgust are often the result when they find that economic and social barriers in the guise of slums, insults, prejudices, etc., are waiting for them in the new land. Except merely in a physical or geographical sense, most of them do not live in America. The surprising thing is that even more of them do not become demoralized. A few "Americanization classes" do not meet the problem at all. To be Americanized, a person must associate with the real America and Americans. It is largely a matter of sentiments and loyalties and that cannot be accomplished by artificial methods. It is the duty of each citizen to assist, rather than to exploit, these recent arrivals.

ORIENTALS IN AMERICA

The difference between the Orient and the Occident is largely a matter of cultural heritage. Eastern civilization has tended to look to the past, whereas Western civilization has been more friendly to progress and the scientific method, and has tended to look to the future. If the cultural heritage changes, the Oriental peoples will keep pace with modern movements as well as do other people. In fact, Japan is already doing so, and there is evidence of similar awakenings elsewhere in the Orient. In the matter of numbers Oriental immigration is not very important. There are only about 140,000 Japanese, 75,000 Chinese, 50,000 Filipinos, and 3,000 Hindus in the United States. The fact, however, that most of them live in the Pacific States, and that there have been considerable friction and resentment are factors which have magnified the problem.

The Chinese first came to America, in considerable numbers, at the time of the California gold rush about the middle of the nineteenth century. Later there was a demand for their labor in connection with railway construction. They were industrious and thrifty and were willing to do the hard, menial tasks. Welcomed at first,

agitation against their presence soon arose. They were so different in dress, language, color, and habits that when a labor problem arose on the Pacific after the completion of the railways, it was easy to point the accusing finger at the Chinese. The story of discriminatory legislation and race prejudice is not an account in which the citizen of the United States can take much pride. Since 1882 Chinese laborers have not been permitted to enter the United States. During the last few decades there has been little agitation against the Chinese. Unlike the Japanese who have tended to remain in large numbers in California, they have spread out over the country. They have also lived more or less apart in Chinatowns. Since many of them did not bring wives, the Chinese are a decreasing group. Forced to live in or near the slums and vice districts of our cities, they have gained a bad impression of American life.

Japanese immigration did not begin, in any numbers, until after the Chinese were excluded in 1882. Like the first Chinese, they were welcomed and their virtues were praised. They were orderly, industrious, intelligent, and opposed to intermarriage. Agitation against them arose when it became evident that they were not content to remain in inferior positions, but were increasingly becoming business competitors. Not satisfied with measures to stop the flow of Japanese laborers, the Pacific states passed laws forbidding the Japanese to own or to lease land.

The general immigration bill of 1924 prohibited the entrance into the United States of aliens ineligible to citizenship. The act caused intense resentment in Japan. It appeared to be a repudiation of the Gentleman's Agreement of 1907 in which Japan voluntarily undertook to check the emigration to the United States of Japanese laborers. It also appeared to contain at least an implication of inferiority. Many students of the problem feel that it is unfortunate that in the study of immigration there has been a sharp separation of the Oriental from the Occidental problem. If the Orientals had been placed on the quota basis, along with the European nations, about 100 to 150 only could have entered each year. Relations would have been more friendly, and no great problem would have been created.

Probably neither any considerable volume of Oriental immigration nor total exclusion is in the interest of national welfare and world friendship. A large incoming stream of Orientals would create friction, since prejudice and racial jealousy are so prevalent. Total exclusion also causes misunderstanding and resentment. Restriction on some quota basis, as suggested above, is probably the wiser policy. But it would also appear to be a matter of sound policy as well as of justice to grant the right of naturalization to those who are already here or to those who may enter, and to give them the same opportunities for development that are open to persons of other races.

TOWARD MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

If race prejudice is one of the great evils in the modern world and responsible for much cruelty, injustice, and for the warped and impoverished lives of multitudes, then how may we rid ourselves of it? To permit such a condition to continue, if it is possible to eliminate it in whole or in part, is to shirk a major moral obligation.

(1) There must be a strong desire to be free from prejudice and to face facts and conditions as they are. The person who says, "I am willing to be convinced but (doubling up his fists) I would like to see the man who can convince me!" will never find truth. An attitude of tolerance and an open mind are especially needed in this field where strong emotion and rationalization have been so prevalent.

(2) We need to realize that if other people do queer things, our customs may be even queerer. As the following quotation would seem to indicate, some of our customs may be more irrational than those which we laugh at as being very funny.

The Chinese gentleman has the "crazy" custom of shaking his own hand in greeting instead of doing the "right" thing by shaking that of his neighbor. We go to a reception, and by shaking each other's hands, mix microbes, and then, without washing our hands, eat sandwiches. The Chinese custom is the more sanitary. Africans rub noses in greeting. Americans touch lips. Are we the more sanitary? Japanese step out of their shoes in entering a house and their houses are clean. We track the offal and tuberculosis germs of our streets into the house, where the rugs collect them ready for the baby's damp fingers. The American man re-

moves his hat on entering his home. It is "civilized" to remove the hat, but "heathenish" to leave shoes outside the door.⁴

(3) Many differences in customs and in personal habits have adequate explanations in the environmental circumstances in the midst of which different people have been reared. If we lived in the heat of the tropics, we too would wear little clothing, and our skin would tan if we were continually exposed to the direct rays of the sun. If we lived in the arctic region, we would need to eat blubber or other heat-producing food. For people who live amid shifting desert sands, what could be more serviceable than a tent home which may be moved from place to place?

(4) We need to learn to judge other people by their achievements and not by their peculiarities. It is highly unfair to place the idiosyncrasies and failures of other races or peoples alongside our own talents and achievements and then draw comparisons. Booker T. Washington, the Negro leader, once went to a town to give an important address. Picking up the local newspaper the next morning expecting to see some comment of his address, he found instead a front-page account of how a Negro boy had attempted to snatch the purse of a white woman. It is unfortunate that so many people judge the race by such instances as that just cited and never hear about the inventors, the scholars, and the artists that the race has produced.

(5) Through reading, discussions, and personal contacts, many of our prejudices may be eliminated. We need to read scientific treatises which discuss the issue objectively, and also to read literature like novels or biographies which present sympathetically the members of the racial group which we are hoping to understand and interpret. Perhaps the very best thing to do is to form the acquaintance of cultured and personally likable members of the other group and try to see issues from their point of view.

(6) Finally, we must endeavor to see beyond the superficial distinctions of color and class and find the human being. Every human being has a right to the fullest opportunity for development.

⁴Blanche E. Atkins, "Geography: For War or Peace?" *Journal of the National Education Association*, Vol. XIV, p. 145.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Is there race discrimination on your campus or in your community? If so, state specifically the forms which it takes. Is there any justification for such discrimination?
2. State what truth or error is contained in the following remarks which are occasionally heard: (1) "This is a white man's country." (2) "The Negro is all right in his place." (3) "The Negro is inferior and will remain so." (4) "In disputes we should always give the white man the benefit of the doubt, and never impair the prestige of the white race."
3. In *Blind Spots*, H. S. Leiper tells the story of a Negro, a college graduate and a writer, who was ignored by the passengers on a transcontinental train and consequently was hungry for companionship and conversation. Finally he borrowed an extra porter's hat and went to another Pullman where his face was not familiar. Soon he was seated with a number of white men and they talked about all sorts of things. Why did the porter's cap make such a difference?
4. A Negro student, who worked in a book store, asked the white manager the reason for his obvious hatred of all Negroes. After a little discussion, the Negro said: "If I came here with no collar on, my shoes burst on the side, and generally unkempt, if I called you 'Cap' and 'Boss' and allowed you to kick me whenever you felt like it, you would tell your friends that I was a 'good nigger,' and you would be willing to make any reasonable sacrifice on my behalf. But if I came with a clean collar on, shoes polished, and generally neat in appearance, answered you 'yes' and 'no' and could talk with you intelligently about any question of interest, you would tell your friends that I was a 'bigoted nigger.'" *And Who Is My Neighbor?*, The Inquiry, Association Press, 1928, p. 40.

The white manager admitted that he was right, but that he had never thought of it that way. Do people in your community generally believe that Negroes and immigrants always will, and always should, belong to one of the menial classes? Why?

5. One Italian, after calling attention to the able Italian talent in America, says, "I do not understand why Italians have been treated in this country as they have been. I go to a store, and they say to me, 'Are you French?' I say, 'No.' They say, 'Spanish?' 'No, I am Italian.' And then there is immediate coldness and contempt." *Old World Traits Transplanted*, by Park and Miller, Harper & Brothers, p. 51.

Why do people make a distinction between different racial or foreign groups? Contrast the attitude toward the American Negro and the East Indian of the same color, toward the Mexican and the Spaniard, and toward the Italian and the Frenchman.

6. The following is the statement of an American-born Japanese: "I always mingled freely with American children while I was in school and never encountered any difficulties. Some of my best friends were American. I found out how thoroughly I had been Americanized when my father took me to Japan three years ago. I felt out of place in Japan. Everything seemed so strange to me. I was really afraid to go about alone because I could not read the signs and was afraid I would get lost. The Japanese also made comments about me. They commented on my dress and on my ways. My grandfather said I spoke Japanese like a Korean, and that was a real slap in the face. I made fun of things in Japan." W. C. Smith, *Second Generation Oriental in America*, The Institute of Pacific Relations.

Objectively the second-generation Japanese and Chinese are Orientals, subjectively many of them are Americans. Why is their position in some ways more difficult than that of their parents? Should this be the case?

7. How do you explain the following cases? Do you think that they could happen on your own campus?

"In my algebra class," a Chinese girl confides, "two American girl friends always worked out their lessons with me. We would have lunch together. We were good friends. One day I met one of them at the beach with her friends. She acted as if she were ashamed to talk to me. She looked embarrassed and indicated that I should not appear to know her. Since that experience, if I meet these girls outside of class I do not speak to them unless they speak to me first. I realize now that the Americans are all right to be friends with in the school, especially when they don't know their lessons and need help. Outside the school they look upon me as a stranger, as an inferior, not worthy to be recognized as their friend. After exams it was "Hello"—that's all."

"Recently a sorority girl in a mid-western state university one afternoon brought to her sorority house a Hindu student who was helping her with a League of Nations conference. It was not long before her sisters were excitedly protesting. Why, they wouldn't get any pledges if she kept that up. And one of the fellows in a fraternity was already

twitting them: 'What kind of a house have you got anyway? Can't your women get invited out with American men?' The fact that the non-American in question was of fine mind and character did not prevent her being judged on the basis of prejudices rather than facts." Quotations from *Out of the Far East*, by A. A. Hunter, Friendship Press, 1934, pp. 69-70.

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Chapter XXVI

NEXT STEPS IN MORAL EVOLUTION

IN EARLY chapters we have had occasion to point out that we live in a changing social order. Our great grandfathers lived in a society that was predominantly rural, agricultural, and individualistic. We live in a society that is predominantly urban, industrial, and growing increasingly collective. Recent generations have seen not only an industrial and a scientific revolution, but the end of free land and the passing of pioneer conditions, the increasing control by private individuals of many of our great natural resources, the use of banking and credit, the growth of the joint-stock company and limited liability, and the growing dependence of both farmer and business man on world markets. These changes have come upon us so rapidly that we have found it difficult to adjust our thinking and our moral codes to keep pace with them.

A simple illustration taken from the field of milk distribution may help to make clear our modern problem. About one hundred years ago where the city of Chicago now stands there were scattered farms. One farmer with a surplus might sell one or two quarts of milk to a neighbor. The farmer's boy or the neighbor's boy ordinarily made the delivery. In this simple transaction there were few problems and little likelihood of injustice. Today, however, there are twenty thousand farmers, some of whom have large herds, who supply the city with milk. The task of the small boy is now handled by about two hundred corporations with 12,000 men in a milk distributors' union. The neighbors or purchasers of milk have grown to considerably over three million persons. The possibility of manipulation, of control, and of injustice is much greater. Think of this changed condition as applying to a great number of commodities, then magnify it so as to include the nation and beyond, and the magnitude of our modern problem becomes more evident.

MORALITY AND SECONDARY GROUP RELATIONS

The social changes mentioned above have led to the development of secondary as distinct from primary group relationships. These changes have brought a host of new moral problems. The primary group is the intimate, face-to-face group, where persons meet, not just for one specific purpose, but for more informal and personal relationships. Such groups include the family, the play group, companions, and gangs. These primary groups are the groups most important in the development of personality, including the formation of habits and early ideas and ideals. In the past our morals have been largely primary group morals, and our codes have tended to give attention to the activities within such groups.

In the modern world, owing to the increasing complexity of society, life is coming to be dominated more and more by secondary and institutionalized groups. Secondary groups are those in which we meet people on one plane of life only. The contacts are for a specific purpose and are more formal and impersonal, such as contacts with doctor, teacher, or merchant. Increased specialization and division of labor, and the enormous expansion of industry have altered in numerous ways the forms of human relationships.

In the field of moral codes these changes are most apparent. Most of our moral codes were formulated under the impetus of the primary group organization of society. It is self-evident that moral codes and other psychological aspects of our culture patterns persist far longer than changes in the material civilization. The upshot is that, while we have made tremendous changes in our physical comforts, in our standards of living, in our means of travel and communication, the socio-psychological aspects of our culture have lagged behind these changes. In other words, as our material universe has expanded enormously under the guiding hand of science and engineering, our moral codes remain largely those devised in the days of superstition, hand manufacture, the stagecoach, and the pioneer. This has produced the strain of inconsistency between the material aspects of social life and the codes of social conduct. Every student of juvenile delinquency and crime realizes the influence of, say, the automobile in the problems of anti-social conduct, just as modern business methods have made possible newer forms of dishonesty. The

whole range of what is considered worth while in life has changed under the new influences.¹

A society in which secondary groups play dominant roles is characterized by interdependence. More than ever before men's lives are at the mercy of their fellowmen, not only upon the highway, but in the matter of the food they eat and the air they breathe. This interdependence has created numerous new forms of wrongdoing. Today the city reservoir is their well, the train or the bus is their covered wagon, the bank or the insurance company keeps their wallet. Modern men send their sick to hospitals, their children to schools, and they trust the inspector to guard their food or drugs or dwelling.

In such a highly complex social order long-range immorality is possible. Men need virtues such as honesty and kindness, but they also need insight and social consciousness. Some of the great evils of our age are done by men who are honest and kind in their personal relations, but who lack the vision and the knowledge to foresee clearly the social effects of their acts. Professor E. A. Ross, writing about three decades ago, saw this problem. He says:

Our social organization has developed to a stage where the old righteousness is not enough. We need an annual supplement to the Decalogue. The growth of credit institutions, the spread of fiduciary relations, the enmeshing of industry in law, the interlacing of government and business, the multiplication of boards and inspectors—beneficent as they all are, they invite to sin. What gateways they open to greed! What fresh parasites they let in on us! How idle in our new situation to intone the old litanies! The reality of this close-knit life is not to be *seen* and *touched*; it must be *thought*. The sins it opens the door to are to be discerned by knitting the brows rather than by opening the eyes. It takes imagination to see that bogus medical diploma, lying advertisement, and fake testimonial are death-dealing instruments. It takes imagination to see that savings-bank wrecker, loan shark, and investment swindler, in taking livelihoods take lives. It takes imagination to see that the business of debauching voters, fixing juries, seducing law-makers, and corrupting public servants is like sawing through the props of a crowded grand-stand.²

¹Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, F. S. Crofts and Co., 1930, pp. 24-25.

²E. A. Ross, *Sin and Society*, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1907, pp. 40-41.

CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

In our discussion of corporate responsibility we shall consider the problem more particularly as it is related to modern business organizations. The rise of corporations, with the separation of ownership and management, limited liability of shareholders, and other financial, industrial, and political devices, have greatly lengthened the range of human contacts. This has made possible great concentration of wealth and power and has tended to make human relationships more and more impersonal and to conceal from man the effects of his actions. While the corporation has made real contributions to human welfare, it has also brought new opportunities for wrongdoing.

The bandit who presses an automatic pistol to your back and demands your ready cash may have a more vicious purpose, but he may do less harm to you than some corporation official who acts within the letter of the law. The power to hire, to fire, to evict, or the power to grant or to withhold credit or loans may mean the power of life and of death for individuals or communities. The moral principles of respect for personality must be applied in these relationships even though they tend to be indirect and impersonal.

The rapid growth in size of business organizations and the dispersion of ownership through the sale of "shares of stock" and other forms of "liquid property," have changed the owners of property from active to passive agents. It has also tended to eliminate the sense of responsibility, and to make business relationships impersonal. In place of actual mills or factories over which the person was in direct supervision and for which he felt responsible, he now holds a "share" or a piece of paper representing certain claims with respect to the enterprise. The owner has little control and feels little, if any, responsibility for its operation.

This separation of ownership and management, so characteristic of business as conducted by the modern corporation, has given rise to at least two forms of property. There is the physical plant or equipment which is immobile and which demands the service of human beings as managers and operators. Then there are the mo-

bile shares of stock or other tokens which pass from person to person and require little or no attention. The management or "control" is the group which is most closely related to the actual operation of the business, and which is most largely responsible for its acts.

Stockholders, directors, and officials who represent them, all share responsibility for immoral acts performed by organizations of which they are a part. Stockholders, in their demands for higher dividends, may unwittingly cause things to be done for which they do not consciously stand. Stockholders and directors do not desire that children be underfed or crippled or that the public be poisoned or politics corrupted, although these things may be the result of their collective demands. Directors of corporations and owners of stocks and bonds are usually honest, patriotic, law-abiding citizens, but they may be the cause of much misery in the world. Not always, but frequently, they are not even aware of the effects of their attitudes and actions. The person who is called upon to act as the agent or representative of some corporation or other group is frequently placed in a difficult position. A conflict may arise between his own personal interests or views, the interests of the group which he represents, and the larger interests of the community or nation. This problem may be a very real and pressing one for the corporation official, the lawmaker, the journalist, or the banker.

This problem of how to locate responsibility, and to distribute praise and blame when group crimes are committed, is an important one. There is danger that our brief discussion may make it appear too simple. Interests and claims of owners, managers and officials, workers and consumers are involved, and each may bear some responsibility and guilt for acts which are not in the interest of public welfare. The corporation is a means for the transaction of business and must be subject to the test of public interest. In order to allocate praise and blame, it may be necessary to give up the outworn and sometimes demoralizing legal fiction that the corporation is an individual person.

When anti-social acts are committed by business organizations or other groups in society, it is possible to pick out and to punish the

men who are responsible. Each act originates with some particular official, committee, or board, and the managers or leaders of such organizations know the persons who are responsible. Society needs to impress upon such persons the real nature of their actions. They may be punished, or if there are damages to be paid, such damages should be paid, at least in part, out of the private incomes of the persons who are directly involved.

To claim that a particular official or director was not responsible since he was under orders, or was under pressure from shareholders, or had no freedom in the matter, is really no valid excuse, since no man should carry out orders which he knows are opposed to law and to social welfare. If society held such persons responsible, "dummy directors" would tend to be eliminated. To direct blame and to exact a penalty or punishment from both the individuals concerned and the group which he represents would eliminate the practice of some men of using such organizations as masks for wrongdoing.

When a criminal gang uses a machine gun to shoot down an enemy or to perpetrate some anti-social act, we do not hold the gun criminally liable. It was merely a tool. In the same way a corporation or similar group is a group of individuals who use a particular type of organization as a tool for the transaction of business. We must think of them as groups of individuals and hold the individuals responsible. Society should permit no man to carry out an order that is clearly anti-social.³

Modern man, while sensitive to the traditional ways of wrongdoing, does not readily recognize the immoral acts made possible by our modern ways of living. Just as the change from a hunting to an agricultural stage of civilization brought new moral as well as new social and economic problems, so the change to an industrial age likewise is bringing a host of new problems, including new types of injustice. Wrongdoing tends to change its form with changes in the social order. Most of the older forms of wrongdoing remain, and new ones are added. Today, we urgently need to apply our accepted principles of morality to our new group and institutional

³W. Z. Ripley, *Main Street and Wall Street*, Little, Brown and Company, 1927, chaps. I, III.

relationships. For illustration, let us consider a few moral precepts which are almost universally recognized.

PRINCIPLES WHICH NEED TO BE BROUGHT UP TO DATE

Thou Shalt Not Kill. Respect for human life is fundamental. Without it, we could not have a stable civilization. This moral precept, set forth thousands of years ago, is equally valid today. If one person kills another person, we call it murder or manslaughter, an immoral act, or a sin, and we strongly condemn the act. Yet where our great grandfathers knew a few ways of killing, today there are hundreds and perhaps thousands of new ways of killing of which they knew nothing. Some of these new ways of killing, being indirect, have not yet come under our condemnation and scorn.

Consider the farmer who refuses to have his cows tuberculin tested, or who, after he knows that they are infected, continues to sell the milk. He may not see the victims of his act, but they are there just the same. Our great-grandfathers knew nothing about the germ theory of disease. We have the facts today and with them new responsibilities and duties. Consider also the corporation that gains control of the milk supply of a city. While paying the farmers no more for their milk, the corporation may raise the price two cents a quart to consumers. The higher the price of milk, the less milk will be consumed, and the lower consumption of milk will register itself in an increased death rate among infants. That is, the infant mortality rates will go up. Perhaps a few thousand babies will die in a large city during the year who might otherwise have lived. If it is wrong to kill one baby directly, is it wrong to kill a thousand indirectly?

Injury may be accepted as a mild form of the same principle. Injury is lack of respect for life. It is the same as killing except that it does not go quite so far. Child labor, under certain industrial conditions, may cut ten, twenty, or more years off the life of a child. If it is wrong to take life, is it wrong to take a third or more of one's normal expectancy of life? What shall we say about an industrial process that kills thousands unnecessarily, or of an employer who refuses to install safety devices when such are available and needed?

Our industrial order has brought into being many new ways of killing. A monopoly of food supplies in the interest of higher prices, or manipulations on the stock exchange may bring ruin to whole communities with tragic personal and social consequences.

Among the modern methods of killing we should include such acts as: food adulteration, rotten tenement houses, defective construction of bridges, quack doctoring, ignoring the orders of the health department or the mine inspector.

Life in society will be increasingly precarious unless the members of the younger generation are more sensitive than the older generation in recognizing and vigorously condemning these immoral practices.

Thou Shalt Not Lie. Lying was condemned in ancient times and is condemned today. In an earlier chapter we have said that truthfulness is one of the basic virtues, even if it is not an absolute one. We cannot develop a wholesome society and carry on our normal relations with other persons except on the basis of mutual confidence and trust. Yet our modern methods of lying by wholesale, such as misrepresentation in the interest of profits, or false statements on the part of other special-interest groups, are too frequently passed over with a shrug of the shoulders.

Journalism, advertising, and propaganda are the main offenders here. Newspapers as business organizations often print what will sell or what will please the readers to hear. Certain newspaper chains will apparently print only one side of certain issues. A paper may print statements that are technically true, but which taken out of their setting give a totally false view of the situation. Advertisers often say the thing about an article that they think will sell the article regardless of the truth of the claim. We severely condemn misrepresentation on the part of individuals, but our moral principles have not been brought up to date in their application to our group relationships. A person may lie by selling cold storage for fresh products, or part cotton for all-wool articles, by misbranding, and by innumerable other means. In an earlier chapter, we briefly discussed methods of propaganda.

Thou Shalt Not Steal. Respect for the possessions of others is also

essential for an orderly, peaceful society. If a man takes a dollar from your pocket, you are rightfully indignant. What is strange is that you are not equally indignant when a group takes many dollars from your pocket. Are corporations, or the members of some other groups, justified in charging two prices for an article simply by reason of the fact that they have been able to gain a monopoly of some needed commodity, or by reason of their superior strength and bargaining power? Professor E. A. Ross suggests that the holding up of prices may be the modern form of piracy. Shall we call it stealing when an organization refuses to pay workers what they earn, or when they force wages down below what is a reasonable wage? Such practices may be more harmful to personality and social welfare than taking a dollar occasionally from men's purses, and therefore need to be branded as the immoral acts which they are.

Men, as individuals and as groups, may steal by means of fraudulent promotion, monopolies, "watered" stock, tax-dodging, manipulating an election, using "pull" to get a franchise unfairly, etc. If it is wrong for me to steal from you, is it equally wrong for one nation to seize a hundred thousand square miles of territory from another nation? If we are to bring our morals up to date, then the accepted principles of living must also be applied to our group relationships.

THE SELFISHNESS OF GROUPS

Group selfishness is an exceedingly dangerous kind of selfishness. While masquerading under the cloak of loyalty to one's group, it may do much harm to other groups and to social welfare in general. Sociologists have two related concepts which help to explain this situation in which we may have sympathy and affection for the members of one's own group while harboring an attitude of avoidance, suspicion, hatred, or fear for another group, or even being in a state of actual hostility with it. One's own group is called the "in-group" or "we-group." The attitude and habits toward one another are those of co-operation, loyalty, and mutual aid. The attitude and habits of members of the in-group toward members of the "out-group" or "other-group" are those of indifference, dislike, disgust, suspicion, or possibly actual warfare. During the World War the

allies were an in-group. On other occasions it may be a gang or club, one's church or a faction within it.

Men urgently need the insight to see that the highest loyalty to the family does not ordinarily conflict with loyalty to our city or nation, and that our duty is not to further the interests of one group at the expense of another, but to further the interests of mankind as a whole. We have not grown up morally and spiritually until the in-group becomes the human family as a whole.

The relations between groups is a field into which the moral consciousness and the thoughts of men have not penetrated deeply. The clashes between classes, between business groups, and between nations have been bitter and difficult to eradicate. In *Morals of Tomorrow*, Ralph W. Sockman says:

The situations are complicated by the fact that noble attitudes of individuals toward groups often blind them to the ignoble attitudes of groups toward one another. For instance a laborer's loyalty to his union may give him a glow of virtuous feeling while he is supporting a most unsocial labor program, or an executive's devotion to his firm may so anaesthetize his moral sense as to dull it to a devilish business policy. The new morality must disentangle group action from these confusions. As members of these groups men must get a clear view of the purposes for which they were created. They must see that no collective unit can morally make a claim based merely on its own self-interest.⁴

THE GAP BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL MORALITY

In addressing the 1935 graduating class at the University of Chicago, President Robert M. Hutchins said:

I am not worried about your economic future. I am worried about your morals. My experience and observation lead me to warn you that the greatest, the most insidious (if I may borrow a word), the most paralyzing danger you will face is the danger of corruption. Time will corrupt you. Your friends, your wives, or husbands, your business or professional associates will corrupt you; your social, political, and financial ambitions will corrupt you. The worst thing about life is that it is demoralizing. . . . "Getting on" is the great American aspiration. And here the demoralizing part comes in: the way to get on is to be "safe,"

⁴R. W. Sockman, *Morals of Tomorrow*, Harper and Brothers, 1931, p. 274.

to be "sound," to be agreeable, to be inoffensive, to have no views on important matters not sanctioned by the majority, by your superiors, or by your group. . . .

Do not let "practical" men tell you that you should surrender your ideals because they are impractical. . . . If, come what may, you hold them fast, you will do honor to yourselves and to the University, and you will serve your country.⁵

There are those who claim that the low state of public moral standards is due to the fact that a sufficiently large number of persons have not been conscious of the evils which exist, consequently public sentiment has not been aroused so as to voice its disapproval. Public standards have shown improvements in the past, and many ancient evils have been eliminated or curbed as the result of the development of a higher moral consciousness. In the future we may be able to direct group relations even more consciously and intelligently.

In opposition to this view which stresses the importance of reason and education, Reinhold Niebuhr in two recent books⁶ has contended that a sharp distinction must be made between individual morals and conduct on the one hand and the behavior of social groups on the other. There are elements in man's collective behavior that cannot be brought under the guidance of reason and conscience. Relations between groups will be more ruthless than relations between individuals, especially where self-preservation is at stake. This being the case, some coercion and forcible resistance will be necessary.

In commenting upon the problems involved in public morals, James H. Tufts says:

Under the stress of self-preservation nations, classes, business, labor-groups, will resort to desperate measures. And besides this major factor in the problem of moral advance, morals of national and economic groups have a three-fold handicap as compared with private morals—the morals of family, neighbor, and friend. (1) Political and economic groups exist for certain special needs and interests which easily tend to assume supreme value and thus distort life; (2) political and economic groups as they increase in size and efficiency tend to become impersonal, whereas family

⁵R. M. Hutchins, *No Friendly Voice*, University of Chicago Press, 1935.

⁶Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932; *Reflections on the End of an Era*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934.

and neighbor morals are more face-to-face; (3) political and economic groups as they gain power acknowledge no superior standard or authority and become a law to themselves.⁷

For generations, under our philosophy of individualism, men have been taught that when they pursue their own selfish interests the greatest good will result in the long run. In the business world, during the nineteenth century, this assumption was seldom questioned. It was an attempt to give ethical justification to the desire to make as much money as possible. What traits of character and what differences in behavior would be exhibited if children were impressed from an early age with the value and necessity of co-operation and mutual support, it is not possible to say. Today an increasing number of students of the problem are realizing the inadequacy of the older approach.

The problem of the relationship between groups is comparatively a more recent one than the problem of the development of individual character. Yet progress in the relations between groups is evident. Business organizations are not so ruthless as they were during the nineteenth century, and in spite of setbacks nations are showing a greater tendency to co-operate. Enlightened public opinion is more and more being taken into account.

Improvement in public as distinct from private morality must wait, first, until a proportionately larger number of persons attain the level of reflective morality, and second, until individuals are made to feel a sense of individual responsibility for the acts of the groups of which they are a part.

The problem of bringing our morals up to date is a continuous or a progressive problem. Even if we should bring them up to date now, and then forget about them, they would soon be out of date again and there would be new maladjustments. This is due to the fact that growth is a law of life, of individual life and also of social life. A keen moral sense, imagination, and intelligence are continuously needed. The progress we have made in the past gives us hope for the future.

⁷J. H. Tufts, *America's Social Morality*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1933, pp. 358-359.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. A child of Mrs. A and a child of Mrs. B become ill at the same time. Mrs. A has called the doctor who declares the disease scarlet fever and quarantines the family. In a telephone conversation the two women compare the symptoms and agree they are the same. Mrs. A says, "Of course you will call the doctor." Mrs. B replies, "No, my son seems to be getting better. I think he has a light case, and anyway it would be very inconvenient for us to be quarantined." Her boy plays with the children next door. Soon two children and the mother in the neighbor's family contract scarlet fever, and one little boy dies. By the time the health officers, who finally hear reports of the matter, investigate the case, the rash has departed from Mrs. B's boy, and Mrs. B remarks that she thinks it was the measles only. What is your view of Mrs. B's conduct?
2. The directors of a railway company reject the recommendation of one of their managers that they provide a certain safety device for their trains, at a total cost of several thousand dollars. Soon after this an accident occurs in which a number of men are killed. This accident probably would have been prevented had the safety device been provided. To what extent were the directors responsible for the death of the men if they considered dividends and refused to weigh the possible consequence of their refusal to provide the safety appliances?
3. While an exploiter is directly and personally guilty for many impoverished lives, and may be a murderer, do we not all bear a share of the social or collective guilt? If those of us who have considerably more to spend upon homes, food, and amusements gave up some comforts, the lives of many children in slum districts could be saved. Do the excuses that we are trying to raise the standard of civilization, or that after all we could do little to change conditions, meet the issue? Where do our social responsibilities begin and end? When a criminal acts from need, or because of conditions that we prolong or tolerate, does not the guilt fall partly upon us?
4. Is the purse snatcher very much worse than the man who snatches seconds at signal lights? One takes property, while the other endangers and may take life.
- ✓ 5. Is a chain of newspapers justified in printing material on one side of an important issue and refusing to print material on the other side? For example, some papers will print all material unfavorable to the

League of Nations, or to public ownership, and will refuse to print, or will put in an inconspicuous place, all material which is favorable.

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Part Six

IMPLICATIONS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Chapter XXVII

SOME PRINCIPLES FOR LIVING

MEN, AS THEY become increasingly liberated from blind custom, tend more and more to direct their conduct on the basis of a distinct philosophy of life. Chapter One brought out this point, and later chapters emphasized that the good life is also the intelligent life. If men are to live wholesome lives and to grow, they need to cultivate certain fundamental principles and attitudes. Some of these principles and attitudes have been emerging, as we have been discussing the numerous problems in connection with the moral life. In this chapter we shall need to restate these principles in explicit and succinct form.

As mature persons, we must think for ourselves and not merely memorize the results of the thinking of other persons. However, as we form judgments and think out our philosophy, we find that our judgments are no longer merely personal opinions. Judgments are sharable and become social judgments in which many persons participate.

Since life compels us to act, we need to think how best to act. While this does not demand certainty, it does call for a comprehensive view and for a ready and usable philosophy of life. In this, as in other fields, we need to acquaint ourselves with what has been done in the field in the past, to observe and to read as widely as possible, and then to live by the best that we know today. Along with this we must retain a readiness to change our views in the light of new conditions or new knowledge. These changes are most likely to come by means of the correlation of more facts and new insight into a larger consistent structure.

A PHILOSOPHY THAT CAN BE LIVED

In forming a philosophy of life, we need to keep in mind two things. In the first place, man needs a philosophy that can be lived

in a world like this. He needs to adjust himself to a changing social order or to an order which is moving into the future. He needs to live on the basis of principles and practices that, in the long run, add to, rather than detract from, human happiness and development.

In *The Enduring Quest*, Professor H. A. Overstreet has referred to "the criterion of actability" as "the philosophic test." Philosophy attempts to discover that which can and must be acted, if life is to be lived with enduring success. It attempts to discover "the great actabilities." Matter apparently is not the only thing which is real, since we cannot act toward all things in the way implied by matter. If we treat persons as if they were pieces of matter, they resent it and protest, and we get into trouble. In the same way we cannot live on the basis of irrationality or cruelty. While persons are often irrational and cruel, these types of activity bring disappointment and defeat in the long run. In a world like this it does not pay to be irrational and cruel.

A PHILOSOPHY THAT MAKES LIFE BETTER

In the second place, man needs a philosophy that makes life better here and now. Man will not be permanently satisfied with a philosophy that holds out no hope, or with one that puts happiness far off in the future. The homely old adage, "You'll get pie in the sky when you die," does not offer much comfort for life here and now. If men are determined to make the world a better place in which to live, they will probably live in a better world than they would otherwise.

The world in which we live does not appear to justify either extreme optimism or extreme pessimism. Browning's "All's right with the world" and Leibnitz's arguments to show that this is the best possible world sound somewhat hollow in the face of war, economic misery, sickness and disease, social insecurity, political corruption, and individual ignorance and greed. Taking, however, the long view and concentrating upon the progress that has been made in nearly every field, the optimist feels that he has justification for his stand. He may point out that cases of wrongdoing collected from near and far make a sensation and are "news," whereas the humble and virtuous citizens who seldom make the headlines compose the great bulk of the population.

Today the pessimist is more likely to be vocal, and he assures us that there is more pain than pleasure, more evil than good, in the world. He is keenly sensitive to the injustices and cruelties of our social order, the greed and exploitation in the industrial system, the hatred and duplicity of international rivalries, the domestic disorders, and the personal viciousness, which are manifested on all sides. In the light of such conditions he finds it impossible to speak of the world as good.

Standing between the optimist and the pessimist is the meliorist, who believes that this is a world that can be made better. When men cease to think of the world as fixed, or static, or planned, and think of it as a process, a growth, and a potentiality, they approach it with a different attitude. The fault is not with the world or with God but with social institutions, human ignorance, and greed; and these are amenable to intelligent control. Social organizations may be changed, and persons may be reconditioned in spite of the fact that the process at times is so slow that to an individual observer it seems as if no progress is being made.

When men discover new and better ways of working and living together, the older ways become "evil." As we saw in an earlier chapter, the virtues of one age may become the vices of a later age. When men view evil as that which is capable of being changed and feel an obligation to co-operate with others to right the wrongs that exist, they will discover a happiness which is not to be found in idleness or even in mere freedom from pain and obstacles. Evil is, in part, an evidence of man's freedom and man's growth. As man gains new insight and knowledge, some of the old "good" becomes evil in the light of the newer "better."

With these two things in mind, let us consider a few concrete principles around which it seems to the author that a sound philosophy of life can be built.

PRINCIPLES TO LIVE BY

Personality is the Thing of Greatest Value

Personality is the thing of greatest worth and should be respected both in ourselves and in others. A human being is a self or a

person and, as such, must not be treated as a thing, or as a means to some end. While man is a physical, a chemical, and an organic being, he has also a rational and a moral nature which places him somewhat apart from those things which are merely physical, chemical, and organic.

In our consideration of the evolution of morality, we found that there is a trend toward the personal and the rational. Evolution on the human level exhibits a purposeful, directional type of process that is distinctive. The basis of right and wrong was found to reside in the relation of acts to persons. Whatever mars or destroys personality development is wrong; whatever leads to the richer development of personality is right.

An outstanding modern minister indicates that the value of personality is central in Christianity and in his own thinking. He says:

Let me tell you my philosophy. I can put it into a few sentences. . . . All my thinking starts from it and comes back to it. Here it is: *the key to the understanding of all life is the value of personality*. Roger Williams said once that "a little key may unlock a box wherein lies a bunch of keys." So when a man sees personality—self-conscious being, with powers of intellect, purposefulness, and good will—as the supreme values, he has a key that unlocks a box of keys.¹

The same writer sees the value of personality as the basis of moral obligation, and as the standard of judgment on social issues.

Instances of lack of respect for personality in ourselves include: failure to develop oneself through lack of care for body and mind, aimless idleness, and selfish enjoyment. Failure to respect personality in others includes prostitution, falsehood and deceit, stealing, injury, refusal to promote the welfare of others or to assist them, paying low wages, and working men and women excessively long hours. Persons need to ask continually, "Am I respecting my own life and making the most of it?" and "Am I respecting the lives of persons about me?" A fair business transaction ought to be beneficial to both parties. A friendship or a marriage relationship should also enrich both personalities.

¹Harry Emerson Fosdick, *The Power to See It Through*, Harper and Brothers, 1935, p. 35.

The Values of Life Must be Shared

Man is a social creature, and, as we saw in Chapter Eight, personality is a social product. Man will not even develop a language if he grows up away from his fellowmen. Life is so interrelated with life that where one man suffers, or fails to develop, the other members of the group of which he is a part also lose something. In the long run, the welfare of the individual and of the group is a common good which unites them.

The most important values of life must be shared or we tend to lose them ourselves. A man succeeds best when he makes it possible for other men to succeed also. Man deceives himself when he thinks that he can permanently gain by growing at the expense of others. One usually cannot rise when he is holding others down. The merchant who ignores the rights of his customers soon finds that he has no buyers to defraud. The employer who refuses to share his gains with his workers and the public may find that his business practices tend to destroy business itself because of the maldistribution in purchasing power. His merchandise piles up in his warehouses, and he is forced to close his factory. This same principle applies to some extent to the relationship between husband and wife, parent and child, the state and its citizens, and nation and nation.

After referring to the above principle, Professor H. A. Overstreet says:

Thus, if we consider the Seven Deadly Sins, we find that each of them is, in one manner or another, a disregarding of this principle. Pride is the first of them. It is an oversteering of oneself, a dwelling upon oneself to the exclusion of others; it is the refusal to let others be of equal moment with oneself. Covetousness is the second. Obviously it again is an oversteering of the self, with the added error that it seeks to draw all to itself even at the cost of the unhappiness of others. Wrath is the third. Wrath is an obsession of rightness on one's own side, and a failure to see rightness on the other side. Envy is the fourth. It is hatred of the happiness of others; it is the wish that they be less happy so that one may oneself be more happy. Gluttony is the fifth. The unwise of gluttony is obvious. It is a gorging of oneself in such measure that one destroys powers that one might fruitfully employ; and it is usually a greedy un-

concern about what others receive. Sloth is the sixth. In a world where energy is reciprocal and polar, sloth is a refusal to make the appropriate return effort. It is the wish to take things to oneself effortlessly, to reap without sowing. The seventh is lechery. It is the use of others for one's sexual pleasure without regard to their own well-being.²

Man's happiness ordinarily increases when he shares in some creative social activity. Life becomes more meaningful when it is linked to other lives in helping to bring some better condition into existence. An important reason for living is to co-operate with other persons in helping to incorporate some ideal into the actual framework of human living.

As persons, we participate in the life of various groups which we help to mold and which in turn tend to mold us. By sharing and co-operating, we are able to do collectively what we cannot do as individuals. Today, as in the past, two principles are in conflict. One says, "Be shrewd; discover your advantage and seize it.—Every man for himself." Then there is the opposing principle of bearing one another's burdens or the ideal of sharing and co-operating. The first principle has been practiced in modern society, especially in the business world. We usually reap the harvest of this attitude in years of depression, confusion, and human misery. This principle, we know very well, cannot be carried out in family relationships, nor in a community in which good will and neighborliness are sought.

Today we are slowly learning that by sharing and bearing one another's burdens we can make life easier and more wholesome for us all. Years ago when education was an individual affair, it was every-man-for-himself so far as education was concerned; and very few persons were educated. Today, by a sharing of burdens, practically all persons are assured of an education such as no individual could obtain a few hundred years ago.

Other tasks may be accomplished and evils defeated by group co-operation. Here is a community that is threatened with disaster by crop failure or by unemployment. The individual may be helpless in such a situation. Other farmers may share their crops, or other

²H. A. Overstreet, *The Enduring Quest*, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1931, p. 219.

workers, their wages, a condition that is not likely. There may be special government aid, or there may be charity. These, however, may have attendant evils. Today many evils confronting man are not of his own making. Where they are widespread in their effect, or where they are socially created, they must be socially borne. In such cases social insurance is one way in which by small sharing we may bear one another's burdens. Education and social insurance are only two of many possible examples of succeeding by making it possible for others to succeed.

No man can live unto himself alone and maintain psychological health. Those whose lives are turned inward tend to become neurotics and to indulge in self pity. The interests of wholesome persons tend to move outward to other persons and to interesting things. The self-centered and the selfish person needs the expansion of interests and of knowledge that leads to an enlarged self. He needs to develop the kind of self that gets its satisfaction from the human values which are common and which may be shared by all men.

Some Worth-while Task Should be Sincerely Pursued

Attach yourself to some worthy task to which you can give yourself with loyalty and enthusiasm. The happiest people are those who forget themselves in their devotion to some worth-while task. Physical and mental health are both dependent upon some well-directed and meaningful effort. For many persons the task which challenges all their resources and yields the satisfaction of continuous achievement may be found in their regular vocations. Fortunate, indeed, are those men and women who can lose themselves in some sort of creative effort or productive work.

The best way of passing the time is to be absorbed in one's work. There is nothing like a great loyalty to lighten one's task and to make a man's work become also his play. The burden of work is not as difficult as the boredom of having nothing to do. Numerous wealthy men work as hard as poorer persons. They have discovered that the most refreshing rest and the most enjoyable play is that which follows work. The number of things which bring satisfaction, apart from work, are few, and a person soon wearies of them.

The attitude which a man brings to his work may make all the difference between play and drudgery, "heaven" and "hell." The well-known story of the replies of three men, who were cutting stone, to the question as to what they were doing, illustrates this point. One said that he was earning three dollars a day, a second was cutting out a marble block, and a third was building a cathedral. The professional man who sees his task as that of eliminating human suffering or ignorance and not merely as that of making money, or the workman who sees his work as meeting some human need and not merely as something that he cannot avoid are more likely to find meaning and joy in existence. Learn to do something worth doing and then do it as well as you can.

Some people are engaged in daily tasks which cannot provide much enthusiasm, or call forth their noblest efforts. Such people frequently gain a great deal of satisfaction from giving themselves wholeheartedly to the furtherance of some "cause" in which they are interested. This does not mean, however, that a person can be absorbed in only one or the other, because many persons will find satisfaction both in their vocation and in other worth-while causes.

While it is to be recognized that much waste and even trouble come from causes which misguided persons are promoting, nevertheless there are many worth-while movements into which an intelligent man can put his noblest efforts. Devotion to such worthy tasks will do us a great deal of good, even though our efforts may not contribute very much to the cause itself. Many of the problems which are worthy of our attention have been touched upon in this book, especially in the two preceding parts. Such problems as the reform of our democratic processes, the reorganization of our industrial life so that more persons will be assured of the means of living, the elimination of racial prejudice and of war, the wise use of leisure on the part of the masses, and the raising of the general intellectual and cultural level of the people, are pressing issues which demand attention.

A Wide Range of Appreciations Must be Cultivated

A wide range of interests and appreciations is a prerequisite to high and wholesome living. Many persons have failed to develop a

wide range of interests and a sufficient depth of inner life; consequently, they are bored and restless if they are forced to spend an evening, or perhaps even an hour, by themselves. Friendship with the great masters of music, art, or literature, a love of nature, and interest in stimulating hobbies may give life a new meaning and zest.

Intellectual curiosity may lead men to ask again, and to reconsider some of the great questions that have puzzled men for centuries: What am I? Whence did I come? Whither am I going? What is the meaning of life? Has the world always existed? Is there a higher power or intelligence? What are truth, beauty, and goodness? Consideration of such problems keeps alive man's sense of wonder and a speculative interest in the universe. These qualities are likely to be dulled if we confine our attention to material things, or to what is objective and immediately intelligible. The person who would call such questions insoluble or futile needs to remember the progress that has been made in the past in the interpretation of life and the universe. Many things at one time thought to be unknowable are today included in the realm of knowledge.

When a man's circle of interests and appreciations ceases to widen, life tends to become sterile and dull. The most significant thing about life is its capacity to expand in ideal directions. Life is not only what it is but what it may become. We are idealizing creatures, and the pull of the future is as important as the push from the past. While the accident of birth ties a man to a parish, a nation, and a race, culturally and intellectually he may overreach all such bounds and be a citizen of the universe. Whether he has a provincial or a planetary mind will depend upon the interests and appreciations he is able to develop. If the universe is growing, it would appear that man also must grow or stagnate.

Man's interests and appreciations need to reach out in two directions: to the great souls who have traveled much farther in life's experiences and who can open up to him new vistas of thought and feeling, and to the less fortunate who need his sympathy and active support. It may seem paradoxical, but it is nevertheless true, that man rises as he stoops to help others.

For Growth One Needs to Live in the Presence of the Best

Intimate and continuous contact with the highest and the best that one knows is essential to a growing, serene, and well-balanced life. This, like the speculative interest mentioned previously, is necessary to save oneself from the merely factual. Growth and richness of life come as much from an inward hospitality to truth, beauty, and goodness, as from outward strenuousness. We tend to become like that which we admire and with which we associate. One difficulty with many people today is not so much that they are vicious, as that their lives are trivial and too much taken up with the commonplace and the mediocre. They listen to cheap jazz when a turn of the radio knob would give them one of Beethoven's symphonies. We are "too busy" to read great books, to hear fine music, to see the beauties in nature, or to cultivate enriching friendships.

We need to place ourselves continually in the presence of great ideas and ideals. We cannot lay down one of the great masterpieces of literature where we have followed the thoughts of some great intellect, and continue to think in terms of the trivial. The need to grow implies an unceasing search for truth, which is the quest for coherence, for the connectedness of the universe, for unity, and for that which can be continuously lived.

We must also place ourselves continually in the presence of the beautiful. Beauty raises us up to a higher level of life and works some transformation in us. While not every person may be able to develop creative genius in art, every person may become an appreciator of beauty. Plato observed many centuries ago that even the less talented persons, if they live in the presence of the great masterpieces of architecture, sculpture, and painting, would cultivate a love of beauty and decency. They would learn to distinguish between what is perfect and harmonious and what is deficient and discordant in nature and art. This sense of the order and fitness of things gradually would manifest itself in their lives. Consequently, Plato was especially concerned to have the youth grow up amid fair and beautiful sights and sounds.³

³See Plato: *The Republic*, Book III.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Sir Walter Scott was a partner in a business venture that failed and left him heavily in debt. Scott could have gone into bankruptcy and legally avoided payment. Unlike most men, he set to work and, after years of writing, he paid the debt. What qualities of character and what principles of living are revealed in his action?
2. A group of students in a university had attended a lecture given by a visitor to the campus and had heard him make a strong appeal to the students to exert themselves, even at the price of personal sacrifice, to improve certain social and economic conditions. After the lecture one student said to another "Who is paying him to talk to us? I cannot understand this public service stuff. I came here so that I can earn easier money when I start to work, and I am going to try to make my pile while the going is good." Is this attitude prevalent among the students you know? How do you explain the fact that it is found?
3. Make a list of ways in which we respect the principles set forth in this chapter, and the ways wherein we deny them in society today.
4. A young doctor, just out from medical school, becomes the assistant to an older doctor who has built up a large practice among the wealthy families of the town. The younger man, who takes care of the poorer patients, discovers that much of their illness comes from unsanitary tenement houses owned by the wealthy clients of his superior. The older doctor, who is the head of the Board of Health, objects to exposing the conditions because it will offend his wealthy patients. The younger man resigns and starts to organize a movement to expose and to eliminate the evil conditions. To what extent was the younger man responsible for improving conditions? How far do you think he should go, and why? R. R. Wicks: *The Reason for Living*, p. 29.
5. Pick out a few examples of different types of integrated personalities and compare them with other persons who exhibit inharmonious selves. What are the main differences which appear in your analysis?

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Chapter XXVIII

MORALS AND COSMIC SUPPORT

MORALITY, as we have seen in previous chapters, is an attempt to discover and to live the good life, which is the intelligent, the fruitful, and the appreciative life. This life must be lived in the midst of existing conditions and will depend upon the nature of the world in which men live. Human attitudes and dispositions must align themselves with the basic structure and processes of the universe, or life will end in failure. Morality, like other phases of life, has developed from meager beginnings, and is related to human feeling and intelligence. As experience and the power of deliberation expand, the degree of freedom is enlarged, and the requirements of personal and social welfare tend to be taken more and more into account. Right is based upon the good, and the good is recognized as that which has value for persons.

MORAL PROGRESS

Progress is change in the direction of some goal which is considered good or valuable. The idea of progress is comparatively recent. For many of the ancients there was not only no progress, but the "Golden Age" was thought to be in the past. An Egyptian inscription, said to date back to about 2000 B.C., laments the passing of the good old days. The medieval man thought of society as essentially static or fixed. Eastern thinkers have frequently thought in terms of an eternal cycle. There was change but no forward movement. In the modern world the idea of progress has gained impetus from the growth of historical research and especially from the doctrine of evolution. Evolution, to most persons, implies progress as well as mere change.

As we look back and compare our own age with conditions a thousand or even a hundred years ago, it is evident that we are much better off materially. From an economic point of view there has also

been considerable progress. Economic goods have been increased at a tremendous rate. Again, there has been progress in the intellectual fields or in knowledge. There are more facts at our disposal than at any other time in human history. Knowledge appears to be accumulative.

Has there been moral progress in the sense of advance toward some moral ideal, such as the enlargement of the range and depth of human values? Moral progress appears to be demanded by our moral sense. Men feel that they ought to advance toward that which is valuable. The sense of obligation exerts a pressure upon us to make the ideal real. Progress, or at least the possibility of progress, is an assumption of morality. There seems to be a close relation between belief in a moral ideal and the conviction that it is being progressively realized in human history. Is it possible that our failure to attain to our moral ideals may be due to the fact that they expand and enlarge as we grow and make progress?

Looking back over past ages, we find that there was apparently a time when the earth exhibited inorganic forces alone. The proverbial visitor from Mars would have discovered only physical and chemical processes taking place. Later on, such a person would have discovered organic forms, sentient beings, but no evidence of self-consciousness nor of abstract thought. But man did appear with self-consciousness and the power of reflection, and in the course of time he achieved and exhibited all those powers and aspirations which today are expressed in science, in art, in philosophy, and in religion. There appears to have been an increasing self-awareness, a developing power of reflection, and a growth of moral ideals including a willingness to co-operate with his fellows.

Throughout human history there has been a growing regard for human life, until the principle of treating every person as an end-in-himself, and not as a means to an end, is becoming increasingly recognized. Many would agree that we have here a valid ethical norm. During ancient times human life was comparatively cheap. For example, at one time in ancient Rome, nine out of every sixteen persons were slaves, and human life was lightly sacrificed in various ways. As a result of the growing recognition of the worth of per-

sons as such, society has largely eliminated cannibalism, infanticide, slavery, torture, and many other inhumanities and evils. Many artificial barriers between man and man have been broken down with the growth of the democratic ideal. While the barriers of class, property, race, color, sex, and religion have not been entirely eliminated in the modern world, and especially under modern dictatorships, yet they have been slowly reduced during recent centuries. The growth of individual freedom, the rise of public education, and the growing recognition of a wide range of human rights is only a small part of the evidence which might be pointed out.

Down through human history the "in-group" has been gradually enlarged from the family, clan, and tribe, to the nation, and is now being extended to take in humanity. In spite of a new outburst of nationalism following the World War, tendencies toward internationalism may also be observed. A study of the history of certain institutions, such as marriage and the administration of justice, seems to indicate a trend in the direction of magnifying the human, the social, and the rational. That is, there appears to be moral progress.

A trend in morals from the external and the authoritative to the personal and the reflective seems to be well established. While this development has not been uniform, and has sometimes led to confusion and retrogression in the conduct of groups of persons, it nevertheless means the possibility of conscious, intelligent progress in the future.

Ethics, on the basis of the evidence, may set forth the postulate of moral progress even though we must admit that there is no complete or absolute proof for any universal principle of progress. On the basis of moral progress, life tends to become more meaningful and the sense of obligation gains increasing significance. In the same way, the scientist posits the principle of uniformitarianism, or the orderliness of nature, not because he is able to offer conclusive proof of such a postulate, but because it is in line with the evidence and because it is necessary in order to make the world intelligible.

Moral progress is possible and desirable even though it may not be inevitable. While there may be forces in the world which are indifferent to, or even antagonistic to, the growth of persons, there are

other forces in the universe which are making for the growth of personality. This would seem to be the case, inasmuch as human beings have appeared and multiplied. Since this is true, morality will consist, in part, in finding and in adjusting ourselves to those forces which are making for growth. This would seem to imply that right and wrong are to some extent grounded in the structure of things. It gives men the hope that if there has been moral progress in the past it will go on in the future. They may also justifiably believe that something can be done to guide and to aid such progress.

DOES THE UNIVERSE SUSTAIN MORALITY?

In considering the question of whether the universe in which man lives is friendly or unfriendly to his moral ideals, we need at once to recognize two facts. First, that the good life is valuable in its own right, or for its own sake. In this sense it is like the beautiful painting which evokes our appreciation. In the same way, "Thou shalt not kill" is good morals quite apart from any supernatural authority. This age is seeking for a morality which rests upon present needs and realities. No external sanctions nor justifications for morality are needed. Right is right because it is intrinsically valuable to persons. Second, when men relinquish belief in God, or when they believe themselves cut off completely from cosmic support and see man as an alien in a universe that cares nothing about his hopes and aspirations, they need not as a result become immoral or vicious. The effect is more likely to be expressed in terms of lowered enthusiasm about life or in lack of morale.¹ Pessimism, rather than immorality, tends to be the outcome of the view that man can expect no support outside of himself.

What man ought to do and to be depends to some extent upon what man is, and upon his place in the order of nature. Ethical questions cannot be separated from questions as to the nature of man, the nature of the universe in which he lives, and his place in the order of the universe. Ethics alone cannot decide such questions; yet the way in which such questions are answered may have a profound effect upon conduct, and upon ethical theories. A man's

¹H. E. Fosdick, *As I See Religion*, Harper and Brothers, 1932, pp. 160-189.

convictions about the nature and meaning of the world will tend to affect his spirit and his outlook. Various writers have called attention to the sadness and the sense of futility that characterize the writings of such men as Arthur Schopenhauer and Joseph Wood Krutch, who think man is cut off completely from cosmic support. If the distinctions which men feel between right and wrong correspond in some degree to a reality which is at the heart of the world order, then these distinctions will make greater demands upon men than they would otherwise.

The fundamental issue is, first, whether we live in a world which is composed of material substances and mechanical forces alone; or, second, whether we live in a world in which intelligence, purpose, and values are present but wholly confined to man, so that there is nothing above or beyond him but his own ideals; or, finally, whether we live in a world in which the characteristics of personality, including intelligence, purpose, and values, are somehow structurally present so that there is the possibility of cosmic support.

In a well-known passage, Professor W. P. Montague states this problem in relation to religion:

Religion as we shall conceive it is the acceptance neither of a primitive absurdity nor of a sophisticated truism, but a momentous possibility—the possibility namely that what is highest in spirit is also deepest in nature, that the ideal and the real are at least to some extent identified, not merely evanescently in our own lives, but enduringly in the universe itself. If this possibility were an actuality, if there truly were at the heart of nature something akin to us, a conserver and increaser of values, and if we could not only know this and act upon it, but really feel it, life would suddenly become radiant.²

The first of the three positions mentioned above, that of *mechanistic naturalism*, regards the principles of the physical sciences as sufficient to explain everything. If accepted in any thoroughgoing sense, this position would seem to deny the reality of freedom, of value, and even of truth. If mechanism were universal, then everything would appear to be the necessary outcome of what has gone before. It would, therefore, seem unreasonable to appeal from what is to what

²W. P. Montague, *Belief Unbound*, Yale University Press, 1930, pp. 6-7.

ought to be, or to call some things true and others false. One set of motions in space would seem to be as valid as any other set. An adequate interpretation must explain, and not deny, the common facts of human experience. Mechanistic naturalism appears to be very inadequate as an all-round interpretation of man and his world. In order to accept the position, one is forced to deny the reality of experiences which do not seem to fit into the interpretation, or else to endow matter and mechanism with qualities not ordinarily included within such concepts. Such explanations arise when men exclude all personal and qualitative factors from their consideration, concentrate on the impersonal elements which they have left, and then forget what they have done.

The second position, that of the new humanism or *humanistic naturalism*, seeks to do justice to the organic and to man, as well as to the inorganic. It acknowledges the reality and worth of human ideals and values. It does not, however, look for nor expect cosmic support for the development of human values. Man alone is responsible for the realization of his dreams and his ideals. As Professor M. C. Otto says:

It is thus a constructive social suggestion that we endeavor to give up, as the basis of our desire to win a satisfactory life, the quest for the companionship with a being behind or within the fleeting aspect of nature; that we assume the universe to be indifferent toward the human venture that means everything to us; that we acknowledge ourselves to be adrift in infinite space on our little earth, the sole custodians of our ideals.³

Is such a position which separates man so completely from the universe that has produced him a reasonable view? We shall want to compare it with the third position.

The third view affirms that there exists in the universe a process, a creativity, a *nisus*, or a power greater than man that makes for truth, beauty, goodness, and the development of persons. According to this view man lives in a world in which intelligence and purpose are somehow structurally present. If man is to realize the good life and the fulfillment of his aspirations, he must intelligently and co-

³M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1924, p. 289.

operatively relate himself to that in the universe which is life-giving and personality-producing.

This third view may affirm as emphatically as do the others that man is a part of nature. Nature, however, must be interpreted in such a way as to include and explain the distinctive powers of man. Man alone is not responsible for the realization of his ideals and aspirations because he alone is not responsible for these ideals. They come from the same source from which he himself comes. Man lives in a personality-producing universe, or at least in a universe capable of producing man as we know him. The creative urge of man would seem to be inherited from the universe which has produced him.

Persons who deny the possibility or the truth of superhuman support for man in his quest for the good life will reply to the above view by saying that, while belief in such support is comforting and encouraging, it is essentially wishful thinking or a cosmic projection of man's hopes and aspirations. The view persists, they say, not because it is true, but because it is a defense-mechanism. By this means men escape the actual and pitiless facts of life and retreat into some desired fairyland of their own creation.

This is a serious charge which we shall need to analyze. It is based upon at least two assumptions. One is that the world does not have meaning, nor value, nor intelligence in its structure and, therefore, if one uses such terms he is necessarily committing the fallacy of wishful thinking. A second assumption is that the interpretations of the objective sciences are the only valid interpretations and that they are complete and final. Both of these assumptions are open to serious question, and many thoughtful persons cannot accept them.

Let us admit that wishful thinking is dangerous where it leads a person to "read in" an element or quality that is not present. However, let us be equally frank to admit that "reading out," or reductionism, is also dangerous. Some, in their desire not to read qualities into nature, may lean backwards and read out what is there. If there is a danger in wishful thinking, there is equally a danger in assuming that things are always contrary to what we desire them to be. Even science is in large part the result of human needs and desires.

Science rests upon two needs or desires: the need to control nature and thus to escape from some limitation, and the need for a systematic understanding of things. All achievement is probably the outcome of a need and a wish. A thing is not true because persons wish it to be true, nor is it false because persons wish it to be true. There are those today who seem to assume that anything which is cheering and hopeful and in line with human desires must be false, and that anything grim and ugly or opposed to human interests has the marks of truth upon it.

How are man's wishes and aspirations to be explained? That they are delusions and falsehoods exhibited by a creature who is an accident in a universe that is indifferent toward him is one view. That they are man's half-conscious realization of his own inherent possibilities is another view. They seem to be projections upon the screen of life of greater possibilities which man as a child of nature has felt within him. They show that man refuses to be confined to present facts and conditions. They are "man's faith in his unrealized self."

In the previous chapter we referred to the test of actability as set forth by Professor H. A. Overstreet. Reality is that which can be acted out. To live as if the universe were irrational, or cruel, or composed of matter only is self-defeating. Some things cannot be acted out or lived in a world like this. Other things can be lived and bring continuing satisfaction. Right and wrong thus appear to be to some extent in the nature of things beyond our interference. Human life develops as it becomes increasingly competent in relating itself to those aspects of the total environment which are life-giving and personality-producing.

In the quest for the good life, men need reinforcements from every direction in which support may be found. Separate a person from his fellows, and he fails to develop. The impoverished and warped lives and the retarded development of many persons today are due in large part to a degree of social isolation. Apart from other persons the individual does not even develop a language, nor become civilized, as we think of the term. Groups which are isolated tend to be backward or retarded. In the same way, human society is dependent

upon nature. The roots of what is distinctive in humanity reach down into biological nature and also into physical nature, as we saw in an earlier chapter. Man exhibits an organic integration and adaptiveness such as biologists find among the lower animals. He also exhibits physical and chemical mechanisms which are similar to those which the physical scientists find elsewhere. Man appears to be a genuine product of whatever processes give rise to nature as we know it. Except from a superficial point of view the problems of conduct and the good life cannot be faced apart from the problem of the nature of the world in which man lives. Morality is a harmonizing of all man's powers and functions, and therefore includes a consideration of man's relation to his fellows and to the total environment in which he lives. Man cannot ignore any source of support without a distinct loss. If the meaning and the development of the individual is enhanced by his social relationships, may not the meaning and significance of human life be affected by man's interpretation of and attitude toward those aspects of the universe upon which he is dependent?

Nature at the human level is a purposeful, meaningful, directional type of process which has manifested itself in all the forms of expression represented by science, art, philosophy, and religion. Here are facts which cannot be ignored any more than can protons, cells, or crystals; and they are as clearly indicative of the nature of the world process. These spring from the nature of the universe and are necessary to interpret the complete truth about it. What we find in man is not all that exists, but it is an important part of that which exists and is structural in the universe. If man is a part of nature, then what we find in man is in nature, and it would appear as if there were in nature a creative factor favorable to personality.

MORALITY AND RELIGION

Historically, morality and religion have been closely connected. Both have emphasized human personality in its relationships and have been concerned with conduct. Morality has been especially concerned with the field of human values, or with the right, the good, and the desirable in respect to conduct. It has emphasized the right of

every person to the fullest development through the sharing of values in a wholesome community of persons. Religion, on the other hand, has been concerned not only with the ordinary values of human life, but with the superhuman values. Religion is the conviction that "what is highest in spirit is also deepest in nature." It attempts to relate man to that which is highest in spirit, and in this way to gain support from the cosmic environment. It represents belief in the reality of spiritual values.

While there appears to be a logical, as well as a practical connection, between morality and religion, they have been separated occasionally in the thoughts and in the conduct of men. There are men who are moral, in the present sense of the term, and yet who scoff at religion. On the other hand, there are some persons who are religious in the sense that they are intellectually and emotionally devoted to certain religious organizations, but they are not moral. That is, they offend the modern moral consciousness. Apparently the moral and the religious capacities of men are not equally sensitive in all persons, nor even in the same man. In the long run, however, if the two are separated, there is damage both to morals and religion. Morality, without religion, lacks drive and is cold; while religion, divorced from ethical considerations, tends to become immoral and to lose much of its significance.

Both morality and religion have had a long history. Moral ideals, as well as conceptions of God, have developed from simple and crude beginnings. Both have changed and developed, as knowledge and intelligence have grown, and as the requirements and needs of life have changed. While theologies and ecclesiastical organizations and rites have come and gone, religion has remained. While ethical systems have risen and fallen, the search for the good life has continued. When the moral ideals and the scientific thinking of men develop more rapidly than their religious interpretations or outlook, the relationship between morals and religion becomes disrupted. Modern morality needs to be related to a religion, not of the past, but to one which is reconstructed and stated in modern terminology.

While we have spoken of morality and of religion as if they were separate and distinct, it must be remembered that there are not two

distinct faculties, a moral and a religious, in man. Consciousness is one and can be broken up only for purposes of study or classification. Considered from their respective viewpoints, the moral and the religious include all phases of life. The religious consciousness is the consciousness of man as directed to the relation which man sustains to the universe in its total meaning. It is concerned with the cosmic forces of good and evil, and scans a wider horizon than the relation between individuals and social groups. The moral consciousness is the consciousness of man as directed to the discovery and development of the richest life and the greatest values that can be realized by human beings. It springs primarily from man's relation to his fellow men, and involves the task of organizing these relations so as to build a wholesome social order.

THE SERVICE OF ETHICS TO RELIGION

Morality as such does not imply any set of theological beliefs. The sense of obligation cannot be claimed by any religious group to the exclusion of other groups. Some of the most constructive criticism of religious beliefs and practices, however, naturally comes from the field of ethics.

The first service of ethics to religion is the purifying effect of its criticisms. Moral standards may advance noticeably beyond those implied by the prevailing religious outlook. The presence of religious practices and of theological beliefs which are out of harmony with current moral standards may do much harm to the growth of religion and the respect with which it is regarded. The doctrine of God and other great doctrines of religious thinking have changed down through the ages in accordance with the developing moral ideals and new conceptions of the universe.

A second service of ethics to religion is to assist it in recognizing and promoting worthy social ends which require the sanction of religion. Religion, apart from moral insight, may be narrow and divisive and may reinforce the prejudices and hatreds of men. Ethical religion will tend to unite men and will stimulate a respect for human personality regardless of the barriers of tribe, class, nationality, or race. Religion may thus be led to attach its sanctions to social

programs and ideals which are yet unattained. Thus religion may be a progressive social force.

THE SERVICE OF RELIGION TO ETHICS

Throughout history, religion has given support to the moral standards and the moral ideals that have been recognized by the group. A man's relations toward God or toward reality have nearly always been thought to include his relations toward other men. According to whether the society is static or progressive, religion has tended either to support the existing order or to popularize social ideals as yet unattained. Most of the great religious leaders were heretics and liberals. They sought to reform both religious practices and social relationships. In the case of Christianity, religion has looked forward to an ideal social order in which the pattern ideas of mutual service, good will, and peace were taken from the family. The attempt to establish a world-wide society in which justice and brotherhood shall prevail has given valuable aid to the development of morality.

In the second place, morality when associated with religion gains in warmth and vigor. The masses of men are not deeply stirred by the appeal of abstract ideas. They are more frequently moved by loyalty to a dynamic and courageous personality. Thus, when associated with religion, morality tends to become more personal. Few causes in history have been successful until they have crystallized around some personality or personalities. Thus Jesus, by making himself the moral and spiritual leader of men, started a new historic movement, significant both religiously and ethically.

In the third place, religion tends to give meaning to life and so to strengthen morale. The conviction, which grows out of religious faith, that there is some meaning in the world and in human life, appears necessary for morale, if not for morals. In many cases, when men no longer believe that the universe supports, in some measure, their highest aspirations and ideals, they tend to lose heart, and there is a note of sadness and perhaps of futility about the business of life.

Finally, religion appears able to tap and to release new levels of energy with which men are able to meet the crises of life. Many

men, both in their private devotions and in their public worship, have had transforming experiences out of which have come new insights, greater power of self-control, and more completely integrated selves. Such experiences have altered their attitudes, both toward one another and toward life in general, and have given them a new sense of power. The new energy thus gained has enabled them to surmount physical and moral obstacles before which they had previously seemed powerless. Men have thus increased their normal powers and have more effectively promoted their chosen ends.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. List the things in modern life which appear to you to indicate moral progress and those that appear to indicate retrogression.
2. Men are said to suffer because of causes found: (1) in themselves, (2) in other persons, and (3) in the forces of physical nature. What are the possibilities of overcoming or reducing the suffering caused by each one of these?
3. The moral argument for belief in God attempts to show that the moral experience of men implies the existence of God. Make a study of this argument and evaluate it. Sorley: *Moral Values and the Idea of God*; Cunningham, *Problems of Philosophy*, rev. ed, chap. XVI.
4. Mr. C, a minister, says in his sermon that every man has in his soul the urge to commune with some higher power. Mr. R, after the meeting, says that the preacher is ignorant because there is no religious instinct. Do you agree with Mr. C, or Mr. R? Or do you differ from both of them? Give your reasons.
5. Mr. A says that there is only one way of knowing, and that is the objective scientific method. Mr. B says that this remark is ridiculous, since there is knowledge by description which is scientific method, and there is knowledge by acquaintance which is more intimate and direct. He insists that there is a genuine difference between a scientific treatise on love and being in love yourself. Religious experience is like the latter in this respect. Comment upon this discussion.

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